Is it permitted to place money on a table as bait to identify a thief?[1]

In situations where a person suspects that theft has taken place within his home or business, he may wish to discover who is responsible in order to prevent further loss and to protect his property. One common method is to place money openly on a table or surface to observe whether anyone will take it. However, this raises a significant halachic question: does intentionally placing money in a visible spot—knowing that someone may be tempted to take it—constitute the prohibition of lifnei iver, placing a stumbling block before the blind? This prohibition applies even against causing a Gentile to stumble and being that Gentiles are also prohibited against stealing, this question remains relevant even if the suspected thief is a Gentile.

The Dispute:

The Stringent View: Some Poskim[2], drawing on various Talmudic sources[3], rule that purposely placing money in a conspicuous area to test or catch a potential thief is forbidden. The reason for this is because it could be considered a violation of lifnei iver. According to this position, by creating a situation in which a person might stumble into theft, the homeowner is seen as facilitating wrongdoing, even if his intention is merely to uncover the identity of the thief.

• May one be Mafkir the money beforehand according to Stringent View: Some Poskim[4] rule, based on one interpretation of the Talmud, the above actions are prohibited even if the owner first designates the money as ownerless (hefker) before placing it on the table. This is because the potential individual is unaware of the change in ownership status, and a person who intends to commit a transgression is regarded as culpable, even when there are legal grounds that might exempt them from wrongdoing. However, other Poskim[5] rule based on another interpretation of the Talmud, that if the owner declares the money ownerless (hefker) before placing it on the table, then it is permitted to test the suspected individual. In this view, since the money no longer belongs to anyone, the act of taking it does not constitute theft, and therefore there is no violation of lifnei iver. The individual who takes the money is not actually committing a transgression, as the item is legally ownerless, and thus the concern of causing another to sin does not apply in this scenario.

The Lenient View: Other Poskim[6] rule, based on other Talmudic sources[7], that placing money in one’s home to determine who is stealing is entirely permissible and does not fall under lifnei iver. Their reasoning is because the owner is not inciting or encouraging theft but simply observing what would naturally happen and the purpose is protective and investigative, not to cause a person to sin. Furthermore, a person is not obligated to guard his belongings so it not be stolen and he has the right to leave his belongings wherever he wishes. Thus, according to these opinions, the homeowner may place the money without concern for Lifnei Iver.

The Final Ruling:

The practical halachic ruling is that one may place money in his home in order to discover who the thief is, as many authorities hold that doing so does not constitute a violation of lifnei iver, and so seems to be the opinion of Admur. Moreover, even according to the stringent view that initially forbids creating a situation in which another person might stumble, many permit the practice when the money is first declared hefker, and therefore, in practice, one may rely on the lenient opinion outright, and certainly may do so if he declares the money ownerless beforehand.

[1] See Torah Lishma 406 who addresses this very question; Ben Ish Chaiy in his Sefer Beniyahu on Kiddushin 32a; Seridei Eish C.M. 3:61-62; Yaskil Avdi 8:43-17; Asei Lecha Rav 7:71 [Shut Hamekutzar] and 8:88; Mishpitei Hatorah 1:78; Torasecha Shashuaiy 40; Ein Lamo Michshol 1 p. 233 and 9 p. 271; Lireiacha Kamocha 9 Kuntrus Vehabiurim 1; Avnei Derech 7:201; Shamru Mishpat 1:126; Torasecha Shashuaiy 40; Marachei Hashulchan 38; Halichos Bein Adam Lichaveiro 15:41; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Lifnei Iver Vol. 36. P. 334-337

[2] Torah Lishma 406 [of Ben Ish Chaiy]; Ben Ish Chaiy in his Sefer Beniyahu on Kiddushin ibid [Only permits if Mafkir money beforehand]; Initial question in Seridei Eish C.M. 61; Rav SZ”A in Minchas Shlomo Tinyana 133:7-9; Rav Ezra Batzri in Dinei Mamanos 4:9; Rav Baruch Shraga in Vehayah Haolam C.M. 35; See Poskim in Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnotes 294-295

