The Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyin [redeeming prisoners, captives], hostage deals, and its regulations in Halacha:[1]

1. Introduction:

Kidnapping prohibition:[2] It is a Biblical prohibition to kidnap another individual and in the 10 Commandments, God commanded us against such behavior. [An unfortunate and sad fact of life that has existed since biblical times, is that just like people murder and steal and commit adultery, so too people kidnap other individuals, and hence each of these behaviors have been included in the 10 Commandments.]

Kidnapping for ransom: People are kidnapped for a variety of motives, including for the sake of slavery and sale, but the primary reason for kidnapping is to request a ransom.[3] Kidnapping for ransom is a grave crime that has plagued societies worldwide. This act involves abducting an individual and demanding a ransom for their release.

Terrorists kidnapping soldiers or citizens for prisoner swap and terrorist demands: Terrorist groups often use kidnapping as a means to fund their activities, leveraging the fear and urgency of the situation to extract large sums of money, and often use it as a bargaining chip for the release of prisoners associated with the terrorist group. In the last 80 years, this has become a go to tactic by terrorist organizations who are adversaries of the state of Israel; to kidnap Jews and Israelis, especially soldiers, with demands of release of their prisoners from Israeli jails. Over the last few decades this tactic used by terrorists has unfortunately been successful due to the succumbing of the Israeli authorities to their demands, having famously released over 1000 terrorists from Israeli persons in exchange for one soldier. Accordingly, they feel encouraged to continue this tactic, and feel the liberty to make even greater demands. Unfortunately, as documented, this was one of the primary motives behind the heinous Hamas October 7 attacks which led to the kidnapping of over 250 individuals and a demand to release all their prisoners from Israeli jails in exchange for their release.

Impact on victims: The impact of kidnapping for ransom on victims is profound and multifaceted. Victims often endure severe psychological trauma, including anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The fear and uncertainty during captivity can have long-lasting effects on their mental health. Families of the victims also suffer immense emotional and financial stress, as they scramble to gather the demanded ransom.

Impact on society: On a broader scale, kidnapping for ransom undermines societal stability and security. It fosters an environment of fear and distrust, particularly in regions where such incidents are frequent. The financial burden of paying ransoms can cripple families and businesses, while the funds obtained by kidnappers often fuel further criminal activities and terrorism.

The Halachic discussion: Unfortunately, historically, the Jewish community has not escaped being subjected to crimes of kidnapping, and hence we find many incidences recorded in the Talmud[4] and Poskim[5] regarding individuals who were kidnapped for a variety of reasons, including to be held for ransom, and hence we have a number of portions in the Talmud which deals with the laws of how to deal with a kidnapping for ransom case. In this article, we will discuss the various Halachic details relating to redeeming captives including the following subjects:

• How great is the Mitzvah of redeeming a captive and is it considered greater than the general Mitzvah of charity?
• Is there any monetary cap given for redeeming a captive? Do we limit the amount of money that one may pay for a ransom, or may one choose to pay whatever amount of money that the kidnappers demand, and on the contrary perhaps it is considered a great Mitzvah?
• Is it permitted for one to do a military or police operation to release the captive?
• How does all the above apply to a hostage deal in which terrorists demand the release of terrorist prisoners in exchange for the captive? May or must one agree to do so? Is there any cap on the amount of prisoners that one may agree to release in exchange for the captive?

1. Mitzvah Raba – The greatness and importance of the Mitzvah of redeeming a captive:[6]

The Mitzvah of redeeming a captive is described in the Talmud[7] as a great Mitzvah “Mitzvah Raba.”[8] It is hence considered the greatest form of charity, and takes precedence to all the other forms of charity, as will be explained below. In fact, there is no greater or more superior[9] Mitzvah than redeeming a captive being that a captive is considered hungry, thirsty, unclothed, whose very life is held in balance.[10] [Redeeming a captive is greater than the creation of the heaven and earth.[11] Anyone who gives money towards redeeming a captive, G-d will save him and his descendants from falling into captivity.[12] In merit of the Mitzvah of redeeming captives the Jewish people will be redeemed from the exile.[13]]

The Positive and Negative commands:[14] One who abstains from fulfilling this Mitzvah and does not redeem a captive when he is in a position to do so, transgresses several negative commands, including: 1) Lo Siameitz Es Levavcha[15]– “Do not harden your heart”; 2) Lo Sikpotz Es Yadcha[16] – “Do not close your hands”; 3) Lo Samod Al Dam Reiacha[17] – Don’t stand idle while your friends blood is being spilled; 4) Lo Yardenu Befarech Lieiynecha[18] – “Do not allow him to perform slave labor in front of your eyes.” In addition, it transgresses several positive commands, including: 1) Poseiach Tiftach Es Yadcha[19] – “You shall open your hands in charity”; 2) Vechaiy Achicha Imach[20] – “Allow your brother to live with you”; 3) Veahavta Lereiacha Kamocha[21] – Love your fellow as yourself; 4) Vihatzel Likuchim Lamaves[22], and many of the like.

Delaying is like murder:[23] For every moment that one negligently delays the redemption of a captive, when possible to redeem him earlier, it is considered as if one is committing murder.

The scriptural source for its severity:[24] The idea that Pidyon Shevuin is a Mitzvah Raba is learned from the verse of Scripture[25] which states regarding the future of the Jewish people in exile “when they say to you, “where will we go?” you shall say to them, So says God, “those who are destined to die a natural death will die a natural death, those who are destined to die by the sword will die by the sword, those who were destined to die my hunger will die by hunger, and those who are destined to be captured, will become captives.” Now, the destiny that is written later in the verse is considered more severe than its predecessors. Dying by the sword is more severe than dying a natural death, as it is more gory on the body and so can also be derived from Scripture.[26] Dying by hunger is more severe than dying by the sword being that there is more pain involved in death due to hunger, and so is stated explicitly in Scripture.[27] Being held as a captive is the worst of them all being that it incorporates all of the previous sufferings, as the captive can potentially die a natural death[28], or be killed by the sword, or die due to hunger. Accordingly, we see that being kidnapped is compared to all the various forms of death, and is hence the greatest form of charity.[29]

Practical example of Pidyon Shvuyim in today’s times:[30] In today’s times, the concept of kidnapping for ransom is rare, at least in Western countries, and is rather limited to countries that have a strong Mafia and gang presence in which kidnapping for the sake of ransom is rampant even today [i. e. Mexico, South America, Asia, Africa etc]. The most common type of Pidyon Shvuyim in today’s times, is helping release a Jew from imprisonment. Below we will discuss whether the Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim applies in such a case.   Does the concept of Pidyon Shvuyim apply to helping release a Jew from a state prison?[31] Penalty of capital punishment:[32] In the event that the Jew is being held with a potential penalty of capital punishment, then the Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim applies even if he is truly a criminal [unless he’s truly deserving of death]. [Thus, those individuals who are arrested for possession or sale of drugs in countries that carry a death penalty, it is a Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim to help release them.] Chance of being killed in prison: Likewise, those prisons which are notorious for death of inmates, either through being killed by other prisoners, or being killed due to malnutrition, or due to malicious, have the Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim apply towards their Jewish inmates. No worry of death:[33] Those prisons which do not have a history of inmate deaths, and hence the life of its inmates are not considered to be in danger, many Poskim rule that the Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim does not apply to its Jewish inmates, and hence one may not channel charity funds from their already intended use for the sake of releasing them from prison. This applies to most prisons today within Western civilization. Nonetheless, certainly it is a great kindness in Mitzvah to donate money for such a cause to help release the inmate. Certainly, this applies if the inmate is unable to observe Torah and Mitzvos while in prison. A Criminal:[34] The above only applies if indeed the inmate is innocent of the crime, or was given a prison sentence disproportionate to his crime. However, if he is truly a criminal who has stolen, or murdered or raped, or molested children, and it is for the benefit of mankind that he remain incarcerated, then on the contrary, he should remain in jail and not be given assistance to help him get released.   Kiruv Organizations – Does the concept of Pidyon Shvuyim apply to helping bring a Jew closer to Judaism:[35] Another major type of Pidyon Shvuyim which exists today is the redeeming of Jewish souls from a state of heresy and apostasy, and bringing them towards observance of Torah and Mitzvos. Certainly, those who take part in such work, and donate money towards the cause are fulfilling a great Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim on a spiritual scale. The Poskim [brought below] rule that one may even desecrate Shabbos in order to help save a Jew from leaving Judaism. Hence Pikuach Nefesh of the soul is just as serious as Pikuach Nefesh of the body, and hence the Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim should apply. Indeed, one of the exceptions recorded in Poskim[36] for redeeming a person for even more than his value is if his children will be brought up in apostasy, and hence it is even a Mehudar level of Pidyon Shvuyim. Redeeming Jewish children from Muslim homes [Yad Leachim, Irgun Lahava]: Another type of Pidyon Shvuyim which exists today in Israel is the redeeming of assimilated Jewish mothers and their Jewish children from the home of the abusive Muslim father. Unfortunately, there exists thousands of Jewish girls who have married Arabs in Israel created Muslim families and live in Arab communities. Many live a life of severe domestic abuse and suffering, and fear for their lives to even attempt to come back to their people. The above organization, amongst others, helps redeem these girls and their children who are Jewish, from their state of captivity, so they can be brought up as Jews.   Ruling of Poskim[37] regarding Desecrating Shabbos in order to help save a Jew from leaving Judaism: *From here we can deduce that saving a Jew from apostasy is Halachcially viewed as Pikuach Nefesh, and hence the Mitzvah of Pidyon Shvuyim should apply. One who discovered on Shabbos that gentiles have kidnapped his daughter from his home for the purposes of removing her from the Jewish people [and make her live like a gentile], it is a Mitzvah for him to travel and place effort to save her. Transgressing Biblical prohibitions: He may travel even past the distance of 12 Mil[38] [which is the Biblical Techum Shabbos according to some Poskim[39]], and he may even perform complete Biblical prohibitions if, necessary, to save her.[40] Doubt if will be successful:[41] This may be done even if it is only a doubt as to whether he will be successful in saving her.[42] Child:[43] This may be done even if the daughter is a child and is not yet obligated in Mitzvos, one is nevertheless to desecrate Shabbos in order to save her.[44] Forcing the father:[45] If the father does not desire to help save her, he is to be forced to do so. Another person’s child:[46] This law applies even to another person’s child, another person’s son or daughter which is not one’s relative, nevertheless if he has ability to try to fulfill this Mitzvah and save the child, then he must do so and he is to be forced[47] into helping in any way he can. This applies even if it is a mere doubt in whether he will be successful, and even if he will have to transgress Biblical prohibitions in order to do so.

