Chapter 1: The obligation of Chinuch
- Must a person other than a child’s father stop a child from sinning?
One who sees a child under the age of Bar or Bas Mitzva transgressing a prohibition does not need to reprimand or stop the child from doing so, if the child is doing so for his own benefit, such as eating Treif foods or desecrating Shabbos for his own needs. Furthermore, even a Rabbinical court does not have the requirement to stop or reprimand him.
Transgressing for the sake of another Jew: However if the child is doing a transgression for the sake of another Jew which is over Bar Mitzvah, such as putting out a fire within another Jews home [in a case that there exists no threat to human life] then every Jew needs to stop or reprimand the child.
If the transgression will become public knowledge: In a case that the transgression of the child will become public knowledge and there is suspicion that this may lead people to mistakenly think that what the child has done is in truth permitted being that no one protested, then the Beis Din is obligated to protest their actions even if they are doing so for their own benefit.
A person other than the child’s father is not obligated to reprimand or stop a child from sinning, unless the child is doing so on behalf of an adult or there is suspicion that people may be misled to think that what the child is doing is Halachicly valid.
1. Question: [16th Elul, 5780]
I saw someones child washing a stain off their pants on Shabbos. I did not say anything to them, although am wondering if I have a responsibility to educate them in matters that are forbidden on Shabbos, or is this only upon the father of the child? The child was certainly above the age of Chinuch.
According to some Poskim, including Admur, you are not required to inform him or stop him, as this obligation is only on the father, until the age of Bar Mitzvah. Nonetheless, it is proper to tell him anyways.
Sources: See Admur 343:1; Michaber and Rama 343; M”B 343:7; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2
- The obligation of a father to educate his children:
- The child has reached the age of education:
Educating: It is a Rabbinical command for a father to educate his son and daughter in both negative and positive commands, beginning from when the child reaches the age of education [to be defined later on].
Reprimanding: It goes without saying that a father is Rabbinically obligated to reprimand and stop his child which has reached the age of education from transgressing a negative command, even if it is only a Rabbinical prohibition.
If the father does not reprimand his child: If the father does not reprimand his child from transgressing a Biblical command, then the father himself is to be reprimanded by the Beis Din. However, for not stopping his children from transgressing Rabbinical commands the father does not need to be chastised.
Must the father stop a gentile which is feeding non-Kosher food to his child: If the child has reached the age of education [which is defined as the age of understanding, to be explained in C] then the father must stop the gentile from feeding his child the forbidden food.
Feeding the child forbidden foods for a need such as for medical purposes: See Halacha 4D!
- If the child is below the age of education:
Educating the child: A child which is below the age of education, [as will be defined next] does not need to be educated in positive commands or reprimanded for transgressing negative commands.
Stopping the child from transgressing: A child which has not yet reached the age of understanding, meaning that he does not understand at all when he is told that something is forbidden to be done, then the father is not obligated to forcibly refrain him or her from transgressing, such as from eating forbidden foods or from desecrating Shabbos or from removing him, if he’s a Kohen, from a cemetery, even if they involve a Biblical transgression. This is because the child does not understand at all the matter which he is being refrained from doing.
Must one stop a gentile from feeding forbidden foods to his child: If the child has not yet reached the age of education [which is defined as under the age of understanding, to be explained in C] then the father need not stop a gentile from feeding his child the forbidden food. However it is forbidden to tell the gentile to do so as will be explained.
Refraining the child from eating forbidden foods: [Although one does not have to force the child to not eat the forbidden food he is nevertheless to refrain the child from eating it as much as possible, as forbidden foods create a bad nature in the child even if the child is a mere infant. Thus not only should the father refrain the child from eating forbidden foods but every bystander should do so, even though they are certainly not obligated to from the letter of the law.]
Assisting the child in transgressing: See Halacha 4
- When is a child considered to have reached the age of education:
The age of education differs between positive and negative commands.
Positive commands: The age of education for positive commands depends on the sharpness and knowledge of that individual child in each particular Mitzva, whether a Biblical or Rabbinical command. For example a child who understands the concept of Shabbos is obligated to hear Kiddush and Havdala. If the son knows how to garb himself in a Tallis, then the father is obligated to educate the child wearing Tzitizs.
Negative commands: A child who has reached the age of understanding, meaning that he understands when he is told that something is forbidden to be done, then the father is obligated to forcibly refrain him or her from transgressing a Biblical or Rabbinical prohibition.
When is a child considered to have reached the age of education:
The age of education for a positive command is dependent on the child’s understanding of each particular Mitzva while by a negative command it depends on him understanding the meaning of “no”.
Practically from what age is a child considered to understand that something is forbidden to be done?
Some Poskim rule this begins from age four or five. Practically, one is to educate a child against transgressing prohibitions starting from the age of three. If however one sees that the child is sharp and already understands prior to age three then he is to educate him even prior to age three.
If a child which has reached the age of education missed Kiddush or Davening must he make it up the next day?
There is no need to educate the child to make up the Kiddush or Davening the next day, as the Miztva of Chinuch is to educate the child to fulfill actual Mitzvos and not mere Hashlamas.
Must one stop his child from transgressing Shabbos prohibitions due to the verse “Your children shall not do work”?
If the child is above the age of education, then seemingly besides for a fathers Rabinical obligation to educate his child in all commands, he is Biblically obligated on Shabbos to prevent a child from transgressing a Biblical command. However this does not seem to be the opinion of Admur, as it is omitted from all Halachas of relevant discussion.
Father must give constant supervision to children:
The father is to take constant supervision over the actions of his wife and children making sure that they are following the correct path of Torah and Mitzvos. One who is lax in doing so is called a sinner.
