Guidelines and restrictions regarding communication with a former spouse:

1. The Halachic issues:

Contrary to popular belief and societal norms, not only do there exist communication restrictions between an ex-husband and wife according to Jewish law, but furthermore they are actually stricter in nature. Meaning, in addition to the regular interaction restrictions that exist between two people of the opposite gender who are not married, the sages enacted additional restrictions between divorcees. The reason for this is simple; being that the two individuals were once married, they remain extremely comfortable with each other, and even a platonic and innocent interaction can lead to sinful activity.[1] Hence, even some of those activities and interactions that are permitted between two people of the opposite gender who are not married, are restricted amongst the divorcees even if they are on very friendly terms and it was not a tumultuous divorce. The following are some examples of these restrictions:

• Collecting a debt or other claim from an ex-spouse:[2] An ex-wife may not collect a debt directly from her ex-husband; instead, she must appoint an emissary to do so. The reverse applies as well—an ex-husband must send an emissary if collecting a debt from his ex-wife. Any claims or financial dealings must avoid direct interaction.[3]
• Appearing in court with an ex-spouse:[4] It is forbidden for an ex-wife to appear in court together with her ex-husband. Doing so can result in penalties such as excommunication or Rabbinical lashes (Makas Mardus).[5]
• Entering the home of the ex-spouse: Forms of contact that do not involve communication are permitted, and hence, the ex-husband may enter the home of his ex-wife even if she remarried.[6] Some Poskim[7] however are stringent [in all cases].[8] [Practically, one may be lenient like the former opinion.[9] This especially applies if one will only be in her home for 1-2 hours or if there are many other Jews around.[10]]

1. The law regarding conversations:

Based on the above laws which are clearly recorded in the Shulchan Aruch, some Poskim[11] conclude that it goes without saying that it is forbidden for the divorcees to speak with each other at all even in public in the marketplace [and certainly not in private]. [While this ruling seems obvious based on the previous restrictions, it is not explicitly recorded in the other Poskim and creates a major challenge for ex-spouses in the common reality in which there are still matters that remain unsolved in their previous joint life together, which requires communication between the parties. Most importantly, navigating child custody times and arrangements, requires communication of both parents with each other, and forcing this communication to go through a third person is often stressful and challenging. Furthermore, it creates a challenge in the event that the parents need to speak and brainstorm about the child’s education and his upbringing, and hence we will explore if any leniency’s are applicable.]

Applicable leniencies: Some Poskim[12] rule that the above speaking restrictions between the exes only applies against having a lengthy conversation, however, a short conversation is permitted even in public. Furthermore, even a lengthy conversation is only forbidden in a public setting in front of many people, however when taken place in private, or inconspicuously, then it is permitted for them to have a conversation even in length, so long as the Yichud prohibition is not transgressed. Furthermore, some Poskim[13] suggest that the entire restriction is only regarding speaking of monetary matters, however to speak of other topics, such as the education of their children, is permitted. Other Poskim[14] however negate this differentiation and rule that the stringency applies towards all topics of conversation. Nonetheless, another major suggestive leniency is with regards to the forms of communication. It is highly probable that the intended restriction of the sages against communication, only applied regarding face-to-face communication. However, to speak through telephone or other technological forms of communication was never forbidden to begin with, as the chance of it leading to a spontaneous sin is impractical. Practically, this is the accepted ruling today to permit for the exes to speak with each other over the phone when necessary especially with regards to their children’s education and custody.

Practical directive: In all cases that communication between the ex-spouses can take place through a third party, then so shall be done in order to avoid direct communication and the restriction mentioned above. In all cases that this is not possible, then they may hold conversation over the phone or email and the like, but not face-to-face. Nonetheless, a short and limited conversation such as a mere greeting, is allowed even face-to-face.

1. Practical applications and examples:

Exchanging greetings: Seemingly, it is permitted for the exes to exchange greetings if they bump into each other or meet each other at a joint engagement, and it is only lengthy conversation that is restricted.

To get remarried: Certainly, it is permitted for the exes to enter even deep conversation with each other and go out on dates with the intent of remarrying.

Shabbos meals: So long as there is no Yichud prohibition involved, from the letter of the law, it remains permitted for the two exes to be present at the same Shabbos meal. However, other than a light and short greeting, it is forbidden for them to converse. Practically, it is strongly advised to avoid these situations due to the uncomfortably of the speaking restrictions. Furthermore, one can argue that joining a Shabbos meal together is to close of an interaction and falls under the same restriction as brought above regarding going to court together. Hence, this only be permitted by large public Shabbos meal such as in a Chabad house or shul Kiddush, or the home of a host who is having many guests, and not if they will be the sole guests, and certainly not if they are joining each other’s Shabbos meal in one of their homes.

Shabbos guest: Regarding if an ex-spouse may stay for Shabbos at their exes, such as in the event of a joint family Simcha, then from the letter of the law so long as there is no Yichud prohibition involved, and they limit conversation to the bare minimum, then it is permitted to be done. Nonetheless, as stated above regarding Shabbos meals, it is strongly advised for this to be avoided, an argument can be made to prohibited from the letter of the law. Hence, this should only be done if there is absolutely no other lodging option available for the spouse, and only in the event that there will be lots of guests at the home, such as in the event of a Simcha with many family members who have arrived.

Conversation about custody and their joint children: It is permitted for the exes to hold conversations over the phone or other form of technological communication regarding the education of their children and/or visitation arrangements. However, they should not speak face-to-face regarding this matter if it will be a lengthy discussion.

Picking up the kids: It is permitted for one to enter his exes house in order to pick up his kids or visit them. Nonetheless, it is best for the two exes to not be in the same home during the visitation, and hence usually the Beis Din arranges visitations in a way that they will not be together in the same house.

[1] Rashi Kesubos 28b; Taz 119:19; Peri Chadash 119:7

[2] Michaber E.H. 119:8; Kesubos 28b

[3] Chelkas Mechokeik 119:24

[4] Michaber 119:9; Rav Papa in Kesubos ibid

[5] The reason: As the business relationship, can lead to promiscuity. [Peri Chadash 119:7]

Eirusin: If the couple only performed Kedushin and not Nesuin and then divorced, it is permitted for her to have dealings with him, such as to ask him to come to court and have a court case with him. If however the ex-husband is very comfortable with her, then it is forbidden. [Michaber 119:10]

[6] Stam opinion in Rama 119/8; Implication of Terumos Hadeshen ibid; Chelkas Mechokeik 119/24; Peri Chadash 119/7

The reason: As he does not live there, and has no business dealings with her. [Rama ibid]

[7] 2^nd opinion in Rama ibid; conclusion of Beis Yosef; Taz 119:19 “Certainly this is completely forbidden and the Rama should not have brought the lenient opinion at all.”

[8] The reason: As since he is familiar with her and recognizes her flirtatious signals, entering her home may lead to promiscuity. [Taz 119:19]

[9] Chelkas Mechokeik 119:24 “I don’t know a good reason for the stringent opinion and one who is lenient does not lose out”; Peri Chadash 119:8 “This opinion’s logic is clear and the stringent opinion makes no sense”; Beir Heiytiv 119:17 “The Poskim strongly questioned the stringent opinion”

[10] Aruch Hashulchan 119:31

[11] Chelkas Mechokeik 119:23

[12] Olas Yitzchak 1 E.H. 151

[13] Beir Eliyahu 3 E.H. 101; Olas Yitzchak ibid in name of Devar Halacha; Mishpatecha Leyaakov 6 E.H. 6

[14] Olas Yitzchak ibid; Mishpitei Uziel 7:95