1. Raising the money to redeem the captive:

Precedence over other charities to the poor:[48] Giving ransom money to redeem a captive takes precedence over giving charity to feed[49] and clothe paupers. [However, those Jews which are found in midst of a war or plague and as a result are found in such a state of poverty, that they will literally die from hunger, then they are to be viewed equal to a captive.[50]]

Re-directing collected funds for the sake of redeeming the captive:[51] Being that there is no greater Mitzvah than redeeming a captive, therefore, one may even use money that had already been collected for the sake of another Mitzvah, whatever it may be, and redirect its use in order to redeem the captive.

Selling a Shul or Beis Midrash for the sake of Pidyon Shvuyin:[52] One may use the funds that were donated, or even sell the building materials, such as wood and stone, that were purchased for the sake of building a synagogue [or Beis Midrash[53]], for the sake of redeeming a captive, even though in general it is forbidden for one to sell them for the sake of any other Mitzvah. However, one should not sell an already built synagogue [or Beis Midrash[54]] for the sake of redeeming a captive [if other ways of raising funds are available[55], or no other Shuls are available to Daven in[56]]. [However, if the building is yet to be complete, then some Poskim[57] rule that it may be sold.]

Selling a Torah scroll for the sake of Pidyon Shvuyin:[58] It is permitted for one to even sell a Torah scroll for the sake of redeeming a captive, [even though in general it is forbidden for one to sell a Torah scroll unless one needs the money to get married or study Torah[59]].

Selling one’s house:[60] One is not required to sell his house for the sake of redeeming a captive.

Paying back the redeemer:[61] An individual who was redeemed from captivity by his friend has an obligation to pay him back if he has the financial capability of doing so.[62] He is obligated to pay back his friend immediately even before going to court, and if he has a legal claim against his friend, then after he pays he should take his friend to court to make his claim, although may not delay paying his friend until after the court case.[63] [This applies even if the captive was an orphan, that we take money from his assets to repay the redeemer, even though in general we never take money from an orphan before he reaches adulthood.[64]]

If more money than needed was collected for a captive:[65] When collecting money for a specific captive any extra money collected belongs to the captive. However, in times of need, the community leaders may decide to use the money for other purposes.

1. Kdei Dmeihem – Limitations on the amount of ransom payment:[66]

It is ruled in the Mishneh[67] and Poskim[68] that the sages instituted that one may not redeem a captive for more than his value [i.e. Kdei Dimeihem]. [This applies whether the captive is a man or a woman, and applies even if there is worry of sexual abuse with the captive.[69]]

How to measure the value of the captive: Some Poskim[70] rule that we follow the market value of the captive as he would be sold on the slave market [which was legal and common in previous times]. Other Poskim[71] rule that it follows the captives personal financial status, and as to whether he is wealthy or poor. Other Poskim[72] rule that it follows the black-market value for Gentile captives as accepted throughout the world.

The reason for the limitation: The Mishneh[73] states, as recorded in the Poskim[74], that the reason behind this restriction is due to “Tikkun Haolam,” which is an institution made for the betterment of the world. The Talmud offers two approaches in how to understand this institution and as to what world benefit they intended to achieve.

• The first approach is due to “Duchka Detzibura,” which means that the sages did not want to allow redeeming captives for more than their value being that doing so would bring economic burden onto the community, and potentially cause them to become destitute.
• The second approach is due to “Delo Ligrivu Velaysu,” which means that the sages did not want to allow redeeming captives for more than their value being that doing so encourages future kidnappings, as it shows potential kidnappers that kidnapping pays well.

In the first approach, the Sages were coming to protect the financial state of the community. In the second approach the Sages were coming to protect people from future kidnappings. The Talmud ibid does not give a final arbitration as to which of the two approaches is correct.[75]

Practical ramification between reasons:[76] The practical ramification between the two reasons and approaches is in regards to whether a wealthy individual may choose to pay the entire ransom on his own without throwing the burden onto the community. According to the first approach, it is permitted even if the value is much more than the value of the captive, being that it does not entail placing a financial burden onto the community. However, according to the second approach, doing so is forbidden, as irrelevant of who pays the ransom money, paying more money than the market value motivates future kidnappings, and is a danger to the community.

The ruling in Poskim: Some Poskim[77] rule like the first approach that it is due to “Duchka Detzibura.”  Other Poskim[78], however rule like the second approach that it is due to “Delo Ligrivu Velaysu,” and so is the practical ruling in the Shulchan Aruch. Practically, although the main ruling follows the second approach[79], although the widespread custom is like the first approach.[80]

The custom today: Some Poskim[81] record that the widespread custom today in many communities is to redeem captives for more than their market value, and to no longer abide by the above regulation of the Sages.[82] These communities are to be praised and are doing a very great Mitzvah.

 

1. Cases of exception for Kdei Dimeihem [that one may pay any amount to redeem the captive]:[83]

• Redeeming oneself:[84] The actual person being held in captivity may agree to pay his captors any amount of ransom money for the sake of redeeming himself, as for the captive himself, no limitations were instituted by the sages. [Nonetheless, some Poskim[85] rule that he is not obligated to do so.]
• Husband redeeming wife: Most Poskim[86] rule that a husband may pay more than market value to redeem his wife, and so is the Ashkenazi practice.[87] Nonetheless, many Poskim[88] rule that he is not obligated to do so, as explained in Halacha H. This allowance to redeem one’s wife for more than her value applies even if he himself is also in captivity, and will need to remain in captivity if he redeems his wife for more than her value.[89]
• Relative or other individual redeeming captive with his own money: Some Poskim[90] rule [based on the second approach written above in D] that even a relative may not redeem a captive for more than his market value due to Tikkun Haolam.[91] Other Poskim[92], however, rule [based on the first approach written above in D] that any individual may choose to redeem a captive for more than his market value, and certainly a relative, such as a father, may redeem his daughter for any amount they demand him to pay.[93] Practically, one is not to protest one who chooses to redeem the captive for more than his value from his own money, and so is the custom.[94]
• Pikuach Nefesh:[95] It is disputed amongst the Poskim as to whether the restriction against redeeming a captive for more than his value applies even in the event that the captives life is in danger, and he may be killed if he is not redeemed. Some Poskim[96] rule that there are no restrictions in such a case, and one may redeem the captive for as much money as requested, as Pikuach Nefesh defers all the laws of the Torah, and certainly defers a restriction of the sages.[97] Other Poskim[98], however, argue that the restriction of the sages applies even in the case of Pikuach Nefesh, and hence even if the life of the captive is held in balance, it is forbidden for one to redeem him for more than his value.[99] [Practically, one may be lenient in this matter.[100]]
• Save from Apostasy: Some Poskim[101] rule that if the captors force the Jewish captives to transgress the Jewish religion and force them to work on Shabbos for no need, then one may redeem the captive for more than his value. Nonetheless, there is no extra leniency given to redeeming a woman who is held captive even if there is worry of Giluiy Arayos.[102]
• A Torah scholar or child prodigy:[103] If the person being held captive is a Torah scholar, or is a child or student prodigy that has the potential of becoming a great Torah scholar, then he may be redeemed for any amount of ransom money, and the sages never instituted their restriction in such a case. [Famously, the Maharam was kidnapped in the end of the 13th century and was held for a very high ransom.[104] Now, despite the fact that he was considered the Gadol Hador, nonetheless, he refused to permit paying the large ransom for his release, and chose to die while in prison. See below!]
• Community agrees to forego the decree: Some Poskim[105] rule that the community has the right to forfeit the institutions of the Sages of Duchka Detzibura, and pay more than the value of the captive, and so is indeed the custom of many communities. Other Poskim[106] rule that the community has the right to pay more than the market value to redeem a captive, so long as it is not more than average amount that is requested in other ransom cases of Gentile captives.

