Chapter 1: The obligation of Chinuch[1]

Introduction

1. Habituation – The meaning of the word Chinuch:[2]

The Hebrew word chinuch, commonly translated as education—a term often understood today as the simple transmission of knowledge and information—carries a meaning far richer and deeper than its modern usage suggests. At its root, the term does not merely refer to the transmission of information. Rather, it denotes a beginning—the initiation of a person into something new, as explained in Rashi.[3] The Rambam[4] explains slightly differently that the word implies limmud ve’hargel: learning combined with habituation. Chinuch, then, is not only about teaching a concept or skill, but about guiding a person until that new reality becomes familiar and internalized. It is the process of helping someone grow accustomed to new expectations, values, or behaviors, until they feel natural rather than foreign. In this sense, education is a dual act. We introduce the child to something new, and at the same time, we patiently help them become comfortable living within it. True chinuch is not achieved at the moment of instruction, but at the point where learning transforms into practice and habit. Practically speaking, this means that it is not enough to simply teach a child information—whether about Torah, mitzvot, good character traits, or other values. Chinuch requires far more than instruction alone. A parent or educator must guide the child consistently and remain involved until those teachings are fully internalized.

True education occurs when the child does not merely know what is right, but begins to live what he has been taught. The values must move from theory into practice, shaping the child’s behavior, choices, and way of life. Chinuch is complete only when the lessons taught become values the child embraces and acts upon naturally.

• Example: For example, when little Avi Cohen learns how to make a bracha, chinuch is not just showing him the words. Real chinuch happens when Avi automatically says the bracha before eating, without being reminded. Education is complete only when knowledge turns into habit.

1. Beyond Academics – The Six Areas of Chinuch According to Halacha

A child’s education according to Halacha is not confined to a single domain of Jewish observance. Rather, there are several distinct areas in which a parent is obligated to guide and develop their child. Each area addresses a different aspect of the child’s growth and together they form a complete and balanced Frum Jew as Hashem truly desires and wants.

1. Mitzvah Fulfillment: A child must be educated in the fulfillment of mitzvahs, learning how to perform them and becoming accustomed to doing so, as will be explained in Halacha 1.
2. Torah Study: A child must be taught Torah, cultivating knowledge of the Torah as well as a connection to learning, understanding, and intellectual growth, as will be explained in Halacha 4.
3. Good Midos: Education must also focus on the development of good character traits, such as honesty, responsibility, sensitivity, and self‑control, as will be explained in Chapter 3 Halacha 1.
4. Life success: A child must be prepared in areas that will enable him to earn an honest and sufficient livelihood, developing skills, discipline, and attitudes necessary for a productive and dignified job, as will be explained in Chapter 3 Halacha 2.
5. Safety: A child must be educated in matters of personal safety, learning how to protect himself physically and emotionally and how to act responsibly in the world, as will be explained in Chapter 3 Halacha 5.
6. Marriage: A child must be educated toward marriage, learning the values, attitudes, and responsibilities necessary to build a healthy and respectful home, as will be explained in Chapter 3 Halacha 6.

Each of these areas plays a vital role in the child’s development. They will be explored and elaborated upon throughout this and the coming chapters.

1. The Biblical exemption of a Child from fulfilling Mitzvos:[5]

From a Biblical perspective, a child is exempt from the fulfillment of all Mitzvos, whether Biblical or Rabbinic, until he or she reaches the age of bar and bas mitzvah.[6] It is precisely for this reason that the sages established the mitzvah of Chinuch, as will be explained in the next Halacha.

Age of Mitzvos for Boy:[7] When a boy turns 13 years of age, he becomes obligated in Torah and Mitzvos.[8]

Age of Mitzvos for Girl:[9] When a girl turns 12 years of age she becomes Biblically obligated in Torah and Mitzvos.[10]

Signs of puberty:[11] Even after the age of 12 or 13, a boy and girl only becomes Biblically obligated in Torah and Mitzvos if he has grown two pubic hairs, otherwise he is only Rabbinically obligated in Torah and Mitzvos. Practically, once a boy reaches the age of 13 and a girl reaches the age of 12, we assume that he has grown two pubic hairs and is thus Biblically obligated in all Torah and Mitzvos. Nonetheless, regarding all matters that relate to him fulfilling an obligation on behalf of others we are stringent to suspect that perhaps he is yet to grow two hairs and is thus only Rabbinically obligated. Accordingly, he cannot fulfill the obligation for others if it involves a Biblical command, such as Kiddush on Friday night, blowing Shofar on the first night of Rosh Hashanah, although he may fulfill their obligations for Rabbinical commands. See “Lifecycles in Halacha Volume 5 – Bar Mitzvah” Chapter 1 Halacha 14 for the full details of the subject.   

• For example, Ari Levi, who just turned thirteen, puts on tefillin every day and keeps Shabbos fully. However, he would not make Kiddush for adults on Friday night, since that mitzvah is Biblical.

A gentile – Sheva Mitzvos: According to the Rishonim who rule that the age of 13 is a tradition of Moshe from Sinai, then it is possible that this age does not apply to a gentile. However, according to the reason of maturity which is learned from Shimon and Levi, then since it is a matter of nature, it seemingly applies also to a gentile.[12] According to this approach, gentiles become Bar Mitzvah at age 20 or 21, which is the age that he is fit to go to war.[13]

2. Chinuch in Mitzvos – The Mitzvah to educate one’s children in Mitzvah performance and not to perform transgressions:
3. The Mitzvah of Chinuch & Whether its Biblical or Rabbinical:[15]

[Unlike the Mitzvah of Talmud Torah[16] which is a Biblical obligation upon the father to teach his son, as will be explained in Halacha 5, the Mitzvah of Chinuch of Mitzvos is not a Biblical obligation upon the father. Rather] it is a Rabbinical command for a father to educate his son and daughter in both the negative and positive commands, beginning from when the child reaches the age of education [to be defined in Chapter 2]. It goes without saying[17] that a father is Rabbinically obligated to reprimand and stop his child who has reached the age of education from transgressing a negative command, even if it is only a Rabbinical prohibition.[18] [This is unlike the Mitzvah of Tochacha which is a Biblical obligation applicable to every Jew to protest the forbidden actions of another Jew, as this Mitzvah only begins once the Jew in question becomes an adult, as will be explained in Chapter 2 Halacha 6D. However, all the above is only with regards to education and reprimanding, however, it is a Biblical prohibition for any individual to actively cause a child of any age to transgress a prohibition, as will be explained in Halacha 8.]

Why the Mitzvah of Chinuch is not Biblical?[19] The Rebbe elaborates on this question and explains:[20] While the Torah clearly commands a parent to teach Torah to one’s child, the obligation to educate a child in the practical fulfillment of mitzvot is understood to be Rabbinical. This distinction leads to the question of why the Torah does not mandate formal mitzvah training prior to a child becoming obligated at Bar or Bat Mitzvah. The Rebbe considers various explanations, including the view that the Biblical obligation focuses on knowledge rather than practice, and another that sees practical education as a preparatory act given independent value through Rabbinic enactment. Ultimately, these approaches are insufficient, leading to the conclusion that the Torah does not demand immediate perfection in mitzvah observance upon reaching maturity. Rather, the Torah recognizes mitzvah fulfillment as a gradual process, allowing for continued learning and habituation even after obligation begins. This is illustrated by the analogy of removing chametz, where one is not considered in violation while actively engaged in fulfilling the commandment. Similarly, a child who has reached Bar or Bat Mitzvah is viewed as being in an ongoing process of fulfillment, rather than failing due to imperfection, underscoring that education and growth are intrinsic components of religious obligation. For a more detailed discussion of this matter and to appreciate its full scope, please refer to the concluding section of this chapter in which the Sicha has been brought in full.

1. The reason for the Mitzvah of Chinuch:[21]

The reason for the rabbinical obligation to educate one’s children in mitzvah performance is so by the time they reach the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah, they not only know how to perform the mitzvot properly, but have already become accustomed to observing them as a natural part of their lives.

1. Scriptural sources for the Mitzvah of Chinuch:[23]

The mitzvah of chinuch can be derived from several verses in Scripture, as noted by Mefarshim and Poskim. These verses collectively establish that although a child is not yet personally obligated in mitzvot, there is a responsibility placed upon parents to teach, guide, and habituate their children from a young age.

1. Chanoch Lanar: חֲנֹךְ לַנַּעַר עַל־פִּי דַרְכּוֹ גַּם כִּי־יַזְקִין לֹא־יָסוּר מִמֶּנָּה “Train a child according to his way; even when he grows old, he will not depart from it”: This most famous verse from  Mishlei[24] teaches that education is meant to instill lasting patterns through early training. Some Poskim[25] learn that this verse served as the scriptural source for the Rabbinical decree of Chinuch. Some Poskim[26] learn based on this that the mitzvah of chinuch carries the status of Divrei Kabbalah—a binding obligation rooted in the words of Scripture as transmitted through the Prophets and Writings. According to this view, the Mitzvah of Chinuch is a Mitzvas Asei of Divrei Kabalah.
2. Yitzaveh Es Banav: כִּי יְדַעְתִּיו לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יְצַוֶּה אֶת־בָּנָיו וְאֶת־בֵּיתוֹ אַחֲרָיו וְשָׁמְרוּ דֶּרֶךְ ה׳ “For I have known him, so that he will command his children and his household after him to keep the way of Hashem.” This verse from Bereishis[27] praises Avraham for commanding his children and household to follow the way of Hashem. Some Mefarshim[28] derive the Mitzvah of Chinuch from this verse.
3. Torah study: וְלִמַּדְתֶּם אֹתָם אֶת־בְּנֵיכֶם לְדַבֵּר בָּם “You shall teach them to your children, to speak of them.” This commandment in Devarim is understood by some Poskim[29] not merely as teaching information, but as accustoming children to constant engagement with Torah.
4. Hakhel:[30] הַקְהֵל אֶת־הָעָם… וּבְנֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָדְעוּ יִשְׁמְעוּ וְלָמְדוּ “Assemble the people… and their children who do not yet know, so that they may hear and learn.” The mitzvah of Hakhel includes the bringing of children who have yet to reach a maturity of comprehension. Some Mefarshim[31] learn that the purpose of this Mitzvah is so even children who are not yet capable of full understanding be exposed to mitzvot and Torah experiences, as through hearing, this leads to questioning, which then leads to them being educated by their parents.
5. Chukas Olam:[32] חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם “An eternal statute for your generations.” The Torah’s repeated emphasis on transmitting mitzvot across generations underscores that children must be taught and trained, for without deliberate education they could not come to know or live by the commandments. [33]

1. The history of the decree:[34]

As is often the case with rabbinical enactments or decrees, the historical circumstances surrounding their original institution are not always fully recorded or documented. Nevertheless, some Poskim[35] suggest that the decree to educate one’s children in Mitzvos dates back to the time of Shmuel HaNavi. Other Poskim[36] maintain that it was originally instituted by Moshe Rabbeinu for his own generation, serving as the initial enactment, and that it was only later extended and formally decreed on behalf of the entire Jewish people.

1. The Nature of the Obligation of Chinuch: Upon the Child or the Father[37]

A central question regarding the mitzvah of chinuch concerns the locus of its obligation: does it rest upon the child himself, or solely upon the father or other adult figure? Some Poskim[38] maintain that the obligation of chinuch is entirely incumbent upon the father (or responsible adult), and not upon the child at all. According to this view, the child bears no personal obligation—even on a rabbinic level—to observe mitzvos, as a child is exempt from all Mitzvos[39]; rather, the responsibility lies exclusively with those charged with his education. Other Poskim[40], however, contend that there exists a rabbinic obligation intrinsic to the child himself, requiring him to fulfill mitzvos by virtue of chinuch, independent of the parental duty to educate. [Regarding the opinion of Admur, in one area[41] he seems to conclude like the former opinion that there is no personal obligation of Chinuch on a child, and the obligation remains only upon his father. However, elsewhere he seems to conclude like the latter approach.[42] Vetzaruch Iyun!]

3. Which Mitzvos and Aveiros must the child be educated in?[43]
4. Positive and Negative Commands:

A father is Rabbinically obligated to educate his son and daughter in both negative[44] and positive[45] commands, beginning from when the child reaches the age of education. [This applies even for those Mitzvos that require Kavana, of which a child is unable to maintain.[46] Nevertheless, not all Mitzvos, prohibitions, and matters of Jewish law that are obligatory upon an adult carry an obligation of chinuch for a child [i.e. fasting on Yom Kippur], as will be explained throughout the coming chapters by each and every Mitzvah.]

A Mitzvah which the child will be exempt from when an adult:[47] Any mitzvah from which a person would be exempt from even in adulthood is not subject to the obligation of chinuch, and therefore a child is likewise exempt from being educated in it while he is young if he contains that exemption.

For a need of the child: It is absolutely forbidden to feed a child a biblical prohibition under any circumstances, regardless of the child’s age or need, as explained in Halacha 8C, with exceptions of cases of Pikuach Nefesh.

May a child be instructed to transgress a Biblical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzvah: No adult may permit a child to transgress a biblical prohibition under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah and even when the act would be an uncommon occurrence. See Halacha 8D for the full details of this matter!

1. Reprimanding the child[48]

A father is Rabbinically[49] obligated to reprimand and stop his child who has reached the age of education from transgressing a negative command. [Nevertheless, not all prohibitions applicable to an adult carry an obligation of chinuch to reprimand a child, as will be explained throughout the coming chapters by relevant prohibitions.]

1. Rabbinical Commands and prohibitions:[50]

A father is Rabbinically obligated to educate his child who has reached the age of Chinuch in even Rabbinical commands. Likewise, the father must reprimand and stop his child from transgressing even Rabbinical prohibitions. However, there are certain leniencies in which the Sages do not require even a father to reprimand his child who has reached the age of Chinuch for performing a rabbinic prohibition. This matter will be explained at length in Halacha 8C-G.

For a need of the child: It is forbidden to feed a child even a rabbinic prohibition when there is no genuine need; however, when there is a true necessity for the child’s physical development, poskim dispute the matter, and in practice one may rely on the lenient view only if no gentile is available to do so, as explained in Halacha 8C.

May a child be instructed to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzvah: One may be lenient to instruct and allow a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzvah, as explained in Halacha 8D.

1. Matters Subject to Halachic Dispute[51]

In any matter of Jewish law where there is a dispute among halachic authorities as to whether an act is permitted or prohibited, and some authorities permit it even Lechatchila, then it is permitted to instruct a child, even ones own child, to perform such an act, even if the child has already reached the age of chinuch. [Nonetheless, it is customary and praiseworthy that parents, where possible, accustom their children to follow the more stringent rulings (lechatchilah) and to act stringently in matters of halachic dispute. This practice reflects the traditional approach to chinuch and a desire to train children toward higher standards of observance. That said, in specific circumstances many are lenient, particularly in commonly encountered cases such as opening bottle caps on Shabbos, opening a refrigerator door when the motor may turn on[52], and similar situations. In such cases, reliance on the lenient opinions is widespread.]

Likewise, it is permitted for a child to perform melachah on one’s behalf after nightfall of the Geonim’s time, even if the person himself follows the later time based on Rabbeinu Tam. Since this too is a matter of halachic dispute, one may rely on the lenient position with respect to instructing or benefiting from the actions of a child.

4. The Form of the Chinuch in Mitzvah’s:[53]
5. Must a Child Fulfill a Mitzvah in the Same Valid Manner as an Adult?

The question is whether the form of a mitzvah performed by a child must be identical to the way an adult fulfills it in order to count as proper fulfillment. In other words, must the mitzvah be performed in a manner that would fully discharge the obligation were the child an adult, or is it sufficient for the child to fulfill the mitzvah with certain deficiencies, so long as the general command is observed?

The Poskim[54] rule is that the obligation of chinuch requires more than exposure to the general idea or spirit of the mitzvah. Rather, one must train the child to perform the mitzvah with all of its essential, validating details, to the extent that if the same act were performed by the child as an adult, it would fully satisfy the obligation. It is not sufficient to fulfill the mitzvah in a way that contains an element of invalidation, even if the general concept of the mitzvah is present.

• For example, with respect to the mitzvah of chinuch in shaking the lulav, one may not give a child an invalid lulav set that does not meet the proper halachic standards. Since such a performance would not fulfill the mitzvah for an adult, it likewise fails to satisfy the requirement of chinuch.

1. Chinuch for Basic Mitzvah versus Hiddur Mitzvah[55]

Some Poskim[56] rule that once a child reaches the age of Chinuch one is required to educate him not just in the letter of the law fulfillment of Mitzvos, but even in Hiddur Mitzvah. Other Poskim[57] however rule, that there’s never an obligation to educate a child in a matter of Hiddur Mitzvah. [Practically speaking, even if one were to conclude that there is no strict obligation to educate a child in the fulfillment of a Hiddur mitzvah, it remains the widespread custom of God‑fearing Jews and families to educate their children not only in the basic performance of mitzvot, but even in matters of hiddur mitzvah (enhancing a mitzvah). This approach is reflected in numerous statements of the Rebbe.[58]]

1. Chinuch for Chumras and Hiddurim[59]

There is no formal obligation to educate a child in matters of chumrah or hiddur mitzvah. Nevertheless, the widespread custom among God‑fearing families is to do so, taking into account the child’s maturity, disposition, and readiness for the Chumra. There is no single, uniform standard that applies in all cases.

• Example: Thus, for example, it may be inappropriate to accustom a child to immersing in a mikveh daily until he is close to the age of bar mitzvah, and indeed so is the common practice to delay until then. Likewise, one should not force a child to refrain from eating or drinking before kiddush until he reaches the age of bar mitzvah, as will be explained in the relevant chapter. At the same time, children are educated from a very young age to refrain from eating Gebrochts on Pesach, even though this matter is a mere Chumra and Hiddur.

🎓 Lesson in Chinuch:

In the above regard, parents and educators must exercise great care not to overburden the child with Chumros and Hiddurim. One must remember that the primary goal of education is not to “win the battle” by imposing this chumrah or that Hiddur and making sure he does so at times out of coercion, but to “win the war” in which the child himself desires to do so when he is older and of age by fostering a genuine love and enjoyment of Judaism. This is something that is often undermined when a child is forced to observe practices for which he is not yet ready. Accordingly, each case must be thoughtfully and responsibly considered and if necessary, one is to consult with a Rav for guidance.

1. Leniencies that can be applied to children:

Not all matters of Jewish law that are obligatory upon an adult carry an obligation of chinuch for a child. For example, with regard to refraining from eating or drinking before kiddush, one is not obligated to educate a child in this practice, as will be explained later. Thus, it is important for parents to educate themselves in what matters they are actually obligated to educate their child in, as will be explained throughout the coming chapters. Additionally, we find that whenever there is a halachic dispute as to whether something is permitted or prohibited, there is room to be lenient on behalf of a child.[60]

1. Tashlumin in Mitzvos[61]

There is a dispute among the Poskim as to whether one is obligated to educate a child to make up (tashlumin) for a mitzvah that he missed. This includes, for example, reciting kiddush during the day to compensate for missing kiddush at night, or praying Minchah twice when Shacharit was missed.

5. Chinuch in Torah – The Mitzvah to teach Torah to one’s children:[62]

Unlike the Mitzvah of Chinuch in Mitzvos which is Rabbinical in origin, there is a Biblical command upon a father to teach his son Torah, as the verse[63] states “Ulimadetem Osam Es Bneichem Lidaber Bam, and you shall teach your children to speak in them.” This matter will be explained in length in Chapter ?? Halacha ??. See there for the full details of this matter.

The source: The Ramban[64] comments on the verse[65], “Vishinantam Livanecha/and you shall teach your children,” that since G-d commanded us to keep his commands, therefore we are to teach our children the commands, as otherwise how will they learn them.

Who is obligated to teach – Fathers versus Mothers:[66] The Biblical obligation to teach one’s son Torah applies towards the father. However, women are not obligated in the mitzvah of Torah study and are therefore not required to teach their sons or finance their education, except as an act of charity when financially able. However, when a woman supports her husband’s or son’s Torah learning—personally or materially—she shares significantly in their reward, since she enables the fulfillment of a commanded mitzvah.

Grandfather:[67] If a father cannot afford or manage his child’s Torah education, the obligation transfers fully to the paternal grandfather, who is halachically required to fund and arrange it just like a father. This duty is explicitly biblical and applies only to sons and grandsons through the father’s line. In contrast, there is no formal obligation to support the Torah education of descendants through a daughter or further generations; such support would be considered an act of charity rather than an obligation, with priority given because of close family ties.

Who is obligated to be taught – Sons versus Daughters:[68] The Biblical obligation upon a father to teach Torah to his children applies specifically to his sons, as men have an obligation of studying Torah. However, there is no obligation for a father to teach his daughter Torah being that women are exempt from Torah study. Furthermore, even though women who study Torah receive reward and hence seemingly a father should be at least encouraged to teach Torah to his daughters, practically the Sages discouraged formal Torah education for daughters, particularly in the Oral Law, citing concerns about misapplication of study. Teaching her the Oral Torah is therefore likened to teaching frivolity, as it may foster cunning rather than genuine understanding. Nonetheless, women are fully obligated to learn all halakhot necessary for their religious observance and are bound by all prohibitions and non–time‑bound commandments. [Despite the above ruling, some of the Rishonim[69] wrote that the father is nevertheless obligated to teach his daughter all the Mitzvahs that they are obligated in, as if she does not know the laws of Shabbos, how will she observe Shabbos? The same applies to all the mitzvot. This obligation is not due to the mitzvah of Torah study itself, but so that she will know the laws.[70] The recent Achronim[71] likewise wrote that in our times, when the traditional transmission from fathers has weakened, it is a mitzvah to teach daughters Torah, Prophets, and Writings, as well as the ethical teachings of the Sages and similar material, in order to firmly establish faith in them and commitment to the mitzvot, including the obligation of reciting blessings.]

What to teach – Theoretical:[72] The father is obligated to teach his child the entire Torah, both the entire Written Torah and Oral Torah. This obligation encompasses the entire Tanach and Torah Shebichsav, ensuring that the child acquires the ability to read and accurately comprehend the Hebrew text. Additionally, the father must instruct the child in all aspects of the Oral Torah, including all the 613 Mitzvos and Halachos, along with their underlying reasons. This includes study of the Mishnayos, Talmud, and Midrashim. The curriculum should cover even those Mitzvos that are not currently applicable, as well as all scholarly opinions, regardless of whether they are accepted as law.

What to teach – Practical:[73] In the present era, since the entire Oral Torah has been committed to writing, a father’s primary obligation is no longer to ensure that his son memorizes the entirety of the Tanach and Oral Law, but rather to provide him with the skills necessary for independent, in‑depth study. This includes a strong command of the Talmud, its complex legal discussions, and the major early and later halakhic authorities, enabling the student to analyze sources and determine practical law on his own. Consequently, the common practice is to focus early education on the Chumash itself, relying on later independent study for the remainder of Tanakh. Nevertheless, core passages containing commandments must be reviewed repeatedly, as they form the foundation of talmudic interpretation. Nonetheless, the above only applies if indeed the child will be able to receive the skills of learning the entire Torah through learning the Talmud and will be motivated to do so on his own. However, if the child will not succeed in getting these skills, or if he does not have the discipline to use his skills to study the entire Torah, then the father is obligated to teach him the entire Torah as stated above.

Discipline:[74] If a child is unable or unwilling to study Torah, the father remains fully obligated—using compulsion if necessary—to ensure mastery of the entire Written and Oral Torah, for the duty to teach one’s children includes enforcing their education when required.

Reteaching Material that child forgot:[75] Once a father has properly taught his son the entirety of the Torah, including the laws and their reasoning, he has fulfilled his Torah obligation even if the son later forgets the material due to lack of review. However, when the son is capable of continued Torah study but neglects it, and the father has the means to intervene, the father bears an ongoing rabbinic responsibility to compel his son to remain engaged in Torah learning.

From what age?[76] From what age is a father obligated to teach his son Torah? As soon as one’s son begins to speak[77], his father is Biblically obligated to teach him Torah.

Until what age:[78] There is no maximum age in which a father becomes exempt from teaching Torah to his son, and so long as a son has not studied the entire Torah and has not received the skills to do so on his own, the father remains obligated to teach him Torah irrelevant of the age of the son.

Personally teaching versus sending to Cheder:[79] By Torah law, the father is obligated either to teach his son himself or to secure a teacher who will instruct him in the entirety of the Torah. If such instruction cannot be obtained without payment, then—even if the father himself is incapable of teaching, and even if he lacks any ability to study at all—he remains obligated by Torah law to hire a qualified teacher to educate his son properly, so that he will acquire knowledge of the entire Written and Oral Torah.

6. Who is obligated to be educated in Mitzvos:

It is obvious that the mitzvah and obligation of a father to educate his children in mitzvos applies to his sons, as is explicitly stated in the verse “ולמדתם אותם את בניכם”. There is no dispute among the poskim regarding this point. What is discussed, however, is whether this obligation also extends to one’s daughters, or whether it is comparable to the mitzvah of Talmud Torah, from which a father is exempt with regard to teaching his daughter. Along similar lines, there is further discussion concerning the extent of this obligation as it relates to other members of one’s household who are not biological children, and whether they are included in the father’s responsibility of chinuch.

1. Educating one’s Daughters:[80]

The obligation upon a father to educate his children in the fulfillment of mitzvah’s applies even towards his daughter’s. [In this regard, it is different than the obligation of Torah study by which we rule that although a father is obligated to teach his son Torah, a father is not obligated to teach his daughter Torah. However, with regards to the obligation to educate one’s child in the fulfillment of mitzvah’s, it applies whether the child is a boy or girl.]

1. Educating Household members:

Not only is a father obligated to educate his biological children in the fulfillment of mitzvah’s, but furthermore, it is implied from the Poskim[81] that he is also obligated to educate all of the members of his household in the fulfillment of mitzvah’s even if they are not his biological children. Thus, an individual who has adopted a Jewish child is rabbinically obligated to educate that child in mitzvah fulfillment just like his own son and daughter.

