Chapter 6: Listening to one’s parents & Obeying their wishes

1. Listening to the instructions and commands of one’s parent and the limitations to the requests that they can make:[1]

*Important note: The below law focuses only on the obligations that the child has towards his parents and as to which instructions he is required to listen to. However, as explained in chapter 9 it is forbidden for a parent to overburden his children with demands and requests, which is defined as any matter which one assesses the child may choose not to adhere to due to its difficulty and the like and a parent who makes such a request transgresses the prohibition of Lifnei Iver. Hence, although the below laws give the parent certain request rights from their children, it is not to be abused, and is only to be requested on a case-by-case basis after assessing the child’s willingness to follow it.

Matters that relate to the father and mother and give them direct benefit:[2] According to all opinions, a son and daughter are obligated to obey the requests and instructions of their parents regarding matters that give the parent direct benefit.[3] [Thus, if one’s father or mother asks their child to bring them a cup of water, the child is obligated to obey the request. Likewise, if the parent request from the son that he visit them or call, then he is obligated to do so.[4] This obligation applies even if the requested matter is not befitting for the parent, such as an elderly woman who asks for expensive jewelry.[5] Furthermore, even if one’s parent does not explicitly ask for a certain matter but the child knows that this is his parents’ wishes, then it is a mitzvah to obey  their wishes.[6]]

Matters that do not relate to the father or mother and do not give them direct benefit:[7] Some Poskim[8] rule that one is only obligated to listen to his parents’ requests and instructions if the parent will receive some direct benefit from it. However, if the parent will not receive any direct benefit from his wishes being fulfilled, then the child is not obligated to listen to him even regarding mundane matters and certainly regarding matters of religion. Listening to one’s parents in such a case is not included in the command of honoring or fearing one’s parents. Likewise, it does not transgress causing pain to one’s parent, as it is the parent who is causing his own pain by making requests of the child that he is not obligated to follow.[9] Other Poskim[10], however, rule that it is forbidden[11] for a child to disobey his parents instructions due to the obligation he has to fear his parent, and hence a child is required to listen and obey the wishes and instructions of his parent even if the parent receives no direct benefit and the matter relates solely to the child.[12] This, however, only applies in the presence of the parent or if the parent will eventually become aware that one did not listen to his instructions [and only applies if the matter does not involve a monetary loss, or great discomfort, as explained next]. However, when not in the presence of the parent and in a way that the parents will not find out about it, the child may choose not to adhere to his parents instructions in a case of difficulty or pain, even according to the above stringent opinion.[13] Certainly, from the letter of the law one is not obligated to listen to his parents instructions after their death.[14] [However, if there is no difficulty or pain involved then according to the stringent opinion he is to listen to his parents even when not in their presence and even if they will never find out about it, and even after their death.[15]] Likewise, it only applies to those matters in which there is a reason behind the request. However, if the parent instructs the child to do something simply in order to control the child, then according to all opinions one is not obligated to listen to his parents.[16] Likewise, it only applies if the parent gives a clear instruction to the child. However, if it is a mere suggestion and recommendation then according to all opinions the child is not obligated to listen to his father.[17] certainly, if the parent made no mention of the matter then the child has no obligation to abide by the wishes of his parents even if he knows what their opinion really is.[18] Practically, even according to the first opinion and even in those cases that one is exempt according to all opinions, a child who obeys his parent’s wishes even when not obligated, fulfills the command of honoring his parents and is doing a great Mitzvah in doing so.[19]