The Maharam of Rothenburg:[107] The Maharam of Rothenburg who was the greatest Torah giant and leader of his generation, was taken captive and held for a very high ransom.[108] Despite the community’s desire to redeem him for the high some, the Maharam of Rothenburg refused to allow himself to be redeemed under the claim that the sages prohibited redeeming a captive for more than his value. Now, although it is permitted to redeem a captive for more than his value if he is a Torah scholar, nonetheless, the Maharam of Rothenburg was stringent upon himself as he did not want the government to continue capturing the Torah leaders and cause Torah to be lost from Israel. He hence refused to be redeemed and indeed was successful in stopping the scheme of capturing Torah scholars from then on.

1. Whom to redeem:[109]

Redeeming one who caused himself to enter captivity:[110] One who sold himself to idolaters, or owed them money and was taken captive as collateral, may be redeemed [using community and charity funds] the first two times that this occurs. However, if he does so for a third time, then we do not redeem him [nor his children who were taken with him] unless his life is in danger in which case there is no limitation as to the amount of times that he is to be redeemed. After the father passes away, then his children who were taken with him into captivity are to be redeemed.[111] [However, so long as the father is still alive, then from the third time and onwards we do not redeem the children[112] unless the father has no control over their Jewish education, and hence redeeming the children will save them from assimilation.[113]]

Redeeming a Heretic:[114] A Jewish captive who became a heretic is prohibited from being redeemed from captivity. A person is considered a heretic if he transgresses even a single command [even one time[115]] with the purpose of rebelling against G-d [i.e. להכעיס], such as if he eats non-kosher meat even when he has ability to eat kosher meat [for the same price and effort].[116]

1. Precedence of whom to redeem:[117]

Person in captivity:[118] Redeeming oneself from captivity takes precedence over redeeming any other captive, including one’s own father or Rebbe, with exception to one’s mother, as will be explained below.

Male versus female captive:[119] A female captive is given precedence to be redeemed over a male captive unless the capturers are accustomed to practice homosexuality, in which case the redemption of the male captive receives precedence over the redemption of a female captive. [However, if the life of the male captive is in danger, then he receives precedence over the female captive, even if the life of the female captive is also in danger.[120] Likewise, redeeming oneself from captivity takes precedence over redeeming a female captive, unless the female captive is one’s mother as explained next.[121]]

Mother versus others:[122] Redeeming ones mother from captivity takes precedence over the redemption of any other captive, including oneself[123] one’s father and Rebbe, if they were all taken into captivity.[124] [However, if one’s life is in danger, then redeeming himself takes precedence over anyone else, including his own mother.[125]]

Father versus others:[126] Redeeming ones father from captivity takes precedence over the redemption of any other captive, with exception to one’s mother, oneself, and one’s Rebbe [if the father is not a Torah scholar[127]] who all take precedence over one’s father.  

Rebbe versus others:[128] Redeeming ones Rebbe from captivity takes precedence over the redemption of any other captive, including one’s father [if the father is an ignoramus], with exception to one’s mother and oneself, who all take precedence over one’s Rebbe. [However, if one’s father is a Torah scholar, then he is to be redeemed prior to his Rebbe, even if his Rebbe is of a greater caliber of Torah knowledge.[129]]

Father verses Rebbe: Redeeming ones Rebbe receives precedence over one’s father unless one’s father is also a Torah scholar, as stated above.

Wife versus others:[130] Redeeming ones wife from captivity receives precedence over the redemption of [any other captive including ones father and Rebbe[131] and even over] oneself. Thus if a couple were captured, the husband would need to redeem his wife before redeeming himself.

1. Forcing one to give money to redeem a captive:

Redeeming oneself:[132] An individual is obligated to redeem himself from captivity if he can afford it. If one refuses to redeem himself, then the courts may confiscate his assets in order to redeem him even against his wishes. [This, however, only applies to redeeming himself for his market value, however, he is not obligated to pay more than the market value to redeem himself.[133] Nonetheless, he may do so if he chooses, as explained above in E.]

Redeeming one’s Wife:[134] A husband is obligated to redeem his wife [for her value]. If a husband refuses to redeem his wife, then the courts may confiscate his assets in order to redeem her even against his wishes. [Many Poskim[135], however, rule that this only applies to redeeming the wife for her market value, however, he is not obligated to pay more than the market value to redeem her. Nonetheless, most Poskim[136] rule that he may do so if he chooses, as explained above in E. [137] However, he is obligated to pay her market value even if it is worth more than the value of her Kesuba.[138] This allowance to redeem one’s wife for more than her value applies even if he himself is also in captivity, and will need to remain in captivity if he redeems his wife for more than her value.[139]]

Redeeming relatives:[140] A father who can afford it is obligated to redeem his son from captivity, if his son cannot afford to do so himself.[141] The same applies by all relatives, that if a person has the financial capability to redeem a relative of his that was taken captive, then he must do so, as it’s not right to place the burden of redeeming the captive on the community so the relative can continue to remain wealthy. In this regard, the closer a relative that one is to the captive, the greater responsibility he has to redeem him. Thus, if several relatives have the financial capability of redeeming the captive, the relative who is biologically closest to the captive is obligated to redeem him and he cannot throw the obligation on more distant relatives.[142] [This, however, only applies to redeeming him for his market value, however, he is not obligated to pay more than the market value to redeem the relative.[143] Nonetheless, he may do so if he chooses, as explained above in E.]

1. Havracha – Restrictions on escape and military/police operations:[144]

It is ruled in the Mishneh[145] and Poskim[146] that the sages instituted that one may not help a captive escape from captivity due to Tikkun Haolam, which is an institution made for the betterment of the world. The intent of this betterment of the world is to prevent the enemies of the Jewish people from holding current and future captives under overly harsh and painful conditions to prevent their escape.[147] [Accordingly, it applies even if there is currently only a single captive being held, and certainly applies if there is more than one captive being held in which case helping one captive escape will have immediate repercussions on the conditions of captivity of the second captive.[148]]

Escaping oneself:[149] The actual person being held in captivity may attempt to escape from his captors even if there are other captives present, as for the captive himself, no limitations were instituted by the sages.

Times of war:[150] Seemingly, during times of war, there is no restriction against performing a military operation to release hostages. Furthermore, seemingly if the life of the captive is in jeopardy, it is permitted to perform a military operation, and so ruled a number of Poskim regarding the famous military operation of Entebe.

Endangering one’s life to help save a captive: Some Poskim[151] rule that it is forbidden for one to put his life in even questionable danger in order to save his friend from even certain death.[152] Other Poskim[153], however, rule that one is obligated to enter himself into questionable danger in order to help save his friend from definite death. Practically, Safek Nefashos Lehakel.[154] [In all cases one must heavily measure this matter to determine if in truth he is in questionable danger if he tries to save him.[155] Furthermore, seemingly the military and police force are not under this restriction as that is what they are paid to do and hence it is no different than the allowance and obligation for a soldier to go to war, and a prohibition for him to turn his back on the war effort.]

1. Hostage deal with terrorists in exchange for prisoners [Entebbe, Gilad Shalit, Oct 7th]:[156]

To our great misfortune, a new type of ransom which was not discussed in the Talmud or codifiers, is the demand of release of terrorists from prisons in exchange for captives. The question is raised as to whether the ransom payment restrictions and limitations enacted by the sages apply likewise to this type of ransom request. Is it more stringent or is it more lenient?