From the Rav’s Desk

Question

I have a teenage boarder living in my home who attends the local Frum high school and participates in activities such as listening to non-Jewish music and watching movies that their parents—and I personally—would not approve of and do not approve of for my own children. From a halachic perspective, do I have an obligation as the head of the household to address this behavior, given that she lives with us, eats with us, and is treated like a sibling to my children? Or is it not my responsibility since they are not my child?

Answer

Yes, there is a halachic obligation. As the leader of the household, you are responsible for ensuring that all members of your home—biological or not—follow the path of Torah and mitzvot. Therefore, you should approach this matter with the same seriousness as you would with your own children. Of course, the method and tone of addressing the issue depend on the relationship and the individual’s personality, so it requires sensitivity and nuance. Nonetheless, the responsibility to act is clear.

Sources:

See Admur 167:23 “And all this is regarding an adult who does not know how to bless. But to train children, one is obligated to bless on every blessing of enjoyment in order to educate them in the mitzvos. And even if there is no obligation of chinuch (education) upon him, such as one who is not from his household.”; Aruch Hashulchan C.M. 290:30 regarding an Aputrapis; Betzel Hachochma 5:3

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule there is no obligation upon the father to educate his nonbiological household members any more than any other Jew. [Rashi Pesachim 88a regarding a master of a slave; Mishneh Halachos 3:26]

1. Educating Students:

While we do find an explicit command obligating the sages to educate all students—including those who are not their relatives— in study of Torah[82], we do not find a comparable obligation with respect to educating them in the fulfilling of mitzvot. However, some Poskim[83] rule that a Rebbe is obligated to educate his students in Mitzvos.

1. Shoteh – Educating a mentally incapacitated child:[84]

A child who is severely developmentally impaired and lacks the capacity for understanding is not obligated in the mitzvot of chinuch.[85] However, if the child is not severely developmentally impaired and is capable of some level of understanding—demonstrating awareness of his actions, a degree of comprehension, and the ability to progress—there is an obligation to educate him in the observance of mitzvot and to prevent him from engaging in prohibited conduct.[86] Accordingly, individuals who are on the higher-functioning end of the autism spectrum are obligated to be educated in Torah and mitzvot, just as any other child, in accordance with their abilities.

Protesting his actions:[87] There is no obligation for a father or any other Jew to prevent or protest a Shoteh who acts on his own initiative to perform a transgression. [It is even permitted to benefit from the imbicel’s actions in such a case, if it was not done on behalf of the adult.[88] However, if the child is not severely developmentally impaired and is capable of some level of understanding—demonstrating awareness of his actions, a degree of comprehension, and the ability to progress—there is an obligation to prevent him from engaging in prohibited conduct, as we stated above.[89]]

Feeding him an Issur:[90] Although a person who is halachically classified as shoteh (legally incompetent due to mental incapacity) is exempt from the obligations of Torah and mitzvot, nevertheless it remains prohibited for others to actively cause such a person to transgress a Torah prohibition. [Accordingly, it is forbidden to feed a mentally incapacitated person non-kosher food. Even in a case where such food is required for health reasons, as long as it does not rise to the level of pikuach nefesh, one may not feed him Biblically forbidden food directly. Rather, it may be given only through a gentile, as will be explained in Halachah 8f.[91] Regarding rabbinically forbidden foods, see Halacha 8c.]

Institution without kosher food:[92] With respect to placing such an individual in an institution for the mentally impaired that does not provide kosher food, the Poskim[93] rule that it is permitted to send a child with severe intellectual disability who is below the age of Mitzvos to a non‑kosher facility.[94] Furthermore, if there is a chance that the individual will receive a cure in the institution and return to normalcy, then certainly he is to be sent there, even if he is above the age of Mitzvos.[95] However, once the child regains normal cognitive functioning, he is to be removed immediately from any institution that provides him with non‑kosher food.[96] This leniency, however, applies only where the individual is deemed completely incompetent (shoteh gamur). However, if the individual is not fully incompetent and possesses some capacity for understanding and education in matters of Torah and mitzvot—such as individuals with Down syndrome or similar conditions, or a cheresh[97] (deaf individual) who is capable of speech and comprehension—then one should refrain from sending them to such institutions, as they are amenable to at least partial religious instruction and observance.[98] [However, from the letetr of the law it is permitted even in such a case, as explained in Halacha 8f that for medical reasons one may instruct a gentile to feed a child even Biblically non-Kosher food.[99]]

1. A sick Child[100]

With regard to a sick child, various leniencies apply in the mitzvah of parents educating their child that would not normally be extended to an adult. For example, it is permitted for a child who is ill to eat even foods that are biblically prohibited when necessary for his health, and the father is not obligated to protest his actions, although in certain cases he may not actually feed him the foods, as will be explained. [Based on this principle, the Poskim rule that a child who requires chametz-based foods on Pesach for his physical development and health is permitted to eat them. In such a case, the father may arrange for the child to be fed through a gentile.] This same rule applies for any prohibition which the child may need due to his illness.

How ill?[101] The above allowance applies even if the illness does not rise to the level of pikuach nefesh and even if he is only slightly ill to the point that he is not defined as even a Choleh Sheiyn Bo Sakana [i.e. not bedridden].[102]

Having a gentile feed the Issur food to the child: In the event of even slight illness, a father may instruct a gentile to feed the forbidden food to the child, as explained in Halacha 8f.

Directly feeding the child the forbidden food: All the above allowance is with respect to the adult or father making the non-Kosher food available for the ill child, instructing a gentile to feed it to him, or simply not protesting the ill child if he is seen eating it. However, unless the situation involves pikuach nefesh [or the matter is needed as part of the general development of the child as explained next], it is forbidden for any Jew to directly feed the child Biblically prohibited food, even if the child is sick as explained in halacha 8a.[103] This restriction however applies specifically when the prohibition is biblical. If, however, the food is forbidden only by rabbinic law, it is permitted for a Jew to hand‑feed the child when he needs it, in cases where a gentile is not available to do so, as explained in Halacha 8C.

Child needs the Issur food for general development: A child who requires certain foods or supplements for the sake of his physical development—such as young children who medically need specific nutrients or foods to support their growth and overall health—may be given those foods even if he is not presently classified as slightly ill. In such cases, it is permitted to even directly feed the child these foods, as they are necessary for his development and wellbeing. Thus, it is permitted to feed a child food on Yom Kippur.[104] [However, if the foods involved are prohibited by biblical law, then ideally a Jew may not feed the child directly, unless the food is not intrinsically forbidden and is merely forbidden at a specific time.[105] However, if the food is intrinsically forbidden then the food may only be made available to him indirectly, such as by instructing a gentile to feed him, or through similar means, and may not be directly fed. However, some Poskim[106] rule that all general necessities may be fed even directly to the child, even if they involve a Biblical prohibition, and so seems to be the plausible ruling. Accordingly, if a child is in need of a certain non-Kosher baby formula for his general health and development, from the letter of the law, it may be even directly fed to the child. However, see next regarding the custom.]

Important Note Regarding Non‑Kosher Foods:[107] All of the above leniencies of non-kosher foods apply only when there is no suitable alternative available and when the food in question is genuinely necessary for the child’s health. Otherwise, the accepted custom is to be extremely stringent with regard to feeding a child non‑kosher food, even in situations where it may be technically permitted for health reasons. This is because non‑kosher food is understood to cause a blockage in the child’s spiritual soul (timtum halev) and to negatively affect character development, as explained in Halacha 8C and Chapter 2 Halacha 3.

7. Who is obligated to educate the child – Father, Mother, Rabbi, School, Teacher, Legal Guardian:[108]

Important note: The halachic discussion regarding who is obligated to educate a child refers specifically to the unique mitzvah of chinuch, which applies only so long as the child is below the age of bar mitzvah, as will be explained in Chapter 2 Halacha 6. Once, however, the child reaches bar mitzvah, the mitzvah of chinuch naturally falls away, and the Torah‑level obligation of Tochacha begins to apply. The Mitzvah of Tochacha applies to every Jew; father, mother, sibling, or even innocent bystander. Accordingly, the entire discussion below is to be taken in the context of it discussing a child who is below the age of Mitzvos.

1. Father – The obligation of a father to educate and reprimand his children:[109]

The obligation to educate a child in Torah and mitzvah’s is specifically upon the father of the child. He is obligated to educate both his son and daughter in the negative and positive commands, and is likewise required to reprimand his child and stop him from performing any transgression, even Rabbinical.

If the father does not reprimand his child:[110] If the father does not reprimand his child from transgressing a Biblical command, then the father himself is to be reprimanded by the Beis Din. However, for not stopping his children from transgressing Rabbinical commands the father does not need to be chastised.

1. Mother – Is a mother obligated to educate or reprimand her children?[111]

A mother is not obligated at all to educate her child, whether her son or daughter, in neither positive or negative commands. [Some Poskim[112] rule that this applies even if the father of the child is not able to educate him.] However, she does receive reward for encouraging her son to study Torah.[113] [Furthermore, although she is not formally obligated to do so, it is certainly a mitzvah for her to be involved in her child’s education.[114] Indeed, the quality and extent of a child’s education often derive more from the mother than from the father, since she is generally present with the child to a greater degree.[115] Consequently, the primary responsibility for education frequently rests upon her shoulders.[116] Moreover, education imparted by the mother is often more effective, as a woman’s manner of speech is typically gentler and more refined, which has a greater impact on the child—particularly in contemporary times, when harsh rebuke is less effective.[117] As for the absence of a formal obligation placed upon the mother, this is because it is natural and self‑evident that a mother educates her child, and therefore no explicit commandment was deemed necessary.[118] Indeed, we find that BatSheva, the mother of Shlomo Hamelech took a proactive stance on his education and admonished him to swerve away from life’s pleasures and focus on wisdom and G-d.[119]]

1. Legal Guardians – Melameid, Grandparents, Dorm, Foster home, Boarding house:[120]

All individuals and institutions who act in the capacity of a legal guardian or educator of a child, bear responsibility for the child’s religious and moral education. They are obligated to guide, instruct, and ensure that the child is raised according to the principles of Torah and mitzvot, fulfilling the educational duties typically incumbent on a parent. [Seemingly, however, this obligation is only upon male legal guardians, however, regarding female legal guardians, then they are no different than the status of a mother of which some Poskim[121] rule that a mother is never obligated in the education of her children even if her husband is not around, as explained above in B.]

1. Beis Din – Rabbinical Leaders of city:[122]

Even if a Beis Din sees a child under the age of Bar or Bas Mitzva[123] transgressing a prohibition they do not need to reprimand or stop[124] the child from doing so, if the child is doing so for his own benefit, such as eating Treif foods or desecrating Shabbos for his own needs [or is defiling himself to the dead if he is a Kohen[125]]. They are however required to reprimand the child if the child is transgressing a prohibition for the sake of another Jew or if the transgression will become public knowledge as will be explained later on.

1. Bystanders – Must a person other than a child’s father stop a child from sinning?[126]

A bystander who is neither the father [nor legal guardian] observing a child under the age of Bar or Bas Mitzva violating a prohibition is not obligated to intervene or issue a reprimand, provided the child’s actions are for their own benefit, such as consuming non-kosher food or desecrating Shabbat for personal needs. They are however required to reprimand the child if the child is transgressing a prohibition for the sake of another Jew or if the transgression will become public knowledge as will be explained later on. [However, if the child is acting for his own sake, then even though an adult Jew also derives benefit from his actions, there is nevertheless no obligation to protest those actions.[127]]

From The Rav’s Desk

Question:

I saw someone’s child washing a stain off their pants on Shabbos. I did not say anything to them, although am wondering if I have a responsibility to educate them in matters that are forbidden on Shabbos, or is this only upon the father of the child? The child was certainly above the age of Chinuch.

Answer:

According to some Poskim, including Admur, you are not required to inform him or stop him, as this obligation is only on the father, until the age of Bar Mitzvah. Nonetheless, it is proper to tell him anyways.

Sources: See Admur 343:1; Michaber and Rama 343:1; M”B 343:7; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2

1. A child who is transgressing for the sake of another Jew:[128]

If a child [of any age[129]] is committing a transgression for the benefit of any other Jew[130] who is already Bar Mitzvah[131]—for example, extinguishing a fire in that Jew’s home when there is no danger to human life—then every Jew[132] is [Rabbinically[133]] obligated to stop the child or reprimand him. This responsibility is not restricted solely to the child’s father or legal guardian. [This obligation to protest a child’s actions applies even if the child performed the act privately and inconspicuously, with no one else present. In such a case once it becomes known that the act was performed on behalf of an adult, one is then obligated to protest and object to the child’s conduct.[134]]

A Rabbinical prohibition: See Halacha 8D regarding if one must protest a child who is performing a Rabbinical prohibition on behalf of an adult.

1. A public transgression that may lead others to sin:[135]

If a child’s transgression is likely to become public knowledge and there is concern that it may lead others to believe such conduct is permissible due to the absence of protest, the Beis Din[136] [and others[137]]  are required to formally object to the actions, regardless of whether the child is acting in their own interest.[138] [Thus, for example, if one sees a child turning a light on or off, or otherwise playing with electricity on Shabbos in public, he is required to protest even if the child is doing so for his own sake.[139] This, however, applies only once the child has reached the age of education, which is an age of comprehension and understanding. If, however, the child has not yet reached the age of education, there is no obligation to protest his actions, even if he does so in public.[140]]

1. Bein Adam Lechaveiro – Universal Responsibility to Correct a Child’s Societal Misconduct[141]

When a child steals, causes damage, injury, humiliation, or other harm between people, it is appropriate for a Beis Din, and for every individual to reprimand the child and prevent such behavior.

1. Matters of Modesty and immorality[142]

If one sees a child performing an immoral and immodest act then it is fitting for anyone to intervene and separate the child from wrongdoing.

1. Non-Kosher food:[143]

If one sees a child eating forbidden foods, it is fitting for anyone to intervene and separate the child from wrongdoing.

8. Lesafos Issur Beyadayaim – Providing or instructing a child with a prohibition:[144]

Throughout this chapter, we have emphasized that the mitzvah of chinuch—educating a child to observe Torah and mitzvot and reprimanding a child who transgresses a prohibition—is, in general, a Rabbinic obligation. The sole Biblical obligation of education rests upon a father to teach Torah to his son. All other aspects of chinuch, including training a child to observe mitzvot and refrain from prohibitions, are Rabbinically mandated. Nevertheless, there exists one notable exception in which the Torah itself imposes a Biblical prohibition with regard to a child’s transgression. This prohibition is known as “Lesapos Lo Issur”—the prohibition against actively feeding or causing a child to transgress an issur. In this case, the Torah explicitly forbids an adult from actively causing a child to violate a prohibition, such as feeding the child forbidden food or directly instructing the child to perform a forbidden act. Unlike the general laws of chinuch, this prohibition is Biblical in nature and applies not only to the father, but to every Jew, without distinction. The parameters, scope, and practical applications of this Biblical prohibition—and how it differs from the general Rabbinic obligation of chinuch—will be explained at length in this Halacha.

1. The general rule:[145]

It is Biblically[146] prohibited for any[147] individual [including his mother[148]] to actively feed a child with his hands a [Biblically] forbidden matter.[149] This applies even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, [including even a one-day old child[150]].[151] Furthermore, it is [Rabbinically[152]] forbidden to even give the child food which contains merely a Rabbinical prohibition [as will be explained in D, with exception to the cases to be explained in Halachas C-G.[153]]. [This Biblical prohibition applies not only to prohibited foods but to all other prohibitions as well.[154]] It is thus forbidden to accustom[155] the child to transgress Shabbos or Holidays even regarding Rabbinical matters. See the Addendum Sicha for Parshas Emor published at the end of this Chapter for a full treatise on this subject!

Foods that are intrinsically kosher but temporarily prohibited:[156] Foods that are intrinsically kosher yet prohibited at a given time [whether by biblical[157] or rabbinic law], such as eating before Kiddush or eating on Yom Kippur—may be hand‑fed to a child if the child desires [or requires[158]] food or drink.[159] In such circumstances, it is forbidden to cause the child distress by withholding the food. [If, however, the child does not need to eat or drink the food, it is forbidden to feed it to him, even when the prohibition is merely time‑dependent.[160]]

A child with developmental challenges: See Halacha 6D!

Child needs the Issur food for general development: See Halacha 6D!

A Sick child: See Halacha 6E!

May the pregnant wife of Kohen enter an Ohel Hameis: See Chapter ?? Halacha ??!

1. Telling a child to transgress a prohibition:[161]

It is [Biblically[162]] forbidden for any person to instruct any child to eat non-Kosher food [or transgress Shabbos[163] or any other prohibition[164]], even if the child is completely below the age of understanding, [such as a mere one-day old infant]. It is [Rabbinically[165]] forbidden to even ask a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, with exception to the cases to be explained in Halacha C-G.[166] [It is even prohibited to hint to a child regarding this matter, such as by phrasing one’s words in a way that the child will understand that he should do some transgression.[167] Furthermore, even indirect instruction—such as telling the child, “There is no prohibition for you to do such-and-such,” or similar language intended to prompt the action—is forbidden.[168]] *See from the Rav’s Desk at the end of this Halacha for a full analysis on this subject!

Pesik Reishei – Asking a Child to Perform an Act That Inevitably Results in a Prohibition:[169] With regard to asking a child to perform an action that will result in a prohibited outcome by way of p’sik reisha (an inevitable consequence), the Poskim are divided. Some Poskim rule that it is forbidden to instruct a child to perform an act when a prohibition will inevitably occur as a result, even if the prohibited act is indirect. Other Poskim maintain that such an instruction is permitted, since the child is not being asked to perform the prohibition itself [as we rule by Amira Lenachri]. Practically speaking, the prevailing approach is to be stringent and refrain from doing so. However, in a case where the child has no awareness whatsoever that any prohibited action will result from what he is being told to do, and his conduct is thus comparable to mis’asek, there is greater room to be lenient.

1. Cases of Necessity for The Child & Rabbinical Prohibitions – May Rabbinical prohibitions be fed or provided to a child?[170]

If there is no reason or necessity:[171] If there is no necessity for the child to eat the forbidden food, or be provided with the prohibition, then it is forbidden [according to all opinions] to feed [or provide] him even Rabbinical prohibitions [as stated above in A-B]. This applies even if the child is a mere infant.[172]

If there is a necessity:[173] If there is some necessity for a child to eat Rabbinically forbidden foods for his own benefit[174], then it is disputed amongst Poskim whether one may or may not feed him the food. [This same dispute applies also to providing the child with any other Rabbinical prohibition in a case where the prohibition fulfills some need of the child.] The following are the opinions brought in Admur: Some Poskim[175] rule that it is forbidden for any person to give even a Rabbinically forbidden item to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, and even if the child is in need for it. This applies even if the child is sick, so long as he is not in danger. Thus, regarding feeding a child a prohibition they have the same status as an adult irrelevant of the child’s age. Other Poskim[176], however, rule that it is permitted to feed a child, even above the age of education, any Rabbinical prohibition so long as it is being done for the need of the child, such as for the child to eat and drink if he wants to, and there are not other foods available.[177] Practically, one may[178] rely on the lenient opinion to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition [even if the child is above the age of education[179]] if the child needs it and no gentile is available to feed the child himself.[180] However, if a gentile is available to feed the child the rabbinic prohibition, it is forbidden for a Jew to do so—even when it is for the child’s need, and even if the child is ill [and rather it is to be fed to him  by the gentile]. In all circumstances, it is prohibited to feed a child a biblical prohibition.[181] [Furthermore, even when a child requires food for medical reasons, every possible effort must be made to provide a kosher alternative. This is because consuming non-kosher food can nevertheless have a negative impact on the child’s character.[182] This principle is evident from the ruling that even a pregnant[183] or nursing[184] mother who must eat non-kosher food for medical reasons should avoid doing so whenever possible, and if she does partake of non-kosher food, she should refrain from nursing the child.[185]]

Definition of necessity:[186] A child’s need which can justify feeding him Rabbinical prohibitions in a time of need is defined as a situation in which the food is required for the child’s physical development, [as opposed to for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah[187]], and no alternative food is available.[188] A child’s mere desire to eat the food because it tastes good is certainly not a sufficient justification.[189] [Accordingly, one should not rely on this ruling without first consulting a competent rav to determine whether the circumstances genuinely constitute a necessity for the child.[190]]

Summary

It is forbidden to feed a child any prohibition—biblical or rabbinic—when there is no genuine need, regardless of the child’s age. When there is a true necessity for the child’s own physical development, poskim dispute whether rabbinic prohibitions may be fed to him, and in practice one may rely on the lenient view only when no gentile is available to do so. Under all circumstances, a biblical prohibition may never be given to a child.

1. Sake of a Mitzvah, Loss Prevention – May a child be instructed to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition on behalf of an adult:[191]

Not for the sake of a Mitzva:[192] According to all opinions it is prohibited for any adult to instruct or even permit a child [of any age, even below the age of Chinuch[193]] to violate even a Rabbinical prohibition solely for the adult’s[194] benefit when no Mitzva is involved [and there is no great loss, as will be explained next].[195] Any such action by the child must be protested against by any adult[196] who sees him doing so, even not the child’s father, and even if child does so of his own initiative on behalf of the adult, as explained in Halacha 7F.

To prevent great loss: In general, it is forbidden to instruct a child to perform even a rabbinically prohibited act, even for the purpose of preventing a significant financial loss.[197] However, in certain specific cases—where a person is so distressed over the potential loss that there is a real concern he may transgress himself—the Sages permitted him to have the rabbinically prohibited act performed through a child, even if the child has reached the age of Chinuch and even if the child is ones own son[198], in order to prevent him from committing the prohibition personally.[199] This leniency applies exclusively to rabbinic prohibitions. A biblical prohibition may never be transgressed, even in a case of great panic or severe financial loss.[200]

For the sake of a Mitzva – Repeated Transgression:[201] According to all opinions, it is forbidden to instruct or even allow a child [of any age] repeatedly violate even a Rabbinic prohibition for the benefit of an adult, even when performed in pursuit of a Mitzva. This restriction is based on concerns that habitual transgression may lead the child to continue such conduct even after reaching adulthood [i.e. Bar and Bas Mitzvah].[202]

For the sake of a Mitzva – Occasional Transgression: In cases where the transgression occurs only on random occasions and solely for the fulfillment of a Mitzva—thereby eliminating concerns of future repetition—the matter is subject to debate amongst the Poskim. Some Poskim[203] rule that it is forbidden to allow a child [of any age], even on an occasional basis, to transgress a prohibition on behalf of an adult, even for the sake of a mitzvah. However, other Poskim[204] maintain that transgressing a Rabbinical prohibition only on random occasions for the sake of a Mitzva is permitted being that there is no worry that the child may come to repeat the prohibition when older.[205] Practically one may be lenient like this opinion which permits instructing and allowing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzva.[206] [This applies even if the child is above the age of Chinuch, and even to the child’s parents.[207] However, one may not allow the child to transgress a biblical prohibition under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence.[208]]

• Case Example:[209] Based on the lenient opinion above, on Friday night a child may be given to drink from the wine of Kiddush customarily recited in shul [even though it is not Bemakom Seuda], since it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, as at times guests eat in shul and drink the Kiddush wine, and it is therefore not a regular practice to give the wine specifically to a child. [In truth, this is permitted even according to the stringent opinion mentioned above, due to an additional consideration[210], as will be explained in Chapter ??, Halacha ??. see there for a full discussion of this matter.]

Summary

It is generally forbidden for an adult to instruct or permit a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the adult’s own benefit, even if the child is below the age of education—such actions must be protested by any adult who witnesses them. However, if the transgression is for the sake of a mitzvah and occurs only occasionally, some authorities permit instructing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition due to the lack of concern that the child will become habituated to the behavior. Nonetheless, it is prohibited to instruct or allow a child to repeatedly violate even a Rabbinical prohibition, even in pursuit of a mitzvah, as this may lead to habitual transgression into adulthood. Under all circumstances, a child may not be instructed to transgress a Biblical prohibition, even for a mitzvah or as a rare event.

1. May one feed a child a Rabbinical Issur for the sake of educating him for a Mitzva?[211]

A Mitzvah that the child will fulfill as an adult: Any matter that serves the purpose of chinuch— for the purpose of educating a child to perform a mitzvah when he reaches bar mitzvah—may be given to a child even if it involves a prohibition. For example, one may feed a child from the Pesach offering even though the child was not included in the original registration at the time of the slaughter, in which case an adult would be prohibited from eating it. Nevertheless, since the intent is to educate the child in the performance of the mitzvah, it is permitted in the case of a minor.

A Mitzvah that the child will not fulfill as an adult:[212] The above allowance only applies if the mitzvah is one that the child will be able to fulfill upon reaching bar mitzvah. However, if the mitzvah is one that the child will be unable to fulfill upon reaching bar mitzvah, then the prohibition may not be given to him, due to concern that he may become accustomed to the act and continue it improperly later.[213] Accordingly, a child may not be given the wine of a brit milah on Yom Kippur so that the blessing should not appear to have been said in vain, since this practice would be prohibited to him as an adult.[214]

1. Asking a gentile to feed a child non-Kosher food or have him perform another prohibition:[215]

It is prohibited for any individual to instruct a non-Jew to provide a child with non-Kosher food [even if the prohibition is only Rabbinical[216]] or to transgress any other prohibition, even if the child is below the age of understanding.[217]

If the child needs to eat the food, such as for medical necessity:[218] If a child requires non-Kosher food for medical reasons, such as mild illness, it is permissible to request that a non-Jew administer the forbidden food to the child, [even if the food is Biblically prohibited[219]].[220] This allowance, however, applies only when no Kosher alternative is available for the child. [221]

1. Giving a child an item with which he may commit a prohibition:[222]

Non-Kosher food: It is forbidden to give a child [of any age] non‑kosher food if there is a chance that he may come to eat.[223] [This applies even to food forbidden merely due to Rabbinic decree.[224]] Moreover, even food that is prohibited only during a specific time period[225] may not be given to a child [when it is forbidden for him to consume it at that time] if there is a chance that he may come to eat it.[226]

Foods prohibited due to repulsiveness:[227] Even foods that are forbidden solely because of their repulsive nature, and thus fall under the prohibition of bal teshaktzu, may not be given to a child if there is concern that the child may come to eat them.