Matters that involve monetary loss:[20] According to all opinions, one is not required to listen to the instructions of his parents if doing so will cause him a monetary loss, such as if his parents instructed him to use his money for a purpose which he does not wish to spend the money on. Even if one’s father or mother instructed the child to make a payment on their behalf, such as to make an order for them, or to donate money to an individual or to a cause in their honor, the child is not required to listen to these instructions. This, however, only applies to a loss of money or property that one already has, however, if the instruction will merely cause a loss of profit, then the matter is subject to the debate above. [Some Poskim[21] rule that the above exemption of listening to one’s parents regarding matters that will cause him monetary loss only apply when the son is responsible for earning his own money. If, however, the son received his money from his parents, then the parents have the right to dictate to the son what the money should be used for, and he must listen to their instructions even if it will cause him a monetary loss. Thus, if a parent instructed a child in a will regarding what to do with the inheritance money that they received after the parents’ death, then the child must adhere to his parents’ instructions.[22]]

Matters that involve great sacrifice and lifetime changes on the side of the child:[23] According to all opinions, one is not required to listen to the instructions of his parents if the matter will entail a great sacrifice on the side of the child [and will have long-lasting affects, such as regarding where to live and whom to marry and what job to take[24]], then the child is not obligated to listen to the instructions of his parents.[25]

Matters that involve the public honor of the parent or may bring them shame: If a request is made by the parent from which the parents will derive an honor in the eyes of the public if it is listened to, then perhaps according to all opinions the child is obligated to adhere to their parents request.[26] However, some Poskim[27] are lenient even in such a case. However, if the matter that they’re requesting will bring the parents to shame if it is not adhered to, then according to all opinions one must adhere to their instructions and on this the Torah instructs us that one who shames his parents is cursed.[28]

Matters that will shame the child:[29] According to all opinions, a child is not obligated to listen to the instructions of his parents if doing so will bring him public shame. [Thus, if one’s parent instructs his child to do something outside that will shame and embarrass him to the onlookers, then he is not obligated to listen to his parents.]

Matters that relate to religious observance: See Halacha 2 where this matter is dealt with extensively.

To decline in a respectful manner:[30] Even in those cases that a child is not obligated to obey the instructions of his parents, nevertheless, in light of the prohibition to contradict a statement of one’s parents, it is most certainly also forbidden for one to disobey their instructions in a rude manner, such as to rudely answer them back that he does not feel like doing it, or to completely ignore their instructions.

Examples of matters which are under the above debate of whether one is required to listen to his parents:[31]

1. One’s parent instructed him not to drink coffee being that it’s damaging to self
2. One’s parent instructed him not to smoke cigarettes.
3. One’s parent instructed him to put on a sweater or coat outside being that it is cold.
4. One’s parent instructed him not to guarantee a loan for another person.[32]
5. One’s parent instructed him not to invest in a certain business. [However, if not entering the business will cause one to lose the money that he has, and not just a potential loss of profit, then according to all opinions he is not obligated to listen to his parents’ instructions.[33]]
6. One’s parent instructed him not to enter into politics or to accept upon himself a public position. [This applies even if the position involves the performance of a mitzvah such as to become a fundraiser for a charity or Torah institution.[34] This, however, only applies if there are other people who can do as good of a job as he in the public position. If, however, he would be the best fit for the job, then according to all opinions he does not have to listen to his parents in this matter, being that it is as if they are asking him to abstain from doing a mitzvah which cannot be done by others.[35]]
7. One’s parent instructed him to dress a certain way or to avoid certain forms of dress. [However, if the forms of dress that the parents request are in order to give them honor and not cause them to be shamed in public by the way their child dresses, then even according to the lenient opinion above one should be stringent.[36] This however is with exemption to matters of dress that relate to religious observance such as a beard, yarmulke, Tzitzis, white shirt, hat and jacket, and the like.[37]]
8. One’s parent instructed him to attend a certain event in their honor. [If attending the event will give public honor to the parent, then perhaps according to all opinions the child is obligated to adhere to their parents request.[38] However, some Poskim[39] are lenient even in such a case.]
9. One’s parents instructed him to go to sleep earlier than his usual bedtime. [If, however, the parent request from the child to go to sleep earlier than most people go to sleep without any real reason, then according to all opinions he is not obligated to listen to his parents.[40]]

 