Historical overview: The above question unfortunately has risen numerous times in Israeli history, including:

• In 1954, a five-man Israel Defense Forces (IDF) patrol was abducted and tortured by the Syrian Army. One of the soldiers, Uri Ilan, committed suicide while in captivity. The surviving POWs and Ilan’s body were returned in exchange for 40 Syrian soldiers1.
• Following the 1956 Suez Crisis, Israel exchanged 5,500 Egyptian prisoners captured during the campaign and 77 others captured during military operations for an Israeli pilot taken prisoner during the war and three soldiers taken captive in pre-war attacks.
• In 1968, 12 Jordanian soldiers taken prisoner during the Battle of Karameh were released in exchange for the body of a missing Israeli soldier.
• An El-Al airliner hijacked to Algeria in 1968 led to the exchange of 12 Israeli crewmen and passengers for 16 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.
• In 1970 terrorists hijacked a plane filled with Jewish tourists on their way from Germany to America, including the great Gaon Rav Yitzchak Hutner.[157]
• In 1977, an Air France flight was hijacked by terrorists which led to the famous Entebbe operation.
• In 1979, 76 terrorists were exchanged for one Israeli soldier, Avraham Amram.
• In the early 1980s, the PLO and Israel carried out prisoner exchanges. The most famous is the “Jibril Deal” in May 1985.
• In 2011 the kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit was released in exchange for 1,027 terrorists prisoners held in Israeli jails.

Argument of leniency: The following arguments of leniency to remove any ransom restrictions can be made: 1) According to the first Talmudic approach of Kdei Dimeihem, there is no regulation against a country redeeming a captive for a lot of money as it does not cause the community to become destitute, and the same would apply to releasing Terrorists, and hence is obligated to be done to save the life of the captives.[158] 2) The restrictions against redeeming a captive, according to most Poskim, does not apply in the case that the life of the captive is in danger, as is the case by hostages.[159] 3) The release of terrorists does not transgress the rule of Ein Dochin Nefesh Mipinei Nefesh being that there is no direct and definite murder of any specific Jew as a result and if it happens R”L, it will only happen after some time.[160] 4) The government is responsible for redeeming captured soldiers, and doing so is an unwritten insurance policy on all soldiers which enlisted into the Army, and hence it is not subject to the restrictions on ransom payments.[161]

Argument of stringency:[162] The following arguments of stringency to restrict the release of terrorists in exchange for captives can be made: 1) According to the second Talmudic approach of Ligrivu Tfei, releasing terrorists will motivate future kidnappings, and hence is forbidden to be done.[163] 2) Ein Dochin Nefesh Mipinei Nefesh. This means that we do not sacrifice one life for the sake of saving another life. Furthermore, it is even forbidden to sacrifice an individual for the sake of saving the public from danger.[164] Thus, it is certainly forbidden to endanger an entire community of Jews for the sake of saving a hostage, and hence since the release of terrorists places the rest of the Jewish people in danger, it is therefore forbidden to be done irrelevant of one’s view on the subject of restrictions on redeeming captives for money. In short, we don’t sacrifice the community for the sake of an individual.[165] 3) During times of war there is no obligation to perform a hostage deal even if the hostages are in  danger, as the entire concept of war involves danger. Now, in today’s times the state of Israel is found in a constant state of war, and hence has no obligation to release terrorists for the sake of releasing hostages. On the contrary, doing so is considered assisting the enemy during war.[166]

Practical ruling amongst today’s Poskim: Some Poskim[167] conclude that the government is obligated to release terrorists in exchange for the hostages, [although if they don’t do so, they have upon whom to rely as stated above[168]]. Other Poskim[169] conclude that they must agree to do so and have upon no one to rely if they refuse.[170] Other Poskim[171] rule that on the contrary, it is forbidden to do so[172], with exception to a prisoner swap that takes place at the conclusion of a war.[173] [It is important to note that the above opinions of leniency, were unaware, and did not show serious concern that these released terrorists will manage to murder Jews once again. However, now that the entire world sees that the terrorists released from the Gilad Shalit deal managed to murder a number of Jewish individuals and then went on to orchestrate the October 7 pogroms which killed, raped, and tortured 1500 Jews, certainly, there is room to consider their opinions to have been retracted in light of the new reality.[174]]

Opinion of Rav Ovadia Yosef and Rabbanut Hareishit Liyisrael:[175] On the 29th Sivan 1977, an Air France flight on its way to Israel was hijacked by terrorists, with 104 Jews taken captive on the hijacked aircraft which was landed by the terrorists in Uganda. The terrorists issued an ultimatum to the Israeli government that if they do not release 40 of their terrorist colleagues within the next 48 hours, then they will kill the Jewish hostages. When  this occurred, a number of Gedolei Yisrael convened on the behest of the Israeli government and prime minister of that time Yitzhak Rabin, to decide whether or not it was Halachically permitted to enter negotiations with the terrorists for a possible prisoner swap. The group was made up of the foremost Poskim of that time, including, Rav Ovadia Yosef, Rav Elyashiv, Rav Yisraeili, Rav S”Z Aurbach, Rav Zaluti, Rav Goldshmit, Rav Bentziyon Aba Shaul. They issued the following ruling on the subject which was given to then prime minister, Yitzchak Rabin. “Although it is clear that releasing terrorists carries with it grave dangers, nonetheless, being that the Jewish hostages are found in a state of immediate danger, according to Jewish law they therefore override the danger of releasing the terrorists and therefore it is obligatory for the government of Israel to enter negotiations with the terrorists and do everything they can to save the captives from the danger that hovers over their lives”  

Gilad Shalit:[176] Prior to signing the prisoner exchange deal for the soldier Gilad Shalit, Rav Ovadia Yosef was asked to voice an opinion on the subject and he ruled symmetrically to his opinion stated above that the deal is to be made and even asked for the terrorist who attempted to murder him personally to be released in the deal.

Opinion of the Rebbe:[177] The Rebbe did not give any halachic ruling as to the question of whether releasing terrorists in exchange for hostages is permitted according to Jewish law, and made mention that indeed Halachic deliberation exists as to its permissibility being that it involves saving a Jewish life. Nonetheless, the Rebbe disagreed with the release of a large number of terrorists in exchange for one soldier as done by the Avraham Amram release deal [i.e. 76 terrorists were exchanged for one Israeli soldier] as a grave tactical error which will invite future kidnappings, and cause more Jewish blood to be spilled. Accordingly, in the Rebbe’s opinion, the policy of the Israeli government must be to not negotiate with terrorists and not to agree to a mass prisoner release deal, even if doing so will lead to Israeli casualties. [Seemingly, in the Rebbe’s opinion, while there is room to permit a prisoner swap agreement in exchange for hostages, it is not an obligation to do so, and therefore it practically should not be done for a large number of terrorists, due to the reasons explained above.] It’s interesting to note that as a solution to the constant headache of terrorists committing kidnappings for the hope of getting a release of other terrorist prisoners, the Rebbe strongly pressed on Israeli officials to have a death penalty for terrorists rather than hold them in Israeli prisons as potential bargaining chips which motivate the future kidnappings.[178]

1. Military operation to release hostages:

Seemingly, there exists no restriction against performing military operations in order to release hostages, and it is no different than any military or police operation that is done by the government. This especially applies during times of war and if the life of the hostages are in danger.

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[1] See Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah Chapter 252 Halacha’s 1-12; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:10-14; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1-4

Talmudic sources: Bava Basra 8b [importance of Mitzvah], Gittin 45a and 58a [regulations], Kesubos 52a [regulations on wife]

[2] See Shemos 20:15; Mechilta ibid; Sanhedrin 86a; Rambam Geneiva 9:1, that the intent of the “do not steal prohibition” within the 10 Commandments is a prohibition against kidnapping, as just like the prohibition against murder and against adultery involve another individual and are liable for capital punishment, so too the not steal prohibition involves stealing another person’s body, and being liable for capital punishment

[3] Kidnapping for ransom can be driven by various factors, including financial desperation, political motives, or organized crime. In many cases, kidnappers target high-profile or wealthy individuals, believing that their families or organizations can afford to pay substantial ransoms.

[4] See Bava Basra 8b, Gittin 45a and 58a, Kesubos 52a

[5] See Maharam Milublin 15 for a case in which a lad was taken captive by Muslims under the claim that he had slept with a Muslim harlot, and was under threat to be killed or forced to convert to Islam, if he is not redeemed; See Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38 regarding a Jewish thief and transgressor  who was held captive and under threat of his life

[6] See Michaber Y.D. 252:1-3; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:10; Bava Basra 8b; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1

[7] Bava Basra 8b

[8] The intent of the above statement is not mere hyperbole, but carries practical ramifications, such as that it is permitted for one to even sell a Torah scroll for the sake of redeeming a captive, as will be explained. [See Michaber Y.D. 252:1]

[9] See Rambam ibid who first states that it is a Mitzvah Gedola, and then in the end states it’s a Mitzvah Raba

[10] Michaber Y.D. 252:1; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:10

[11] Meil Tzedaka 1058

[12] Mateh Moshe 2:4

[13] Menoras Hamaor Perek Hatzedaka end of Shaar 5

[14] Michaber Y.D. 252:2; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:10