A live creature:[228] It is forbidden to give an infant a live non‑kosher locust to play with, as it may die and the child may come to eat it, in which case it is considered as though one actively fed the child non‑kosher food. However, one may give a child a live treif[229] bird to play with, since even if it dies, it is not fit for consumption in its present state. [Furthermore, in modern times being that it is no longer customary to eat locusts, a live non-Kosher locust may be given to children to play with, as there is no concern that they will eat it.[230]]

Giving the child an item with which he will desecrate Shabbos with:[231] All of the above restrictions apply specifically to prohibited foods, even where the prohibition is time‑dependent.[232] However, with respect to Shabbos, it is permitted to give a child [of any age below Bar and Bas Mitzvah[233]] objects with which he may perform a prohibited act for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so [and even if the act is Biblically forbidden].[234] [Some Poskim[235] rule that this leniency applies even in a case where the child would be unable to reach the item without the assistance of an adult. This leniency however only applies to individuals other than the child’s father.[236] The father, however, may give such an item to a child only if the child is below the age of chinuch.[237] Once the child reaches the age of chinuch, the father is obligated to educate him in mitzvot and to protest improper behavior, and therefore may not provide him with an item through which he will perform a prohibition.[238]] For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos.[239] Although the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is solely for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him.[240] Nevertheless, an adult may not place the food directly into the child’s mouth[241], [nor instruct the child to eat it, as explained in Halacha B]. [Likewise, it is forbidden for one to tell the baby to eat it.[242]] [Some Poskim[243] maintain that if an item will cause the child to engage in a constant prohibition, it may not be given to him. Others[244] rule that any item whose primary function involves the performance of a prohibited act, in which case it will most certainly be performed by the child, may not be given to a child at all. Likewise, if providing the item to the child implicitly conveys to him that he is expected to perform a prohibited act with it, this would seemingly fall under the standard category of sefiya, and is no different from explicitly instructing the child to perform the prohibition. Accordingly, only in a case where the child has not yet reached a level of maturity or understanding to recognize that the adult, by providing the item, is asking him to perform a prohibited act, may there be room to permit it.[245]]

Giving a child an item with the intent that he desecrate Shabbos: Some Poskim[246] rule that the above leniency applies only when the item is given to the child without intent that he perform a prohibited act with it. However, if the giver’s intent is specifically that the child commits a transgression using the item, it is forbidden to give it to him.[247]

From the Rav’s Desk: The Prohibition of Instructing a Minor to Transgress: Scope, Severity, and Halachic Basis

Question

I am seeking clarity regarding the parameters and severity of the prohibition against telling a child to perform an act that is prohibited for an adult—such as on Shabbos or with respect to any other prohibition in the Torah. I understand that it is forbidden to ask a child to do a prohibited act. However:

1. Is this prohibition based on the mitzvah of chinuch (education)?
2. Does it apply only to the father, or to any adult?
3. Does it apply only to biblically prohibited acts, or also to rabbinic prohibitions?
4. Is the prohibition itself biblical or rabbinic in nature?
5. Does it apply only to a child who has reached the age of chinuch, or even to very young children?

Answer

It is forbidden for any adult, not only the father, to instruct any minor, even a very young child and even below the age of chinuch, to perform any act that is prohibited for an adult. This prohibition applies to both biblical and rabbinic prohibitions. According to most Rishonim and Poskim, the prohibition to instruct a child to violate a biblical prohibition is itself of biblical status. The prohibition is not based on chinuch, but on an independent Torah commandment known as “לא תאכילום” (lo ta’achilum), which the Sages understood to prohibit adults from actively causing minors to transgress.

Explanation

This concept is known in halachic terminology as ספייה בידיים (safiya b’yadayim), meaning actively causing a minor to transgress. Unlike chinuch, which focuses on guidance and correction, safiya b’yadayim treats the adult’s action as a direct violation of Torah law. Consequently, anything that is forbidden for an adult to do is likewise forbidden for him to cause a child to do, whether through action or instruction, and when the underlying prohibition is biblical, the severity of the prohibition remains biblical as well.

The foundation of this prohibition is found in the Gemara (Yevamos 114a), which teaches that it is forbidden for an adult to feed non‑kosher food to a child. The Gemara derives this from three separate biblical contexts: the prohibition of eating non‑kosher creeping creatures, the prohibition of consuming blood, and the prohibition for Kohanim to become defiled through contact with the dead. In each case, the Torah’s language is expounded by Chazal to include not only a prohibition on the individual, but also a prohibition upon adults to actively cause minors to transgress. In particular, the verse “לא תאכלום” is traditionally read as “לא תאכילום”—do not feed them. Although these verses explicitly address only three categories of prohibitions, the Rishonim and Poskim explain that they are not isolated cases. Rather, they serve as paradigms from which a general principle is derived. From these examples, Chazal establish that it is forbidden for an adult to actively cause a child to violate any prohibition of the Torah. This includes all biblical prohibitions, not merely those mentioned explicitly in the verses. Thus, the prohibition is comprehensive in scope and applies across the entirety of Torah law.

This prohibition is fundamentally distinct from the rabbinic mitzvah of chinuch. Chinuch is an educational obligation intended to train a child to observe mitzvos so that he will continue to do so upon reaching adulthood. It is primarily incumbent upon the father, applies only once the child has reached an age of understanding, and is rabbinic in nature. By contrast, the prohibition of לא תאכילום is not educational at all. It is an independent prohibition that applies to all adults, regardless of parental relationship, and applies even to children who are far below the age of chinuch, including infants.

Because this prohibition is not rooted in chinuch, it applies universally and without regard to the child’s cognitive ability. Even if the child has no understanding of the act and no halachic responsibility, the adult who causes the transgression bears full responsibility. For this reason,

even a one‑year‑old child may not be instructed to perform a prohibited act.

However, a further question arises regarding whether there is a distinction between actively feeding a child a prohibited item and merely instructing the child to perform a prohibited act himself. One might argue that instructing a child resembles amira le‑nochri, which is generally a rabbinic prohibition. However, many Rishonim and Poskim reject this comparison. They maintain that instructing a child to transgress constitutes direct causation and is therefore included in the biblical prohibition of לא תאכילום. According to this view, the adult’s verbal instruction is functionally equivalent to physically feeding the child the prohibition.

Sources:

See regarding the general prohibition of Sefiyah Beyadayim: Admur 343:5 “All of the above applies only with regard to the obligation to separate a child from a transgression. However, to actively feed a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden for every person, even if the child is not at all capable of understanding, as it is stated: “Do not eat them”—which the Sages expounded to mean: “Do not feed them to minors.” This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 266:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41; Michaber 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Yevamos 114a; Terumos Hadeshen 62; M”B 343:4 “As for forbidden food—everyone is prohibited from it, and if the infant eats it, the infant has no understanding at all. And this matter is prohibited by the Torah, for we derive it from what is written regarding creeping creatures: “You shall not eat them” (lo tochelum), and the verse is read thus, and the Sages received it as an exposition to mean: “You shall not feed them to minors.” And likewise regarding blood it is written: “Any soul among you shall not eat blood,” and the Sages received this as an exposition to mean: “Do not feed [blood] to minors.” And likewise regarding the impurity of priests it is written: “Say and you shall say,” and the Sages said: “Say”—to the adults, that they should say [it] to the minors. And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress. Therefore it is forbidden to give a child any food that is forbidden, or to give it to him to play with, lest he come to eat it, for this is considered as though one feeds him directly by hand. [This is the ruling of the Magen Avraham], even [in such a case], etc., and [one may not avoid this] by saying [to do so] to a non‑Jew.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 194; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1

See regarding that the prohibition is Biblical: Admur ibid; 262:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41 in end; Bach 343 and Taz 343 that so applies according to Tur; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Achiezer 3:1 in name of Noda Beyehuda; M”B ibid; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that the prohibition to cause a child to eat non-Kosher food is merely Rabbinical. [P”M 343 M”Z 2 in opinion of Tur and possibly Rambam]

See regarding that the Biblical prohibition applies to all Issurim: Implication of Admur ibid “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food; Implication of Shut Admur 41; Implication of Yevamos ibid as learn many Rishonim, Achronim, and Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Ramban Vayikra 21:1; Mishneh Berurah 343:4 and Shaar Hatziyon 434:12 as is learned from the Gedolei Harishonim on Talmud [Yevamos 112] which brings three verses which teach that it is forbidden for a Gadol to help a child transgress “And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 506; Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1 “And only from the combination of all three of these matters do we learn, by means of the common denominator, that in all prohibitions the adults are warned with regard to the minors.” 

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by prohibitions other than non-Kosher foods, the prohibition to cause a child to sin is merely Rabbinical. [Levush 343:1; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Pesicha Koleles 2:9 in opinion of Tur; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 508]

Opinion of Admur: Admur does not explicitly write that the above prohibition of feeding a child an Issur extends to all other prohibitions in the Torah, although it is implied from his beginning wording which states “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food. The same is implied from Shut Rabbeinu ibid

See regarding that the prohibition applies to even instructing the child to do so: Admur 343:5 “It is forbidden for any Jew to instruct a non‑Jew to feed the child prohibited items, since instructing a non‑Jew (amira lenochri) is forbidden with regard to all Torah prohibitions—and certainly one may not instruct the child himself to do so.”; So rule regarding even Amirah Lenachri, and certainly this would apply even more so to instructing the child directly: M”A 343:2; Rashi Yevamos 114a; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 p. 13; Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Mishneh Berura 343:4; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

See regarding that the prohibition to even instructing the child to do so is also Biblical: Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Shiltei Giborim Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M ibid; M”B 343:4 “And this matter is prohibited by the Torah…And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Mishneh Lemelech in name of Rashba, brought and negated in Tehila Ledavid ibid]

Opinion of Admur: It is not clear from Admur whether the prohibition he mentions against instructing a child to perform a prohibited act is biblical or rabbinic. On the one hand, Admur discusses this prohibition toward the end of the halakhah in the context of Amirah Lenachri, which suggests that instructing a child may itself be only rabbinically prohibited. This would imply that the biblical prohibition applies specifically to actively feeding a child a forbidden substance. This reading is further supported by siman 265:10, where Admur does not indicate that a biblical prohibition is involved in simply telling a child to carry a wallet or money from place to place and refers consistently to a case in which the wallet was placed onto the child. This approach appears to follow those authorities who maintain that instructing a child is prohibited only on a rabbinic level, whereas the biblical prohibition is limited to directly causing the child to consume or perform the prohibited matter. Vetzarcuh Iyun! See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

9. Does one need to repent for sins that he did as a child?[248]

A child [under Bar/Bas Mitzvah] who hit his father or committed other sins while still a child, although he does not need to repent when he grows older, nevertheless, it is proper for him to accept upon himself a certain matter for the sake of repentance and atonement, even though he had transgressed before he became of punishable age. [This applies whether to sins between man and his fellow, or sins between man and Hashem.[249] The purpose of this repentance is not for the sake of removing Divine retribution, being that he is not liable for any punishment. However, the forbidden act, despite not being punishable, leaves a damaging impact and spiritual stain on the soul of the child. It is for this reason that the child should do some act of repentance for the sake of cleansing his soul of any spiritual blemish.[250]]

Below age of Chinuch: Some Poskim[251] rule that the above Teshuvah is only relevant for children who caused damage when they were of age to remember what they did. If, however, they were of very young age, and they don’t remember the incident, they are not required to do Teshuvah at all. However, some Tzadikim did Teshuvah even for pain that they caused their parents prior to the age of Chinuch.[252]

Addendum Likkutei Sichos #1

This chapter discussed the nature of chinuch, obligation, and growth in mitzvah observance. To clarify a fundamental principle underlying these halachos, we include here a Sicha of the Rebbe from Parshas Eikev. This Sicha explains that the Torah does not demand instant perfection in knowledge or observance, but views growth, learning, and gradual development as part of the mitzvah itself. This perspective provides essential clarity for understanding chinuch, responsibility, and realistic expectations in avodas Hashem.

Does G-d really expect and demand perfection in our knowledge of his commands and in our religious observance?

(Likkutei Sichos Vol. 35[256])

In this week’s Parsha, Parshas Eikev, we learn about the Mitzvah of Torah study and the obligation for a father to teach his child Torah, as the verse[257] states “and you shall teach your children to speak in them.” In this talk, the Rebbe delves into the Halachic question of whether the general obligation of educating one’s child in Torah and Mitzvos is Biblical or Rabbinical, and after concluding from the sources that the teaching of Torah to one’s child is a Biblical obligation while educating him in Mitzvos is only a Rabbinical obligation, the Rebbe then begins the quest of understanding why there is no Biblical obligation to educate one’s child in Mitzvos. After all, doesn’t he need to know how to do all the Mitzvos as soon as he/she becomes Bar/Bat Mitzvah? The Rebbe travels through a very deep and analytical discussion of various potential answers, which concludes in their negation. In the final answer that the Rebbe gives to this question, one can arguably say, that the Rebbe delineated one of the greatest and most unconventional novelties of his career, which aside for being fascinating in its own right, revolutionizes the way we think and view our level of observance, and the mistakes that we make.

Many Baalei Teshuvah face internal intense emotional and psychological pressure to serve G-d in the most perfect way and perform all of the commands correctly. On a different front, all those involved in pursuing knowledge of Torah law by either studying from the texts directly, or participating in Halacha classes, are inevitably faced with the reality that there are things that they have been doing wrong. If this itself is not enough to break the spirit of the genuine G-d-fearing Jew who is trying to better himself in the fulfillment of the commands, all the more so will his heart be broken with the prospect that it will probably take him his entire life to properly learn all the commands in the Torah with their details, and until then he will most likely be doing things wrong due to being unaware. Due to this, some Torah observant individuals are actually afraid to take upon themselves the proper study of Halacha, due to the potential dread of what they will discover, of their improper observance. Others may suffer from an even worse dilemma, in which even after they learn the proper law, will remain complacent and unmoved to actually make a change, due to their inability to accept the prospect that they were doing something wrong. Others will simply be unwilling to accept being told or taught that they are doing something wrong, under the assumption that they are already knowledgeable in all the ins and outs of all the commands, and if they haven’t heard of this correction until now, it must be incorrect.

The novelty of the Rebbe in this talk helps revolutionize the way of thinking for all these individuals and motivates each individual to gradually grow in his knowledge and fulfillment of Torah and Mitzvos with a healthy self-esteem and self-confidence of his religious observance, despite his mistakes.

1. Was Avraham truly Torah observant his entire life?

On the verse[258], “Veavraham Zaken Ba Bayamim/and Avraham was old and experienced in days” the sages[259] state that Avraham served G-d his entire life to the point that every day of his entire life were complete days involved in serving G-d. This statement is quite puzzling and requires further understanding. We are all aware that Avraham is the one who discovered monotheism and was not born into this belief system. Meaning, that there was a period of his life prior to this discovery in which he was not involved in serving G-d being that he was not yet aware of His existence. Furthermore, as the Rambam[260] states, at first Avraham was an idol worshiper, and served idols together with all of his other countrymen and members of his family. It took him time until he actually discovered G-d and the worthlessness of the idols. As brought in Chazal, Avraham worshiped many deities and celestial beings until he finally discovered G-d. How then can we truthfully say that he served G-d every day of his entire life? [Even when eulogizing an individual after his passing, one is only allowed to slightly exaggerate in praise of the deceased, however, to overexaggerate is forbidden.[261] Hence, how could we be allowed to exaggerate and say that Avraham served G-d throughout his entire life when we know that this is clearly not true? It is like saying of a non-religious Jew who eventually became a Baal Teshuvah and who tasted every non-Kosher food in the world prior to his repentance, that throughout every day of his life he ate only Kosher!]

At what age did Avraham discover G-d: There are various opinions regarding the age that Avraham finally discovered G-d and monotheism. The Talmud[262] states that it was at age 3. This is based on the verse[263] which states “Eikev Asher Shama Avraham Bekoli/Being that Avraham listened to My voice,” which the Talmud interprets to mean that Avraham listened to G-d’s voice for the numerical value of the word Eikev/עקב which is 172. Meaning, that he listened to G-d for 172 years out of his 175 years of life, thus showing that he recognized G-d at age 3. Others[264] say that Avraham recognized G-d at age 40 and others[265] saying was at age 48. According to these latter opinions, it is not just that Avraham had a few years missing from his service of G-d but had over 25% of his life lacking service of G-d and being involved in idol worship. How then can one possibly say that Avraham served G-d for every day of his life, ignoring his first 40 or 48 years of idolatry.

To understand this matter we must first introduce the subject of whether a child’s education in Torah and Mitzvos is a Biblical or Rabbinical obligation.

2. Is the Mitzvah to educate a child, Biblical or Rabbinical?

All of us are aware of the great Mitzvah to educate children in the path of Torah and Mitzvos, and of its importance to ensure an everlasting continuity of the Jewish faith, hence sprouting forth the establishment of Torah educational institutions from kindergarten through elementary school, through high school. An interesting question that is raised is regarding the status of obligation of giving one’s child a Torah and Jewish education. Children who have yet to reach the age of Mitzvos are not obligated in Jewish observance, at least not from a Biblical perspective, and hence what is the Torah standpoint regarding education of such children? So, it is a clear ruling in the Poskim[266] that indeed the Mitzvah of educating one’s child in Mitzvos is merely Rabbinical. This applies for both positive and negative commands and applies both the girls and boys. Meaning, that just as the child himself does not become obligated in Mitzvos until he reaches the age of 13 for a boy and 12 for a girl, so too similarly there is no Biblical obligation to educate one’s child in the keeping of Mitzvos. This revelation aggravates the following question:

3. Question-Why is there no Biblical obligation to educate a child in Mitzvos?

The fact that the Mitzvah of educating a child in Mitzvos is merely Rabbinical, aggravates the following very powerful question. How can there be no Biblical obligation to educate a child in Mitzvos if he is Biblically obligated to observe all of them properly starting from the moment that he/she becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah? Is it possible for a child to suddenly gain knowledge and experience in all the commands of the Torah the moment that he/she becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah? Certainly not! So, it ends up that by the Torah not commanding and obligating the child to be educated in Mitzvos prior to reaching the age of Mitzvos, it is setting him up for religious failure and will cause him to begin his religious life in the most disastrous way with transgressions, and lack of observance of the commands. Why does the Torah itself not take responsibility of this inevitable result, and why does it leave it to the sages to make the decree of educating children in Mitzvos in order to prevent this from happening?

The Rebbe will now attempt several suggested answers, and after their negation, eventually conclude with a most magnificent Torah novelty on the subject of Jewish observance and education.

4. The first Answer and its rebuttal:

The Biblical command to teach one’s child Torah is in order so he know how to perform the Mitzvos when he is older: Although, as stated above, there is no Biblical command to educate one’s child in Mitzvos, nonetheless, there is a Biblical command upon the father to educate his child in Torah learning[267], as the verse[268] states “and you shall teach your children to speak in them.” The Ramban[269] comments on the verse[270], “Vishinantam Livanecha/and you shall teach your children,” that since G-d commanded us to keep his commands, therefore we are to teach our children the commands, as otherwise how will they learn them. According to this, one can say in answer to the above question, that although there is no unique obligation to educate one’s child in Mitzvah fulfillment, he must educate him in the surrounding laws of all the Mitzvos and teach him how to perform them, and this is the fundamental purpose of the Biblical command instructing a father to teach his child Torah. In other words, there is a Biblical obligation upon a father to educate his child in learning Torah[271], and this itself is for the sake of him knowing the Mitzvos. Nonetheless, the sages did not suffice with this general obligation to educate the child in the knowledge of the commands and decreed that a father must also educate his child in the actual fulfillment of the commands, in order so he is already accustomed to performing them when he gets older[272], following the verse in Proverbs[273] which states “Chanoch Lanaar Al Pi Darko Gam Ki Yazkin Lo Yassur Mimena/educate your child according to his way, so he does not swerve from it when he is older.”

The rebuttal against this answer: The above explanation, unfortunately, does not suffice due to a couple of reasons. First off, it is not unanimous amongst the Poskim that the Biblical obligation of a father to teach his child Torah is for the sake of education of Mitzvos. Indeed, according to the majority of Poskim[274], this Mitzvah is intrinsically for the sake of the Mitzvah of learning Torah and not for the sake of education, similar to a father’s obligation to circumcise and redeem his son which has intrinsic value and is not for the sake of his child’s future education. In addition, the simple learning of the details of the Mitzvos does not suffice in educating a child in how to keep them when they are older, as is proven from the fact that the sages needed to make this institution of educating a child in Mitzvos despite the general Biblical requirement for a father to teach his child Torah. Why was the Torah itself not concerned with the same concerns as the sages, that an education focusing on gaining knowledge of the Torah laws without practicing them, will not suffice for the child when he is older? If a child has been accustomed to living a life of nonobservance of Mitzvos, and has never in actuality performed the Mitzvos, how can he be expected to change his entire accustomed nature in one moment, when he turns the age of Mitzvos at 12 for a girl and 13 for a boy? How can the child be expected to suddenly fulfill all the Mitzvos properly like a pro, without stumbling and making mistakes?

5. The second answer and its rebuttal:

There is a Biblical command to educate one’s child in the performance of Mitzvos: Seemingly, one can answer our above question in the following manner: Indeed, there is absolutely a Biblical obligation on a father to educate his under Bar/Bas Mitzvah child in the actual fulfillment of Mitzvos, so he receives practical experience and knows how to perform them properly when he reaches the age of Mitzvos. This obligation does not need any written source in Scripture and does not even have to be explicitly spelled out by the Talmud or Poskim, and is something self-understood from the mere fact that the child is obligated in Mitzvos as soon as he/she comes Bar/Bas Mitzvah.

An example from other Mitzvos: To what is this similar? It is self-understood that when the Torah commands a Jew to wear Tefillin, that included in this command is a command for him to make, or purchase, or borrow, a set of Kosher Tefillin for him to wear. There’s absolutely no need for anyone to spell out this obvious obligation that comes with the command, in order to be able to fulfill the command. It is self-understood, that one who does not put in the effort to make, buy, or borrow, a pair of Tefillin for him to wear, that he transgresses the Biblical command, and he cannot excuse himself under the claim that the Torah never explicitly obligated him to place effort to access a pair of Tefillin. This concept applies by many other Mitzvos that the Torah commanded us, such as the Mitzvah of dwelling in a Sukkah, shaking the Lulav, blowing the Shofar, of which we are all obligated to place due effort to have access to the objects with which the Mitzvah is performed.[275] Furthermore, the mere obligation in the command also carries with it the obligation for one to study its laws and know how to fulfill it properly, even if this detail is not explicitly spelled out in Scripture. Therefore, one who does not perform a Mitzvah properly due to his lack of effort in educating himself in its details, is considered to have transgressed a Biblical command. Based on this, we can argue and say that since a child becomes obligated in Torah and Mitzvos as soon as he/she becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah, therefore, it is a self-understood Biblical obligation upon the father to educate him in the fulfillment of the Mitzvos. Ideally, this obligation should be on the child himself, but since a child does not have the maturity to be commanded in anything, therefore the command relating to his education is given over to his father, similar to the obligation of the father to redeem his son, which is done on behalf of the son who cannot do so himself at this age.[276]

We will now address the exact Halachic status of this self-understood obligation, and why it nevertheless remained necessary for the sages to make a specific institution of educating children.

Hechsher Mitzvah-The status of the above Biblical command of education: The above self-understood Biblical command on a father to educate his child in Mitzvos has the Halachic status of a “Hechsher Mitzvah”, as opposed to an intrinsic commandment. It is similar to the chopping of wood for the sake of making a fire for the welding of a circumcision knife, which is not an intrinsic Mitzvah, but rather a preparation Mitzvah, known as Machshirei Mitzvah.[277] It hence does not contain intrinsic value regarding certain laws, such as to transgress Shabbos on its behalf. Based on this understanding, we can now explain the novelty of the sages in them turning the Mitzvah to educate one’s child in Mitzvos into a Rabbinical command.

The Rabbinical command of education gives it essential worth: The sages desired that the Mitzvos fulfilled by a child contain intrinsic value as opposed to a mere preparatory value, and hence made an explicit institution that a father must educate his child in Mitzvos in order to give these Mitzvos intrinsic Rabbinical value. In other words, if not for the decree of the sages the Mitzvos of a child would not be considered real Mitzvos but simply preparatory Mitzvos, and by the sages making their institution, it gave the Mitzvos of a child intrinsic status. One of the ramifications between the preparatory Biblical obligation and the specific Rabbinical obligation is regarding whether the Mitzvah must be performed by the child properly with all of its details, as we will now explain.