Summary: One is only obligated to adhere to his parents’ requests and instructions in the following cases: 1. The parent will receive direct benefit from the request being followed and the request will does not contradict Torah law. 2. The parent will not receive direct benefit from the request being followed but it will give them great shame if it is not adhered to. 3. According to some opinions, one is always to adhere to the requests of his parents even if they do not receive direct benefit from it, if there is good reason behind the instruction, and the matter will not bring shame to the child, and it will not cause the child monetary loss or a great sacrifice with long-term effects. Other opinions hold that there is no obligation to adhere to his parents’ requests even in such a case if they do not receive direct benefit from the request being followed, and so is the ruling of Admur. One is not obligated to adhere to his parents’ requests and instructions in the following cases: 1. The request will bring great shame to the child. 2. The request will cause the child monetary loss. 3. The request will require a great sacrifice on the side of the child and have everlasting effects. According to some opinions there is no obligation to adhere to his parents’ requests if they do not receive direct benefit from the request being followed, and so is the ruling of Admur.   Q&A Is a child obligated to listen to the instructions of a parent who is insane?[41] No, with the exception to matters relating to their general health and well-being. May one distance himself from his parents if they request from him things that are not befitting for them?[42] Yes.

 

2. Parent instructs a child to transgress Torah?[43]

If one’s father instructed him to transgress words of Torah, he may not listen to him.[44] This applies whether it is a positive or negative command. This applies even by rabbinical command.[45] [This applies even if the parent will receive direct benefit from the transgression. Thus, if one’s parent asks one to do something on his behalf which will end up causing him to nullify an obligatory mitzvah that cannot be done by another, then he is not required to listen to him, and he is rather to fulfill the mitzvah, as explained in Chapter 5 Halacha 19.[46] Furthermore, even by a non-obligatory Mitzvah, if one’s parent asks one to do something on his behalf with the sole intent to nullify him from doing a mitzvah, then he is not required to listen to him, and he is rather to fulfill the mitzvah.[47] If, however, ones parents asks of him not to do a certain Mitzvah due to other reasons, then if the Mitzvah is not an active obligation at all for him to perform, such as they asked him not to work in collecting charity for distribution, then some Poskim[48] rule that he should listen to them. Likewise, if the mitzvah can be performed by another, then one is to listen to his parents as explained in Chapter 5 Halacha 19.[49]]

Father instructs his son not to say Kaddish for his mother:[50] The father may not protest his son from saying Kaddish on behalf of his mother.[51]