[15] Devarim 15:7

[16] Devarim 15:7

[17] Vayikra 19:16

[18] Vayikra 25:53

[19] Devarim 15:8

[20] Vayikra 25:36

[21] Vayikra 19:18

[22] Mishlei 24:11

[23] Michaber Y.D. 252:3; Maharik Shoresh 7

[24] Bava Basra 8b

[25] Yirmiyah 15:2

[26] Tehillim 116:15

[27] Eicha 4:9

[28] See Maharsha ibid that a captive may be more prone to die a natural death due to a change in his conditions

[29] See Chasam Sofer Bava Basra 8a; Chidushei Chasam Sofer Shabbos 22a; Drashos 1:141; Toras Moshe Parshas Mikeitz; Parshas Beshalach that it is specifically observant Jews who have such suffering during captivity

[30] See Aruch Hashulchan 252:1

[31] See Shevet Halevi 4:124-3; 5:135:1; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1

[32] See Chavos Yair 213, brought in Pischeiy Tehsuvah 252:6; Maharam Milublin 15 regarding lad who slept with harlot and was going to be killed, brought in Pischeiy Tehsuvah 252:4

[33] Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1 as we rule regarding Hagomel; Pischeiy Choshen Nezikin 12:3;

Other opinions: See Pamonei Zahav 101; Shach 252:9; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1 footnote 5

See regarding Hagomel: One who was incarcerated in a prison for capital punishment, or for monetary motives  and was chained with steel cuffs, and has now been released, is to recite the blessing of Hagomel. [Seder 13:2; Luach 12:8; Ketzos Hashulchan 65:1] However, one who was incarcerated without conditions of suffering, may not recite the blessing, as it has no basis in scripture. [Shaar Hakolel 23:2; Ketzos Hashulchan 65:1 footnote 4; See also Michaber E.H. 141:16; Likkutei Sichos 12:27 footnote 39] Furthermore, some Poskim rule a blessing may never be recited unless one’s life was endangered, and hence being freed from incarceration that did not have a death penalty does not deserve a blessing even though one had lack of freedom and one was under suffering. [Implication of M”A 219:1; Machatzis Hashekel ibid that so applies even according to Talmidei Rabbeinu Yona and Rav Haiy Gaon; Conclusion of Biur Halacha 219:1; See P”M 219 A”A 1]

[34] See Shevet Halevi 4:124-3; 5:135:1; Vealeihu Lo Yibol 2:113 in name of Rav SZ”A; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1

[35] Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1; See Michaber Y.D. 252:6; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:13; Mishneh Gittin 46b and Gemara 47a; Sheilas Yaavetz 1:68, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 252:7 “if for saving the body the male comes before the female then certainly for saving the soul.”

[36] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; Radbaz 1:40; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1 footnote 8; See Maharam Milublin 15 who concludes that perhaps one may redeem a captive who may be converted to another religion if the captive once converted may become a source of anti-Semitism; See regarding redeeming the children after the father who caused himself to be captured passes away: Michaber Y.D. 252:6; Shach 252:6; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:13; Mishneh Gittin 46b and Gemara 47a; Sheilas Yaavetz 1:68, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 252:7

[37] Admur 396:29; Michaber 30614; Tosafus Shabbos 4a; Eiruvin 32:b; Gittin 41b; See also Admur 329:10; Rama 329:8

[38] Admur ibid; Michaber ibid; Tosafus ibid

[39] M”B 306:57

[40] Admur ibid; Darkei Moshe; Beis Yosef; M”B 306:57

[41] Admur ibid; Kuntrus Achron 306:1; Levush

[42] The reason: As this matter is treated like Pikuach Nefesh in which case one desecrates Shabbos even for a questionable saving of life. There is no greater Pikuach Nefesh than this in which case she will leave the Jewish people and desecrate Shabbos her entire life. [Admur ibid; M”A 306:29; Taz 306:5; M”B 306:57] It is better that we desecrate one Shabbos on her behalf than have her desecrate many Shabbasos, as it is due to this reason that we desecrate Shabbos for Pikuach Nefesh, as the Torah stated “desecrate one Shabbos in order so he guard many Shabbasos”. [Admur ibid; first opinion in Yuma 85b; See Admur 328:2 that rules like Shmuel]

[43] Admur ibid in parentheses; Elya Raba 306:33; M”B 306:57

Other opinions: Some Poskim leave this matter in question. [M”A 306:29, brought in M”B ibid]

[44] The reason: One may desecrate Shabbos to save her in order so she fulfill many Shabbasos when she is older. It is also for this reason that one may desecrate Shabbos for the Pikuach Nefesh of a Katan. [Admur ibid in parentheses] However Tzaruch Iyun, as in 328:2 Admur rules that we desecrate Shabbos because of the verse of Vechaiy Bahem. See Biur Halacha 329:4 “Ela” that it is because of Vechaiy Bahem that one may save a child.

[45] Admur ibid; Michaber ibid

[46] Admur ibid; Malbushei Yom Tov; Olas Shabbos 306 end; Elya Zuta 306:12; M”B 56

[47] Admur ibid; See however Shaar Hatziyon 306 footnote 44

[48] Michaber Y.D. 252:1; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:10

One who vowed to give money to charity: Despite the above, one who pledged to give money to charity, may not donate the pledged money to redeem a captive unless he receives permission from the towns people. [Rama ibid; 256:4 Maharik Shoresh 7; Shach 352:2] However, the Bach 252, brought in Shach ibid, argues on this ruling of Rama. The Shach ibid elaborates in length on how the opinion of the Rama is correct.

[49] Literally “Lifarnes.” Evidently this refers to feeding them.

[50] See Shvus Yaakov 2:84; Beis Lechem Yehuda 252:1

[51] Michaber Y.D. 252:

[52] Michaber O.C. 153:13; Y.D. 252:1; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:11; Taz 153:1; M”B 153:79; Biur Halacha 152; See Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:2

[53] See Taz 252:2; Bach 252

[54] See Taz 252:2; Bach 252

[55] See Shach 252:1; M”A 153:33 in name of Shach and Taz ibid; M”B 153:80; Chayeh Adam 17:36; Aruch Hashulchan 153:2

[56] Taz 153:12; M”A 153:4

[57] Michaber O.C. 153:13; From the Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:11 it is implied that if the Shul is still in the process of being built, then one may sell it for redeeming a captive; Taz 252:2; Taz 153:1; M”B 153:79; Biur Halacha 152; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:2 footnote 10

Other opinions: See M”A 153:32; Aruch Hashulchan 252:5

[58] Rama 270:1; Shach 252:1; Taz 252:1; Beis Yosef 252; Tosafus Megillah 27a; M”B 153:24

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that one may not sell a Torah scroll for the sake of redeeming a captive. [Derisha 252:2, brought and negated in Shach and Taz ibid]

[59] Megillah 27a

[60] See Taz 252:2

[61] Rama Y.D. 252:12; ; Hagahos Mordechai Bava Kama Remez 58; Kesubos Remez 274; Mahariy Viyal 148-149; Beis Yosef 252

[62] We do not say that this is similar to a case of one who chases a lion away from his friends proper by which one is not obligated to pay him for his services. [Rama ibid]

[63] The reason: As if prior to reimbursing him we permitted people to make claims in court against reimbursing the friend who redeemed him, then people would abstain from redeeming their friends from captivity.[Rama ibid]

[64] Shach 252:13; Mahariy Viyal 148; See Michaber C.M. 110:1

The reason: As if we delay paying back the redeemer until the orphans reach adulthood then people would abstain from redeeming orphans from captivity.[Shach ibid]

[65] Michaber Y.D. 253:6; Mishneh Shekalim 3a

[66] Michaber Y.D. 252:4; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:12; Mishneh Gittin 45a

[67] Mishneh Gittin 45a; Braisa Kesubos 52a in opinion of Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that there are opinions in the Talmud which disagree with the entire institution and hold that there’s never a limitation regarding how much money one may pay for redeeming a captive. [1^st answer in Ramban Gittin 45a in opinion of Tana Kama in Kesubos 52a and in opinion of Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Chanania in Gittin 58a]

[68] Michaber Y.D. 252:4

[69] See Shach 252:9-10; Beir Sheva p. 22; Ramban Gittin 45a

[70] Rashi Kesubos 52b; Ritva Kesubos 52b in name of Rashi and Raavad; Maggid Mishneh Ishus 14:19; Nimukei Yosef; Piskei Riaz; Meiri Gittin 45a; Maharam Milublin 15, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 252:5 [there he rules that this applies even today even though there is no longer a slave market in most of the world, and one must measure the value based on countries which have a slave market even today’s, such as in Arab countries]; Beir Hagoleh E.H. 78:2; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:3

[71] Meiri Kesubos 52b; Opinion brought and negated in some Poskim ibid; See Shevet Halevi 5:137-4; Derech Emuna 8:77

[72] Radbaz 1:40 that so is the custom, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 252:5; Possible implication of Michaber E.H. 78:2; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:3

[73] Mishneh Gittin 45a

[74] Michaber Y.D. 252:4; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:12

[75] The Gemara ibid records a story in which Levi Bar Darga redeemed his daughter from captivity for 12,000 gold Dinar, a huge sum of money, to try to prove like the first approach. However, this proof is later rejected being that it is possible that Levy did so without the consent of the sages. Hence, the matter remains inconclusive.