- Is a mother obligated to educate or reprimand her children?
A mother is not obligated at all to educate her child whether in positive or negative commands.  However she does receive reward for doing so. [Furthermore, although she is not commanded to do so she certainly should do so. On the contrary, the quality and quantity of a child’s education comes a lot more from the mother than the father, as a mother is found a lot more with her child, and thus the main task of education is placed on her shoulders. Furthermore, the quality of education is greater when coming from the mother, as a woman is more soft tongued which has greater impact on a child, especially in today’s generation, where tough rebuke is not as effective. As for why there is no actual obligation placed upon the mother, this is because it comes natural that the mother educates her child and there is thus no need for a command. ]
- Assisting a child in transgressing a prohibition:
- The general rule:
It is Biblically forbidden for any person to give a [Biblically] forbidden food to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, [including even a one day old child]. Furthermore, it is forbidden to even give the child food which contains merely a Rabbinical prohibition [as will be explained in D]. [This prohibition applies to forbidden foods as well as to all other prohibitions.] It is thus forbidden to accustom the child to transgress Shabbos or Holidays even regarding Rabbinical matters.
- Telling a child to transgress a prohibition:
It is [Biblically] forbidden for any person to tell any child to eat non-Kosher food [or transgress Shabbos or any other prohibition], even if the child is completely below the age of understanding, [such as a mere one day old infant]. It is forbidden to even ask a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, with exception to the cases to be explained.
- May Rabbinical prohibitions be fed or given to a child?
If there is no necessity to do so: If there is no necessity for the child to eat the forbidden food then it is forbidden [according to all opinions] to feed him even Rabbinical prohibitions as stated above, even if the child is a mere infant. 
If there is a necessity: If there is a necessity for the child, for his behalf, to eat Rabbinically forbidden foods then it is disputed amongst Poskim whether one may or may not feed him the food. One may rely on the lenient opinion to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition [even if the child is above the age of education] if the child needs it and no gentile is available to feed the child himself. However if a gentile is available to feed the child the prohibition then it is forbidden for a Jew to feed it to him, even for the need of the child, even if the child is sick. It is always forbidden to feed the child a Biblical prohibition.
The definition of a necessity: The definition of a need for the child is that the child needs the food for his physical development [in contrast to for the sake of fulfilling a Mitzva] and no other food is available. [One is thus not to rely on this ruling without first consulting a Rav with regards to if in truth the matter is considered a necessity for the child.]
Foods which are Kosher but may not be eaten at the current time: Kosher foods which are forbidden to be eaten at the current time [whether Biblically or Rabbinically], such as the prohibition to eat before Kiddush or on Yom Kippur, may be even hand fed to child if the child wants [or needs] to eat or drink, and it is forbidden to oppress the child by withholding the food.
- May a child transgress a Rabbinical prohibition on behalf of an adult:
Not for the sake of a Mitzva: According to all opinions it is always forbidden to have a child transgress a Rabbinical prohibition on behalf of an adult if doing so does not involve a Mitzva, and one must protest against the child’s actions if he does so, as explained in Halacha 1.
For the sake of a Mitzva: According to all opinions it is forbidden to have a child transgress a Rabbinical prohibition on a steady basis for the sake of an adult, even if it is for the sake of a Mitzva, as there is suspicion that when the child becomes older he will continue to transgress that prohibition. However to have him transgress only on random occasions for the sake of a Mitzva, when there is thus no suspicion that the child may come to repeat the prohibition when older, then this matter is disputed in Poskim. Practically one may be lenient for the sake of a Mitzva.
- May one feed a child a Rabbinical Issur for the sake of educating him for a Mitzva?
Any matter which involves educating the child in a Mitzva, so he become educated to do it when he reaches Bar Mitzva, may be given to a child even if it contains a prohibition. For example, one may feed a child from the Pesach offering even though the child was accounted for during the original slaughtering in which case it is usually forbidden to be eaten by an adult, although for a child since ones intent is to educate the child for a Mitzva it is permitted.
- Asking a gentile to feed a child non-Kosher food:
It is forbidden for any person to tell a gentile to feed a child a non-Kosher food [even if it is merely Rabbinically forbidden], or transgress any other prohibition, even if the child is below the age of understanding.
If the child needs to eat the food, such as for medical purposes: If the child is in need for the non-Kosher food, such as he is slightly ill, [and thus needs the food for medical purposes], then one may ask a gentile to feed the forbidden food to the child, [even if the food is Biblically forbidden]. However this only applies if there is no other Kosher food option for the child. [Regarding until what age one is considered a child in this regard see Q&A below!]
- Giving a child an item which he may do a prohibition with:
Non-Kosher food: It is forbidden to give any child non-Kosher food. Furthermore even if the food is only forbidden during a specific time it is forbidden to give it to a child [in a case that it is forbidden for the child to eat such food].
Foods which are forbidden to be eaten due to their repulsiveness: Even foods which are merely forbidden due to their repulsiveness, and thus contain the prohibition of Baal Teshaktzu, are forbidden to be given to a child if there is suspicion that the child may come to eat it.
A live creature: It is forbidden to give a baby a live locust to play with as it may die and he will come to eat it, in which case it is considered as if one has fed the child the non-Kosher food with his hands. However one may give a child a live Treif bird, as even if it dies it is not fit to be eaten in its current state.