[3] The Torah Lishma ibid and Seridei Eish base this position on several Gemaras, including: Kiddushin 32a and Tosafus there; Moed Katan with the story of Rebbe and his maidservant; Bava Metzia 75b regarding the Issur of lending without proof

Background from Talmud Kiddushin: See Kiddushin 32a “Rav Huna tore a silk garment in front of his son Raba Bar Rav Huna in order to test him to see if he would get angry. He did so when his son was already angry over another issue. By doing so, he did not transgress the prohibition of Lifnei Iver being that he had already forgiven his honor. He likewise did not transgress the prohibition of Bal Tashchis being that he tore it in an area where it would not lose any of its value.”; Tosafos on Kiddushin 32a explains that we must assume Rav Huna informed his son beforehand that he had relinquished his honor, for had the son been unaware of this, he would still have been violating a prohibition. This scenario is analogous to the case discussed in Kiddushin (81b), involving an individual who intends to consume non-kosher meat but inadvertently eats kosher meat. Such an individual is nonetheless required to seek atonement for their actions. Accordingly, Rav Huna would still be considered in violation of the prohibition against “lifnei eever.” Based on the referenced Tosafos, it can be concluded that even if Rav Huna’s objective was to educate his son, any situation in which he might potentially cause his son to transgress a prohibition would subject him to the restrictions imposed by the principle of “lifnei Iver.” The Ritva however also addresses Tosafos’ question but provides a different perspective: because the test serves the son’s best interests, Rav Huna would not violate the principle of “lifnei eever” so long as the son is not actually committing a wrongdoing, given that Rav Huna has already waived his honor. In essence, if it is possible to prevent the son from erring by relinquishing one’s personal honor, this step should be taken. However, since disclosing this information to the son may undermine the educational value of the exercise, it is permissible, for pedagogical purposes, to proceed with the test without informing the son that his father had already forgiven his honor; thus, the father would not be in violation of “lifnei eever.” Based on this reasoning, in situations where an individual wishes to administer such a test to evaluate a child’s honesty, the permissibility would hinge on the aforementioned dispute between Tosafos and the Ritva. If disclosing that the wallet is “hefker” (ownerless) renders the test unfeasible, conducting the test without such disclosure would, according to Tosafos, constitute a transgression of “lifnei eever.”

[4] Torah Lishma ibid based on Tosafus Kiddushin ibid, brought in previous footnote, and Nazir 23, and Kiddushin 81b, unlike his Pirush on Kiddushin ibid in Beniyahu

[5] Ben Ish Chaiy in his Sefer Beniyahu on Kiddushin ibid based on intrepertation of Ritva on Kiddushin ibid “Regarding the incident of Rav Huna and his son Rabbah, the Ritva writes that it is difficult, for the son did not know that his father had waived his honor, and it is therefore comparable to one who intended to eat pork but, by mistake, ate lamb—who still requires atonement, as stated in Nazir 23a. And it is possible that this does not violate lifnei iver lo titen michshol, since this is a ‘general prohibition,’ and in such cases we are not overly stringent, and we permit it in order to test him to see whether he becomes angry, etc. “From this matter I learned another ruling: when a person hires a servant in his home and is uncertain whether he is suspected of theft, he may wish to test him by throwing a silver dinar into his courtyard in such a way that it appears to have fallen from him, and then observe what the servant will do. If the servant is honest, he will see the dinar, pick it up, and bring it to the homeowner; but if he is a thief, he will take it for himself and consume it. The question is whether this constitutes lifnei iver, for perhaps he is a thief and will take it, thereby transgressing the prohibition of ‘You shall not steal’ (Leviticus 19:11). I suggested that the homeowner should first declare the coin ownerless (hefker). Then, when the servant takes it for himself, he is not committing theft at all, since it is hefker and he acquires it lawfully by the laws of ownerless property. And if one objects that since the servant does not know it is hefker and intends to take it for himself, the homeowner who threw the dinar is nevertheless violating lifnei iver, the Ritva teaches us that in such situations we are not stringent, and we permit it in order to test him.”; Halichos Bein Adam Lichaveiro 15:41