Q&A If one’s parents instruct their child not to fulfill a certain custom or stringency, must he listen to them?[52] A child is not obligated to listen to his parents who ask of him not to fulfill a certain custom or stringency even if it is not required to be practiced from the letter of the law [and accordingly, parents should not get involved in these matters and instruct their children things that the child is permitted to make his own decision on[53]]. Some Poskim[54] rule that this applies even by a matter which is a mere Hiddur Mitzvah. Certainly, the son is not obligated to listen to his parents to be lenient in matters in which there are authorities who hold it to be forbidden, even though practically we do not rule this way. Customs-Minhag Yisrael:[55] Likewise, a custom which is accepted amongst the Jewish people is to be respected and followed even if the parent asks of him to be lenient in it. A baseless custom or stringency:[56] The above lack of obligation to listen to the parents’ wishes only applies if the custom or stringency has a certain root in Halacha and is not just a personal preference that is not recorded by the Poskim. However, even regarding customs and stringencies of mere preference, one is only required to listen to his parents regarding those matters in which the parent will receive direct benefit from the son abstaining from fulfilling the stringency. However, if the parent will not receive any direct benefit from his wishes being fulfilled, then the child is not obligated to listen to him even regarding mundane matters and certainly regarding matters of religion.[57] However, some Poskim[58] rule that if being stringent in this matter will cause great pain or shame to the parent, then one is to abstain from his non-required custom even if the parent will not this receive direct benefit from it. However, even by a non-obligatory Mitzvahs and stringencies, if the request of the parent is for the sole intent to nullify him from doing a mitzvah, then he is not required to listen to him, and he is rather to fulfill the mitzvah.[59] Hataras Nedarim: In the event that a child chooses to compromise on a custom or stringency for the sake of his parents, due to his parents’ wishes, then he is to perform Hataras Nedarim prior to breaking his custom.[60] If, however, one only plans to compromise on the custom on a temporary basis due to the circumstances with his parents, and then plans to return to keeping the custom, then one is not required to perform Hataras Nedarim.[61] Nonetheless, if it is easily attainable than one should perform Hataras Nedarim even in such a case.[62] Examples of Halachic stringency’s that one may follow even against his parents’ wishes: 1. To Daven a Nussach of prayer of his choosing. One is not required to listen to his parents who ask him to change his Nussach of Davening.[63] 2. Not to carry on Shabbos even in an area with a Kosher Eruv. One is not required to listen to his parents in this regard if they ask him to carry.[64] However, one is required to do so in order to relieve his parents from carrying a heavy burden.[65] 3. Not to use electricity in Israel over Shabbos, and to only use a generator. One is not required to listen to his parents in this regard if they ask him to use the regular city electricity over Shabbos.[66] 4. Not to shave or trim the beard with a machine or scissors.[67] One is not required to listen to his parents in this regard even if they ask him to trim or shave his beard so he looks upkept and not embarrass them.[68] 5. Not to grow long hair. One is not required to listen to his parents in this regard even if they ask him to grow out is hair long so he can make a ponytail and the like.[69] 6. To eat products which follow leniencies in the laws of Kashrus such as Chalav Yisrael and Pas Yisrael. One is not required to listen to his parents if they ask him to eat Chalav Akum products or Pas Akum products. 7. To be particular to eat only Yashan flour products. One is not required to listen to his parents if they ask him to eat Chadash products.[70] 8. To not eat certain products of a Hashgacha which has lenient policies, or Kashrus mishaps. One is not required to listen to his parents if they ask him to be lenient to eat such products. [However, if there is no known issue or no known leniencies with the particular Hashgacha, and it is generally relied upon by G-d-fearing Jews, then he should listen to his parents if they ask him to eat from it.[71]] 9. Tevilas Ezra. One is not required to listen to his parents if they ask him to be lenient to not immerse in the Mikveh.[72]    Examples of stringencies that one may drop due to his parents’ wishes: 1. Long Peiyos. If one’s parents do not want him to have long Peiyos, then one may let go of his custom for their sake.[73] 2. Tevilos of Tosefes Kedusha [non-Tevilas Ezra]. If one’s parents do not want him to immerse in the mikvah daily for non-Keri purposes, then one may let go of his custom for their sake.[74] 3. Fasts, as explained in Q&A below.   May a child fast for purposes of penitence against his parents’ wishes?[75] No. May a parent protest against his child for making Aliyah to Israel?[76] No. A child is not obligated to obey his parents in this matter. See Halacha 4!   Must one listen to his parent if he does not want him to be a Sandek for a Bris?[77] No, as it is a mitzvah to do so, and his parents cannot protest Mitzvah’s. If one would like to make the Bris of his son in the morning and his parents want him to delay it to the afternoon so they can travel to the Bris, must one listen to his parents? Some Poskim[78] rule that one is not required to adhere to his parents request in such a case, as it is a mitzvah to perform the circumcision as soon as possible. However, other Poskim[79] rule that it is to be delayed in such a case to fulfill the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents. If one’s father or mother asks him not to wear a Tallis Katan, must he listen to him?[80] No, the child is not required to listen to his parent in this matter. May an Avel during Shiva leave his home, and visit his father, or mother, or other relative, in order to hide the Aveilus from them?[81] If not doing so can jeopardize the health of the relative, then it is permitted to do so.