Giving the child an item with which he will desecrate Shabbos with: (However all the above is regarding prohibited foods, even if it is forbidden due to time) However it is permitted to give to a baby on Shabbos items which he is able to do prohibited actions with for himself, and even if one knows that he will do these actions with them, such as to give a baby a cake which has letters written on it which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos as explained in chapter 340, even though the young child will for certain eat it, [nevertheless] since he intends for his own benefit one need not separate him [from doing the prohibition] as was explained above [in Halacha 1]. Nevertheless one [a Gadol] may not place [the cake] into the mouth of the baby. [Likewise, it is forbidden for one to tell the baby to eat it.] [Some opinions learn that by an item which a baby will do a constant prohibition with, it is forbidden to give the child that item. Others learn that all items which their main function is the doing of a prohibition, may not be given to any child.]
Giving a child an item with intent that he desecrate Shabbos with it: Nevertheless the above is only referring to when one gives the child the item without intent that the child do a prohibition with it. However, if the givers entire intent is so the child commits a transgression with the object then it is forbidden to be given to him.
· It is forbidden to tell any child, even an infant, to transgress a prohibition, whether Biblical or Rabbinical. However if the child needs a prohibition done for his physical development and there is no gentile available to have it done through, then one may be lenient to allow the child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition. Furthermore, all Kosher foods which are merely forbidden for a specific time period may be fed to a child, even if he is above the age of education.
· One may always ask a gentile to transgress a prohibition for a childs behalf if the child is in need of it being transgressed such as he is ill.
· It is forbidden to give any child, even an infant, a non-Kosher food or any non-kosher item which he may come to eat, even if he is giving it to the child to play with.
· It is permitted to give a child below the age of education, an item which he may come to desecrate Shabbos with so long as one is not giving him the item for the intent that he desecrates Shabbos with it. [Some opinions learn that by an item which a baby will do a constant prohibition with, it is also forbidden to give the child that item. Others learn that all items which their main function is the doing of a prohibition, may not be given to any child.]
May a child eat before Kiddush?
If the child wants to eat or drink then he may eat or drink before Kiddush whether of night or day, and it is forbidden to oppress him by making him wait. This applies even if the child is above the age of education [so long as he is under Bar or Bas Mitzva].
May a child be given to drink the wine of Kiddush which is customarily said in Shul?
Yes, however it is first to be given to a child which has reached the age of education for blessings. [Subsequently the other children may come and drink from the cup.]
May a child be given wine of a Bris Mila to drink on Tishe Beav?
Yes however it is first to be given to a child which has reached the age of education for blessings.
May a child be given wine of a Bris Mila on Yom Kippur?
No, this applies whether or not the child has reached the age of education. However some are accustomed to give the wine to the child being circumcised. Furthermore those which are accustomed to give the wine to a child are not to be protested even though one is not to act this way initially.
May a child eat before Davening?
One may feed a child, even if he is above the age of education, before he has Davened. It is forbidden to oppress him by withholding food. 
May a child eat Matza on Erev Pesach?
A child which is too small to understand the story of the Jewish people leaving Egypt, which will be told over on Seder night, [then if he needs to eat] he may be fed matza throughout Erev Pesach, as well as on Pesach even before Kiddush. However a child which can understand the story is forbidden to be fed Matza on Erev Pesach. This law applies whether the child is a boy or a girl.
May a child be given Matza after nightfall before the Seder?
After nightfall one may not give children [even below Chinuch] Matza until the end of Maggid, although he may give them other foods to eat prior to the Seder. Nevertheless one is not to feed them too much so as they not fall asleep by the time the seder begins.
May a child in need be fed Chameitz on Pesach?
One may ask a gentile to feed Chameitz to a child which is in need for it, and so is the custom. One however must beware to not acquire the Chameitz from the gentile, such as by paying him before hand.
If one could not make it home before sunset may he give his child his wallet for him to carry home?
May one give a child his wallet before Shabbos for him to carry on Shabbos?
If one left an item in a public domain may he bring a child there so he carry the item back home?
Asking a child to carry it: It is forbidden to tell any child, even below the age of education, to carry the object.
Leading a child under the age of Chinuch to the area: One may however lead a child under the age of understanding, even if this is his own child, into the area without the child knowing the purpose of him going there and then have the child carry it home under the assumption that he has found a lost object.
Leading another person’s child which is over the age of Chinuch to the area: Any adult may lead another person’s child into the area, without the child knowing the purpose of him going there and then have the child carry it home under the assumption that it is a lost object. If however the child knows to whom the object belongs to and intends to return it to him then every person must stop the child from carrying the object. Thus if the owners child found the object and is carrying it, then if the child knows that it belongs to his father then all bystanders are to reprimand him for carrying it.
Leading one’s own child to the area: It is forbidden for a father to lead his child that is over the age of understanding into the area and have him carry the object, even if the object belongs to another person.
A father which sees his child carrying the object: In any of the above cases that the father of a child which is over the age if understanding sees his child carrying the object, then even if the child is doing so for his own sake he must be reprimanded by his father and stopped.
May one give his child a siddur or chumash to carry with him to Shul in an area without an Eiruv?
If the child is below the age of understanding, then one may give the child a Siddur or Chumach for him to carry for his own personal use in Shul, and if the father wants he can look along with him. It is however forbidden to give the child a siddur to carry for the fathers use.
If the child is above the age of understanding, then he may never be given a siddur or chumash to carry. Although in an area where there usually is an Eiruv and one Shabbos it happens to fall, then one may be lenient to allow him to carry, as this is not something which occurs often for the child to mistakenly apply when older.
May a child carry food to shul in an area where there is no Eiruv?
Below three years old: If the child is below the age of understanding, such as below 3 years old, then he may be given food to carry to Shul.
Above three: If however the child is above the age of understanding, such as above three years old, then if the food is for his own consumption, then he may be given it to carry if this cannot be done through a gentile, and the area does not have the status of a Biblical public domain.