[6] See Admur Hilchos Ribis Veiska Halacha 1 [unlike the wording in Tur 160; Ramban Devarim 23:1, see Hearos Ubiurim 883 p. 72] “A person must be extremely, extremely careful regarding the prohibition of interest (ribbit), whether the loan is to a poor person or to a wealthy person, for the Torah issued several negative commandments and warnings—even upon the borrower—unlike other monetary laws, where if a person wishes to allow himself to be robbed he may do so. But regarding interest, because of the severity of the sin, the Torah also warned the borrower.”; Seridei Eish C.M. 3:61-62 “All the more so in our case, where he is not handing the object to the other person at all, but merely leaving it in his courtyard, and the other comes and steals it. There is no logic to forbid a person from leaving his belongings unsecured out of fear that someone might come, steal them, and thereby violate lifnei iver. It is obvious that in such a case there is no prohibition of lifnei iver.”; Yaskil Avdi 8:43-17 “According to this, there is no prohibition, for he is merely making a general statement, and he can also say that he intended only to test him, etc. This shows explicitly that whenever the intent is to test him, it is obvious that there is no prohibition of lifnei iver. Certainly, there is also no prohibition even of ‘assisting’ (mesaye’a), since he never intended to cause him to sin, but only to test him—especially in our case, where the homeowner’s sole intention is for his own benefit, to know whether the person is trustworthy so that he may keep him in his employ. Furthermore, I would add that this too is ultimately for the benefit of the servant himself. For if, Heaven forbid, he were to stumble, the employer would dismiss him from his position, and by seeing that his misconduct leads to the loss of his livelihood, he will be compelled to improve his ways and repent from his wrongful actions. Thus, the employer is actually doing him a favor, for through this he will correct his behavior in the future and thereby earn his share in this world and the next. Otherwise, he would lose his portion in this world—since no one would be willing to employ him—and he would also lose his share in the World to Come, for he would suffer full punishment with no one to redeem or save him from before the Blessed One.”; Asei Lecha Rav 7:71 [Shut Hamekutzar] and 8:88 “In conclusion, it is certain that there is absolutely no prohibition of lifnei iver lo titen michshol, and it is permissible according to the letter of the law to test a housemaid to determine whether she is trustworthy. However, it appears to me that one should not follow the opinion of the author of Yaskil Avdi, who permitted testing her by placing actual cash openly, for as I explained there, it is not typical at all for a person to leave sums of money lying out in the open.”; Mishpitei Hatorah 1:78; Torasecha Shashuaiy 40; Ein Lamo Michshol 1 p. 233 and 9 p. 271; Lireiacha Kamocha 9 Kuntrus Vehabiurim 1; Marachei Hashulchan 38; See Poskim in Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnotes 296

[7] See Seridei Eish ibid “It further seems to me that it is permissible based on what the Ritva writes in Avodah Zarah 63a: A person may say to his donkey-drivers and laborers, ‘Go and buy food with this dinar,’ and he need not be concerned with violations of Shevi’it or of tithes. The Ritva asks: does this not constitute a transgression of lifnei iver (placing a stumbling block)? See there, where he answers that whenever we are not handing someone an actual prohibition, but rather giving him something permitted—while merely fearing that he might use it in a prohibited manner—there is no violation of lifnei iver, because we may attribute it to the possibility that he will not commit a sin, and a person is not obligated to guard his fellow from wrongdoing. This is an explicit Mishnah in Shevi’it (5:8): Beit Shammai say that a person may not sell a plowing cow during Shemitah, whereas Beit Hillel permit it, because the buyer may slaughter it [instead of using it for prohibited plowing]. And see Avodah Zarah 15b, where Rav Ashi says: ‘Whenever it is possible to attribute the situation [to a permitted use], we do so.”