Do all the bylaws of a Mitzvah apply likewise to a child’s education:[278] The Biblical obligation of educating the child in Mitzvos for the sake of preparation for the future, carries with it the leniency that the child is not obligated to be educated to perform the Mitzvah with all of its validating details. Since the main purpose of the Biblical command is for preparation and contains no intrinsic value, therefore, it is not so crucial if the fulfillment of the Mitzvah is lacking some details, so long as the child receives the general concept of the command and knows how to fulfill it. However, once the sages made the Rabbinical decree of educating a child, the Mitzvah now carries intrinsic value and therefore must be fulfilled properly with all the details.[279]

The rebuttal: While the above explanation to our original query of why the Torah does not explicitly command a father to educate his children and Mitzvos, sounds lucid and clear, practically it is most difficult to accept. According to the above explanation it ends up that there is an actual Biblical obligation to educate one’s children in the general fulfillment of Mitzvos, and that the Rabbinical obligation simply obligates that it be performed in a valid method. Why then do all of the Poskim unequivocally record that the Mitzvah of education is merrily Rabbinical and do not go into the above most important distinction. Indeed, the negation of the above distinction and novelty is explicit in the words of Admur in his Hilchos Talmud Torah[280] in which he states that, “a child is exempt from all the commands and also his father is not Biblically obligated to educate him in Mitzvos, and the obligation is only Rabbinical.” This unequivocal statement negates any level of Biblical obligation, and hence the above novelty which creates a Biblical command of general Chinuch in Mitzvos has to be stricken down from the record. Accordingly, we return back to our original question: Why did the Torah not feel it necessary to command a father to educate his child in the fulfillment of Mitzvos and prevent a most drastic occurrence of the child starting off his religious life as a transgressor.

6. The concluding answer:

After negating the above potential answers, the Rebbe concludes with a most simple but revolutionary explanation, which he defines in terms scarcely used, as a “Great Chidush in Halacha.”

A child is not Biblically expected to fulfill everything the moment he becomes Bar Mitzvah: Due to the powerfulness of the above question which has yet to be properly answered, we must conclude that our entire premises was wrong to begin with. The question began under the assumption that since a child becomes Biblically obligated in Torah and Mitzvos at the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah, therefore he is Biblically expected to fulfill all of the commands properly once he reaches this age, and if he doesn’t then he is considered to have transgressed the command. Due to this assumption, our question was raised regarding why the Torah does not obligate the father to educate his child in the Mitzvos, so he does not transgress them when he becomes the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah.

In truth, however, one can question the certainty of the above assumption. Perhaps in truth a child is not Biblically expected to fulfill all the commands properly the very moment he reaches the age of Mitzvos. Meaning, that although he certainly becomes Biblically obligated in Mitzvos when he reaches the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah, the Torah does not command him or expect him to fulfill all the Mitzvos perfectly at that moment. Rather, from that age and onwards the Torah obligates him to begin to educate himself in all the Mitzvos and strive to fulfill all of them. However, since it will inevitably take time until he can properly educate himself in the details of the Mitzvos, and gain experience in how to do them properly, therefore, the Torah does not hold him responsible for his lack of fulfillment or even transgressions, so long as he is in the active process of educating himself. Furthermore, one can argue that not only is he considered exempt due to reasons of duress when he accidentally performs a transgression or performs a Mitzvah in an invalid method due to lack of knowledge and experience, but furthermore it can be considered as if his invalid Mitzvah is considered part of the process of him fulfilling the command. The reason why the Torah is so lenient in the above and does not expect perfection of religious observance the moment one becomes obligated in Mitzvos, is because the Torah was not given to angels but to humans, and the Torah does not demand something of a person that is beyond his capability.[281] Thus, if the fulfillment of a certain Mitzvah takes time, he is not considered to be transgressing that Mitzvah so long as he is involved in the process of fulfilling it. An example for this concept can be brought from the Mitzvah of destroying Chametz.

The Mitzvah of Biur Chametz is fulfilled throughout one’s involvement in destroying it:[282] The law states that one who finds Chametz on Pesach is obligated to destroy it the moment he finds it and transgresses the Biblical negative command of owning Chametz if he delays its destruction. Notwithstanding this law, the Poskim[283] write that so long as one is involved in the process of destroying the Chametz he is not considered to be transgressing this command even if there is a great delay between the time that he found it and its final destruction. Thus, for example, even if it takes him one hour to prepare the fire and have it burn the Chametz to the point it becomes charcoal, he is not considered to be transgressing anything during this hour. [Due to this concept, we rule that from the letter of the law, there is no requirement to destroy one’s Chametz prior to the start of the 6th hour of the day on Erev Pesach, and he may begin to destroy it immediately after the start of the 6th hour of the day, even though he will inevitably be owning the Chametz throughout the process of its destruction.[284]] Furthermore, not only is he not considered to be transgressing the command of owning Chametz during this hour delay, but it is even considered that he is in the process of fulfilling the command, as it is not possible to fulfill the command without him preparing the fire and having it take it’s time to burn the Chametz. This same concept can then be used to understand the status of a child when he becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah. Since the child only becomes Biblically obligated in the commands at this age, and it is not possible for the Torah to obligate him personally to prepare for them prior to this age due to his immature state, therefore, from the moment he becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah and begins to involve himself in the fulfillment of Torah and Mitzvos, he is considered to be within the process of fulfilling them, and any delay in their proper fulfillment is not viewed as a transgression.

The lack of liability is not due to the exemption of “Anus Rachmana Patrei” but rather due to him being considered already involved in the Mitzvah: The above idea [of one not being considered to transgress a command while he is involved in preparing for its fulfillment] should not be confused with the known concept of “Anus Rachmana Patrei”, that G-d exempts one from liability in a case of duress. This concept only applies when one is already intrinsically obligated in fulfilling the command and its actual fulfillment takes no delay, but due to external reasons beyond his control, is unable to fulfill it, [such as one who is in jail and could not shake a set of Daled Minim due to reasons beyond his control]. In such a case, the Torah does not hold him liable for his lack of fulfillment, due to the rule of “Anus Rachmana Patrei.” However, when the obligation itself contains an intrinsic aspect that causes its delay of fulfillment, then the moment one begins the preparations to fulfill it, he is considered to already be in the process of fulfilling the Mitzvah, and certainly is not considered to have transgressed it during those moments of delay which were intrinsically unavoidable and are part of the natural process of its fulfillment.

The difference between Mitzvos that require preparation before their time of fulfillment arrives, versus the obligation of a child  who becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah: Now, regarding those Mitzvos that require special training, or require an object for their fulfillment, such as the blowing of the Shofar and shaking of the Lulav, it is understood that one is obligated to begin the preparation for the Mitzvah before the actual time of obligation arrives, in order so he can fulfill it properly when the time arrives to fulfill it. Thus, already prior to the holiday of Rosh Hashanah and Sukkos begins his obligation to search for a Shofar and Daled Minim, and if he is lax in placing due effort to acquire these items by the time their obligation arrives by the festival, then he is considered to have nullified a positive command. In essence, this concept applies to all the Mitzvos of the Torah, that their obligation of fulfillment also obligates one in educating himself and preparing himself for the Mitzvah when the time comes. The one exception to this is by a child when he becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah. Being that he cannot legally be obligated in anything prior to reaching the age of maturity, at the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah, therefore even his obligation to educate himself and prepare for the Mitzvos only begins after he/she turns Bar/Bas Mitzvah. Thus, a person who is above the age of Mitzvos will only be considered to have transgressed a Mitzvah if enough time has passed for them to be able to educate themselves and prepare for its fulfillment.

The novelty of this explanation and it’s forced conclusion: Now, although this explanation and understanding is a great novelty in Halacha, it seemingly is unavoidable, as it is not possible that G-d would hold us responsible for the delay of fulfillment of Mitzvos, when the very nature of the Mitzvah requires a delay in order for it to be fulfilled. Thus, since the fulfillment of every Mitzvah in the Torah requires one to properly educate himself of its details, therefore, the time that it takes to educate oneself of a given Mitzvah is considered part of the fulfillment of the Mitzvah and part of the obligation. Now, since a child can only become obligated in Mitzvos from the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah, therefore the Biblical obligation for him to prepare for the Mitzvos also only becomes an obligation at that time.

The Rebbe now brings several proofs for this idea that the Torah does not hold one responsible to fulfill all the Mitzvos properly the second he becomes obligated in them, and rather gives one time to prepare and educate himself.

7. Proof 1-A proof from a convert:

A proof to the above concept can be brought from the law regarding the conversion process for a Gentile. Logic should dictate that prior to the conversion of a Gentile to Judaism he should be required to study and become expert in all of the practical laws and customs of Judaism in order so he can begin properly fulfilling them as soon as he converts. Lack of doing so would be a major stumbling block to both him and the Jewish nation, as it would inevitably cause him to transgress various laws and not fulfill various commands after he converts, due to his ignorance. If every Jew, including a convert, is obligated in all the Torah laws and every Jew carries liability for another Jews observance [i.e., Kol Yisrael Areivim Zeh Bezeh], then there is seemingly no room to allow ignorant Gentiles to join the Jewish nation until they are properly educated and trained. How surprising then is it to discover that in truth while a potential convert is obligated to be informed of some of the light and severe commands, he is not informed of all of them.[285] Furthermore, the Rambam[286] rules that one may not lengthen in the discussion of the Mitzvos in one’s conversation with the potential convert. Furthermore, even the little bit of information that is given over to him, is not for educational purposes, but simply to dissuade him from converting. Accordingly, we see that the initial conversion process according to Halacha promotes converting a Gentile while he is still ignorant of all the details of the religion, despite the fact that the moment he is converted he becomes obligated in them all. The question is therefore rightfully raised as to how we can be allowed to set up this new convert for automatic failure in his religious duties due to his ignorance.

Rather, the answer to this question is the same as the answer we explained regarding a child who has become Bar/Bas Mitzvah. Since a Gentile’s obligation of keeping Mitzvos only begins after he converts, therefore his obligation to educate himself of the Mitzvos also only begins then, after he converts, and so long as he is taking time to educate himself in the commandments and their details, not only is he not considered to be transgressing them, but furthermore he is actually considered to be already involved their fulfillment.

The Rebbe now offers a second proof for this idea.

8. Proof 2-A proof from Mount Sinai:

When the Jewish people accepted the Torah on Mount Sinai, they were not informed of all the details of the entire Torah at that time. The 613 commands were gradually revealed to them throughout their 40 years of stay in the desert.[287] Furthermore, even regarding the commands that were given to them on Mount Sinai, certainly it took time for them to study these commands and learn their details. Furthermore, regarding those commands that involve objects, such as Tzitzis and Tefillin, certainly it took them time to prepare these objects to fulfill the Mitzvah with them. Now, are we to say that from the time they received the Torah until the time that they actually fulfilled the Mitzvah, it was considered that they were transgressing the command? Certainly not! Rather, as we explained above, since they were already involved in the preparations for the fulfillment of the Mitzvah, therefore it was already considered as if they were fulfilling the Mitzvah, as the preparations themselves were part of the fulfillment of the Mitzvah. This concept therefore likewise applies to a child who becomes Bar/Bas Mitzvah, that so long as he needs time to educate himself and prepare for the proper fulfillment of the Mitzvah, or proper awareness to beware from a transgression, then he is not considered to be transgressing that negative or positive command, and on the contrary, he is considered to be involved in its fulfillment.

It is due to this reason that there is no Biblical obligation on a father to educate his child to fulfill Mitzvos while he is still a child.

9. Avraham Avinu was preparing to serve G-d even before He was discovered:

Based on the above explanation, we can now answer our original question regarding Avraham, and how he could be considered to have been observant his whole life, if in truth he only found G-d at a later stage. Based on the above, the answer is that although Avraham did not find G-d until age 3, or 40, or 48 [depending on the opinion], since from the moment that he was born he was already in his search for G-d, and preparing himself for serving Him, therefore he is considered to have served G-d all of his days. The Rambam[288] writes that Avraham already from a very young age began pondering the creation of the world and the discovery of its true creator. While it took him many years of searching, and trial and error with various deities and forms of idol worship, eventually he finally discovered G-d. Accordingly, since even prior to his discovery of G-d he was involved in searching for Him therefore he is considered to have been serving Him even then, as he was involved in the process of educating himself in G-d’s existence.

Addendum Likkutei Sichos #2

The prohibition to cause a child to transgress a sin, and its reasoning

(Based on Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1)

This week’s Parsha, Parshas Emor, speaks of the laws that are relevant to priests. In its opening statement the verse states, “Emor El Hakohanim Bnei Aaron, Veamarta Lahem.” This represents an instruction to Moshe to teach the laws of the priesthood to the priests, which includes the laws of not defiling oneself to the dead. The Talmud[292] interjects here on the above statement, addressing the question of why there was a need for Scripture to repeat the term Veamarta/to say, after already stating this in the beginning of the verse, “Emor.” The Talmud concludes, as Rashi brings in his commentary on this verse, that it is coming to teach as a fundamental law that the adults are tasked with the responsibility to oversee that their children likewise follow the commands. In regard to the above command, this means that the adult priests are commanded to not only not defile their own bodies with a corpse, but to also not defile the bodies of their children with a corpse. Now, we find this concept of responsibility that an adult holds for the religious observance of children repeated in two other places in the Torah, for a total of three times. In this talk, the Rebbe delves into the necessity for this idea to need to be repeated so many times, and the very special lesson that it teaches us regarding the Chinuch of our children.

1. The prohibition for an adult to cause a Jewish child to transgress a prohibition:[293]

Although the laws of Chinuch are merely Rabbinical and is only binding on the father of the child, as there is no Biblical obligation to actively educate one’s children in the observance of the commands, nonetheless, there does exist an independent prohibition against any adult causing a Jewish child to transgress a command. Meaning, although one is not Biblically obligated to stop a child from doing a transgression, nonetheless, one cannot cause him to transgress. Thus, it is Biblically forbidden for any person to give a [Biblically] forbidden food to a child for him to eat, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, including even a one-day old child. Furthermore, it is [Biblically[294]] forbidden for any person to tell any child to eat non-Kosher food, or transgress Shabbos, or any other prohibition, even if the child is completely below the age of understanding, [such as a mere one-day old infant]. Now, what is the scriptural source behind this prohibition?

2. The three areas in Scripture from where we learn the prohibition for an adult to cause a child to transgress a sin:

The Talmud[295] records three places in Scripture from where we learn that it is forbidden for an adult to cause a Jewish child to sin.

1. One is from our source above regarding the prohibition for a priest to defile himself to a corpse, from which the Talmud learns from the double wording of Emor and Veamarta that the adult priests are also commanded not to defile their children.
2. The second area in Scripture from where this matter is learned, is regarding the prohibition of eating insects.
3. The third area in Scripture from where this matter is learned, is regarding the prohibition of eating blood.

The Talmud then sums up that collectively from all these three sources we learn a general rule of the Torah, that one may never cause a child to transgress a sin by any one of the Torah prohibitions and not just by the above three. As for the question of why all three sources in Scripture were necessary, the Talmud there explains that anyone of these three sources alone would not have sufficed.

The need for each one of the three sources:

If the Torah would’ve only taught us the above rule by the prohibition against eating insects, we would’ve thought that since the eating of insects is so severe that it is prohibited even in the tiniest amount, therefore this prohibition of feeding them to children is unique to this prohibition, and one should not learn from it to other prohibitions. Likewise, if the Torah would’ve only taught us the above rule by the prohibition against eating blood, we would’ve thought that since the eating of blood carries the severity of the punishment of Kareis, therefore this prohibition of feeding them to children is unique to this prohibition and should not be learned to other prohibitions. If the Torah would’ve only taught us the above rule by insects and blood, we would’ve thought that it only applies by those prohibitions that are applicable to all of the Jewish people. However, those prohibitions only relevant to priests do not carry with them the prohibition against causing a child to transgress. Thus, the Torah had to teach us it as well regarding the priestly laws. Now, if the Torah would’ve only taught us the above rule by the prohibition of priests, we would argue that it is a special rule unique only to priests, and that by all other prohibitions of the Torah, it remains permitted to cause children to transgress. For this reason, concludes the Talmud, we needed all three sources to teach us the rule for the entire Torah.

This Talmudic teaching leaves out one very important unanswered question, and that is why the Torah couldn’t have simply taught us the above rule regarding a prohibition that contains no severities over other prohibitions and therefore can be the lamplight for all the other prohibitions in the Torah. For example, the eating of meat that was not ritually slaughtered [i.e., Niveila] is under a regular negative command without the penalty of excision and without the severity of being transgressed even when eating the tiniest amount. Why did the Torah not choose to simply teach us the above rule regarding the eating of Niveila meat and save us the need of having three sources? At most, we would’ve only needed in addition to the teaching by Niveila, a teaching by the priests, in order to include this rule also by those commands that are unique to priests alone. However, all three sources would not have been necessary. From the fact that the Talmud does not even address this question we must say that there is something unique between these three sources, which relate to the rule that they teach.

Indeed, there are some Poskim[296] who learn that by these three prohibitions of blood insects and impurity, not only is it forbidden for an adult to cause a child to transgress them, but furthermore if he sees a child transgressing them then he must reprimand the child. However, according to the vast majority of the Poskim[297], this is not the case, and by all prohibitions there is never a requirement to reprimand the child who was witnessed to transgress it, and the prohibition simply remains against actively causing the child to transgress it. Accordingly, we must continue our search to find something unique between these three sources and the prohibition which they teach.

3. The connection between children and adults:

To understand the above we must first introduce an exploration on the connection between children and adults. For the Torah to command adults regarding children there must be some connection between adults and children, as if they shared nothing in common, then it would be impossible to command one regarding the other. Now, regarding children who have reached the age of education, there is some level of intellect that they already have in common with their adult pears. However, the above law that prohibits an adult from causing a child to transgress the prohibition does not differentiate between a child who has reached the age of education and a child who was just born. What then can be the connection between a one-day old child and an adult, that the adult can therefore be commanded not to cause the child to transgress a prohibition? The answer to this is the essence of the Jew.

4. Every Jew shares the same G-dly essence:

Every Jewish individual, whether adult or child even of a single day of age, contains a G-dly soul, and contains a G-dly essence which they share. With regards to this essential G-dly point there is no difference between an adult or child, and they all contain the same quality and quantity level of essential G-dliness within them. The difference between an adult and a child, and one individual and another, can only be regarding the soul revelations in which some individuals have a greater revelation of the G-dly soul than others, and adults have a much greater revelation of the G-dly soul than does a child. However, from the perspective of the essence of the soul, there is no difference.

This is similar to the ability of the animal soul of a human or animal to give life to its body. The aspect of life which the soul gives to the body is the same in any size body, whether that of a one-day old child or a giant the size of Og Melech Habashan. The life energy that the soul has to enliven the body does not change between the different sizes of bodies. However, the other soul faculties, such as intellect and emotions, do fluctuate from person to person and body to body, in both quality and quantity.

Bottom line, from all the above it is understood that the difference between one Jew and another is only in respect to the soul faculties, however from the respect of the essence, we are all the same. Based on this, we can now explain the connection between the three cases which were used as sources to teach us that adults are commanded not to cause a child to transgress a prohibition.

5. Each one of the three commands touches on the essence of the Jew:

Each one of the three commands relating to not eating blood, insects, and the impurity of a priest relate to the essence of the soul, for which reason specifically they were chosen to become the lamplight for the rest of the Torah regarding this matter. As stated above, the prohibition against eating an insect does not have a minimum measurement. The fact that the prohibition of eating an insect applies even to the tiniest amount is due to the fact that it represents the essence of evil. When discussing essential evil its size no longer matters and hence even the tiniest amount is forbidden. Likewise, the penalty of Kareis given for one who eats blood, is due to the fact that it is an essential impurity which touches the essence of the soul, and hence can cut off the entire soul from its source. Normally, a sin simply disconnects a single string of connection from the soul to its source above, however a sin with the penalty of Kareis cuts off the entire soul. Being that these two prohibitions have a connection with the essence of the soul, therefore the Torah chose both of these examples to be used to showcase the general prohibition for adults to cause children to transgress the prohibition, being that they all share the same essence.

______________________

[1] See Admur 343; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1-14; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Chinuch Volume 16 p. 161-180; Chinuch Habanim Lemitzvos 1

[2] Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 162

[3] See Rashi Bereishis 14:14; Devarim 20:5

[4] Rambam Pirush Hamishnayos Menachos 4:5

[5] Admur Basra 4:2; 37:3; 39:1 [regarding Tefillin]; 55:6; 128:49; 199:9 [regarding Birchas Hamazon]; 271:7 [regarding Kiddush]; 616:8 [regarding Yom Kippur]; Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1 “Even though a minor is exempt from all mitzvos”; See Michaber O.C. 616:2; E.H. 155:12-15 [regarding Miun] and 169:10 [regarding Chalitza]; Rambam Shevisas Asur 2:11 regarding fasting on Yom Kippur; Ishus 2:10; Mishneh Avos 5:21; Mishneh Nida 5:6 p. 45b “At age 12 her vows become valid”; Shut Harosh 16:1; Rashi Avos 5:21; Orchos Chaim Tefila 73; Magen Avos of Tashbeitz Avos ibid in name of Midrash; Maharil 51; Birkeiy Yosef 55; Igros Kodesh 5:76; Likkutei Sichos 10:70; 15:291; Reshimos Choveres 19 and 21 and 59; Shaareiy Bar Mitzvah pp. 76-94; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol 4 Erech Bar Mitzvah footnotes 1-4; Nitei Gavriel 1:1 footnote 1 in length; Shevach Yakar 38:1

[6] The reason: As prior to this age his G-dly soul has yet to enter into his body. [Admur in Basra 4:2]

[7] All Poskim ibid

The source: 1) Some learn that the age of Bar Mitzvah is a tradition of Moshe from Sinai, and is not sourced in the written Torah. [Teshuvos Harosh Kelal 16; Maharil 51; See Likkutei Sichos 10:70; 15:291; Igros Kodesh 5:76] 2) Others learn that it is learned from the verse in Vayishlach [Bereishis 34:5] regarding Shimon and Levi who are called “Ish”, which shows that when one turns 13 years old he is called an Ish, and a woman, being that she has greater maturity, she is Bas Mitzvah a year earlier, at age 12. [Rashi Avos 5:21; Rashi Nazir 29b; Rav Ovadia Bartenura Avos ibid; Tosafos Yom Tov Avos ibid; Machzor Vitri Avos; ibid; See Likkutei Sichos 10:70; Igros Kodesh 5:76; Reshimos Choveres 21 in length]

[8] The reason: The reason that a boy becomes obligated in Mitzvos in age 13 is because at this age his G-dly soul completes its entry into the body. [Admur in Basra 4:2]

[9] Admur 616:8 regarding Yom Kippur; Michaber O.C. 616:2; E.H. 155:12; Rambam Shevisas Asur 2:11 regarding fasting on Yom Kippur; Ishus 2:1; Mishneh Nida 5:6 p. 45b “At age 12 her vows become valid”

[10] The reason a girl turns Bas Mitzvah a year before a boy: A girl becomes obligated in Mitzvos a year earlier than a boy is because Hashem granted extra understanding [Bina] to a woman. This means that her mental maturity is faster than a man, and she thus reaches the age of obligation, one year earlier. [Nidda 45b; Likkutei Sichos 11:331; Igros Kodesh 6:199; Toras Menachem 27^th Elul 5742 p. 2269; See Torah Temima on Bamidbar 30:4]

[11] Admur 37:3; 39:1 regarding Tefillin; 55:6; 128:49; 199:9 regarding Birchas Hamazon; 271:7; M”A 271:2; M”B 271:3; Rav Poalim 1:10; Kaf Hachaim 271:9; See Michaber E.H. 155:15 regarding Miun and 169:10 regarding Chalitza

[12] Igros Kodesh 5:76, brought in Shulchan Menachem 3:333; See Likkutei Sichos 10:70

[13] Reshimos Choveres 19

[14] Admur Basra 4:2; See Kaf Hachaim 225:11

[15] Admur 343:2 “All this applies to others, but a father—since he is obligated by rabbinic decree to educate his son or daughter even in positive commandments once they reach the age of education—how much more so is he obligated by rabbinic law to rebuke them and prevent them from transgressing prohibitions.”; Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1 “Even though a minor is exempt from all mitzvos, and his father is not obligated to educate him in mitzvos on a Torah level but only by rabbinic decree, nevertheless Talmud Torah is a positive commandment from the Torah upon the father to teach his young son Torah, even though the minor himself is not obligated. As it is stated, “And you shall teach them to your sons, to speak of them.”; Basra 4:2; Admur 39:1 “A minor, even though he is subject—by rabbinic law—to the obligation of tying Tefillin, he is not subject to this prohibition by Torah law. (And even according to rabbinic law, the warning applies only to his father, as explained in Siman 343.)”; 266:10; Shut Admur 41; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:28; Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; Nazir 29b; Sukkah 28b; Chayeh Adam 66:1; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61; Igros Kodesh 8:92; 95; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 162; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1

Opinion of Admur in Tanya: In Tanya, in the Hakdama to Shaar Hayichud Vihemuna, Admur writes in parentheses that “The Mitzvah of Chinuch is also with a positive command, as written in chapter 343” The intent of this statement is not to say that the Mitzvah of Chinuch is a positive command, but rather that the Rabbinical command of Chinuch also obligates one to train one’s child in following the Biblical positive commands. [Lessons in Tanya]

[16] And the Mitzvah of Vehigadeta Lebincha on Pesach night, as will be explained in Chapter ??

[17] Meaning if he is even obligated to educate the child in positive commands then certainly he must stop him from transgressing.