May a child wear clothing which contains noise making bells on Shabbos?
No as it is forbidden to cause these forms of noise on Shabbos. This applies even if the child is completely below the age of understanding.
May one lift up a child to turn on or off a light?
Above the age of three: One is to be stringent to not do so due to the suspicion that perhaps he or she has reached the age of understanding that certain things may not be done on Shabbos, in which they are obligated to keep Shabbos due to the education laws.
Below the age of three: If the child does not have understanding of the Shabbos prohibitions then he or she may be lifted to turn on or off a light. In all cases it is forbidden for the child to be told to do a prohibition, even if the child is one day old.
If one left the light of his fridge on may he tell his child to open or close the fridge door?
It is forbidden to ask a child to open the fridge even if the child is beneath the age of Chinuch and even if he is a mere infant. Some however are lenient to permit to tell the child to remove the plug from the outlet while the fridge is off. This however only applies to old fridges which do not have any electricity working in the fridge when the motor is off. It is permitted to place a child that is below the age of Chinuch [less than 3 years old] in front of the door of the fridge, and if the child opens it on his own accord one may leave the fridge slightly ajar throughout the remainder of Shabbos.
Until what age are the typical needs of a child considered to be like the needs for one who is bedridden?
This matter is disputed in the Poskim:
Some Poskim say that it is dependent on if he still needs to be fed baby foods by his mother, Thus once the child begins eating like an adult [on his own] then he is no longer considered like one who is ill.
Other Poskim brings that until the age of 9 a child is considered like one who is ill.
Other Poskim rule that the child is only considered like an ill person until the age of 2-3.
Other Poskim rule that the child is only considered like an ill person until the age of 6.
 Admur 343:1, brought in Michaber and Rambam Hilchos Machalos Assuros 17:27
 Even if the child is over the age of Chinuch [Admur 343:1-2]
Other Opinions: The Rama brings an opinion which rules that a child which has reached the age of education, then even another adult other the father must reprimand and stop the child. The Mishneh Berura  rules [based on the Chayeh Adam] that by a Biblical transgression one is to be stringent and reprimand a child which has reached the age of education even if the child is not his son.
 Here the wording of Admur is “separate” or stop while in the other two cases to be brought next he uses the term reprimand or protests, while in the next haalcha regarding a fathers obligation the term “reprimand and stop” is used. vetzaruch Iyun on the difference.
 In the Talmud [Yevamos 114a] and Shulchan Aruch the entire discussion is with regards to a Beis Din reprimanding the child and not regarding an ordinary bystander. The Ketzos Hashulchan [9:1] writes that if even a Beis Din is not obligated to reprimand a child then certainly other people are not obligated. Perhaps the reason for why no mention of this was made in Shulchan Aruch is because there is not even an inkling of a thought that a bystander is obligated to educate someone else’s child. However a Beis Din which is responsible for the education of all the towns folk, including the child’s father, perhaps one would think is obligated to reprimand the child, hence the ruling that they too have no obligation.
 Lit. Al Daas Gadol. So rules also Admur in 334:26 that if the child is going to extinguish the fire even on behalf of a person other than his father he must be reprimanded. Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur stated this addition (another person) in parentheses. To note however that in the Gemara [Yevamos 104a] explains that the reason the child must be reprimanded is because he is doing so on behalf of his father, and thus perhaps here Admur novelizes that even when done on behalf of others he must be reprimanded. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11] This is also explicitly implied in Rashi there which equates this case to the case brought earlier in the Gemara regarding having children carry keys in a public domain on behalf of another person, of which there it was allowed because they were not doing so on behalf of that person. Nevertheless tzaruch Iyun why the need to place this addition in parenthese.
The Mishneh Berurah [334:65] rules in the name of the Peri Megadim as above that the child is to be reprimanded even when he goes to extinguish another persons fire.
 Although in 343:1 implication is made that it is referring to that the Beis Din is to reprimand the child [as opposed to others], in 334:26 and 362:17 Admur rules clearly that all bystanders must protest the child’s actions. So rules also Ketzos Hashulchan 147:1.
 This is a Rabbinical requirement
 So rules Admur in 588:6 and so is implied from the Halacha here. Vetzaruch Iyun regarding if others including the father is obligated to protest the child’s actions. See sources in previous footnotes.
 Such as for example if the child was blowing Shofar on Shabbos Rosh Hashana then since people hearing the Shofar may think that one is indeed meant to blow even on Shabbos Rosh Hashana, therefore the child is to be reprimanded. [Admur here and 588:6]
 Admur 343:2
 Admur ibid; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61;
Opinion of Admur in Tanya: In Tanya, in the Hakdama to Shaar Hayichud Vihemuna, Admur writes in parentheses that “The Mitzvah of Chinuch is also with a positive command, as written in chapter 343” The intent of this statement is not to say that the Mitzvah of Chinuch is a positive command, but rather that the Rabbinical command of Chinuch also obligates one to train one’s child in following the Biblical positive commands. [Lessons in Tanya]
 Admur ibid; implied conclusion of M”A 343:1 [however see Machatzis Hashekel]; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82; Shivas Tziyon 61, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah Y.D. 396:2; Machatzis Hashekel 343:1
Other opinions: Some Poskim rule a father is not obligated to educate his daughter in Mitzvos. [M”A 343:1 that so is implication of Nazir 29; Machatzis Hashekel explains the M”A ibid leaves this matter in question.]
 Admur says “even positive commands”
 Meaning if he is even obligated to educate the child in positive commands then certainly he must stop him from transgressing.