[76] Rashi Gittin ibid

[77] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66 that so is the custom; Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38 in his Limud Zechus approach that the Rif and Rosh did not give a conclusion in this matter and that so rules Maharam Milublin as a Limud Zechus; All Poskim who permit a relative to redeem on his own, as explained in E; See Ran Gittin 22b

[78] Michaber 252:4 “In order so the enemies are not motivated to continue the kidnappings”; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:12; Rashba Gittin 45a; Ran Gittin 22b that so is implied from Rambam and from Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel in Gittin ibid; Implication of Kesubos 52a as rules Rav Shimon Ben Gamliel; Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a; All Poskim who prohibit a relative to redeem even on his own, as explained in E;  See Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38; Radbaz 1:40; See Ran Gittin 22b

[79] As so rules the Shulchan Aruch and most Poskim

[80] Shach 252:4 in name of Bach 252; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66 and Radbaz ibid, brought next; Maharam Milublin  ibid and Kneses Yechezkal ibid that one may choose to follow the first approach;

[81] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; Radbaz 1:40 [and 498] that the widespread custom is to be lenient today to redeem for more than the value, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 252:5

[82] The reason: The custom of the many communities, including Turkey and countries near it, is to redeem the captives for more than their value. The allowance of this Is based on the following factors: 1) the community agrees to compromise on the financial burden that it will cause them and hence have the right to dismiss the institution. 2) the Jewish people are a minority in exile and we must prevent the death of any remaining Jew. 3) the captors force the Jewish captives to transgress the Jewish religion and force them to work on Shabbos for no need. 4) if we do not redeem them they will be killed, and in a case of Pikuach Nefesh, the sages never enacted their decree. [Rashal ibid] Alternatively, the reason is because: 1) there are also Gentile captives which are  redeemed for the same amount. 2) perhaps the captive is a Torah sage. 3) 1) the community agrees and is even happy to compromise on the financial burden that it will cause them and hence have the right to dismiss the institution. [Radbaz ibid]

[83] See Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:4

[84] Michaber Y.D. 252:4; Tosafus Gittin 45a; Tosafus Kesubos 52a; Rosh Gittin 4:44; Braisa in Kesubos 52a; Yeish Cholin in Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a; See Shach 252:11 “and not himself” which can be understood to mean that one may not redeem himself for more than his value. However, in truth this is not the intent of the Shach ibid as doing so would contradict what he himself writes in 252:4 and contradict the ruling of all the above Rishonim and Poskim. Rather, one must say that its meaning is as explained below that one may redeem his wife for more than her value even if he himself remains in captivity.

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that even the person himself may not redeem himself for more than his value [1^st approach in Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a]

[85] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; See Haflah Kesubos 52; Gilyonei Hashas Gittin ibid

[86] Implication of Michaber E.H. 78:2, as learns Chelkas Mechokeik 78:2, that he may do so; Rama E.H. 78:2 [see Rama Y.D. 252:4]; Shach Y.D. 252:4 and 11; Beis Shmuel E.H. 78:2; Chelkas Mechokeik E.H. 78:2; Bach 252; Tur E.H. 78; Tosafus Gittin 45a; Tosafus Kesubos 52a; Rosh Kesubos 4:22 in name of Rameh; Kesubos 52a “Up until 10 times her value”; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; See Maharam Milublin 15

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that a husband may not pay more than market value even to redeem his wife. [Michaber E.H. 78:2, as learns Beis Shmuel and Chelkas Mechokeik 78:2 in his opinion, that it is forbidden to do so; Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel Kesubos 52a-b; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:4 that he may not do so]

[87] The reason: As Ishto Kigufo, a man’s wife is like his own body, and hence the husband may redeem her for more than her value just as he may redeem himself for more than his value. [Tosafus ibid and ibid]

[88] Michaber E.H. 78:2; Shach Y.D. 252:11; Simple understanding of Rama 78:2; Rambam Ishus 14:19; Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel in Kesubos 52a; Rif Kesubos 19a

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by the first time she is held captive, the husband is obligated to pay up to 10 times her value [Beis Shmuel E.H. 78:2 in opinion of Rama ibid; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; Tana Kama in Kesubos 52a “He must pay up until 10 times her value”; See Maharam Milublin 15; Chelkas Mechokeik 78:2 in opinion of Rama]

[89] See Shach 252:11 “and not himself”; Beis Shmuel E.H. 78:2

[90] Implication of Michaber 252:4 that the only exception to the Takana is to redeem oneself for more than his market value; Shach 252:4 in opinion of Michaber ibid; Implication of Michaber E.H. 78:2, as learns Beis Shmuel and Chelkas Mechokeik 78:2 in his opinion, that it is forbidden to do so even by one’s wife; Possible implication of Rama E.H. 78:2 that only one’s wife may be redeemed for more than her value and that other relatives [however, see Beis Shemuel and Chelkas Mechokeik ibid who entertain that perhaps the intention of the Rama ibid is that the husband is obligated to do so]; Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel Kesubos 52a-b; Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a; Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38 in his main approach; See Ran Gittin 22b; All Poskim ibid who rule that Ligrivu Tfei is main reason;

[91] The reason: According to the second approach, it is forbidden to redeem a captive for more than the value of the captive, as irrelevant of who pays the ransom money, paying more money than the market value motivates future kidnappings, and is a danger to the community. [Rashi Gittin ibid]

[92] Shach 252:4 in name of Bach 252; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66 that so is the custom today; Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38 in his Limud Zechus approach that the Rif and Rosh did not give a conclusion in this matter, and that so agrees the Maharam Milublin ibid; All Poskim ibid who rule that Duchka Detzibura is main reason; Bigdei Yom Tov 37; Shema Avraham 12; Meiyn Ganim 18

[93] The reason: According to the first approach it is permitted to redeem a captive even if the value is much more than the value of the captive, being that it does not entail a financial burden onto the community. [Shach ibid; Rashi ibid]

[94] Shach ibid; Bach ibid; Derech Emunah Matanos Aniyim 8:78 that so is custom; See Rashal and Radbaz ibid that today we are anyways lenient to redeem

[95] See Pischeiy Teshuvah 252:4

The story of Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Chanania and a debate of its understanding: The Gemara in Gittin 58a states: Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Chanania visited a large metropolitan in Rome and was told that there is a certain very beautiful Jewish child incarcerated in the local prison. He went to the person and had a conversation with the child and realized that the child is a prodigy of Torah scholarship and stated that he is assured that he will become a great Torah leader amongst Israel and hence he will not move from his place until he redeems him for all the money that is requested. They say, that he did not move from there until he redeemed him for a large sum of money and it was not very long until he became a great leader among Israel and his name was Rebbe Yishmael Ben Elisha. [See Shaar Hagilgulim Hakdama 38 that he was a Gilgul of Yosef Hatzadik, and hence had beautiful hair, and was held in prison] The Rishonim all question the basis for this redemption for more than the value of the captive which contradicts the institution of the sages, and several answers are given, including: 1) it was a case of danger of life, and by danger of life the sages did not institute the regulation. [1^st answer in Tosafus Gittin 58a; 2^nd answer brought and negated in Ramban Gittin 45a; 2^nd answer in Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a] 2) the institution does not apply to a Torah prodigy. [1^st answer in Tosafus Gittin 45a; 2^nd answer in Tosafus Gittin 58a; Ramban Gittin 45a; 3^rd approach in Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a] 3) During times of the Churban the Takana of Ligrivu Tfei is not relevant. [2^nd answer in Tosafus Gittin 45a; 1^st answer in Ramban Gittin 45a; 1^st answer in Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a] See Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38 for why Tosafus in the two areas did not bring both reasons

[96] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; 2^nd answer in Tosafus Gittin 58a based on story of Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Chanania; 2^nd answer in Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a; Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38 according to reason of Duchka Detzibura and that one may choose to follow this reason; Nachalas Leyehoshua 5, brought in Ashel Avraham Otzer Mefarshim 3, brought in Pischeiy Tehsuvah ibid; Sdei Chemed 74; Erech Lechem of Maharikash 252; Beis Hillel 252:2; Beis Dovid Y.D. 120

[97] The reason: Now, although every captive is considered to be in a state of Pikuach Nefesh as explicitly recorded in the Talmud Bava Basra 8b based on the verse in Yirmiyah, nonetheless, a general captive which is held for purposes of ransom is not found in a state of immediate danger, as opposed to one whose life is being immediately threatened. [Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a; Sdei Chemed Divrei Chachamim 77; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1 footnote 5]