[18] A father regarding Issurei Shabbos: Some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos a father is Biblically obligated to prevent his son from transgressing on his behalf, as the verse states Lo Saseh Kol Melacha, Ata Ubincha Ubitecha. [See Shaar Hatziyon 343:54; Biur Halacha 266:6; Ketzos Hashulchan 141 footnote 28; Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5 footnotes 32, 61 and 67-70] Practically, Admur and other Poskim do not agree with this opinion and hence the obligation remains Rabbinical. [See Admur 266:10; and so is Setimas Admur throughout 343; Poskim in Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 70]

[19] See Likkutei Sichos Vol. 35 Parshas Vayeira

[20] See Likkutei Sichos Vol. 35 Parshas Vayeira

[21] Rashi Sukkah 2b “Mechunach Veragil Bemitzvos”; See Rashi Chagiga 6a; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 162; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1

[22] Admur Basra 4:2; See Kaf Hachaim 225:11

[23] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 162

[24] Mishlei 22:6

[25] Shut Admur 41 “For there, the discussion concerns a positive commandment that is incumbent upon the father to educate his son in, so that he will fulfill it on his own when he grows up—this is the mitzvah of education (chinuch), as it is written: “Train a child according to his way; even when he grows old, he will not depart from it.”; Chayeh Adam 66:1; Rashba Megillah 19b; Ritva Sukkah 2b; See Turei Even Chagiga 6a

[26] Chayeh Adam ibid

[27] Bereishis 18:19

[28] Meshech Chochma on Bereishis ibid; See Shelah Hakadosh Shaar Hosiyos Os Derech Eretz

[29] Pirush Rabbeinu Meyuchas

[30] Devarim 31:13

[31] Ramban on Devarim ibid

[32] Vayikra 3:17

[33] Ramban Devarim 6:7

[34] Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 162 footnote 9

[35] Turei Even Chagiga 6a

[36] Haemek Davar Devarim 11a

[37] See Sdei Chemed Kelalim Mareches Ches; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 162; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 17 p. 233; Mishnas Rebbe Aaron 4:2; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1 footnote 4 [The Rebbe ibid understands that this debate is dependent on the separate question of whether a minor can be motzi an adult in the fulfillment of a mitzvah that is rabbinic in nature. According to this understanding, the issue of a child’s personal obligation would directly impact his ability to discharge the obligation of others. However, in the Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid, the two disputes are in fact explained to be unrelated. Even according to those Poskim who maintain that a minor possesses a certain personal rabbinic obligation, that obligation is nevertheless on a lower level than that of an adult. As a result, the minor still lacks the capacity to be motzi an adult. Accordingly, according to the Rebbe’s approach, there would appear to be a contradiction in the rulings of the Alter Rebbe, as will be demonstrated later—reflecting a tension between the former and latter approaches. According to the explanation of the Encyclopedia Talmudit, however, no contradiction exists at all, since the minor’s inability to be Motzi an adult does not depend on whether his obligation is personal or derivative, but rather on the inherent disparity between his level of obligation and that of an adult. Vetzaruch Iyun]

[38] Admur 39:1 in parentheses “A minor, even though he is subject—by rabbinic law—to the obligation of tying Tefillin, he is not subject to this prohibition by Torah law. (And even according to rabbinic law, the warning applies only to his father, as explained in Siman 343.)”; Implication of Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1 “Even though a minor is exempt from all mitzvos, and even his father is not obligated to educate him in mitzvos on a Torah level but only by rabbinic decree”; Admur 640:4 in parenthesis “The warning is only on his father”; 37:3 [Father is obligated to purchase him Tefillin for Chinuch]  [Unlike Admur 186:3; See Likkutei Sichos ibid footnote 26]; Rashi Brachos 48a; Ramban Milchamos Brachos 20b and Chidushim on Kiddushin 31a; Rashba Sukkah 38a; Teshuvas Maharam Bava Basra 4:200; Ritva Megillah 19b; Teshuvos 97; Meiri Brachos 20a and Megillah 19b; Ran Kiddushin 31a and Megillah 19b; Shut Harosh 4:21; Kesef  Mishneh Chametz Umatzah 6:10; See Rambam Brachos 5:7; Nechalos 11:10

[39] See Mishneh Avos end of chapter 5; Mishneh Nida 52a; Chagiga 2b; Rambam Chagiga 2:4; Admur Basra 4:2

[40] Implication of wording of Admur 39:1 outside of parentheses “A minor, even though he is subject—by rabbinic law—to the obligation of tying Tefillin, he is not subject to this prohibition by Torah law.” [However, in the parentheses Admur writes the opposite that the obligation is only on the father]; Admur 186:3 [The child is obligated in Birchas Hamazon like the adult]; 479:6 [The child is only Rabbinically obligated in order to educate him in Mitzvos]; 640:3-4 [The child is obligated in Sukkah]; [See Likkutei Sichos ibid footnote 26]; Kesef Mishneh Chametz Umatzah 5:10 in opinion of Ran Megillah ibid and Tosafus Megillah ibid and Brachos 15a; 48a [However, see also Kesef Mishneh Barchos 5:7 and Brachos 5:15-16]; Chikreiy Lev O.C. 70; Kelilas Shmuel 8:8; See Likkutei Sichos ibid that so is implied from the wording in Rambam Brachos 5:1 and 15; Tzitzis 3:9; Sukkah 6:1; Lulav 7:19

[41] See Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah ibid; Admur 640:4 in parenthesis; 37:3

[42] See Admur 186:3 “The child is obligated like the adult”; Admur 39:1; 186:3; 479:6; 640:3-4; Likkutei Sichos ibid footnote 26 in which the Rebbe concludes that the opinion of the Alter Rebbe follows this approach despite his ruling in the previous source “And so too this is implied in the opinion of the Alter Rebbe: although he writes at the beginning of the laws of Talmud Torah that even though a minor is exempt from all mitzvos, and his father is not obligated to educate him in mitzvos on a Torah level (but only by rabbinic enactment), nevertheless he writes in Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim סימן קפ״ו סעיף ג׳ that a minor, even if he did not eat to the point of satiation, can discharge the obligation of an adult in Birkat HaMazon. From his precise wording there it is clear that, nonetheless, the minor is obligated by rabbinic law just like the adult. This wording (“כמותו” – like him) appears in the first printing of the Shulchan Aruch, whereas in our later printings the word “כמותו” does not appear. See Chikrei Halachos, volume 1, where the author explains the view of the Alter Rebbe according to the version that includes the word “כמותו,” in the same manner as explained here.”; Chikrei Halachos on 186:3; See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid

[43] Admur 343:2 “He is obligated by rabbinic decree to educate his son or daughter even in positive commandments once they reach the age of education—how much more so is he obligated by rabbinic law to rebuke them and prevent them from transgressing a negative commands even if it is a Rabbinical prohibition.”

[44] Admur ibid; Rama 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:28; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Shabbos 121a; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a; Levush 343:1; Rashba and Ritva and Riaz on Yevamos 114a; Mahaam ben Baruch 200; Rashall Yevamos 14:7; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 194 footnote 526 and 529-531

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that there is no obligation to educate a child in a negative command with exception to Yom Kippur and Shabbos. [Tosafus Yisheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yireim; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Rashba, Tosafus Rid, Meiri, Nimukei Yosef on Yevamos 1141; Rashba 1:128; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 196 footnote 519-525]

[45] Admur ibid “even positive commands”; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a

[46] Turei Even Chagiga ibid; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Chinuch Volume 16 p. 161 footnote 29

[47] Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Chinuch Volume 16 p. 161 footnote 28

[48] Admur ibid; 362:17; 334:26; 338:6; Michaber 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:28; Levush 343; Kaf Hachaim 343:7; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:12-13 footnote 143 and 148; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 196 footnotes

[49] A father regarding Issurei Shabbos: Some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos a father is Biblically obligated to prevent his son from transgressing on his behalf, as the verse states Lo Saseh Kol Melacha, Ata Ubincha Ubitecha. [See Shaar Hatziyon 343:54; Biur Halacha 266:6; Ketzos Hashulchan 141 footnote 28; Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5 footnotes 32, 61 and 67-70] Practically, Admur and other Poskim do not agree with this opinion and hence the obligation remains Rabbinical. [See Admur 266:10; and so is Setimas Admur throughout 343; Poskim in Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 70]

[50] Admur 343:2 “He is obligated by rabbinic law to rebuke them and prevent them from transgressing a negative commands even if it is a Rabbinical prohibition”; Admur 343:3 “This applies both to positive commandments from the Torah and to those enacted by the Sages.”; 343:6 in parentheses; 362:17; Taz 343:1; M”A 343:2; Beis Yosef 343 in name of Rav Pasi; Radbaz 1432; Olas Shabbos 343:2; Elya Raba 343:2; P”M Pesicha Koleles 2:10; Rambam Shabbos 24:11; Machalos Assuros 17:27; Nechalos 11:10; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; Chayeh Adam 66:2; Bikurei Yaakov 657:4; Chikrei Lev O.C. 99; Y.D. 152; M”B 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:10, 18 and 28; Toras Refael 99; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 192 footnote 466; p. 197 footnotes 539-543

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that there is no obligation for a father to reprimand a child who is below Bar and Bas Mitzvah who is performing a mere Rabbinical prohibition. [Implication of Rama 343:1 who writes that he is only obligated to refrain the child from transgressing a Biblical prohibition; Shach in Yoreh Deah 81:26 learns that by Rabbinical commands there is no need to reprimand the child, as is the simple reading of the Rama; Rameh Mipano 111; Elya Raba 186:3 in opinion of Levush; Birkeiy Yosef 657 in name of Batei Kehuna leaves this matter in question regarding Daled Minim on other days and Chagiga 6a; Imrei Bina O.C. 14; Hagahos Chasam Sofer O.C. 343; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 192 footnote 467-473, p. 197 footnote 543]

[51] See Rama 259:7; Admur 259:7; Beis Yosef 269; M”A 269:1; Makor Chaim of Chavos Yair 259; Ateres Tzevi 259:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; 8; 259:2

[52] See Az Nidbaru 8:23

[53] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 163 footnotes 30-31; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:8

[54] See Ritva Sukkah 2b that even a child may not dwell in the sukkah that is over 20 cubits tall; Ran Yuma 82a; Rabbeinu Manoach on Rambam Shevisas Assur 2:10; Biur Halacha end of 657 [however, see M”B 658:28] See Even Yisrael 7:3; Igros Moshe Y.D. 1:224; 2:104; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 106; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 35 Parshas Vayeira; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:8

Chiddush of Rabbeinu Manoach and Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos: One may suggest that there exists a Biblical obligation of educating the child in Mitzvos for the sake of preparation for the future, although that this obligation carries with it the leniency that the child is not obligated to be educated to perform the Mitzvah with all of its validating details. Since the main purpose of the Biblical command is for preparation and contains no intrinsic value, therefore, it is not so crucial if the fulfillment of the Mitzvah is lacking some details, so long as the child receives the general concept of the command and knows how to fulfill it. However, once the sages made the Rabbinical decree of educating a child, the Mitzvah now carries intrinsic value and therefore must be fulfilled properly with all the details. [See Rabbeinu Manoach on Rambam Shevisas Assur 2:10 from whom the Rebbe learns to be making this explicit distinction. Rabbeinu Manoach on Rambam Shevisas Assur 2:10 explains based on the Rambam, that there are two different levels of obligation of educating a child to fast on Yom Kippur. The obligation to educate a child below the age of 11 to fast for a few hours is not a rabbinical command of Chinuch but is due to the general obligation of a father to educate a child which obligates the father to educate the child in the general concept of the mitzvah, while the obligation for the child to fast from age 11 is an actual rabbinical obligation and therefore the child must fast the entire day] Practically, however, the Rebbe rejects this explanation that Chinuch is Biblical from any level. [See Likkutei Sichos ibid]

[55] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnotes 31 and 450-454; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:8; Koveitz Noam 4; Igros Kodesh 31:70

[56] Rama 675:3 regarding a child lighting Chanukah candles “According to our custom that every family member lights their own candles, also a child who has reached the age of education is required to light”; P”M 671 M”Z 1; See M”B 677:13; Kaf Hachaim 677:22; According to Michaber, obviously the child does not light being that according to him only one person lights in each home.

[57] M”A 677:8 “Possibly even according to our custom that every family member lights their own candles, a child is exempt from lighting”; M”B 677:13; Biur Halacha 675:3 “Uledidon”; Shiltei Giborim, brought in M”A ibid; Meiri; Kaf Hachaim 677:22; The M”A and Biur Halacha ibid bring opinions that argue on Rama and hold that even according to the Ashkenazi custom that all male household members light, nevertheless, there’s no obligation to educate a child in a matter of Hidur Mitzvah, and therefore he is not obligated to light. The M”B 675:14 concludes he is only required to light one candle; Sefer Chanoch Lanar 25 footnote 2; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[58] See for example Igros Kodesh 8:20; 22:208

[59] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:8; 468:13; Rav Yaakov Yosef a”h would often quote Achronim who rule that there is no obligation on a father to educate his child in Minhagim that are due to Chumros, including the eating of Kitniyos on Pesach

[60] See Michaber 259:7; Admur 259:7; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:8; 259:2

[61] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 106 footnote 36; 343:8;

[62] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1 “Although a minor is exempt from all the commandments, and his father is not obligated by Torah law to educate him in the commandments but only by rabbinic enactment, the study of Torah is a positive commandment from the Torah incumbent upon the father to teach his young son Torah, even though the child himself is not obligated. As it is stated: ‘And you shall teach them to your sons, to speak of them’ (Deuteronomy 11:19). From when is the father obligated to teach him? From the time the child begins to speak, he teaches him ‘Torah tzivah lanu Moshe…’ (‘The Torah that Moses commanded us…’) and the first verse of the section Shema Yisrael. Afterwards, he teaches him little by little, verse by verse, by heart, until the child reaches the age of five years.”; Michaber Y.D. 245:5; Rambam 1:1 and 5; Kiddushin 29a; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 pp. 169-171

[63] Eikev 11:19

[64] Ramban Vaeschanan 6:7; This concept is also recorded a number of Rishonim, including: Bahag in his introduction of Kum Asei 71 who writes the one must teach his child Torah and mitzvah’s; Semag Mitzvas Asei 12; Yireim 225; Rabbeinu Meyuchas on Torah Eikev 11:19; Meiri Kiddushin 30a; Bamidbar Raba 17a

[65] Vaeschanan 6:7

[66] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah Chapter 1 Halacha 14 “A woman is not obligated in the commandment of Torah study, as it is stated: ‘And you shall teach them to your sons’—your sons and not your daughters. Just as she is not obligated in the commandment of Torah study for herself, so too she is not obligated in the commandment of Torah study for her sons, and she is exempt from paying the costs of their instruction. She is not compelled in this matter, unless she is wealthy, in which case it applies as an obligation of charity. Nevertheless, if she assists her son or her husband—whether through her efforts or her financial support—so that they may engage in Torah study, she shares in their reward, and her reward is great, since they are commanded and fulfill the mitzvah through her assistance. This is unlike a woman who studies Torah herself, who does receive reward, but not as great as that of a man, since she is not commanded and does so voluntarily.”

[67] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah Chapter 1 Halacha 8 “If the father does not have the means to hire a teacher for his son, and he also cannot study with him himself, but the grandfather (the father’s father) does have the means, the grandfather is compelled to hire a teacher for his grandson. All the expenses of the grandson’s Torah education are a mitzvah upon him just as they are upon the father. This is because just as there is a positive Torah commandment upon a father to teach his son Torah, so too there is a positive Torah commandment to teach one’s grandson, as it is stated: ‘And you shall make them known to your children and to your children’s children.’ However, there is no such obligation regarding the son of one’s daughter, nor the son of one’s grandson—even to hire a teacher, and certainly not for other Torah‑education expenses. Rather, this would only fall under the laws of charity, if he is financially able and deserving of giving charity, since close relatives take precedence, as will be explained in the laws of tzedakah.”

[68] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah Chapter 1 Halacha 14 “Even though she receives reward, the Sages instructed that one should not teach his daughter Torah, because most women lack the disposition for formal study and may misinterpret words of Torah as trivial matters due to limited intellectual preparation. Teaching her the Oral Torah is therefore likened to teaching frivolity, as it may foster cunning rather than genuine understanding. Nevertheless, women are obligated to learn the laws that are necessary for them to observe, such as the laws of niddah, immersion, salting meat, the prohibition of seclusion, and similar matters, as well as all positive commandments not dependent on time and all prohibitions—whether from the Torah or rabbinic enactment—in which they are obligated equally with men. In earlier generations, sages would publicly teach the commonly applicable laws needed by all people, in language understood by women and the unlearned, every Sabbath.”

[69] Sefer Chassidim 313 based on Sanhedrin 94b; Iggur 2 in name of Semag; Rama Y.D. 246:2; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 171; Vetzaruch Iyun as to why this was omitted from Admur

[70] Bris Olam of Choda on Sefer Chassidim ibid; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 171

[71] Chofetz Chaim in Likkutei Halachos Sotah 3; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 171

[72] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah Chapter 1 Halacha 1 “until he reads the entire Written Torah, together with all of the Prophets and the Writings. In those days, when most people spoke the holy language (Hebrew), and even an infant, when he began to speak, his father would speak with him in the holy language, there was therefore no need to teach young children the meanings of the words. Afterwards five years to learning the Mishnah by heart, which consists of fixed legal rulings without cantillation. After that, they would devote five years to the Talmud, which is the concise understanding of the reasons for the laws and judgments and their sources from the Written Torah, through the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted, as well as all other rabbinic interpretations—whether received as a tradition, as a law given to Moses at Sinai, derived by logical reasoning, or enacted by the Sages as protective measures and safeguards for the words of the Torah.” Chapter 1 Halacha 4: “And even if he himself does not know how to study at all, he is nevertheless obligated by the Torah to hire a teacher to instruct his son thoroughly, so that he will know the entire Written and Oral Torah, that is, Tanakh and all the fixed halakhic rulings of the entire Torah together with their reasons, for these are the very explanation of the 613 commandments of the Torah and their precise details in all their particulars. And although there are differences of opinion among them, these and those are the words of the living God. This obligation applies even to commandments that are not practiced at present. He must also teach all the words of the Sages that are supported by interpretations of the verses—namely, the aggadot, as it is stated: ‘If you will surely keep this entire commandment”

[73] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah Chapter 1 Halacha 6 “In our time, since the entire Oral Torah is written and accessible to us, there is no longer a need to hire a teacher for one’s son to teach him the entirety of the Oral Torah. Rather, the father must ensure that his son is taught to understand the Talmud well in most places, including the laws and complex sugyot, together with the majority of the early and later halakhic authorities, and to train him in analytical study of practical halakhah, so that he will be able to examine, learn, understand, and rule on matters of law independently through study of the Talmud and the early and later decisors. In this way, the son will be able on his own to learn the entire Talmud and the halakhic authorities and thereby know all the laws of the Oral Torah, which are the explanation of the 613 commandments with their details, reasons, and sources, as though he had learned them directly from a teacher. The same applies to all of Tanakh and the aggadic interpretations. For this reason, it is no longer customary to teach young children the entire Tanakh as was done in earlier generations, but only the Torah itself, relying on the assumption that they will learn the remainder on their own as they mature—unlike earlier times, when vowelization and cantillation were not written and were transmitted orally. Nevertheless, it is necessary to teach the child and review with him many times all the sections of the Torah in which the commandments and laws are written, for these are explained in the Talmud, and the verses, words, and letters of these passages are constantly expounded in talmudic interpretation. However, if the son does not reach the level at which he can study and understand on his own all the laws of the Oral Torah with their underlying reasoning, or if he is unwilling to study independently, the father is obligated to hire a teacher who will compel him and teach him thoroughly the entire Written and Oral Torah, reviewing it with him many times until he knows and remembers all the laws of the Oral Torah with their reasons. For even the act of compelling a child to study and acquire full knowledge of the Torah is included in the positive commandment of ‘And you shall teach them to your sons,’ since Scripture speaks of minors, who require compulsion.”

[74] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah Chapter 1 Halacha 6 “For even the act of compelling a child to study and acquire full knowledge of the Torah is included in the positive commandment of ‘And you shall teach them to your sons,’ since Scripture speaks of minors, who require compulsion.”

[75] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah Chapter 1 Halacha 6 “Once the son has learned all the laws together with their underlying reasons at least once, and later forgets them because he does not wish to review his studies on his own, the father has already fulfilled his obligation. Since he taught him thoroughly until he knew the entire Torah, he has fulfilled the positive commandment of ‘And you shall teach them to your sons.’ Nevertheless, as long as the son is capable of engaging in Torah study but does not do so, and the father has the ability to compel him, the father is obligated by rabbinic tradition to compel him to engage in Torah study.”

[76] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Michaber 245:5; Rambam Talmud Torah 1:6; Sifri Eikev 11; Sukkah 42a

[77] This is approximately at two years old. [Likkutei Sichos 21:343 footnote 40 based on Radak] Others say it is when the child knows how to speak fluently, which is approximately at age 4. [Aruch Hashulchan 245:2] See Menoras Hamaor Ner 3 Kelal 2:2; Nitei Gavriel 17:8

[78] Setimas Kol Haposkim who never mention a maximum age; See Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:6 that one is to pay for his learning even after the son is married with children; Halacha 1:8 That there is a positive command to teach all the Talmidim, irrelevant of age.

[79] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:4 “By Torah law, the father is obligated to teach his son himself, or to find a teacher who will teach him the entire Torah. And if he cannot find one for free—even if he himself is unable to teach him, and even if he does not know how to study at all—he is nevertheless obligated by the Torah to hire a teacher to instruct him properly, so that he will know the entire Written and Oral Torah.” and 9; Kuntrus Achron 1:1; Nitei Gavriel 17:7

[80] Admur 343:2 “All this applies to others, but a father—since he is obligated by rabbinic decree to educate his son or daughter even in positive commandments once they reach the age of education”; Implied conclusion of M”A 343:1 [however see Machatzis Hashekel]; Toras Kohanim Emor; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82; Rebbe Yochanon in Nazir 29 according to Rav Avraham Min Hahar; Shivas Tziyon 61, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah Y.D. 396:2; Machatzis Hashekel 343:1; Aruch Laner Sukkah 2b; Birkeiy Yosef O.C. 343:7; P”M Pesicha Koleles 343; Chayeh Adam Hilchos Brachos 66:2; Erech Hashulchan end of 343; M”B 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:8; See Orach Mishor Nazir ibid; Chikrei Lev O.C. 70; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 164 footnotes 39-445

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule a father is not obligated to educate his daughter in Mitzvos. [M”A 343:1 that so is implication of Reish Kakish in Nazir 29a; Machatzis Hashekel explains the M”A ibid leaves this matter in question; Shita Mekubetzes Nazir ibid in name of Tosafus and Rosh; Chidushei Rabbeinu Peretz Nazir ibid; Ramban in Milchamos Yuma 82b; Ran ibid; P”M 225 A”A 5 regarding why we don’t say Baruch Shepatrani by a Bas Mitzvah]

[81] See Admur 167:23 “And all this is regarding an adult who does not know how to bless. But to train children, one is obligated to bless on every blessing of enjoyment in order to educate them in the mitzvos. And even if there is no obligation of chinuch (education) upon him, such as one who is not from his household.”; Aruch Hashulchan C.M. 290:30 regarding an Aputrapis; Imrei Yosher 3; Yad David Pesachim 88a; Sdei Chemed Mareches Ches Kelal Get; Betzel Hachochma 5:3; Shevet Halevi 8:95; Chanoch Lanar 2:7 footnote 15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1 footnote 12; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 166 footnotes 70-75; See regarding the Chiyuv of an Aputrapis to provide the children with Mitzvah objects: Tosefta Terumos 1; Gittin 52a; Pesachim 88a; Rambam Nechalos 11:10; Michaber C.M. 290:15; Admur 434:16; Chok Yaakov 434:15; See regarding the Chiyuv of a master to educate his slave: Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Chinuch Volume 16 p. 167 footnotes 83-84

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule there is no obligation upon the father to educate his nonbiological household members any more than any other Jew. [Rashi Pesachim 88a regarding a master of a slave; Chikrei Lev O.C. 70; Pesach Hadvir 343:3; Mishneh Halachos 3:26]

[82] See Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:8; Michaber Y.D. 245:3; Rambam Talmud Torah 1:2

[83] Migdal Oz of Yaavetz 3; See Rambam shavuos 12:8

[84] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:10; Kaf Hachaim 343:21-22; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnotes 103-104

[85] Minchas Chinuch Mitzvah 5; Pesach Hadvir 343:6; P”M Pesicha Koleles 9; Kaf Hachaim 343:8

[86] P”M 343 A”A 2; See Rambam Eidus 9:10; Oneg Yom Tov 153; Minchas Asher 2:47; Piskeiy Teshuvos 55:14; 139:7; 343 footnote 125

[87] Minchas Chinuch Mitzvah 5; Pesach Hadvir 343:6; Kaf Hachaim 343:8

[88] Biur Halacha 325:10 “Eino Yehudi”

[89] P”M 343 A”A 2; See Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 125

[90] See Admur 266:10 “Nevertheless, when one gives it to him—or even to a cheresh or a shoteh—it must be given to them only after they have already lifted their feet to walk, and it must be taken from them when they wish to stop, in order that they not perform an act of lifting and placing (akira and hanacha), as explained above. For even though one is not commanded regarding their resting [i.e., cessation of labor], nevertheless, one is certainly warned by the Torah not to feed them a prohibited item directly, as will be explained in siman 343. And this, that one gives it to them in such a manner, is permissible, even though…”; Michaber 266:6; Tosafus, Piskei Riaz, Ramban, Rashba on Shabbos 153b; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 18:3; Kneses Hagedola Y.D. 157:56; Chasam Sofer O.C. 83; P”M Pesicha Koleles 2:1; 266 M”Z 4; Pesach Hadvir 343:7; Imrei Bina Shabbos 9; Amudei Eish 4:6; Kaf Hachaim 343:8 and 21

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that there is no Issur of feeding a Shoteh non-Kosher food or other Issurim. [Terumas Hadeshen 62, brought in Chasam Sofer ibid; Shivas Tziyon O.C. 4; See Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 121]

[91] See M”B 343:5; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 124

[92] Chasam Sofer O.C. 83 and in Hagahos 343:11; Maharam Shif O.C. 163; Orchos Chaim 343:1; Kaf Hachaim 343:22; Igros Moshe 2:88; Shevet Halevi 9:4; Minchas Asher 2:47; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:10

[93] See Chasam Sofer, and Maharam Shif ibid, brought in Kaf Hachaim ibid that although it is permitted to send the child to such an institution until the age of Mitzvos, it is better not to being that the non-Kosher food will contaminate his soul.