 The Rama writes that he is only obligated to refrain the child from transgressing a Biblical prohibition, however the Taz and Magen Avraham argue on the Rama saying that in truth even for Rabbinical commands the father must educate his child, and so rules Admur and Mishneh Berura 3. The Shach in Yoreh Deah 81:26 learns that by Rabbinical commands there is no need to reprimand the child, as is the simple reading of the Rama.
 Deduced from 343:6 in which Admur rules that if the child is below the age of understanding then the gentile does not need to be reprimanded.
 343:3; Mishneh Berura 343:3
Although from the Rama it can be read that a father is obligated to refrain a child from transgressing even if the child is below the age of education, nevertheless from the Achronim [Admur; Magen Avraham; Mishneh Berura] it is understood that this is an incorrect reading of the Rama.
However it seems from the Shach Yoreh Deah 81:26 that he learns that the father must stop his child from transgressing Biblical commands even if he is below the age of education, as the case there is referring to nursing a baby forbidden milk, and a nursing child is usually below the age of education.
 What are these words of Admur coming to add. Perhaps it means that when the child is already beginning to understand the concept of “No” he is already to be stopped. Vetzaruch Iyun.
 However one should try to refrain him from eating forbidden foods as will be explained next. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3
 Rama Yoreh Deah 81:7 regarding an infant eating milk from a gentile, as explained in Shach 81:26.
 Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3
 What about other Shabbos commands? Seemingly Admur emphasizes Kiddush and Havdala because he is referring to that the child has knowledge of the concept of a holy day called Shabbos, and immediately when he has such knowledge he is on the educational level of understanding the concept of Kiddush and Havdala which is sanctifying Shabbos over all other days. However regarding other Shabbos commands not necessarily has the child yet reached an age of understanding and education.
 This refers to wearing the Tallis with two corners facing the front and another two facing the back and the child knows how to hold the tzitzis by Kerias Shema. [17:4]
 This refers to buying the child a pair of Tzitis or at the very least to not allow the child to wear a 4 cornered garment without tzitzis. [17:4]
 Thus the difference between the age of education for a positive or negative command is that by a positive command the age is dependent on his understanding of that particular Mitzva while by a negative command it depends on him understanding the meaning of “no”.
 Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2
 Yaavetz in Migdal Oz 3:5; Nitei Gavriel Yom Tov 1:5
 Kinyan Tora 5:21
 Shaareiy Tziyon 334:54. Vetzaruch Iyun why no mention was made in Admur 334
 Rambam Hilchos Sota, last Halacha
 Admur 343:4
 Other Poskim [see Sdei Chemed Ches 59] rule that there is a complete obligation on the mother to educate her children, and that all agree if the father passed away then the mother is obligated to educate them. However perhaps one can deduce from Admur which writes “at all” that there is no obligation on the mother even after the child has passed away.
 Admur in Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:16
 Although there is no obligation upon the mother nevertheless there is some level of Mitzva placed upon the mother to educate her child. [Machatzis Hashekel, brought in Mishneh Berura 2; Peri Megadim Pesicha koleles 2:10 rules that according to all there is a Mitzva. Shalah Hakadosh writes that there is a Mitzvah for the mother to reprimand her child even more than on the father.]
 Rebbe in Shaar Halacha Uminhag 3:63 and 80.
 This is learned from the verse “Do not feed them” which h the Sages learned to mean that one may not feed a prohibited food to Ketanim. [Yevamos 112a]
 Mishneh Berurah 4 as is learned from the Talmud [Yevamos 112] which brings three versus which teach that it is forbidden for a Gadol to help a child transgress.
 This is going on Rabbinical matters of which there are opinions which rule one may have a child transgress them on an occasional basis. [343:6] However a biblical prohibition is always forbidden to ask a child to perform. [265:10]
The Mishneh Berura 6 explains an example of this to mean to ask a child to carry a key in a public domain on Shabbos.
 Mishneh Berura 343:4
 265:10; In Admur 343:5 the Halacha is referring to telling a child to eat non-Kosher. The Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3 adds that this includes telling a child to desecrate Shabbos. This is explicitly stated by Admur in 265:10.
VeTzaruch Iyun based on this from 328:134 that implies that asking a child to transgress Shabbos in a case of danger is better than having an adult do it, jhnec implyinmg there is no Biblical prohibition involved in asking him!!
- Perhaps one can say that the Isssur in asking a child is not in having him do the transgression bit in asking him to do something which he is not allowed to do. However in a case of danger since even a Jew may do so, asking the child is not forbidden at all, and hence there is no prohibition at all taking place, as the child is not commanded in Mitzvos and the adult was allowed to ask him. If however an adult transgresses, then although it is allowed and a Mitzvah, it is merely Dechuyah and is like the mashal of an amputation.
Hence the advantage of asking a child is that it goes from dechuyah or Hutrah
 Mishneh Berura 343:4
 This is learned from the law [Yoreh Deah 81:7] that it is forbidden for a toddler past 24 months to restart nursing, even though nursing is a mere rabbinical prohibition, being that the child no longer needs the milk. [343:6]
 Meaning that he is hungry or thirsty and there is nothing else available, or he needs to eat for medical reasons.
The following are the opinions brought in Admur:
First Opinion [Stam in Admur and only opinion in Michaber:Rama: Rambam]: It is forbidden for any person to give even a Rabbinically forbidden item to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, and even if the child is in need for it. This applies even if the child is sick, so long as he is not in danger. Thus regarding feeding a child a prohibition they have the same status as an adult irrelevant of the child’s age.
