From the Rav’s Desk – Q&A on Does G-d need us

Does G-d truly not know whether to desire the actions of the righteous versus the actions of the wicked? [Likkutei Torah Tzav]

The Midrash Raba on Bereishis writes on the verse, “Vayehi Or/And there shall be light,” that “these are the actions of the righteous, although at this point I, G-d, do not know whose actions I desire, those of the righteous or those of the wicked. When Scripture later states “and G-d saw that the light is good,” this is a sign that G-d has decided to desire more the actions of the righteous.” This entire Midrash seems puzzling as how could G-d even entertain the idea of desiring the actions of the wicked more than the actions of the righteous to the point that he was initially left undecided as to which He desires. The explanation rather is as follows: G-d in His essential and infinite Self is perfect and complete and does not need or desire the actions of the righteous just as he doesn’t care or get affected by the actions of the wicked. This is the intent of the original statement of the Midrash. [All agree that G-d is omnipotent and perfect and infinite. Believing that somehow G-d is essentially in need of the righteous actions of man to satiate some lust or passion or vulnerability would be heretical, it would deem him incomplete and imperfect. Likewise, in the same sense, to state that he becomes affected and influenced by the actions of the wicked would be tantamount to saying that he has human qualities. In truth, G-d in His essence is absolutely perfect and doesn’t need and does not get affected by anything outside Him.] Why then does the Midrash continue and state that in the end G-d chooses to desire the actions of the righteous? [This is because as a result of His perfection, G-d has the ability and right to make choices, and hence He can choose to become vulnerable and to desire specifically the actions of the righteous.] G-d is able to so to say contract Himself to the point that He yearns for the actions of the righteous. [Now, one may rightfully ask that if this is the case then it ends up that G-d made Himself selfish, and that the entire Jewish religion surrounds the quenching of G-d’s lusts for the righteous actions of mankind. This can leave a Jew to think that Jewish observance doesn’t really have anything in it for him and it’s all about G-d. In truth, however, this so to say selfish desire of G-d to desire the actions of the righteous, is a desire to give and benefit the righteous.] The true reason that G-d chose to desire the actions of the righteous is because he desires to benefit and reward mankind in order so they not eat bread of shame. [Hence, His desire for our righteous actions is all about us, not Him. He desires to see our benefit similar to how a parent desires to see his children succeed. So yes G-d has a selfish desire to be selfless.]

• The Divine lesson: This short but yet powerful teaching of the Alter Rebbe solves a much heated and debated subject of contemporary times as to whether G-d needs us. Some passionately and vehemently argue that He does, as otherwise He would not have created us, as no one does something without a purpose of it quenching some desire that He has. Hence, the Jewish religion is about Him and not about us, and we are simply there to quench His passions. They furthermore argue that having this perspective is a major motivating factor for one to serve G-d and fulfill His commands, as it makes him realize that even his mere mortal actions are precious in the eyes of G-d and please Him. However, now for the other side of the coin. Others passionately argue with equal enthusiasm that taking such a position as above is heretical, and that the entire Jewish religion is about us, for our benefit, and does not serve G-d any need or purpose. They further claim that the previous perspective, even if not heretical, deflates all motivation of serving G-d, as who wants to serve a dictator and dedicate every moment of their entire lives towards fulfilling His selfish wants and desires. The above teaching of Admur gives us a balanced perspective which incorporates both perspectives. Indeed, G-d in His essence cannot be described as needing anything which would be human like, and hence heretical to the belief of G-d’s perfection and state of being unlimited. At the same time, G-d chose to become vulnerable and have a desire to be served by mankind and hence indeed man’s righteous actions make a difference to G-d and please Him. However, this desire for man’s righteous actions and the pleasure it gives G-d is not selfish in nature, as the pleasure is found specifically in the fact that upon doing the righteous actions man will receive duly deserved reward from G-d, and hence G-d takes pleasure in the pleasure that man receives from Him.

Yes. A Bar Mitzvah boy in Aveilus may have his Bar Mitzvah take place as usual. He may wear Shabbos clothing.

Background – A child who became Bar Mitzvah during Shiva/Shloshim:

Some Poskim^[1] rule that a child who became Bar/Bas Mitzvah during the Shiva [or Shloshim] of a relative, is not obligated to keep Shiva or any laws of Aveilus even after he becomes Bar Mitzvah.^[2] Other Poskim^[3] rule a child who became Bar/Bas Mitzvah within the Shloshim from the burial, then he is to keep Shiva and Shloshim from that day and onwards. Practically, we rule like the former opinion that the child remains exempt from all mourning.^[4] [This applies even if he only discovered the death after he became Bar/Bas Mitzvah. If, however, he became Bar/Bas Mitzvah between the death and burial, he is obligated in Aveilus.^[5]]

[1] Michaber 396:3; Beis Yosef 396; Tur in name of Rosh; Rosh [student of Maharam] in end of Moed Katan; Taz 396:1 [Regarding the contradictory ruling of the Taz 340:15 in name of the Derisha, that even if a child has reached the age of Chinuch he is to be educated to mourn, see Shivas Tziyon 61, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 396:2, that this only applies if the child has a father and is not in a Talmud Torah, in which case he is to be educated by his father to mourn. However if the child does not have a father, or he is in a Talmud Torah, then he is exempt from Aveilus, as explained in the next footnote.];

[2] The reason: As once one is exempt at the time of the obligation, he remains exempt also for the Tashlumin. [Rosh ibid] Alternatively, the reason is because the Chiyuv of Aveilus is specifically at the moment of burial, when the bitterness is greatest, and hence since the child was exempt at that time, there is no obligation for him to keep mourning laws later on. [Taz 396:1 in explanation of ruling of Michaber ibid, and answer of contradiction in Michaber ibid to his ruling in 341 where he rules like the Maharam regarding Havdalah.]

[3] Maharam Merothenberg [teacher of Rosh ,brought in Rosh in end of Moed Katan], brought in Shach 396:1 and Taz 396:1; Rabbeinu Yerucham and Bach 396 conclude to follow the Maharam, as he was the teacher of the Rosh, as well as that the ruling of the Michaber ibid is contradicted earlier in 341 where he rules like the Maharam regarding Havdalah; The Taz ibid negates his opinion; The Shach in Nekudos Hakesef defends the ruling of the Maharam against the proofs of the Taz; Yad Eliyahu 93 also negates the ruling of the Taz ibid, brought in Gilyon Maharsha 396

Within the Shiva: Some Poskim rule [unlike Michaber ibid] that if a child became Bar/Bas Mitzvah within the Shiva then he must keep Shiva for the remaining days that are left of Shiva even according to the Rosh, as every day of Shiva is a separate obligation and is not Tashlumin, and it is only in a case that he became of age after Shiva that there is a dispute. [Yad Eliyahu ibid; Poskim brought in Pnei Baruch 25:5 footnote 12 and Nitei Gavriel 127:3 footnote 5-6; Gesher Hachaim 19:3-3 that so is custom] However according to the Michaber and Tur and Taz ibid the Katan is exempt even in such a case.

After Shloshim: If he became Bar/Bas Mitzvah after the Shloshim, then according to this opinion, he is to keep Aveilus for one hour, just as is the law regarding a Shemua Rechoka. [Maharam; Pnei Baruch 25:5]

[4] Taz 396:1 “Therefore it appears Halacha Lemaaseh to rule like the Rosh, not for his reason, but for the reason I mentioned.”; Chochmas Adam 168:6; Aruch Hashulchan 396:5; Kitzur SHU”A 216:2; Ikarei Hadat 36:48

[5] Nitei Gavriel 127:4 and 8; See Taz ibid