[94] The rationale is that this is considered indirect consumption of non‑kosher food rather than direct feeding, which is prohibited. [Chasam Sofer ibid]

[95] Chasam Sofer ibid; Orchos Chaim ibid; Kaf Hachaim ibid

[96] Chasam Sofer ibid; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 130 that this is a Chumra and not from letter of law, as he is being fed by gentiles

[97] See the following Poskim regarding the status of a Cheresh today when they have educational systems which teach them to talk: Tzemach Tzedek of Nikolsberg; Shut Shaar Hazekeinim 2 Beis Melo p. 135; Orchos Chaim 343:1; Kaf Hachaim 343:23; Kesav Sofer; Mishpitei Uziel; Minchas Shlomo 1:34; Piskeiy Teshuvos 55:14

[98] Chasam Sofer ibid and ibid; Minchas Shlomo ibid; Minchas Asher ibid; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 125-127

[99] Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 127

[100] See Admur 343:5 regarding asking a gentile to feed him an issur if he is in need of it; 343:5-6 and 8 regarding directly feeding him an Issur Derabanon for a need; Admur 450:24-26 regarding the allowance by Chametz; M”A 343:3; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; M”B 343:5; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:12; 450:5

[101] Admur 343:5; M”A ibid; M”B ibid

[102] The reason we permit even if not bedridden: In cases where a child is classified as choleh sheiyn bo sakana—for example, if he is bedridden—significant leniencies apply, even with respect to an adult, and certainly with respect to a child. Accordingly, there is nothing novel in permitting such leniencies in that situation. The novelty here is that even when a child does not reach this level of illness, many of the leniencies normally afforded to one who is ill may nevertheless still apply to him.

The reason we only permit by slight illness: As for why the child must nonetheless be at least slightly ill, and why it does not suffice to rely on the established rule that a child is treated like one who is non-dangerously ill with respect to the laws of Shabbat: this is because, absent any actual need, there is no allowance to permit a child to be given even foods prohibited by rabbinic law as explained in Halacha 8c, and all the more so with regard to foods that are biblically prohibited. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 5] Accordingly, the only circumstance in which it is permitted to allow a child to eat forbidden foods is when the child is at least slightly ill and the food is necessary for his health, or even if he is not currently ill, when the food is required for his physical development. Furthermore, the concept that a child is considered “like one who is ill” applies only until a certain age and does not extend all the way until bar mitzvah. By contrast, the leniency afforded to one who is slightly ill applies until adulthood. [See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343 footnote 141]

[103] Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 143

[104] M”B 343:3

[105] Admur 269:3 “It is permitted to feed a minor before Kiddush, whether at night or during the day. One may not cause affliction to a minor, for the prohibition against actively feeding a child applies only when the food itself is intrinsically forbidden, such as non‑kosher food and the like. However, when the food is intrinsically permitted but the time is one during which eating is prohibited, it is permitted to feed it to a minor. Thus, minors are fed on Yom Kippur, even one for whom there is no concern of danger were he to fast.”; 471:10; 616:1 “Accordingly, it is permitted for an adult to feed a minor, give him drink, apply ointment to him, and wash him with cold water.”; Rama 612:10; 616; Magen Avraham 269:1; Tur 616; Sefer Hayashar Rabbeinu Tam Chidushei Hateshuvos 52; Rashba and Meiri Eiruvin 40b and Yevamos 114a; Mishneh Berura 269:1; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 187; This ruling applies even according to the stringent opinion cited by the Alter Rebbe, which prohibits feeding a child even a rabbinic prohibition as that stringency is limited to foods that are intrinsically prohibited in and of themselves, such as a piece of neveilah.

[106] See Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 143 based on M”B 343:3 who permits feeding eating and bathing child on Yom Kippur

[107] Rama Yoreh Deah 81:7 regarding an infant eating milk from a gentile, as explained in Shach 81:26; M”A 343:2; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:11;  Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 4; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:12

[108] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 165

[109] Admur 343:2; 343:6 in parentheses regarding Rabbinical; Admur 616:4 “All of this applies to a minor who has not yet reached the age of education for the mitzvah of affliction. However, if he has reached the age of education, it is permitted to feed him, give him drink, anoint him, and wash him directly, in the manner explained above. If the minor performs any of these acts on his own, there is no need to protest, except for his father, who is required to protest and to educate his son in the mitzvot. His mother, however, is not obligated in this. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for her to place food before him, since doing so is considered as if she were feeding him directly.”; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Michaber 343:1; 37:3; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; Nazir 29a; Sukkah 42a; Erechin 2b; Bach 17; Biur Halacha 39; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 165 footnotes 47-48; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1

[110] Admur ibid; M”A 343:2; Taz 343:1; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam Shabbos 24:11 and in name of his father in-law; Radbaz 1432; 1563 Olas Shabbos 343:2; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:10, 12, and 28; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 196 footnote 532; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1 footnote 3

[111] Admur 343:4 “However, with regard to his mother, there is no obligation upon him at all—neither a positive commandment nor a negative prohibition.”; Admur 616:4 “All of this applies to a minor who has not yet reached the age of education for the mitzvah of affliction. However, if he has reached the age of education, it is permitted to feed him, give him drink, anoint him, and wash him directly, in the manner explained above. If the minor performs any of these acts on his own, there is no need to protest, except for his father, who is required to protest and to educate his son in the mitzvot. His mother, however, is not obligated in this. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for her to place food before him, since doing so is considered as if she were feeding him directly.”; [See also Admur 640:4]; M”A 343:1; 616:2; 640:3; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Nazir 29a; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a; Maharam Ben Baruch 200; Ritva Eiruvin 82a; Birkeiy Yosef 343:7; Machatzis Hashekel 343:2; 200:4; M”B 343:2; Sdei Chemed Ches 59; Kaf Hachaim 343:9; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 2; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 165 footnotes 49-69, 197 footnote 534; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1 footnote 9; Shaareiy Chinuch pp. 113-122; Hisvadyus 5750 3:171, brought in Shaareiy Chinuch ibid “The obligation of chinuch (religious education), according to the strict letter of the law, rests upon the father. The father is obligated by rabbinic law to educate his son or daughter even in positive commandments, and all the more so to prevent them from transgressing prohibitions. This is not the case with the mother, who is not obligated in this responsibility at all—neither regarding positive commandments nor prohibitions.

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that there is a complete obligation on the mother to educate her children. [Rebbe Yochanon in Nazir 29 according to Rav Avraham Min Hahar; Hilni Hamalka Sukkah 2b; Chiddushei Rabbeinu Peretz Nazir ibid; Rashi Chagiga 2b; Meiri Yuma 78a; Opinions in Birkeiy Yosef 343:7; Shalah Hakadosh Shaar Haosiyos Daled Derech Eretz, brought in Kuntrus Chanoch Lenar and Toras Menachem 5743 2:1085; Orach Mishor Nazir ibid; Tosefes Shabbos 343:1, brought in Machatzis Hashekel 343:1; Elya Raba 640:4, brought in Shaareiy Teshuvah 640:2; Chayeh Adam 66:2; Aruch Laner Sukkah 2b; Bikurei Yaakov 640:5; Chikrei Lev O.C. 70; Sdei Chemed Ches 59; Daas Torah 343; Shevet Halevi 1:67; See Kaf Hachaim 343:9; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 196 footnote 533;] Furthermore, some Poskim rule that the obligation of the mother is even more than on the father. [Shalah Hakadosh Shaar Haosiyos Daled, brought in Kuntrus Chanoch Lenar and Toras Menachem 5743 2:1085; Menoras Hamaor Abuhav 168; Migdal Oz of Yaavetz 3:25] Other Poskim rule that so long as the father is alive, the mother is obligated to educate her children as an emissary of their father. [Chasam Sofer Sugyos 24]

[112] Implication of Admur ibid [perhaps one can deduce from Admur which writes “at all” that there is no obligation on the mother even after the child has passed away]; Terumas Hadeshen 94 in opinion of Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a; Poskim in Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that there is a complete obligation on the mother to educate her children if the father is unable to do so, such as if he passed away or is out of town. [Terumas Hadeshen 94 in his own opinion; Meiri Nazir ibid; Tosafus Eruvin ibid; Imrei Yosher 3; Shaareiy Teshuvah 640:1 in name of Poskim; M”B 640:5; Hagahos Imreoi David on 343; Pesach Hadvir 343:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:9 in his conclusion; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1 footnote 10 that so applies according to all; See Sdei Chemed Ches 59]

[113] Admur in Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:14 “Nevertheless, if she helps her son or her husband with her body and very much encourages him to engage in Torah study, she shares in their reward, and her reward is great—since they are commanded [to learn] and they do so through her.”; Hisvadyus 5750 3:171, brought in Shaareiy Chinuch ibid

[114] Peri Megadim Pesicha Koleles 2:10 rules that according to all there is a Mitzva; Mateh Efraim 616 in Alef Lamateh 5; Machatzis Hashekel 343:1; M”B 343:2; See also Hilchos Talmud Torah Kuntrus Achron 1:1; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3

[115] Hisvadyus 5750 3:171, brought in Shaareiy Chinuch ibid “However, beyond this, since the actual education and guidance of sons and daughters—especially young boys and girls—depends to a great extent, and primarily in practice, on the direction of the mother, the mainstay of the home, and consequently the essence of education is carried out through her; it is therefore well known what the Shelah writes: that women are obligated in rebuking and guiding their children just like the father, and even more so than he, because they are more available and are found in the home more frequently.”; Sichos Kodesh 5737 2:2

[116] Shalah Hakadosh Shaar Haosiyos Daled, brought in Kuntrus Chanoch Lenar p. 34 and Toras Menachem 5743 2:1085 and Hisvadyus ibid, “Women are obligated to admonish and guide their sons no less than the father—and even more so—since they are more available and more frequently present in the home.”

[117] Hisvadyus 5750 3:171, brought in Shaareiy Chinuch ibid “Moreover, women have an added advantage in education and rebuke over men, since by the very nature of women their influence in education is carried out with gentle speech and through a feeling of closeness, love, and affection more than is the case with men. And we see this clearly—especially in recent generations—that specifically through a path of closeness and love, ‘educate the child according to his way’, the success of education is far greater.”

[118] Rebbe in Shaar Halacha Uminhag 3:63 and 80.

[119] See Sanhedrin 70b; Menoras Hamaor ibid

[120] See Admur 167:23 “And all this is regarding an adult who does not know how to bless. But to train children, one is obligated to bless on every blessing of enjoyment in order to educate them in the mitzvos. And even if there is no obligation of chinuch (education) upon him, such as one who is not from his household.”; Aruch Hashulchan C.M. 290:30 regarding an Aputrapis; Imrei Yosher 3; Yad David Pesachim 88a; Sdei Chemed Mareches Ches Kelal Get; Betzel Hachochma 5:3; Shevet Halevi 8:95; Chanoch Lanar 2:7 footnote 15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:1 footnote 12; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 166 footnotes 70-75; See regarding the Chiyuv of an Aputrapis to provide the children with Mitzvah objects: Tosefta Terumos 1; Gittin 52a; Pesachim 88a; Rambam Nechalos 11:10; Michaber C.M. 290:15; Admur 434:16; Chok Yaakov 434:15 See regarding the Chiyuv of a master to educate his slave: Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Chinuch Volume 16 p. 167 footnotes 83-84

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule there is no obligation upon any legal guarding other than the father to educate children under his care. [Rashi Pesachim 88a regarding a master of a slave; Mishneh Halachos 3:26 See Chikrei Lev O.C. 70, Pesach Hadvir 343:3, and Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 75 that according to those who hold a mother is exempt actually exempt all legal guardians, whether male or female.]

[121] See Chikrei Lev O.C. 70; Pesach Hadvir 343:3; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 75

[122] Admur 343:1 “A minor who transgresses the words of the Torah for his own enjoyment—for example, if he eats non‑kosher food or desecrates Shabbat for his own needs—the Beit Din is not commanded to separate him [from the transgression].”; Admur 301:21; 334:26; 362:17; Michaber 343:1 regarding eating Niveilos and Beis Yosef 343 that this includes all Issurim; 2^nd opinion in Rama 343:1; Rama Y.D. 373:1; M”A 343:1; Tur 343; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Shabbos 12:7; Avel 3:12; Rebbe Padas Yevamos 114a; Sefer Hateruma 215; Semag L.S. 65; Rashba and Ritva Yevamos 114a; Hagahos Maimanis Shevisas Assur 2; Teshuvas Maharam Ben Baruch 200; Tosafus Nazir 29; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82; Birkeiy Yosef 343:7; M”B 343:8; Kaf Hachaim 343:1 and 3 and 29; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 167 footnotes 76-82; 195 footnotes 512

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that if one sees a child who has reached the age of education transgressing a prohibition, then anyone who sees this, including and especially a Beis Din, must reprimand and stop the child. [1^st opinion in Rama 343:1; M”A 640:3; Shach Y.D. 373:1; Elya Raba 640:4; P”M 640 A”A 4; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Gittin 55a; Shabbos 121a; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yereim; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Tosafus Yisheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yireim; Rashba and Ritva on Yevamos 114a; Rashi Eruvin 96b; Chayeh Adam 66:3; See Kaf Hachaim 343:2 and 28; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 196 footnote 526] Some Poskim conclude based on this opinion that by a Biblical transgression one is to be stringent and reprimand a child which has reached the age of education even if the child is not his son. [Chayeh Adam ibid; Mishneh Berura 343:7] Other Poskim rule that if the father is not present, then even by Rabbinical prohibitions one is obligated to reprimand the child. [Kaf Hachaim 343:28] Some Poskim learn that by the three prohibitions of blood insects and impurity, not only is it forbidden for an adult to cause a child to transgress them, but furthermore if he sees a child transgressing them then he must reprimand the child, even if he is below the age of Chinuch. [Bach 343; Beis Yosef 343; Kaf Hachaim 343:3; See Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1]

[123] Even if the child is over the age of Chinuch [Admur 343:1-2; 2^nd opinion in Rama ibid]

[124] Here the wording of Admur is “separate” or stop while in the other two cases to be brought next he uses the term reprimand or protests, while in the next halacha regarding a father’s obligation the term “reprimand and stop” is used. vetzaruch Iyun on the difference.

[125] Setimas Admur and all Poskim ibid; Rama Y.D. 373:1; M”A 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:3 that so rule most Poskim and so is Setimas Hegemara

Other Opinions: Some Poskim learn that by the three prohibitions of blood insects and impurity, if one sees a child transgressing them then he must reprimand the child, even if he is below the age of Chinuch. [Bach 343; Beis Yosef 343; See Kaf Hachaim 343:3; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1]

[126] Admur 343:1 regarding a Beis Din, and 343:2 that this applies to all bystanders; 167:23; 362:17; 596:2; Admur 616:4 “All of this applies to a minor who has not yet reached the age of education for the mitzvah of affliction. However, if he has reached the age of education, it is permitted to feed him, give him drink, anoint him, and wash him directly, in the manner explained above. If the minor performs any of these acts on his own, there is no need to protest, except for his father, who is required to protest and to educate his son in the mitzvot. His mother, however, is not obligated in this. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for her to place food before him, since doing so is considered as if she were feeding him directly.”; Michaber 343:1; 2^nd opinion in Rama 343:1; Rambam Hilchos Machalos Assuros 17:28; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a; Besi Yosef end of 343; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:1

Background: In the Talmud Yevamos 114a and Shulchan Aruch 343 the entire discussion is with regards to a Beis Din reprimanding the child and not regarding an ordinary bystander.  The Ketzos Hashulchan 147:1 writes that if even a Beis Din is not obligated to reprimand a child, then certainly other people are not obligated. Perhaps the reason for why no mention of this was made in Shulchan Aruch is because there is not even an inkling of a thought that a bystander is obligated to educate someone else’s child. However, a Beis Din which is responsible for the education of all the towns folk, including the child’s father, perhaps one would think is obligated to reprimand the child, hence the ruling that they too have no obligation.

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that anyone who sees a child who has reached the age of education transgressing a prohibition, then he must reprimand and stop the child. [Chayeh Adam 66:3; Bikurei Yaakov 640:5; Kaf Hachaim 343:28; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 196 footnote 528; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 footnote 19 in opinion of Rama ibid, based on Yevamos 114a that Beis Din is Lav Davka and the same applies to any person; So rule regarding a Beis Din: 1^st opinion in Rama 343:1; M”A 640:3; Elya Raba 640:4; P”M 640 A”A 4; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yereim; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Rashi Eruvin 96b;] Some Poskim conclude based on this opinion that by a Biblical transgression one is to be stringent and reprimand a child which has reached the age of education even if the child is not his son. However, by Rabbinical prohibitions there is no need to be stringent. [Chayeh Adam ibid; Mishneh Berura 343:7] Other Poskim rule that if the father is not present, then even by Rabbinical prohibitions one is obligated to reprimand the child. [Kaf Hachaim 343:28] Some Poskim learn that by the three prohibitions of blood insects and impurity, not only is it forbidden for an adult to cause a child to transgress them, but furthermore if he sees a child transgressing them then he must reprimand the child. [Beis Yosef 343; Bach 343; See Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1]

[127] Chanoch Lanar 7:3 based on Rama and M”B 362:7; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2

[128] Admur 343:1 “If he does so on behalf of an adult, one must protest and stop him, by rabbinic law, as explained in סימן של״ד.”; Admur 334:26 in parentheses; Michaber 334:25; Beis Yosef 334; Rosh 1:1; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Chayeh Adam 66:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:1; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:5, 13; 343:2 footnote 22 and

[129] Admur 334:26 “Even if he has not reached the age of Chinuch”; Bach 334 “This child is prior to the age of Chinuch , such as a four or five year old and we are not certain as to whether this Katan is performing the action on behalf of his father”; Tosafus Shabbos 121a

A child below the age of comprehension: This obligation applies only to a child who has reached a level of mental maturity such that he is capable of acting on behalf of others. In such a case, when it is determined that the child performed the act for the benefit of an adult, there is an obligation to protest his actions even if he is officially below the age of Chinuch. However, if the child is so young that he lacks the comprehension to act on behalf of others, then even if it appears outwardly that he is doing so, there is no obligation to object. Thus, for example, if a two‑year‑old plays with a light and turns it on or off—even if the adults had been discussing whether they wanted the light on or off—there is no requirement to protest. Since a child of that age does not possess sufficient understanding to perform actions on behalf of others, his conduct is not treated as such. [See Michaber 334:25; Rishonim on Shabbos 121a; Chikrei lev 63; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:5 footnote 74]

[130] Admur 343:1 “Bishvil Gadol”; 334:26 “on behalf of his father (or another Jew)”; M”B 334:65 in name of P”M; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

Father versus other person: So rules also Admur in 334:26 that if the child is going to extinguish the fire even on behalf of a person other than his father, he must be reprimanded. Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur in 334:26 stated this addition (another person) in parentheses. To note however that in the Gemara [Yevamos 104a] explains that the reason the child must be reprimanded is because he is doing so on behalf of his father, and thus perhaps here Admur novelizes that even when done on behalf of others he must be reprimanded. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11] This is also explicitly implied in Rashi there which equates this case to the case brought earlier in the Gemara regarding having children carry keys in a public domain on behalf of another person, of which there it was allowed because they were not doing so on behalf of that person. Nevertheless, tzaruch Iyun why the need to place this addition in parentheses. The Mishneh Berurah [334:65] rules in the name of the Peri Megadim as above that the child is to be reprimanded even when he goes to extinguish another person’s fire.

[131] See Chanoch Lanaar 7:3 in name of Sefer Malei Haroim that if a child is doing so on behalf of another child he does not need to be protested. So is also implied from Admur ibid which states “Bishvil Gadol”; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 footnote 22

[132] Implication of Admur 343:1-2 and 334:26 “even if his father is not there” and in parentheses “or for another Jew”; See Admur 343:2 that this obligation to reprimand and correct improper behavior is not limited to the Beit Din, even though they are the primary subject discussed in this halacha. Rather, this obligation applies to every individual. This is made explicit by the wording in the beginning of the next halacha, where Admur states that all of the above applies when dealing with “other people”, clearly indicating that the responsibility is not confined to judicial authorities alone.

[133] A father regarding Shabbos: Some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos a father is Biblically obligated to prevent his son from transgressing on his behalf, as the verse states Lo Saseh Kol Melacha, Ata Ubincha Ubitecha. [See Shaar Hatziyon 343:54; Biur Halacha 266:6; Ketzos Hashulchan 141 footnote 28; Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5 footnotes 32, 61 and 67-70] Practically, Admur and other Poskim do not agree with this opinion. [See Admur 266:10; and so is Setimas Admur throughout 343; Poskim in Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 70]

[134] See Admur 334:26 “Even if his father is not there”; Beis Yosef 334 based on Rashi Shabbos 121a; M”B 334:65; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:5 footnote 72

[135] Admur 343:1 “Admur 343:1 “Furthermore, if it is a matter that becomes public and there is concern that those who hear about it may err and say that such a thing is permitted, one must protest even if the minor is acting on his own initiative. For example, if he blows the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, since the sound is heard publicly and people may come to err and say that one may blow [the shofar] even when it falls on Shabbat.”; Admur 588:6; M”A 343:1; Ran 9b; Beir Heiytiv 343:1; Kaf Hachaim 343:2; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2

[136] Implication of Admur ibid; Admur 588:6; Vetzaruch Iyun regarding if others excluding the father re obligated to protest the child’s actions. See sources in next footnote

[137] Implication of Admur 343:2; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 [This obligation to reprimand and correct improper public behavior is not limited to the Beit Din, even though they are the primary subject discussed in this halacha. Rather, this obligation applies to every individual. This is made explicit by the wording in the beginning of the next halacha, where Admur states that all of the above applies when dealing with “other people”, clearly indicating that the responsibility is not confined to judicial authorities alone.]

[138] Such as for example if the child was blowing Shofar on Shabbos Rosh Hashana then since people hearing the Shofar may think that one is indeed meant to blow even on Shabbos Rosh Hashana, therefore the child is to be reprimanded. [Admur ibid and 588:6; Kaf Hachaim 343:1]

[139] Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2

[140] See Mateh Efraim 589:5 Alef Lamagen 6; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2 footnote 30

[141] Rambam Geneiva 1:10; Maggid Mishneh Geneiva 1:10 in name of Rambam; Bach 343 in end; Beir Hagoleh C.M. 349:5; Chayeh Adam 66:5; P”M 343 M”Z 2; M”B 343:9 in name of P”M and other Achronim; Kaf Hachaim 343:26; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 and 6; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 200

[142] Shoel Umeishiv Basra 4:44; Or Sameiach on Rambam Rotzieach 1:13; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2

[143] Chanoch Lanaar 7 footnote 5 in name of Malei Haroim; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2; See Shach Y.D. 81:26

[144] See Admur 343:5-10; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[145] Admur 343:5 “All of the above applies only with regard to the obligation to separate a child from a transgression. However, to actively feed a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden for every person, even if the child is not at all capable of understanding, as it is stated: “Do not eat them”—which the Sages expounded to mean: “Do not feed them to minors.” This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 266:10; Admur 616:1 “This applies even if the water was heated before Yom Kippur, since bathing in hot water is not prohibited solely because of the mitzvah of affliction. After all, throughout the year on Shabbat it is permitted to wash with hot water. Rather, there is also a rabbinic decree concerning bathhouses—meaning that bath attendants are suspected of heating water on Shabbat. For this reason, entering a bathhouse on Shabbat was prohibited, as explained in the relevant section. Therefore, these acts may be done for the minor directly by hand, just as one feeds him directly, in all matters prohibited by rabbinic law, as explained in סימן שמ״ג.”; 616:2 “Likewise, it is forbidden for an adult to put sandals on the minor, since this does not constitute affliction for the minor, who does not feel the deprivation as strongly. However, if the minor puts them on himself, whether one is required to protest is explained in סימן שמ״ג—see there.”; Shut Rabbeinu 41; Michaber 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Yevamos 114a; Terumos Hadeshen 62; M”A 616:2; M”B 343:4 “As for forbidden food—everyone is prohibited from it, and if the infant eats it, the infant has no understanding at all. And this matter is prohibited by the Torah, for we derive it from what is written regarding creeping creatures: “You shall not eat them” (lo tochelum), and the verse is read thus, and the Sages received it as an exposition to mean: “You shall not feed them to minors.” And likewise regarding blood it is written: “Any soul among you shall not eat blood,” and the Sages received this as an exposition to mean: “Do not feed [blood] to minors.” And likewise regarding the impurity of priests it is written: “Say and you shall say,” and the Sages said: “Say”—to the adults, that they should say [it] to the minors. And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress. Therefore, it is forbidden to give a child any food that is forbidden, or to give it to him to play with, lest he come to eat it, for this is considered as though one feeds him directly by hand. [This is the ruling of the Magen Avraham], even [in such a case], etc., and [one may not avoid this] by saying [to do so] to a non‑Jew.”; Kaf Hachaim 343:6; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 194 and 187; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and 7

[146] Admur ibid; 262:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41 in end; Bach 343 and Taz 343 that so applies according to Tur; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Achiezer 3:1 in name of Noda Beyehuda; M”B ibid; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 195 footnote 506

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that the prohibition to cause a child to eat non-Kosher food is merely Rabbinical. [P”M 343 M”Z 2 in opinion of Tur and possibly Rambam]

[147] Admur ibid; Shut Rabbeinu 41 “However, to feed a minor a prohibition directly is forbidden according to all opinions—not because of chinuch, but rather because it is written “You shall not eat them,” which is expounded as “You shall not feed them,” as stated in the chapter Cheresh. For the obligation of chinuch is not imposed upon the father alone, as the Rambam writes—see Orach Chaim, siman 343.”; M”A 616:2; Levush 343:1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4; See Yevamos ibid; Rashi Yevamos 90a

[148] See Admur 616:4; 640:4

[149] The source: This is learned from the verse [Vayikra 11:42] “Do not feed them” which h the Sages learned to mean that one may not feed a prohibited food to Ketanim, Lehazhir Gedolim Al Haketanim. [Yevamos 112a] See also Toras Kohanim end of Shemini; and beginning of Parshas Emor; See Likkutei Sichos ibid that every Jew—regardless of age—possesses the same essential G‑dly soul. From the perspective of the soul’s essence, there is no difference between a newborn child and an adult; all share an equal and identical level of essential G‑dliness. Differences between individuals exist only in the revelation and expression of the soul’s faculties, such as intellect and emotion, which are far more developed in adults than in children. This distinction is comparable to physical life‑force: the same life energy animates all bodies equally, regardless of size, while other faculties vary. Accordingly, the true difference between Jews lies only in external soul faculties, not in the soul’s essence. This principle explains why the Torah holds adults responsible not to cause a child to transgress—since, at their core, a child and an adult share the same essential sanctity. [Likkutei Sichos ibid] Alternatively, the reason for this prohibition is because the child may become used to performing the prohibition even when an adult. [Terumos Hadeshen 62; See Chasam Sofer O.C. 83; Achiezer 3:81]

[150] See M”B 343:4; Tehila Ledavid 343:1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[151] Admur ibid and 266:10; M”A 343:2; M”B 343:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 509; See M”B  343 Shaareiy Tziyon 6

[152] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[153] Admur 343:7-8

[154] Admur 616:1-2 regarding bathing and placing sandals on a child on Yom Kippur; Implication of Admur ibid “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food; Implication of Shut Admur 41; Implication of Yevamos ibid as learn many Rishonim, Achronim, and Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Ramban Vayikra 21:1; Mishneh Berurah 343:4 and Shaar Hatziyon 434:12 as is learned from the Gedolei Harishonim on Talmud [Yevamos 112] which brings three verses which teach that it is forbidden for a Gadol to help a child transgress “And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 506; Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1 “And only from the combination of all three of these matters do we learn, by means of the common denominator, that in all prohibitions the adults are warned with regard to the minors.”