3. Traveling from Eretz Yisrael for the sake of one’s parents:[82]

Although in general it is forbidden for a resident of Eretz Yisrael to leave Eretz Yisrael[83], it is permitted for one to leave Eretz Yisrael for the sake of visiting his parents or caring for his parents.[84] [This applies even to a Kohen.[85] It goes without saying that if one’s parents are traveling from Eretz Yisrael for a certain medical or financial need, then it is permitted for one to travel from Eretz Yisrael together with one’s parents in order to escort them and assist them in their journey. However, one may not leave Israel for the sake of meeting the body of a parent which is on its way for burial in Israel.[86]]

Moving to the Diaspora for the sake of one’s parents: Some Poskim[87] rule that it is only permitted for one to temporarily leave Eretz Yisrael for the sake of visiting and caring for his parents, however, he may not do so for permanent basis. Other Poskim[88], however, rule that it is permitted to move to the diaspora even permanently for the sake of caring for one’s parents.

4. Making Aliyah to Israel while leaving one’s parents in the Diaspora:[89]

If one desires to permanently move to Eretz Yisrael, and his parents do not want him to do so, then some Poskim[90] rule that he is not required to listen to his parents and may go ahead and move to Israel. Certainly, one may move to Israel if his parents do not voice any protest. Other Poskim[91], however, rule to the contrary that one may not leave his parents alone in the Diaspora even for the sake of moving to Israel, and even if they do not protest his move. Practically, if one’s parents need the son to stay with them in order to care for them, then he should not move.[92]

5. Health Hazards-Must one listen to his father if he asks him to feed him a food or beverage that is against the doctor’s orders due to a health condition?[93]

A child is not obligated to listen to his father regarding a matter that is damaging to his health. This applies even if the father threatens not to forgive his son, not in this world or the next world if he does not comply with his wishes. [This applies even if the matter is not lethally dangerous for the parent but are simply damaging to his general health.[94] Some Poskim[95], however, rule that this only applies if the matter is possibly lethally dangerous for the parent. If, however, it is not lethally dangerous then the child must obey his father’s instructions even though the matter he is asking for is unhealthy for the father. Furthermore, the above allowance for the son to disobey his parent only applies if the doctor gave a personal directive to the parent to avoid the matter based on their medical history and condition. If, however, the doctors did not personally instruct the parent against it, then the son must apply to his parents’ wishes even if it is contrary to general health directives for the public.[96] Thus, if one parent asks from his son to place sugar within his coffee, the son may not refuse to do so on the basis that sugar is not healthy for the body absent of a specific doctor’s orders for his parent.]

6. Enemies of parent-Parent instructs child not to befriend a person:[97]

If one’s father instructed his son not to talk with a certain individual, and to not forgive him, until the arrival of a certain date, then if the son desires to make peace with the individual right away, he may do so and ignore his father’s request.[98] [Thus, it goes without saying that a son may not continue or assist in a heated dispute that his father has with an individual even if his father instructs him to do so, and even if it appears to him that his father is in the right. On the contrary, he should try to make peace between the parties, as aside for the great mitzvah of making peace, perhaps his father is truthfully in the wrong and is simply blindsided.[99] Nonetheless, the son should not openly befriend the enemy of his father if this will cause the father to become upset.[100] Some Poskim[101]  write that the above prohibition only applies in the case that the reason for the fathers instructions is due to hate, and indeed the son will come to hate the individual. If, however, the father’s instructions will not lead to the son hating the individual and was not given an order so he hate the individual, then it is permitted for the son to follow the instructions. Thus, if a father instructs his son not to talk to an individual due to the bad influence that he will have on him, then his son is to obey his instructions.]

Father instructs his son not to say Kaddish for his mother:[102] The father may not protest his son from saying Kaddish on behalf of his mother.[103]

Father instructs son not to learn Torah from a certain Rabbi:[104] If a person would like to learn Torah from a certain Rabbi and his father tells him not to learn Torah from him due to a certain dispute that he has with that Rabbi, then one should not listen to his father as it is as if his father is telling him to stop learning Torah.