[98] Ramban Gittin 45a; Maharam Milublin 15 “Not one Posek has ever written that if the captives life is under threat, then one may redeem him for more than his value” [see, however, Beis Hillel 252:2, brought in Pischeiy Tehsuvah ibid who states that he forgot the Toasafus ibid who writes so; See however, Kneses Yechezkal ibid]; Yad Eliyahu 43, brought in Pischeiy Tehsuvah ibid; See Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38 that according to the reason of “Lo Ligrivu Tfei” the institution applies even in a case of danger of life for the captive;

[99] The reason: As every captive is considered to be in a state of Pikuach Nefesh as explicitly recorded in the Talmud Bava Basra 8b based on the verse in Yirmiyah, and nonetheless the sages instituted a restriction in redeeming them for more than their value, and hence the institution applies even in the case of immediate Pikuach Nefesh. [Ramban Gittin 45a]

[100] Kneses Yechezkal ibid; Sdei Chemed 74 that so rule most Rabbanim; Minchas Yitzchak Likkutei Teshuvos 110; Shevet Halevi 5:137-4; Yabia Omer C.M. 10:6; Shiurei Torah Lerofim in name of Rav Elyashiv that whenever it is a case of doubt regarding an institution, one may be lenient [See Maggid Mishneh Gezeila 4:7; Ketzos Hachosehn 362:3]; Derech Emunah Matanos Aniyim 8:78 that one is obligated to do so today; See Rashal and Radbaz ibid that today we are anyways lenient to redeem; Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid

[101] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; Radbaz 1:40; Pesakim Uteshuvos 252:1 footnote 8; See Maharam Milublin 15 who concludes that perhaps one may redeem a captive who may be converted to another religion if the captive once converted may become a source of anti-Semitism; See regarding redeeming the children after the father who caused himself to be captured passes away: Michaber Y.D. 252:6; Shach 252:6; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:13; Mishneh Gittin 46b and Gemara 47a; Sheilas Yaavetz 1:68, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 252:7

See regarding Desecrating Shabbos in order to help save a Jew from leaving Judaism:  Admur 396:29; Michaber 30614; Tosafus Shabbos 4a; Eiruvin 32:b; Gittin 41b; See also Admur 329:10; Rama 329:8

[102] See Ramban Gittin 45a; Shach 252:9-10; Beir Sheva p. 22

[103] Michaber Y.D. 252:4 “However, if the captive is a Torah scholar, or is a Torah student with seen potential for becoming a great scholar then they may be redeemed even for a large sum of money.”; 1^st answer in Tosafus Gittin 45a; 2^nd answer in Tosafus Gittin 58a; Rosh Gittin 4:44; Rashba Gittin 45a; Ran Gittin 23a; Ramban Gittin 45a; Ritva Kesubos 52b; Implication of Gittin 58a as was done by Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Chananya, as explained in 1^st approach in Tosafus Gittin 45a and 2^nd approach in Gittin 58a [however, according to the 2^nd approach in Tosafus Gittin 45a and 1^st approach in Gittin 58a the reason is not because he was a Gadol Hador.]; 3^rd approach in Meiri Beis Habechira Gittin 45a; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66 regarding Maharam of Rothernberg; Radbaz 1:40 and 498; Sefer Chassidim 925

[104] See Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66

[105] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; Nachlas Yehoshua 5; Bibayis El Cheder 58

[106] Radbaz 1:40

[107] Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66

[108] Tradition has it that a large ransom of 23,000 marks silver was raised for him.

[109] Michaber Y.D. 252:6-9

Redeeming a Canaanite slave taken into captive: See Michaber Y.D. 252:7 and Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:14 that he is to be redeemed as any other Jew if he converted.

[110] Michaber Y.D. 252:6; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:13; Mishneh Gittin 46b and Gemara 47a

[111] The reason: The reason for this is because we do not want the children to become assimilated amongst the Gentiles. [Shach ibid]

[112] Implication of Michaber ibid; Shach 252:6; Rashi Gittin 47

The reason: The reason for this is because so long as the father is alive and has control over his children’s education, there is no worry of assimilation, and hence no reason to exclude them from the restriction against redeeming after the third time. [Shach ibid; Rashi ibid]

[113] Shach 252:6

[114] Michaber 251:2; Rama 252:6; See Maharam Milublin 15; Kneses Yechezkal Y.D. 38; See Chasam Sofer Bava Basra 8a; Chidushei Chasam Sofer Shabbos 22a; Drashos 1:141; Toras Moshe Parshas Mikeitz; Parshas Beshalach that it is specifically observant Jews who have such suffering during captivity

[115] Shach 251:3; Taz 251:1

[116] No intention to rebel but transgresses due to lack of belief in the command: If the transgressor did not perform the transgression out of rebellion but rather simply out of lack of care/belief in the command then although there is no obligation to support him, nevertheless it is not forbidden to do so. [Implication of Shach 251:3, See Admur Hilchos Shechitah 2 who differentiates with regards to being allowed to shecht between one who just doesn’t believe/care about the command and one who has intention to rebel.]    

No intention to rebel and transgresses simply out of lust and leisure: If a person transgresses for reasons of leisure, then although there is no obligation to redeem him, nevertheless, there is no prohibition to do so. [Rama 251:2]

[117] Michaber Y.D. 252:8-9; Mishneh Horiyos 13a

[118] Michaber Y.D. 252:9; Mishneh Horiyos 13a

[119] Michaber Y.D. 252:8; Mishneh Horiyos 13a; Hagahos Mordechai Kesubos Remez 266

[120] See Rama ibid; Taz 252:6; Horiyos 13a that the life of a man takes precedence over the life of a woman

The reason: As a man is obligated in more Mitzvos. [Taz ibid]

[121] Implication of Michaber Y.D. 252:9 and Shach 252:9 who only mentions one’s mother as taking precedence over one’s own redemption, hence implying that only ones mother takes precedence to oneself and not another female.

[122] Michaber Y.D. 252:9; Mishneh Horiyos 13a

[123] Implication of Michaber ibid; Shach 252:9

[124] The reason: The reason for this is because it is a lot more degrading for her to be in captivity, as they commonly use her to sin [i.e. sexual rape]. Hence, although in general one is required to precede his father to his mother in honor and respect, nonetheless, regarding redeeming from captivity the mother receives precedence over the father due to the above reason. [Shach 252:9-10; Beir Sheva p. 22]

[125] Shach 252:10

[126] Michaber Y.D. 252:9; Mishneh Horiyos 13a

[127] Shach 252:8

[128] Michaber Y.D. 252:9; Mishneh Horiyos 13a

[129] Shach 252:8; Michaber 242:34

[130] Michaber Y.D. 252:10; Hagahos Mordechai Kesubos Remez 288

[131] Implication of Michaber ibid, as if she receives precedence over oneself, then certainly she receives precedence over one’s father whom one has precedence over.

Wife versus mother: Tzaruch Iyun if ones wife takes precedence over ones mother. Perhaps she takes precedence due to his Kesuba obligation to redeem her.

[132] Michaber Y.D. 252:11; Hagahos Mordechai Bava Kama Remez 59 in name of Maharam Merothenberg 39

[133] Shach 252:11; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; See Haflah Kesubos 52; Gilyonei Hashas Gittin ibid

[134] Michaber Y.D. 252:10; E.H. 78:1; Hagahos Mordechai Kesubos Remez 288

[135] Michaber E.H. 78:2; Shach Y.D. 252:11; Simple understanding of Rama 78:2; Rambam Ishus 14:19; Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel in Kesubos 52a; Rif Kesubos 19a

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by the first time she is held captive, the husband is obligated to pay up to 10 times her value [Beis Shmuel E.H. 78:2 in opinion of Rama ibid; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; Tana Kama in Kesubos 52a “He must pay up until 10 times her value”; See Maharam Milublin 15; Chelkas Mechokeik 78:2 in opinion of Rama]

[136] Implication of Michaber E.H. 78:2, as learns Chelkas Mechokeik 78:2, that he may do so; Rama E.H. 78:2 [see Rama Y.D. 252:4]; Shach Y.D. 252:4 and 11; Beis Shmuel E.H. 78:2; Chelkas Mechokeik E.H. 78:2; Bach 252; Tur E.H. 78; Tosafus Gittin 45a; Tosafus Kesubos 52a; Rosh Kesubos 4:22 in name of Rameh; Kesubos 52a “Up until 10 times her value”; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:66; See Maharam Milublin 15

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that a husband may not pay more than market value even to redeem his wife. [Michaber E.H. 78:2, as learns Beis Shmuel and Chelkas Mechokeik 78:2 in his opinion, that it is forbidden to do so; Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel Kesubos 52a-b]

[137] Shach 252:4 and 11

[138] Michaber E.H. 78:1, 3; Rambam Ishus 14:19; Kesubos 52b

Other opinions: Some Tanaim were of the opinion that the husband is never obligated to pay more than the value of her Kesuba, nor of her market value, whatever is less. [Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel in Kesubos 52b “Trei Kueli Is Bei”]

[139] See Shach 252:11 “and not himself”; Beis Shmuel E.H. 78:2 in opinion of Rama ibid that it is an obligation to do so

[140] Michaber and Rama 252:12

[141] Michaber Y.D. 252:12; Hagahos Mordechai Bava Metzia Remez 367 in name of Maharam Merothenberg 39 based on Kiddushin 18a

[142] Rama Y.D. 252:12; Hagahos Mordechai Bava Metzia Remez 367 in name of Maharam Merothenberg 39; Bava Kama Remez 59

[143] Shach 252:4 and 11

[144] Michaber Y.D. 252:5; Mishneh Gittin 45a; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:12

[145] Gittin 45a

[146] Michaber Y.D. 252:5; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:12

[147] Michaber ibid; Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:12; Mishneh Gittin ibid

The reason: The Tana Kama in the Mishneh ibid states that the reason is due to Tikkun Haolam, while Rav Shimon Ben Gamliel says that it is a Tikkun for other captives. The Talmud states that the practical ramification between the two approaches is regarding if there’s only one captive. According to the first approach, one may not help a single captive escape while according to the second approach, if there is only one captive one may help him escape.