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by prohibitions other than non-Kosher foods, the prohibition to cause a child to sin is merely Rabbinical. [Levush 343:1; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Pesicha Koleles 2:9 in opinion of Tur; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 508]

Opinion of Admur: Admur does not explicitly write that the above prohibition of feeding a child an Issur extends to all other prohibitions in the Torah, although it is implied from his beginning wording which states “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food. The same is implied from Shut Rabbeinu ibid

[155] This is going on Rabbinical matters of which there are opinions which rule one may have a child transgress them on an occasional basis. [Admur 343:6] However a biblical prohibition is always forbidden to ask a child to perform. [Admur 265:10] The Mishneh Berura 343:6 explains an example of this to mean to ask a child to carry a key in a public domain on Shabbos; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[156] Admur 269:3 “It is permitted to feed a minor before Kiddush, whether at night or during the day. One may not cause affliction to a minor, for the prohibition against actively feeding a child applies only when the food itself is intrinsically forbidden, such as non‑kosher food and the like. However, when the food is intrinsically permitted but the time is one during which eating is prohibited, it is permitted to feed it to a minor. Thus, minors are fed on Yom Kippur, even one for whom there is no concern of danger were he to fast.”; 471:10; 616:1 “Accordingly, it is permitted for an adult to feed a minor, give him drink, apply ointment to him, and wash him with cold water.”; Rama 612:10; 616; Magen Avraham 269:1; Tur 616; Sefer Hayashar Rabbeinu Tam Chidushei Hateshuvos 52; Rashba and Meiri Eiruvin 40b and Yevamos 114a; Mishneh Berura 269:1; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 187; This ruling applies even according to the stringent opinion cited by the Alter Rebbe, which prohibits feeding a child even a rabbinic prohibition as that stringency is limited to foods that are intrinsically prohibited in and of themselves, such as a piece of neveilah.

[157] As is proven from that a child may eat on Yom Kippur. Vetzaruch Iyun regarding Chameitz.

[158] Ketzos Hashulchan 147

[159] The reason: As the [Sages] only prohibited feeding [Rabbinically] forbidden foods [to a child] when the food is forbidden in it of itself, such as a piece of Treifa [Niveila] and the like. However, if the food is Kosher in it of itself and it is just forbidden to be eaten within a certain time slot, then it is permitted to be fed to a child. A proof for this is the ruling regarding feeding a child on Yom Kippur in which case one may do so even if there is no danger involved for the child to fast. [Admur 269:3; M”A 269:1; Yevamos 114b; Machatzis Hashekel on M”A 106:3]

[160] This implication emerges from the Alter Rebbe’s wording here, and is further supported by 621:4, which indicates that a child may not be given wine from a bris on Yom Kippur, despite this too being only a temporary prohibition—whereas for this very reason a child may otherwise be fed on Yom Kippur. See the footnote in the Questions and Answers section regarding eating before Kiddush for a more detailed analysis of this distinction.

[161] Admur 343:5 “It is forbidden for any Jew to instruct a non‑Jew to feed the child prohibited items, since instructing a non‑Jew (amira lenochri) is forbidden with regard to all Torah prohibitions—and certainly one may not instruct the child himself to do so.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited even if only by rabbinic law.”; Rashbatz in Piskeiy Nida ; Kisei Eliyahu 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4; So rule regarding even Amirah Lenachri, and certainly this would apply even more so to instructing the child directly: M”A 343:2; Rashi Yevamos 114a; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 p. 13; Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Mishneh Berura 343:4; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[162] Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Shiltei Giborim Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M ibid; M”B 343:4 “And this matter is prohibited by the Torah…And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2; See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Mishneh Lemelech in name of Rashba, brought and negated in Tehila Ledavid ibid]

Opinion of Admur: It is not clear from Admur whether the prohibition he mentions against instructing a child to perform a prohibited act is biblical or rabbinic. On the one hand, Admur discusses this prohibition toward the end of the halakhah in the context of Amirah Lenachri [and in 343:6], which suggests that instructing a child may itself be only rabbinically prohibited. This would imply that the biblical prohibition applies specifically to actively feeding a child a forbidden substance. This reading is further supported by siman 265:10, where Admur does not indicate that a biblical prohibition is involved in simply telling a child to carry a wallet or money from place to place and refers consistently to a case in which the wallet was placed onto the child. This approach appears to follow those authorities who maintain that instructing a child is prohibited only on a rabbinic level, whereas the biblical prohibition is limited to directly causing the child to consume or perform the prohibited matter. Vetzarcuh Iyun! See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[163] Admur 265:10; Rishonim ibid; Poskim ibid; In Admur 343:5 the Halacha is referring to telling a child to eat non-Kosher. The Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3 adds that this includes telling a child to desecrate Shabbos. This is explicitly stated by Admur in 265:10; VeTzaruch Iyun based on this from 328:13 that implies that asking a child to transgress Shabbos in a case of danger is better than having an adult do it, hence implying there is no Biblical prohibition involved in asking him! A. Perhaps one can say that the Issur in asking a child is not in having him do the transgression but in asking him to do something which he is not allowed to do. However, in a case of danger since even a Jew may do so, asking the child is not forbidden at all, and hence there is no prohibition at all taking place, as the child is not commanded in Mitzvos and the adult was allowed to ask him. If, however, an adult transgresses, then although it is allowed and a Mitzvah, it is merely Dechuyah and is like the mashal of an amputation. Hence the advantage of asking a child is that it goes from dechuyah or Hutrah

Instructing a child before Shabbat to perform a transgression on Shabbos: One may not direct a child, even prior to Shabbat, to carry out an act on Shabbat that constitutes a transgression. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3]

[164] Mishneh Berura 343:4; Rishonim and Poskim ibid

[165] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[166] Admur 343:7-8

[167] Implication of Poskim that doing so is within the realm of Lesafos Lo Issur; Sefer Shevisaso Shel Katan 2:3; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[168] Rashbatz in Piskeiy Nida ; Kisei Eliyahu 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[169] See Pnei Meivin 198; Beis Yitzchak 44; Chelkas Yoav 1; Maor Hashabbos 4:13; Chut Shani 4:95; Teshuvos Vehanahgos 1:230; 3:82; Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnotes 64-66

[170] See Admur 343:5-8; See also Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Tiferes Yisarel Pesicha Miseches Eiruvin; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:11 in great length; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Beir Moshe 6:18; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 197; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13 footnote 145

[171] Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law….. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 343:6 “But if he does not need it, it is forbidden to feed him even if he is not yet capable of understanding (and his father must protest if he is capable of understanding), even with regard to a rabbinic prohibition. For it is forbidden to nurse him with his mother’s milk after twenty‑four months, even though the prohibition of a woman’s milk is only rabbinic, since he no longer needs it after twenty‑four months.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited even if only by rabbinic law.”; Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Michaber 343:1; Y.D. 81:7; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Tosafus Rosh Hashanah 32a; Mordechai Shabbos 369; M”A 343:3; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma 2a; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Rebbe Eliezer in Braisa Kesubos 60a; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 544

The source: This law is learned from the ruling in Michaber Yoreh Deah 81:7 in which it states that it is forbidden for a toddler past 24 months to restart nursing, even though nursing is a mere rabbinical prohibition, being that the child no longer needs the milk. [Admur 343:6]

[172] Admur ibid; 266:10; M”A 343:2

[173] See Admur 343:5-6 and 8; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 198 footnotes 5244-549

[174] Meaning that he is hungry or thirsty and there is nothing else available to eat, or he needs to eat for medical reasons.

[175] Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; M”B 362:44; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549

[176] Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 “And there are those who say that anything which is for the need of an infant—such as eating and drinking—the Sages did not decree against it at all, and it is permitted to feed him by hand any matter whose prohibition is only rabbinic, if he needs it, even if he has reached the age of education (Chinuch).” Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 “But anything that is for the infant’s own need and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he might become accustomed to it and do the same when he grows up. This is because it is known to him that they permit his needs only because he is small, and he will not be misled by this to do so when he grows up. Therefore, it is permitted to feed him before Kiddush if he wishes to eat, and likewise to give him to drink, and it is forbidden to afflict him. And so too with all similar cases regarding all other rabbinic prohibitions.” [See Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 7 that this Halacha in Admur is a continuation of the lenient opinion in 343:6]; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; M”A 556:1; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548

[177] The reason we don’t suspect the child will do so also when older: When an action serves the child’s own needs and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he would become habituated to it and continue the practice as an adult. Since it is understood that such permission is granted only because he is a minor, there is no risk that he will be misled to act similarly when he matures. [Admur 343:7; M”A 556:1; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Ran 57a]

[178] May one be stringent like the first opinion if he so chooses? If one chooses to however he may be stringent like the first opinion, and on this it was not stated that one may not oppress a child. [Tzemach Tzedek Miluim 13]

[179] As the lenient opinion does not differentiate in this matter between a child who is above or beneath the age of Chinuch

[180] Admur 343:6 “One may rely on their words to be lenient with rabbinic prohibitions when the child needs it and there is no non‑Jew available to feed him.”; Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 follows the lenient opinion, although without depending it on a gentile not being available – see below for the explanation on this contradiction; [Vetzaruch Iyun from all the following areas where Admur makes no mention of this lenient opinion: Admur 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; See Tzemach Tzedek O.C. Safek Lemi 4; Hearos Ubiurim 829 p. 64]; Taz 346:6 [regarding child brining key through a Karmalis]; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Rav Akiva Eiger Kama 15; Kesav Sofer 47 [not to protest against one who is lenient]; Maharam Shick O.C. 173 is  Milameid Zecgus on the Makilim; Shoel Umeishiv Mahdurah Gimel 117; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27 records the lenient opinion Lehalacha; Implication of Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that he is lenient (unlike M”B 362:44); Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 145 concludes that there is no final arbitration on this matter although writes that Ashkenazim are accustomed to be lenient in this while Sephardim are stringent

Other opinions – Sephardim: Some Poskim rule that one must be stringent like the former opinion which prohibits a Jew from directly feeding a child even a Rabbinically forbidden food even in a time of need. [M”B 362:44 (unlike Biur Halacha ibid); Kesav Sofer 47 that initially we do not rule Lekula; Mahariy Asad 84; Levushei Mordechai 1:51; Arugas Habosem 1:69; Maharshag 2:24; Maharam Shick O.C. 173; Livyas Chen 128 and Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid that so rule Sephardim as is Setimas Maran]

Ruling of Ketzos Hashulchan: Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 who omits this final conclusion of Admur. However, indeed, in Badei HaShulchan 11:11 he addresses this omission, explaining that he intentionally refrained from publicizing this lenient ruling of Admur, since there are Rishonim who maintain that one should not rely on the lenient view. Nevertheless, this itself requires further iyun: if the Alter Rebbe himself ruled leniently, then who are we—who follow his rulings—to diverge from his pesak?

Contradiction from Admur 343:7: Regarding that which the Alter Rebbe rules explicitly in 343:7, which appears to imply that one must never withhold a rabbinic prohibition from a child: There the Alter Rebbe writes that a child may be fed any rabbinic prohibition for his need, and that it is forbidden to oppress him, and he concludes that the same applies to all rabbinic prohibitions. The Tzemach Tzedek (Miluim 13) raises several difficulties with this ruling:

1. In the previous halachah, the Alter Rebbe merely rules that one may be lenient in accordance with the second opinion—and only under specific conditions, such as when no gentile is available—whereas here he appears to rule that one must be lenient.
2. In truth, the specific case discussed in Halacha 7 (tasting before Kiddush) is permitted even according to the first opinion, as the Alter Rebbe explicitly rules in 269:3, since this is not an intrinsic prohibition. Why, then, is this distinction not mentioned here?
3. Moreover, with regard to these matters, one may be lenient even with a biblical prohibition, as is evident from the allowance to feed a minor on Yom Kippur.

The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 7) resolves these questions by explaining that Halacha 7 is not an independent ruling, but rather a continuation and clarification of the second opinion. The Alter Rebbe’s intent is to explain that, according to this opinion, any rabbinic prohibition may be given to a child for his own need—this in contrast to actions performed for the needs of adults, which were prohibited in the previous halachah even according to the second opinion. See there for his resolution of the remaining difficulty raised by the Tzemach Tzedek.

In conclusion: The ruling of 343:7 does not represent the Alter Rebbe’s final and absolute position regarding all rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, it is stated within the framework of the second opinion, and the practical ruling therefore remains as stated above: this leniency applies only under specific circumstances, such as when no gentile is available.

[181] Pashut from all Poskim ibid! Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[182] Rama Yoreh Deah 81:7 regarding an infant eating milk from a gentile, as explained in Shach 81:26; M”A 343:2; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 4; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:9; See Pri Chadash (Yoreh De’ah, siman 81, se’if katan 26) who already protested and cried out sharply about this matter, stating as follows: Since in our times people are not careful with these matters of forbidden foods, most children go astray, and most of the insolent individuals of our generation lack any fear of Heaven that penetrates their hearts. Even when they are rebuked directly, they are not receptive to moral instruction. And who is greater for us than Elisha ben Avuyah? For he did not come to that path because of any later deed of his own, but rather because his mother, who was pregnant with him, passed by a place where food was being cooked for idolatry. She smelled it and felt a need to eat from it, and that substance permeated him like the venom of a snake.”

Time‑Dependent Prohibitions: The Achronim have discussed whether this negative effect applies also to permitted foods that become prohibited due to time-related restrictions, such as chametz on Passover, eating on Yom Kippur, and eating matzah on the day before Passover. [See Darkei Teshuvah 81:90; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 4] From the words of the Gemara in Yoma (82b), which discusses a pregnant woman who smelled food on Yom Kippur, it is evident that this category is also included. [Arugas Habosem O.C. 138] Nevertheless, it is certainly forbidden to be stringent in a situation involving even a possible danger to life, and the ruling must be determined according to the judgment of the halachic authority in each case. However, allowing a minor to eat before kiddush or havdalah is clearly more lenient according to all opinions, since this prohibition is merely a rabbinic safeguard enacted out of respect for the sanctity of the day. [Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:9]

[183] Darkei Moshe O.C. 617:1 “One must be careful that a pregnant woman guard herself as much as possible that she does not eat pork and non-kosher meats as this will cause that her child will be God fearing”; Or Zarua 279; Yerushalmi Chagiga 9b regarding the mother of Acher that she had once eaten a non-Kosher food during her pregnancy due to having smelled it and lusted after it, and this is what caused her son to become a heretic; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 142:1; Shevach Habris 1:24; Nitei Gavriel 3 56:5

[184] Rama Y.D. 81:7; Taz Y.D. 81:12; Shach Y.D. 81:24; Arugas Habosem O.C. 138; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 142:1; 147:2;

[185] Shach Y.D. 81:24; P”M 81 M”Z 12; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 147:3; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:9

[186] See Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill”; 343:7 “Whatever is for the need of the child and for his Takanaso – development and benefit”

[187] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[188] So is evident from the source of the ruling regarding nursing a toddler pass 24 months which is forbidden. Thus one must conclude that even when the child needs to eat, if other Kosher foods are available it is forbidden for him to eat it.

[189] See Admur 343:9-10 [This is demonstrated by Admur 343:9-10, who rules that even rabbinically prohibited foods may not be given to a child and the only allowance to feed him cake with lettering is because the Melacha is not the main purpose of the item. This makes clear that a child’s mere desire to eat a food because it tastes good is not considered a legitimate justification. Furthermore, he explicitly rules there that even by cake with lettering it may not be placed into the child’s mouth directly.

[190] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[191] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older. But when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah. Therefore, it is permitted to give a taste to a child who has reached the age of education from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no need at all for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated to do so. Nevertheless, since the prohibition of tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, and the only reason to prohibit it would be out of concern lest the child become habituated to it—and this concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, because children are not given to taste on a fixed basis every single Shabbat. For sometimes there are guests who stay and eat in the rooms of the synagogue and hear Kiddush there, and then there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited—even if only by rabbinic law.”; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[192] Admur 343:6 regarding even a Rabbinical prohibition “provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah” and 343:7; Admur 343:1 regarding general law “If he does so on behalf of an adult, one must protest and stop him, by rabbinic law, as explained in סימן של״ד.”; Admur 334:26 in parentheses regarding Kibuiy on Shabbos which is possibly only Rabbinical; Beis Yosef 334; Rosh 1:1; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:13

[193] Admur 334:26 “Even if he has not reached the age of Chinuch”; Bach 334; Tosafus Shabbos 121a

[194] This applies whether the child is doing so on behalf of his father or on behalf of any other adult: Admur 343:1 “Bishvil Gadol”; 334:26 “on behalf of his father (or another Jew)”; M”B 334:65 in name of P”M; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

Father versus other person: So rules also Admur in 334:26 that if the child is going to extinguish the fire even on behalf of a person other than his father, he must be reprimanded. Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur in 334:26 stated this addition (another person) in parentheses. To note however that in the Gemara [Yevamos 104a] explains that the reason the child must be reprimanded is because he is doing so on behalf of his father, and thus perhaps here Admur novelizes that even when done on behalf of others he must be reprimanded. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11] This is also explicitly implied in Rashi there which equates this case to the case brought earlier in the Gemara regarding having children carry keys in a public domain on behalf of another person, of which there it was allowed because they were not doing so on behalf of that person. Nevertheless, tzaruch Iyun why the need to place this addition in parentheses. The Mishneh Berurah [334:65] rules in the name of the Peri Megadim as above that the child is to be reprimanded even when he goes to extinguish another person’s fire.

[195] The reason: This can be inferred from 343:6, where Admur limits the allowance to cases performed for the sake of a mitzvah. The reason is that asking a child to transgress is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress, which is forbidden when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that only when there is a mitzvah need did the Sages not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, even if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[196] Implication of Admur 343:1-2 and 334:26 “even if his father is not there” and in parentheses “or for another Jew”; See Admur 343:2 that this obligation to reprimand and correct improper behavior is not limited to the Beit Din, even though they are the primary subject discussed in this halacha. Rather, this obligation applies to every individual. This is made explicit by the wording in the beginning of the next halacha, where Admur states that all of the above applies when dealing with “other people”, clearly indicating that the responsibility is not confined to judicial authorities alone.

[197] So is implied from the ruling of the Admur, who mentions an opinion of leniency to ask a child to perform a rabbinic melachah on behalf of an adult only in a case involving a mitzvah. He does not mention, even once, that such an allowance exists in a case of great loss or pressing need alone. This is likewise implied from the ruling of the Admur (266:10), who permits instructing a child to carry one’s wallet [and today we don’t have a Reshus Harabim Min Hatorah] specifically due to a state of panic, and not merely because of a significant financial loss. Now, although with regard to Amirah Lenachri we are lenient even in cases of great loss or great need to permit the performance of a rabbinic prohibition, it nevertheless appears that we are more stringent when it comes to a Jewish child. In that context, the leniency is limited exclusively to the sake of a mitzvah. The reason for this distinction is that only in the context of a mitzvah is a child’s involvement viewed as an isolated and exceptional act, such that there is no concern he will come to perform similar prohibitions upon reaching maturity. However, if a child is instructed to transgress even a rabbinic prohibition merely due to need or financial loss—even if the need is great—there is concern that this will train him to act similarly later in life. Therefore, greater stringency is required, limiting the leniency solely to cases involving a mitzvah. [See Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11–6] A further point to consider is that even in a case that it is done for the sake of a Mitzvah the matter is subject to dispute, as cited by Admur. The Alter Rebbe conclusion for leniency applies only in the context of a mitzvah, and no broader allowance is stated for cases of loss. Accordingly, there is no basis to assume that the more lenient opinion would extend this leniency to other circumstances, nor is there any justification to conclude that the final ruling of the Admur permits leniency in cases beyond those involving a mitzvah.

Other opinions: Some Poskim understand that according to those authorities who are lenient to permit, on occasion, instructing a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah, they are likewise lenient in cases of great need or substantial financial loss. According to this view, any situation in which it is permitted to ask a non‑Jew to perform a rabbinic prohibition would equally permit, on occasion, asking a Jewish child to do so. This would apply even to the child’s parents, and even if the child is above the age of Chinuch. Hence, they conclude that one may rely on this lenient approach whenever a gentile is not available. [Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 40 in name of Poskim, including Admur!] As stated above, however, this significant leniency is notably omitted from the ruling of the Admur. Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[198] However, some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos it is better that the Melacha be done by a Katan who is not one’s son, if possible. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5]

[199] See Admur 266:10 regarding having one’s child carry ones wallet on Shabbos; Michaber 266:6; Piskeiy Rid Shabbos 153b; Piskeiy Riad 24:1; Shiltei Giborim 66a; Piskeiy Teshuvos 266:1; 343:3; See also Admur 244:13; 301:40; 311:1; 332:3; 334:2 and 25; Kuntrus Achron 266:2

[200] See Admur 334:25-26; Beis HaLevi 1:13; Shaareiy Deiah 2:66; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:180; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 37

[201] Admur 343:6 “there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older.”; Admur 343:8 “Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”;  Tur 559 in name of Tosafus; Shut Rashba 1:323; Tosafus Shabbos 139a; Eruvin 40b in name of Rabbeinu Shmuel; Beis Efraim Y.D. 62; Mechzeh Avraham 36; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 49

[202] Admur ibid; Eruvin 40b; Rashi ibid

The reason: As he has already become accustomed as a child to transgress.

[203] Implication of Admur 343:6 that so rule all Poskim who prohibit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition even in a case that he needs to eat it: Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Chasam Sofer 6:13; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549; [See, however the following Poskim who understand that even this opinion agrees to permit it on occasion and hence there is no dispute between the sides: Beis Efraim Y.D. 62; Mechzeh Avraham 36; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 49]

[204] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf….when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah.”; Admur 343:8 “Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”; Rashba 1:92; Shut Rashba 323; Tosafus Eruvin 40b; See M”A 269 and 289; Darkei Moshe 325:8; Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Meishiv Davar 20; Eretz Tzevi 75; All Poskim who permit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition in a case that he needs to eat it: Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 40

Background: According to the lenient opinion which allows one to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition in a case that he needs to eat it, they hold that the entire prohibition of giving a Rabbinical prohibition to a child [even above the age of education] is only due to that he may come to transgress this sin also after he matures and becomes Bar Mitzva. Thus, if the incident is not a common occurrence, they allow the child to transgress it, if it is a mere Rabbinical prohibition.

[205] The reason: The reason for this allowance is because asking a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, which is permitted when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8 and 307:12). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that when there is a mitzvah need the Sages did not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[206] Setimas Admur 343:8; Implication of Admur 343:6 [This is implied from the wording of Admur, who states, “therefore it is permitted,” even though he is addressing the lenient opinion, and likewise follows his final ruling in the previous debate on which this debate is dependent, in which he permits one to be lenient in a time of need for the child. Nevertheless, there is no explicit final ruling in Admur on this matter, unlike the case of feeding a child a rabbinic prohibition for his own sake, regarding which Admur issues a definitive ruling.]; M”A 269 and 289; Darkei Moshe 325:8; Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Shut Harim O.C. 3; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 2:53; Pnei Mevin O.C. 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Eretz Tzevi 75; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnotes 40-42

Ruling of Ketzos Hashulchan: Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 who omits this final conclusion of Admur. However, indeed, in Badei HaShulchan 11:11 he addresses this omission, explaining that he intentionally refrained from publicizing this lenient ruling of Admur, since there are Rishonim who maintain that one should not rely on the lenient view and if it were to be publicized it could lead to a destruction of Halacha. Nevertheless, this itself requires further iyun: if the Alter Rebbe himself ruled leniently, then who are we—who follow his rulings—to diverge from his pesak?

[207] However, some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos it is better that the Melacha be done by a Katan who is not one’s son, if possible. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5]

[208] Admur 621:4; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

The law by a Biblical prohibition: A biblical prohibition may not be transgressed under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence. This is because with respect to biblical prohibitions, the Sages were concerned that permitting a child to transgress, even for the sake of a mitzvah and on a rare occasion, could lead him to do so later in life. Accordingly, it is forbidden to give a child the wine of a bris on Yom Kippur [Admur 621:4]

[209] Admur 343:6 “Therefore, it is permitted to give a child who has reached the age of education a taste from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no actual need for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated in this matter. Nevertheless, since the prohibition against tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, it should not be prohibited except out of concern that the child may become accustomed to it. Such concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, as children are not given to taste from it on a regular basis every Shabbat, since at times there are guests who stay and eat in the synagogue premises and hear Kiddush there, in which case there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”; See Admur 269:3; 471:10; M”A 269:1; Rashba 92 regarding Kiddush on Yom Kippur;

Other reasons for allowance: Regarding the rationale for this leniency, there is an apparent discrepancy between Admur 269:3 and 343:6. In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. However, in 343:6, Admur bases the allowance on the opinion of the Rashba, who permits giving the wine to a child because it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, since at times there are guests who eat in the synagogue and drink the Kiddush wine, and it therefore does not become a regular practice to give the wine to the child.