Second Opinion [Ran; Rashba]: It is permitted to feed a child, even above the age of education, any Rabbinical prohibition so long as it is being done for the need of the child, such as for the child to eat and drink, and there are not other foods available.
 If one chooses to however he may be stringent like the first opinion, and on this it was not stated that one may not oppress a child. [Tzemach Tzedek Miluim 13]
 So rules the lenient opinion.
 So is the final ruling of Admur in 343:6. Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 which does not mention Admurs final ruling in his summary of the law and rather concludes with the initial stringent ruling in Admur. Now, in the Badei Hashulchan [11:11] he makes mention of this omission saying that he did not want to give over this lenient ruling to the public being that there are Rishonim which hold that one should not rely on the lenient opinion. Vetzaruch Iyun as if Admur himself ruled that way then who are we which follow his rulings to dissent.
Regarding that which Admur plainly rules in 343:7 which implies that one must never withhold a Rabbinical prohibition from a child:
There Admur writes that a child may be fed any Rabbinical prohibition for his need, and it is forbidden to oppress him, and the same applies to any Rabbinical prohibition.
The Tzemach Tzedek [Miluim 13] addresses the following questions to this ruling. 1) Earlier, in the previous Halacha Admur merely ruled that one may merely be lenient like the second opinion [and only in specific conditions if no gentile is available], and not that one must be lenient as is written in the current Halacha. 2) In truth the matters mentioned in Halacha 7 by Admur [eating before Kiddush] is permitted even according to the first opinion, as Admur clearly rules in 269:3 being that it is not an intrinsic prohibition, why is thus no mention made here. 3) Regarding these matters one may even be lenient by a Biblical prohibition, as it is permitted to feed a Katan on Yom Kippur.
The Ketzos Hashulchan [147 footnote 7] answers the above questions by explaining that Halacha 7 is really a continuation of the second opinion, and Admur is merely explaining that the second opinion rules that any Rabbinical prohibition may be given to a child for his need in contrast to the needs of adults which was forbidden in the previous Halacha even in accordance to the second opinion. See there for how he answers the remaining question of the Tzemach Tzedek.
In conclusion: The ruling of 343:7 is not the final ruling of Admur regarding all Rabbinical prohibitions and thus the ruling remains as written above that it is a mere leniency and may only be done if no gentile is available.
 Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11
 So is evident from the source of the ruling regarding nursing a toddler pass 24 months which is forbidden. Thus one must conclude that even when the child needs to eat, if other Kosher foods are available it is forbidden for him to eat it.
 Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11
 269:3; 471:10; based on Magen Avraham 269:1
 As is proven from that a child may eat on Yom Kippur. Vetzaruch Iyun regarding Chameitz.
 Ketzos Hashulchan
If however the child does not need to eat or drink the food then it is forbidden to feed him it even if it is only a “timely” prohibition. [So is implied from Admur here and so is implied from 621:4 that a child may not be given to drink the wine of a Brsi on Yom Kippur even though it too is a mere time prohibition, in which for this reason a child may be fed on Yom Kippur. See footnote by Q&A regarding eating before Kiddush for a further analysis.
 This follows even the stringent opinion mentioned in Admur which forbids feeding a child even a Rabbinical prohibition, as the prohibition only applies to foods which are forbidden in it of themselves, such as a piece of Niveila. However by Kosher foods which are merely forbidden to be eaten within a certain time slot, then all agree that they may be fed to a child, and furthermore it is even forbidden to withhold food from them. The proof for this is the ruling regarding feeding a child on Yom Kippur in which case one may do so even if there is no danger involved for the child to fast. [269:3]
 So is learned from 343:6 in which Admur limits the allowance to when done for the sake of a Mitzva. This is because asking a child to transgress is similar to asking a gentile to transgress which was forbidden to be done not for the sake of a Mitzva. [see 343:8] The Ketzos Hashculchan 147 footnote 11-6 explains however that only when there is a need for a Miztva did the sages not suspect that the child may come transgress even when older, if it is a random occurrence, however for non-Mitzva matters the Sages suspected that the child may come to continue transgressing, even if he only did so on a random occurrence when young.
 343:1 and 334:26
 However a Biblical prohibition is forbidden to be transgressed according to all opinions even for the sake of a Mitzva, and even if it an uncommon occurrence. This is because by a Biblical prohibition the Sages were suspicious that if we allow a child to transgress even for the sake of a Mitzva, and even by an uncommon occurrence he may come to do so while older. Thus it is forbidden to give a child the wine of a Bris on Yom Kippur. [621:4]
 As he has already become accustoimed as a child to transgress.
 According to the lenient opinion which allows one to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition in a case that he needs to eat it, they hold that the entire prohibition of giving a Rabbinical prohibition to a child [even above the age of education] is only due to that he may come to transgress this sin also after he matures and becomes Bar Mitzva. Thus if the incident is not a common occurrence they allow the child to transgress it, if it is a mere Rabbinical prohibition.
 So is implied from the wording of Admur “therefore it is permitted” even though Admur was going on the lenient opinion. There is no explicit final ruling regarding this matter, unlike the matter of feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition for his own sake in which Admur gives a final ruling.
 However if the child will not be able to fulfill the Mitzva when he reaches Bar Mitzva, then he may not be given the prohibition. Thus a child may not be given the wine of a Bris Mila on Yom Kippur.
 So is implied from Admur.
 As asking a gentile to do a prohibition for oneself is forbidden regarding all Biblical prohibitions. [343:5]
 So is evident from the reason of Admur, brought in next footnote, and so rules Mishneh Berura 343:5.