[148] Implication of Michaber ibid; Beir Hagoleh ibid; Pirush Hamishnayos of Rambam on Mishneh Gittin ibid 4:6

[149] Chavos Yair 213, brought in Pischeiy Tehsuvah 252:6; Peri Chadash 252; Ritva Gittin; Derech Emuna 79 on Rambam Matanos Aniyim 8:12; See story in Gittin 45a with Rav Ilish who ran away despite leaving Benos Rav Nachman there

[150] See Omek Hapeshat 122 Devarim

[151] Admur 329:8 “Although every individual is obligated to even desecrate Shabbos in order to save the life of another Jew, even if there is doubt as to whether they will be saved, nevertheless, if there is danger [involved in trying to save the Jew] one may not endanger himself in order to save his friend because [in the meantime] he is not within the range of danger. [This applies] even if one is witnessing the death of his friend and even if his danger [in trying to save him] is doubtful while his friend’s is certain, nevertheless [he is not to put himself in danger to save him].”; 2^nd opinion in Admur Choshen Mishpat Hilchos Nizkeiy Haguf Vehanefesh Halacha 7 in parentheses; Issur Viheter 59:38; Elya Zuta 329:4; Smeh 426:2 based on omission of all Rishonim and Poskim; M”B 329:19

[152] The reason: The reason for this is as the verse states, “You shall live by them” and not that one should come into doubt of death through fulfilling the Mitzvah of “Do not stand by the blood of your friend.” [Admur ibid]

[153] 1^st opinion in Admur Choshen Mishpat Hilchos Nizkeiy Haguf Vehanefesh Halacha 7 “One who sees a friend drowning in the sea or that murderers are coming upon him and he is able to personally save him or to hire someone to help save him, then he is obligated to trouble himself to hire others to save him, and he then returns and collects the money from the victim if the victim has the money, and if not then he may not refrain from [paying to help save him], and if he does refrain from doing so then he transgresses the command of “do not idle while your friends blood is being spilled. Even to enter oneself into a questionable case of danger there are opinions who say that one must do in order to help save his friend from definite death.” [Omitted from Admur Hilchois Shabbos ibid; This difference of ruling as well as the parentheses given by Admur in Nizkei Haguf is discussed by the Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos 28 p. 153 footnote 19. The Rebbe does not give any concluding stance on this subject.]; Hagahos Maimanos Rotzeiach 1:14 in name of Yerushalmi; Radbaz Leshonos Harambam 1582

[154] Conclusion of Admur in Choshen Mishpat Hilchos Nizkeiy Haguf Vehanefesh Halacha 7 in parentheses

[155] Choshen Mishpat 426:2; M”B 328:19; Shevet Halevi 8:87; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 329:9

[156] See Orchos Rabbeinu 1:366; Shiurei Torah Lerofim  2:138; Yabia Omer C.M. 10:6 regarding a hostage deal to release terrorists by the Air France hijacking in Entebbe; Rav Tzvi Shechter in Ikvei Tzoan 32; Chavas Binyamin [Yisraeli] 16; Koveitz Or Hamizrach 40:212; Siach Yitzchak Gittin 45a; Omek Hapeshat 122 Devarim

[157] See Rav Tzvi Shechter in Ikvei Tzoan 32

[158] Orchos Rabbeinu ibid

[159] Yabia Omer ibid

[160] Yabia Omer ibid

[161] Chavas Binyamin [Yosraeli] 16; Koveitz Or Hamizrach 40:212

[162] See Koveitz Or Hamizrach 40:212

[163] Orchos Rabbeinu ibid; See Yabia Omer ibid

[164] See Rama Y.D. 157:1; Yerushalmi Terumos 8:4; Tosefta Terumos 7:23; Rambam Yesodei Hatorah 5:5; See Yabia Omer ibid; Koveitz Or Hamizrach 40:212

[165] Omek Hapeshat 122 Devarim in name of Rav Shmulevitz and Rav Moshe Shternbuch

[166] Rav Tzvi Shechter in Ikvei Tzoan 32 and in name of Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky regarding giving money in exchange for hostages and certainly this would apply to releasing terrorists in exchange for hostages

[167] Orchos Rabbeinu ibid; Yabia Omer C.M. 10:6 in name of Rabbanim: Rav Ovadia Yosef, Rav Elyashiv, Rav Yisraeili, Rav S”Z Aurbach, Rav Zaluti, Rav Goldshmit, Rav Bentziyon Aba Shaul; Siach Yitzchak Gittin 45a; Minchas Yitzchak Likkutim 110; Shiurei Torah Lerofim  2:138 in name of Rav Elyashiv; Shamru Mishpat 4:689; Mishnas Hamishpat p. 197; Devar Yehoshua 5 Y.D. 15 and 17

[168] Orchos Rabbeinu ibid

[169] Minchas Yitzchak Likkutim 110; Shiurei Torah Lerofim  2:138 in name of Rav Elyashiv

[170] The reason: As the terrorists are in any event motivated to continue the kidnappings, as well as that during times of destruction and war the concept of Lo Ligrivu does not apply. [Rav Eylashiv ibid]

[171] Rav Tzvi Shechter in Ikvei Tzoan 32 and that so ruled Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky; Koveitz Or Hamizrach 40:212; Omek Hapeshat 122 Devarim in name of Rav Shmulevitz and Rav Moshe Shternbuch and many Rabbanim

The story with Rav Yitzchak Hutner: When Rav Yitzchak Hutner was taken hostage in the hijacked plane in Jordan in 1970, his students in America desired to arrange his release in exchange for giving millions of dollars to the terrorists. While some Rabbanim defended this action on the basis that the monetary limitations of ransom payments do not apply to a Torah scholar, Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky ruled that it is forbidden to do so in this case, as it is a time of war and it is forbidden to help the enemy and give them money.

[172] The reason: 1) As the state of Israel is in a constant state of war with its enemies, and hence even payment of a monetary ransom is forbidden and certainly the release of terrorists. [Rav Tzvi Shechter ibid; Omek Hapeshat 122 Devarim in name of Rav Shmulevitz and Rav Moshe Shternbuch] 2) As releasing the terrorists will cause more Jews to be killed. 3) It encourages future kidnappings. [Omek Hapeshat 122 Devarim in name of Rav Shmulevitz and Rav Moshe Shternbuch] 4) There is no obligation to redeem a Mumar.

[173] See Koveitz Or Hamizrach 40:212; After the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Israel exchanged all its Palestinian prisoners and POWs from Arab armies in exchange for all Israeli soldiers and civilians taken captive during the war.

[174] See Siach Yitzchak Gittin 45a who concludes this way in the name of his brother even prior to the October 7 attacks, and certain this would apply now.

[175] Yabia Omer C.M. 10:6

[176] See Siach Yitzchak Gittin 45a; Abirei Bavel p. 359

[177] Sichas Motzei Parshas Bamidbar 5739 regarding the 76 terrorists that were exchanged for one Israeli soldier, Avraham Amram; See also Igros Kodesh 31 p. 332 regarding the discussion to release terrorists in exchange for the hostages that were later released in the Entebbe operation in which the Rebbe expresses surprise that no one thought of the fact that perhaps even after an agreement is reached with the terrorists and the release of the terrorist prisoners takes place, the terrorists will not agree to release all the hostages alive.

[178] During a yechidus with an Israeli official, the Rebbe strongly criticized the Israeli governments policy of arresting and imprisoning Arab terrorists. “You are mistaken when you arrest and imprison terrorists,” the Rebbe warned. “These terrorists came to kill and they should be killed. You’re going to end up paying dearly when they demand the release of these killers in a prisoner exchange.”