[210] In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. Hence, its permissibility is not dependent on the above debate, and it is allowed even according to the stringent opinion above.

[211] Admur 343:8 “Anything that falls under the category of chinuch (educational training for mitzvot), it is permitted to actively give a child a prohibited item—for example, to feed the Paschal offering to a minor who has reached the age of chinuch, even though he was not formally registered for it. Although the Paschal offering may be eaten only by those registered for it, nevertheless, since one’s intent is to educate him in the mitzvah, it is permitted. However, a mitzvah for which chinuch does not apply—meaning a mitzvah that he will not be able to perform when he grows up, which is the fundamental rationale of chinuch—such as giving him a taste from the cup of wine of a circumcision on Yom Kippur so that the blessing should not appear to have been said in vain: even though this is a mitzvah-related need, nevertheless, since when he grows up it will be forbidden to him, it is also forbidden now, due to concern that he may become accustomed to it and drink from it even when he is older, as will be explained in סימן תרכ״א. Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”; M”A 343:3; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Tosafus Pesachim 88a; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Elya Raba 343:3; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:17; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 198 footnote 550-555; Likkutei Sichos 26:69-74

[212] Admur ibid; See also Admur 186:3; Shut Admur Hazakein 41 in end; Rashi Sukkah 20b; Chagiga 6a; Eruvin 40b

[213] Admur ibid; Mordechai Yuma Remez 727

[214] Admur ibid; 2^nd opinion in Admur 190:4; 621:4 and 5-6; Rashi Eruvin 40b

[215] Admur 343:5 “If a gentile feeds a prohibited item to a child who is not yet capable of understanding, the child’s father is not required to protest. However, it is forbidden for any Jew to tell a gentile to feed the child, since instructing a gentile is prohibited with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah. All the more so is it forbidden to tell the child himself to do so.”; M”A 343:3; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 in name of Rameh; M”B 343:5; Kaf Hachaim 343:15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and 12

[216] So is implied from Setimas Admur here; however, see the continuation where he writes “since instructing a gentile is prohibited with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah.” Vetzaruch Iyun as Halachically, asking a non-Jew to instruct a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition constitutes a threefold rabbinic prohibition (shevut de‑shevut de‑shevut): instructing a non-Jew is itself rabbinically prohibited; a minor performing a prohibited act involves a separate rabbinic concern; and the underlying prohibition itself is rabbinic. This stands in contrast to instructing a child directly to perform a rabbinic prohibition, which constitutes a double rabbinic prohibition (shevut de‑shevut) and remains prohibited, as explained above.

[217] The reason: This is because asking a non-Jew to perform a prohibited act on one’s behalf is forbidden with respect to all biblical prohibitions. [Admur 343:5; 243:1]

[218] Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill—it is permitted to tell a gentile to feed him, for the needs of a minor are treated as those of a sick person who is not in danger. In such a case, the Sages permitted instructing a gentile even regarding biblical prohibitions, as explained in siman 328. Similarly, if the child requires wine to drink and no Jewish wine is available, but only ordinary wine of gentiles, and the wine is not strong enough to be rendered permissible through dilution of six parts water to one part wine (as explained in Yoreh De’ah siman 134), it is permitted to tell a gentile to give him to drink.”; M”A 343:3; M”B 343:5; See also Admur 328:19; 22; 450:24-25 regarding Chametz; Tehila Ledavid 343:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:15-16; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:12

[219] Admur 450:24-26 regarding Chametz; So is also evident from the reason of Admur, brought in next footnote; Mishneh Berura 343:5

[220] The reason: Since the needs of a child are halachically equated with those of a non‑dangerously ill person, by which the Sages permitted instructing a non‑Jew to transgress on his behalf even by a biblical prohibition. [Admur ibid; 328:19; 22; 450:24-25; Tehila Ledavid 343:4] As for why Admur limits this leniency here to a case where the child is slightly ill—despite the general principle that even the needs of a healthy child carry the status of one who is ill—this is because there is no necessity for a healthy child to consume specifically non‑kosher food, absent medical need. Accordingly, such a case would not arise with respect to a healthy child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 5]

[221] This is evident from the fact that if possible Admur [ibid] requires one to dilute non-Kosher wine of a gentile with water in a way that it no longer retains its prohibition, rather than ask a gentile to feed it to the child in its current state.

[222] Admur 343:9 “It is forbidden to give a child a live non‑kosher locust to play with, lest it die and the child eat it, in which case one would be actively feeding him a prohibited item, since he himself gave him the prohibition. All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is. Even something that is prohibited only because of bal teshaktzu (repulsiveness) may not be given to him if there is concern that he might eat it. However, it is permitted to give him a non‑kosher bird to play with, since even if it dies it is not fit for consumption.” Admur 343:10 “(All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food, even when the prohibition is time‑dependent.) However, on Shabbat it is permitted to give a child objects with which he can perform a prohibited labor for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so. For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbat, as explained in siman ש״מ. Even though the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him, as explained above—provided that an adult does not place the food directly into the child’s mouth.” Admur 616:4 “All of this applies to a minor who has not yet reached the age of education for the mitzvah of affliction. However, if he has reached the age of education, it is permitted to feed him, give him drink, anoint him, and wash him directly, in the manner explained above. If the minor performs any of these acts on his own, there is no need to protest, except for his father, who is required to protest and to educate his son in the mitzvot. His mother, however, is not obligated in this. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for her to place food before him, since doing so is considered as if she were feeding him directly.”; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[223] Admur 343:9 “All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is… if there is concern that he might eat it.” and 10 in parentheses “All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food”; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b; Kaf Hachaim 343:13

The reason: As this is considered as if he is actively feeding him a prohibited item. [Admur ibid; M”A ibid; rashi ibid]

[224] As rules Admur next regarding Bal Tishaktzu

[225] Such as Matzah on Erev Pesach for a child who has reached the age of understanding, or a child on Yom Kippur which has reached the age of Chinuch for fasts.

[226] Admur 343:10 in parentheses; 616:4

[227] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Implication of Shabbos ibid; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 10; See Admur Basra 3:11

[228] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b; Kaf Hachaim 343:13

[229] Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur mentions a Treif bird, as even by a kosher bird it is forbidden to be eaten without slaughtering and thus the same suspicion applies.

[230] Chidushei Rashal on Hagahos Ashri of Shabbos; Pischei Olam 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:13

[231] Admur 343:10 “(However all the above is regarding prohibited foods, even if it is forbidden due to time) However it is permitted to give to a baby on Shabbos items which he is able to do prohibited actions with for himself, and even if one knows that he will do these actions with them , such as to give a baby a cake which has letters written on it which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos as explained in chapter 340, even though the young child will for certain eat it, [nevertheless] since he intends for his own benefit one need not separate him [from doing the prohibition] as was explained above [in Halacha 1]. Nevertheless one [a Gadol] may not place [the cake] into the mouth of the baby.”; M”A 343:2; See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; 3:82 and Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144 who permit to have a child below age 6 to open the fridge; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 who allows placing a child below age 3 in front of the fridge and in front of the light switch; Other contradictory rulings of Admur and their resolution: See Admur 266:10 [forbidden to give wallet to carry], 301:21 [prohibits dressing child with clothing that contain  bells that make noise]; Tehila Ledavid 343:2; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11; Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54; Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79;

The contradiction in Admur: There is an apparent contradiction within the rulings of Admur regarding the permissibility of giving a child below the age of chinuch an item with which a prohibition will be performed. Here in 343:10, Admur explicitly permits giving a child cake that contains letters, notwithstanding that the inevitable result of eating the cake will be the erasure of the letters, a rabbinic prohibition of mechikas ksav. This ruling implies that even where the adult is aware that a prohibition will certainly occur (pesik reisha), and even where the adult benefits from the child’s action, it is nevertheless permitted to give the item to a child below the age of chinuch. However, this ruling appears to contradict numerous other rulings of Admur, including 343:9 (prohibiting giving a child non‑kosher food), 266:10 (forbidding handing a child an object to carry in a public domain), and 301:21 (based on M”A 301:35 prohibiting dressing a child in garments with bells that will inevitably cause prohibited noise), all of which indicate that one may not actively place a child in a situation where a prohibition will certainly be transgressed.

The resolutions to the contradictions: This internal inconsistency has led to multiple approaches among the Poskim in explaining Admur’s position. Some make note of the contradiction and leave it unresolved (tzaruch iyun). [Tehila Ledavid 343:2] Others resolve the contradiction by sharply limiting the scope of 343:10, ruling that a child below chinuch may only be given an item with which a prohibition might occur if the adult has no intent for the child to perform the prohibition; if the adult’s intent is that the prohibition be done, even indirectly, it is forbidden. According to this approach, the cake-with-letters case is permitted only because the adult’s intent is feeding the child, not erasing letters. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147, fn. 11; Article of Rav Avraham Elyashvili in Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79] A different resolution that is suggested distinguishes between a one‑time prohibition and a constant or ongoing prohibition. They explain that Admur permits giving a child an item that will result in a single, incidental transgression (such as erasing letters while eating cake), but forbids giving items that will cause continuous violations (such as bells that ring repeatedly or objects that will be carried for an extended period). [Chikrei Halachos vol. 4 p. 54] Other contemporary Poskim adopt a more expansive reading of Admur. According to this approach, the decisive factor is whether the item inherently compels a prohibition or merely enables it. If the child retains a genuine choice whether or not to perform the prohibited act, then giving the item—or even placing the child in proximity to it—is not equivalent to instructing the child to sin, even if the adult hopes to benefit from the result. This reading understands 343:10 as the governing principle, with the stricter rulings in other simanim applying only where the item’s sole or unavoidable use is the prohibition itself. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 55 and 62]

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is possibly forbidden to arrange for a child to perform a prohibition due to Gerama. [See Bear Sarim 5:74; Meorei Haeish 4:13 footnote 182; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 61]

[232] Admur ibid in parentheses

[233] Setimas Admur ibid

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that anyone who sees a child who has reached the age of education transgressing a prohibition, then he must reprimand and stop the child even if he is not the child’s father, and hence certainly it would be forbidden to provide an Issur to such a child. [Bikurei Yaakov 640:5; Kaf Hachaim 343:28; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 footnote 19 in opinion of Rama ibid, based on Yevamos 114a that Beis Din is Lav Davka and the same applies to any person; So rule regarding a Beis Din: 1^st opinion in Rama 343:1; M”A 640:3; Elya Raba 640:4; P”M 640 A”A 4; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yereim; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Rashi Eruvin 96b; Chayeh Adam 66:3] Some Poskim conclude based on this opinion that by a Biblical transgression one is to be stringent and reprimand a child which has reached the age of education even if the child is not his son. However, by Rabbinical prohibitions there is no need to be stringent. [Chayeh Adam ibid; Mishneh Berura 343:7] Based on this, by one may not provide a child who has reached the age of c=Chinuch with an item with which he may do a Biblical prohibition, but may provide him with an item with which he can perform a Rabbinical prohibition if he is not the child’s father. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4]

[234] This is learned from the Gemara Shabbos 90b which does not differentiate [and neither does any Posek] and seemingly allows to give a child a kosher locust to play with even though the child may kill, trap, detach a wing or the like to the locust. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11]. As for the reason that there is a difference between giving the child a food or an item meant for desecrating Shabbos, Tzaruch Iyun.

[235] See Tehila Ledavid 343:6; Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 57

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that in a case where the child would have been unable to reach the item or perform the act independently, and required the assistance of an adult, the matter constitutes a Biblical prohibition of Sefiyas Issur, and is therefore forbidden. [Achiezer 3:81-7]

[236] Hearah 85 in new Shulchan Aruch; See previous footnotes for other opinions

[237] Admur 343:3; M”A 343:2; Issur Viheter Shaar 48:8; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; M”B 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; See Tosafus Erechin 3a; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3; Beir Moshe 6:20; Mishneh Halachos 3:49; 7:36; Sheilas Shaul 32; Shevet Halevi 7:104; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2 footnote 32 and 61

Other Opinions – Shabbos Melachah Performed by a Child Below the Age of Chinuch: The above Poskim all rule that a child who is below the age of chinuch does not require protest if he performs a melachah on Shabbos, as is the general principle by all prohibitions performed by a child who lacks mental maturity. However, some Poskim rule that Shabbat melachah is an exception to this general principle. According to this view, parents are biblically obligated to prevent their children from performing melachah on Shabbat even if the child has not yet reached the age of understanding or education. The reason given is that the Torah explicitly commands that one’s children rest on Shabbat, as stated in the verse: “You shall not do any work—you, your son, or your daughter.” Under this approach, young children are likened to one’s animals, which are likewise commanded to rest on Shabbat, and therefore parents bear a direct obligation to ensure that their children refrain from labor on Shabbat regardless of age. [Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118] This opinion is a Daas Yachid. [Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid]

[238] See Admur 343:1-2; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61

[239] Admur ibid and 340:4; M”A 343:5; Mordechai Remez 369 in name of Maharam, brought in Beis Yosef 340

[240] Admur ibid; 640:4; Mordechai ibid

[241] Admur ibid; Mordechai ibid

[242] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

[243] Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54 based on Admur’s ruling in 301:21 that it is forbidden to give a child clothing with bells, addresses the apparent contradiction between that ruling and the leniency discussed here. He explains that permission is granted only where the child will perform a single, isolated prohibition—such as eating a cake with letters on it—whereas an item that leads to a constant prohibition is forbidden to give to a child. Others (see He’aros U’Biurim, Ohalei Torah no. 831, p. 79) explain that the prohibition in 301:21 is due to the father’s intent: the clothing is given specifically so that the child will ring the bells in order to amuse or calm himself. In such a case, it is prohibited, as explained by the Ketzos HaShulchan (266:10; see the next halacha). However, this explanation is not entirely compelling. While it may be assumed that the child intends to play with the bells, it is not evident that the adult necessarily has such intent; perhaps the garment was given simply for the child to wear. Rather, it may be explained that since the garment’s primary purpose is to produce sound, giving it to the child—regardless of the adult’s subjective intent—is tantamount to instructing the child to perform a prohibited act. As such, it is treated as though the adult is actively “feeding” the child the prohibition. This differs from the case of the cake: although eating it necessarily entails erasing the letters, that is not the cake’s primary function. Its essential purpose is consumption, and therefore giving it to the child is not considered equivalent to directly causing him to perform a prohibited act.

[244] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 55; See previous footnotes

[245] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 62

[246] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11 based on Admur 266:10

Background and Other approaches: This ruling is based on Admur 266:10, and is likewise codified by the Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11). However, in light of the explanation above, it may be suggested that the prohibition in siman 266 is not dependent on the giver’s subjective intent. Rather, since it is evident to all that the wallet is being given for the purpose of carrying it—and thereby performing a prohibited act—this is considered akin to actively “feeding” the child a prohibition. In such a case, giving the item is halachically equivalent to instructing the child to perform the transgression, which is forbidden. In other words, whenever an item is given to a child and its sole understood purpose is for the performance of a prohibited act, it is treated as though the child has been explicitly told to commit that prohibition.

[247] With respect to the case of lettering on a cake discussed above, since the giver’s intent is not that the letters be erased but rather that the child eat the cake, it is therefore permitted to give it to the child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11]

[248] Admur 343:11 “A minor who struck his father or committed other transgressions while he was a minor does not require repentance (teshuvah) upon reaching adulthood. Nevertheless, it is proper for him to accept upon himself some act of repentance or atonement, even though the transgression was committed before he became legally punishable. With regard to matters involving monetary obligations, this will be explained in Choshen Mishpat, siman 359.”; Rama 343; Mahariy 62; Bach 343; Sefer Chassidim 692 “A certain man once came before a sage and said: “I remember that when I was a child, I stole from people and committed other sins.” The sage said to him: “You must pay up for all the sins that you remember, and you must repay everything that you stole. Just as King Yoshiyahu repented for all his sins and compensated anyone whom he had wronged while he was still a minor, so too must you act. Likewise, if a person was once a sage, then lost his sanity and later regained his wisdom, he should repay all the losses he caused. Even though, according to testimony and the ruling of the court, he may be legally exempt, he should nevertheless pay. The same applies to one who caused damage while extremely intoxicated: even though he lacked full awareness at the time, he should still make restitution unless the law explicitly exempts him. All of this is done so that a person may fulfill his obligation not only before the court, but also in the eyes of Heaven.”; Shvus Yaakov 1:177 brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah C.M. 349:2; Gilyon Mahrsha Y.D. 240:1; Based on story in Shabbos 56b; Baba Kama 98b, brought in Kaf Hachaim 343:32; Kaf Hachaim 343:35-36; See Rambam Hilchos Shegagos 9:3; Toras Menachem 19:26

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that a child is not required to repent at all for his wrongdoing even when he becomes older. [Beis Yaakov 3, brought in Shvus Yaakov ibid] Practically, we do not rule like his opinion. [Shvus Yaakov ibid; Kaf Hachaim ibid]

[249] Elya Raba 343:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:33; M”B 343:9; Implciatiomn of Sefer Chassidim ibid

[250] Bach 343: The verse in Mishlei 19:2 states that “Even without knowledge, a soul is no good.” This teaches us that even a child that transgresses a sin without knowledge causes impurity to his soul, it is thus proper for him to do Teshuvah; See Terumos Hadeshen 2:62; Likkutei Sichos 14 p. 144 footnote 13; Sichos Kodesh Balak 5730; Shulchan Hamelech 343

Other opinions: See Sefer Chassidim ibid who implies that this is required Min Hadin.

[251] Sefer Chassidim ibid “However if he was very young when the action was committed and he does not remember, he does not need to pay”; Beis Yaakov 3; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:14; Lehoros Nasan 4:34; 6:102

[252] Maor Vashemesh Parshas Maaseiy and Divrei Chaim Parshas Ki Savo regarding Reb Meilech Milizensk that he repented for paining his mother prior to birth and when nursing

[253] Noda Beyehuda Tinyana Y.D. 164, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah Y.D. 376:3

[254] See Michaber C.M. 96; Kaf Hachaim 343:34; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:14

[255] Sefer Chassidim 692; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Bava Kama 3:3; Chavos Yair 169; Kaf Hachaim 343:35; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:14; Yabia Omer 3:27

[256] This Sicha is printed in the section of Parshas Vayeira, although relates to our verse written in Parshas Eikev.

[257] Eikev 11:19

[258] Chayeh Sarah 24a

[259] Zohar 1:129; 224:1

[260] Rambam Avoda Zara 1:3

[261] See Michaber Y.D. 344:1

[262] Nedarim 32a; Hasagas Haraavad Avoda Zara 1:3

[263] Toldos 26:5

[264] Rambam Avoda Zara 1:3

[265] Bereishis Raba 30:8

[266] Admur 343:2; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Brachos 5:1; Shevisas Assur 2:10; Sukkah 6:1; Chagiga 4a; Nazir 29a; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Chinuch

Opinion of Admur in Tanya: In Tanya, in the Hakdama to Shaar Hayichud Vihemuna, Admur writes in parentheses that “The Mitzvah of Chinuch is also with a positive command, as written in chapter 343” The intent of this statement is not to say that the Mitzvah of Chinuch is a positive command, but rather that the Rabbinical command of Chinuch also obligates one to train one’s child in following the Biblical positive commands. [Lessons in Tanya]

[267] Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam 1:1

[268] Eikev 11:19

[269] Ramban Vaeschanan 6:7; This concept is also recorded a number of Rishonim, including: Bahag in his introduction of Kum Asei 71 who writes the one must teach his child Torah and mitzvah’s; Semag Mitzvas Asei 12; Yireim 225; Rabbeinu Meyuchas on Torah Eikev 11:19; Meiri Kiddushin 30a; Bamidbar Raba 17a

[270] Vaeschanan 6:7

[271] Admur Talmud Torah Kuntrus Acharon 1:1

[272] See Rashi Sukkah 2b; Rashi Chagiga 6a

[273] Mishleiy 22:6; See Rashba Megillah 19b; Ritva Sukkah 2b; Omitted from Admur 343; See Admur Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:6

[274] See Likkutei Sichos ibid footnote 12

[275] See Rambam Brachos 11:2

[276] See Rivash 131

Regarding the mitzvah of circumcision: The same can be argued that the father fulfills it on behalf of the son who is unable to do so at his age, and so can be understood from Or Zarua 2:104. However, according to Shut Ran 52, the mitzvah of circumcision is not the same as it is in intrinsic command on the father. See Likkutei Sichos 11:44 in length.

[277] See Shabbos 130a

[278] See Rabbeinu Manoach on Rambam Shevisas Assur 2:10 from whom the Rebbe learns to be making this explicit distinction. Rabbeinu Manoach on Rambam Shevisas Assur 2:10 explains based on the Rambam, that there are two different levels of obligation of educating a child to fast on Yom Kippur. The obligation to educate a child below the age of 11 to fast for a few hours is not a rabbinical command of Chinuch but is due to the general obligation of a father to educate a child which obligates the father to educate the child in the general concept of the mitzvah, while the obligation for the child to fast from age 11 is an actual rabbinical obligation and therefore the child must fast the entire day

[279] See Ritva Sukkah 2b that even a child may not dwell in the sukkah that is over 20 cubits tall; Ran Yuma 82a; Rabbeinu Manoach on Rambam Shevisas Assur 2:10

[280] Chapter 1:1; See also Admur 343:2 and Mahadura Tinyana 4:2

[281] See Brachos 25b; Bechoros 17b; Avoda Zara 3a; Shemos Raba 34:1

[282] See Admur 445:1

A source from Hilchos Talmud Torah of Admur: A possible source for the novelty of the Rebbe in this answer can be brought from Hilchos Talmud Torah of Admur, where Admur brings from the Mishneh in Avos 2:16 that “Ein Alecha Hamelacha Ligmor:It is not your obligation to complete” and explains this to mean that while one is obligated to begin studying the subjects of Torah, he is not necessarily expected to complete the study of all the subjects, and this depends on one’s intellectual capabilities and the amount of free time he has on his hands. [See Admur ibid 2:3, 5, 8; 3:2; 4:6, 16] Vetzaruch Iyun why this source was not mentioned at all by the Rebbe.

[283] See Admur ibid regarding the start of the 7^th hour and see Admur 431:1; 440:1; 444:16; 445:1

[284] In the words of Admur ibid: “Just like that Biblically, even though starting from the beginning of the 7^th hour it is a command that one no longer have any Chametz in his possession, and every moment which he possesses Chametz from there on, and is not involved in destroying it, he transgresses a Biblical Positive command, nevertheless, he is not obligated to destroy the Chametz at the end of the 6th hour, in order so he not own any Chametz from when the 7th hour begins, and rather it is only from the beginning of the 7th hour and onwards that he is obligated to destroy it. So too Rabbinically, even though starting from the beginning of the 6th hour it is a [Rabbinical] command that one no longer have any Chametz in his possession, and every moment which he possesses Chametz from there on, and is not involved in destroying it, he transgresses a Rabbinical Positive command, nevertheless, he is not obligated to destroy the Chametz at the end of the 5th hour, in order so he not own any Chametz from when the 6th hour begins, and rather it is only from the beginning of the 6th hour and onwards that he is obligated to destroy it.”

[285] See Yevamos 47a-b

[286] Hilchos Issureiy Biyah 14:2

[287] Another similar proof that can be suggested, is from the development of Halacha throughout the generations. Even after the passing of Moshe, the laws of the Torah were becoming constantly formed and developed until the Talmudic times. Are we to say that the Sages who were unaware of later developed novelties and teachings which are today accepted as Halacha, and part of the Biblcial Torah, having been expounded by the 13 rules of expounding, are considered to have transgressed these laws? Did Rebbe Elazar Ben Azariah who never said the 3^rd paragraph of Kerias Shema at night until age 70, when he was finally taught to do so by Ben Zoma [see Brachos 12b] considered to have transgressed this positive command of remembering the exodus at night? Are all the Poskim who gave a certain ruling and then retracted from their rulings later on in their lives [i.e., a common phenomenon found by even the greatest of Poskim] considered to have transgressed and caused others to transgress? The above novelty of the Rebbe solves this issue, as it is all part of the process of reaching perfection in the command, and hence even during the time of their Halachic “error”, they were considered to be fulfilling the Torah.  

[288] Avoda Zara 1:3

[289] See the following letter of the Rebbe, printed on Chabad.org: How to Become a Baal Teshuvah: Greeting and Blessing: Your letter reached me with some delay. In the meantime, I was pleased to see your husband at the farbrengen here. As for the subject matter of your letter, you surely know that the Torah tells us that the conquest of the promised Holy Land was to take place by stages. The same applies, in a deeper sense, to the personal conquest of the self. In other words, when it comes to personal advancement in matters of Yiddishkeit, the best method is sometimes precisely in the way of a gradual conquest, step by step, and stage by stage, rather than by means of a drastic change. Of course, there are certain situations and matters where a drastic change may be necessary, but by and large steady progress is usually steadier than progress by fits and starts.

https:::www.chabad.org:therebbe:letters:default_cdo:aid:2025529:jewish:How-to-Become-a-Baal-Teshuvah.htm 

[290] Gittin 43a

[291] Rav Poalim 4:2

[292] Yevamos 114a

[293] Admur 343:5

[294] Mishneh Berura 343:4

[295] Yevamos ibid

[296] See Beis Yosef 343; Bach 343

[297] See Admur 343:3; M”A beginning of 343