 As the needs of a child have the same status as a non-dangerously ill person, in which case the Sages permitted one to ask a gentile to transgress for him even a Biblical prohibition. [ibid] As for the reason that Admur limits the allowance here to only if the child is slightly sick [despite the rule of that even a healthy child’s needs have the status of one who is ill] , this is because it is simply not necessary for a child to eat specifically non-kosher foods other than for medical purposes. Thus the case would not apply to a healthy child. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 5]
 This is evident from the fact that if possible Admur [ibid] requires one to dilute non-Kosher wine of a gentile with water in a way that it no longer retains its prohibition, rather than ask a gentile to feed it to the child in its current state.
 Meaning even if the food is Kosher but may not be eaten at this time it is forbidden to give it to a child. An example of such is food on Yom Kippur or Matza on Erev Pesach.
 Such as Matzah on Erev Pesach for a child which has reached the age of understanding, or a child on Yom Kippur which has reached the age of Chinuch for fasts.
 Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur mentions a Treif bird, as even by a kosher bird it is forbidden to be eaten without slaughtering and thus the same suspicion applies.
 This is learned from the Gemara Shabbos 90b which does not differentiate [and neither does any Posek] and seemingly allows to give a child a kosher locust to play with even though the child may kill, trap, detach a wing or the like to the locust. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11]. As for the reason that there is a difference between giving the child a food or an item meant for desecrating Shabbos, Tzaruch Iyun.
 Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11
 Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54 based on 301:21 where Admur rules it is forbidden to give a child clothing with bells. He hence answers the seeming contradiction between the ruling here and there by saying that only by a single prohibition, such as having the child eat the cake, is it allowed, however by a constant prohibition it is forbidden.
However others [see Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79] explain that the reason for the prohibition in 301:21 is because there the father is giving the child the clothing intentionally so the child make noise with it to calm the child down and the like, and it is hence forbidden as explains the Ketzos Hashulchan from 266:10-see next Halacha.
In truth however this explanation does not carry much basis as although we can claim that the child has intent to play with the bells, who says the adult had this intent. Perhaps the adult gave it the child simply to wear. Perhaps however one can explain that since the adult has given him a clothing which its entire purpose is for making noise with the bell, then irrelevant of his personal intent, it is as if he is telling the child to do a prohibition with it, and it is hence considered like one is “feeding” him the Issur and telling him to do it. This is unlike the cake which although cannot be eaten without the child breaking the letters, nevertheless this is not the cakes main function, as its main function is to be eaten, and it is thus not considered like the adult is feeding him the Issur.
 See previous footnote.
 Based on 266:10, and so rules Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11. However based on the explanation given above one can say that the reason why in 266 it is forbidden is not because of one’s personal intent but because it is obvious to all that the wallet is being given for the purpose of being carried and a transgression done, and it is thus similar to “Feeding” a prohibition with one’s hands the same way it is considered one is doing so by telling him to carry it. In other words if one gives an item to a child and the only understood message is for the child to doa prohibition with it then it is just like he is being told to do it which is forbidden!
 Regarding the lettering on cake case brought above, there since ones intent is not that the letters be broken but that the child eat the cake, it is therefore permitted. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11]
 269:3; 343:7; so rules also Mishneh Berura 269:1. Ruling is based on Magen Avraham 269:1.
Vetzaruch Iyun from 343:6 [“The child can wait to hear Kiddush in the place of a meal, in the house of his father which is educating him in this”] which implies that ideally a father should educate his child to not eat before Kiddush. Perhaps though this is referring to if the child does not feel a need to eat or drink before Kiddush in which case one would then educate the child to wait. However see next footnote.
 So is the wording of Admur in 343:7; 471:10, and so rules Ketzos Hashulchan [147:5] that the allowance only applies if the child needs to eat, and so is clearly implied from 343:6 which bases the allowance of giving a child to drink from the Shuls Kiddush on the lenient opinion [and not on the differentiation between a timely and innate prohibition], as well as that which was mentioned in the previous footnote. So is also the implication of 621:4 which forbids giving a child to drink the wine of a Bris on Yom Kippur, even though a child may be fed on Yom Kippur, thus implying that there is a difference between whether something is done for his own need [feeding him] or for the need of others [giving him the Bris wine]. However in 269 [as well as 106:3] no mention is made that it is only allowed if the child wants or needs it, and on the contrary it is implied from there that even if the child feels no desire to eat he may nevertheless be fed, as the case there is discussing giving a child wine of Kiddush from Shul. Thus seemingly there is no prohibition at all by such foods even if the child does not need or want to eat. However perhaps one can answer that the reason why no mention of “need:want” was made in 269 is specifically because the case there was referring to giving the child to drink from the Shuls Kiddush of which in truth there is no need for him to drink it, although nevertheless since it is being done for the sake of a Mitzva, and it is a mere time prohibition, it is allowed according to all. The ramification between the two approaches would be if a parent may feed a child before Kiddush even if the sole purpose of doing so is that the child goes to bed and not out of the child’s desire.
 This is because Kosher foods which are time forbidden may be fed to a child. See above Halacha 4D
 Vetzaruch Iyun according to this what some rely on to make their older children [over 9] delay eating until they hear Kiddush. Seemingly not only is this unnecessary but it is even forbidden as written above. In Piskeiy Teshuvos [343:1] and SSH”K [52:18] they rule that any child under Bar or Bas Mitzva may eat or drink before Kiddush if they so wish.
There is a custom for the shul to make Kiddush every Friday night independent on whetehr people are fulfilling their obligation with the Kiddush. This is no longer the custom in many communities and is not the custom in Eretz Yisrael.
 Regarding the reason for this allowance there is a discrepancy between 269:3 and 343:6. In 269:3 Admur explains the reason for the allowance to be due to the fact that eating before Kiddush is a mere time prohibition [as opposed to Kashrus prohibition] to which we rule that no prohibition was ever made aginats feeding such a food to a child even if he is above the age of education.
However in 343:6 Admur depends the reason on the opinion of the Rashba which holds that one may give the wine to the child because it is for the sake of a Mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, being that at times there are guests which eat in Shul which drink the Kiddush wine, and thus it is not a regular practice to give the child the wine to drink.
The Halachic ramification between the two opinions is whether in today’s times when guests no longer stay to eat in Shul, may one rely on giving the wine to a child. According to the reason in 269 one may still give the child the wine. However according to the reason in 343 he may not.
Perhaps one can answer that Admur in 343 was explaining that according to the lenient opinion, even without the reason mentioned in 269 it would remain permitted to give the child the wine. Practically the ruling in 269 which is the main place of this Halacha is the final ruling, and thus the child may be given the wine in all situations.
 621:4-6 and 343:8
 The reason: By a Biblical prohibition the Sages were suspicious that if we allow a child to transgress even for the sake of a Mitzva, and even by an uncommon occurrence he may come to do so while older when it will be forbidden for it to be done, and it is thus forbidden to be done even as a child. Seemingly for this reason it is not permitted despite the fact that it is only a “timely” prohibition. [ibid 343:621]
 This is because Kosher foods which are time forbidden may be fed to a child. See above Halacha 4D
 So is implied from Admurs reason there, although Tzaruch Iyun from that which was explained in the previous footnotes-see there.
 This is because Kosher foods which are time forbidden may be fed to a child. See above Halacha 4D
 The reason for this is because once the child is old enough to understand the story of the Exodus there is a Mitzva for his father to teach him the story as written in the Hagada, and included in this story is the verse “For this sake [of us fulfilling the Mitzvah of eating Matzah and Maror-Rashi] did Hashem remove you from Egypt”. Now if the child has already filled himself with Matza how can he be told that it is for this sake, [as the Matza is no longer a novelty for him-Machatziz Hashekel]. Vetzaruhv Iyun: 1) The reason given for why an adult cannot eat Matzah on Erev Pesach is because it is similar to having relations with ones bride in her father’s house prior to the wedding [Admur 471:4] which shows that he cannot control his desires. So too here one who eats Matzah on Erev Pesach shows that he cannot control his desires. [Chok Yaakov in name of Levush]. Why is then a different reason mentioned regarding why a child cannot eat Matza on Erev Pesach? So too vice versa why was the reason mentioned by the child not also mentioned by the adult? 2) Why does Admur:Magen Avraham emphasize the words “the child became full with Matzah”, does this mean if the child just eats a mere piece on Erev Pesach that it does not contradict the “Bavur Zeh”? 3) What is the logic of the reasoning mentioned above, how does the child becoming full from Matza contradict the statement that it is for the Matzas sake that we were removed from Egypt?
 So is implied from the wording “Tinokos”. However in 471:10 Admur explicitly rules children below Chinuch may be given Matzha on Erev Pesach, and seemingly the same would apply to after nightfall, before the Seder.
 Mishneh Berurah 343:5
 343:3, and so is implied from the end of 362:17 which mentions the obligation of the father to protest his sons actions, which only applies if the son is above the age of understanding.
 Even the owner of the objects child may be led to the area by another person so long as the father does not have knowledge that the intent is so his son carries the object, and the son does not know that the objkect belongs to his father, as will be explained.
 This is because one is not commanded to reprimand someone elses child which is committing a transgression for his own benefit.
 As one can assume that he is carrying it in order to return to his father, in which case the rule is that all must reprimand him for transgressing a prohibition for someone else’s behalf.
 As one can assume that he is carrying it in order to return to his father.
 Mentioned in Piskeiy teshuvos 343:3
 Biur Halacha 343 “Bidivrei Sofrim”
 Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 165:5
 As there is no bodily need involved for the child to take the Siddur, and is thus forbidden even according to the lenient opinion [Rashba] brought in Admur.
 Tehila Ledavid 343:4, based on the lenient opinion which allows transgressing an occasional Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzvah.
 As giving them the clothing with the bells to wear is like feeding them a prohibition with one’s hands. Now although it was explained above [Halacha 4 based on Admur 343:10] that one may give a child an item with which he will transgress Shabbos with if one does not intend that the child transgress Shabbos, perhaps one can say that in this case one does intend that the child make noise with his bells so one can tell where he is at all times, and therefore it is forbidden. Vetzaruch Iyun.
 Piskeiy Teshuvos 343 footnote 8
 Vetzaruch Iyun, as explained above in the end of F that a child even below Chinuch may only be given an object if the adult has no intent for the child to the prohibition with that object, while here the entire intent of lifting the child is for him to turn off the light. Hence on what bases is it permitted.
 Admur 343:5; 265:10; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3; Beir Moshe Elektri 6:9-10
 Beir Moshe ibid
 Admur 340:10; Vetzaruch Iyun from 266:10, and so rules Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11, that a child even below Chinuch may only be given an object if the adult has no intent for the child to the prohibition with that object, while here the entire intent of lifting the child is for him to turn off the light. Hence on what bases is it permitted? Perhaps however one can say that since here one is not placing the item into the hands of the child and is simply placing him near the item, therefore it is more lenient.
 See Shabbos Kihalacha Vol. 1 p. 214
 Ketzos Hashulchan 134 footnote 18; Aruch Hashulchan 328:20
 Minchas Yitzchak 1:78; SSH”K
 Sheivit Haleivi, Chazon Ish, Rav SZ”A
 Tzitz Eliezer 8:15-12