Not to befriend a person who belittled and shamed his parent:[105] One is to distance himself from people who speak against his parents or belittle them, and he should therefore avoid speaking with them. [Accordingly, although it is forbidden for one to hate an individual who is in a fight with his father even if his father instructs him too, nonetheless, this only applies if the father himself is not allowed to hate  the individual. However, if the father himself is permitted to hate the individual due to his actions, such as if the individual belittled or shamed the father[106], then it is  likewise permitted for the son to hate him. This especially applies if the person caused one’s parent so much pain that it caused the parent to get sick and shorten his life. In such a case it is a mitzvah for the son to hate such an individual due to the command of respecting one’s parent.[107]]

7. Informing on one’s mother to one’s father:[108]

One may not inform against one’s mother to one’s father if one knows that the father will get upset at his mother. For example, if the son did something at the behest of his mother and is now being questioned by the father as to why he did so, then he should not tell his father that his mother told him to do so if he knows that his father will get upset with her.

8. Choosing a Yeshiva for learning-Who gets to decide the father or son?[109]

If a student desires to go to a certain institution of Torah study in which he believes he will [possibly] see more in his learning from the specific rabbi that is there, then he may go there even if his father protests this due to worry that the many Gentile idol worshipers who live there may harm him. The son is not obligated to obey his father’s requests in this matter.[110] [This applies even if not obeying his father will cause the father much pain.[111] This applies even if a Yeshiva is available in his current city, but he feels he will be more successful in the other Yeshiva.[112] This applies even if the son is not certain that he will be more successful in his learning in the Yeshiva of his choice, although believes that there is a chance that this will occur.[113] If, however, the son will see equal success in the yeshivas of either town, then he should remain in his hometown in order so he can care for his parents.[114]]

Father instructs son not to learn Torah from a certain Rabbi:[115] If a person would like to learn Torah from a certain Rabbi and his father tells him not to learn Torah from him due to a certain dispute that he has with that Rabbi, then one should not listen to his father as it is as if his father is telling him to stop learning Torah.

Studying Chassidus and Kabbalah:[116] If one’s parent forbids one from learning the inner dimensions of the Torah, one is not obligated to listen to the parent in this regard. Nevertheless, as with all matters, this disobeying of one’s parents’ wishes should only be done in a respectful and peaceful manner and tone. Leaving Yeshiva in order to help one’s father in his business:[117] One is not obligated to leave his learning in Yeshiva to help one’s father in his business, and on the contrary, the continued Torah study of the son will help the father in his Parnasa.

9. Choosing a Shul to Daven-Who gets to decide the father or son?[118]

If a son desires to go to a certain Shul to Daven because they Daven with greater concentration [or because they are more G-d-fearing[119]], then he may go there even if his mother [or father] protests this. The son is not obligated to obey his mother’s [or father’s] requests in this matter. [Nevertheless, as with all matters, this disobeying of one’s parents’ wishes should only be done in a respectful and peaceful manner and tone.[120]]

10. Choosing a spouse-Can a parent instruct who one’s son or daughter can marry?[121]

If a father protests to his son against the woman who his son desires to marry, then his son is not obligated to obey his father’s requests in this matter [and he may marry her if he wishes].[122] [Likewise, a parent cannot instruct their child to marry a certain woman who they desire to have as a daughter in law.[123] The same applies regarding a daughter, that if a father protests to his daughter against the man who his daughter desires to marry, then his daughter is not obligated to obey her father’s requests in this matter.[124] This applies even if the parent has a valid reason for opposing the Shidduch.[125] This applies even if the protest is due to that the parents want the child to live next to them, and entering such a marriage would require them to live far away.[126] The above, however, only applies if the child desires to marry a person who is proper for them, and for their family stature, and nonetheless the parents protest the match due to some other side reason. However, if the parents’ misgivings are due to real concerns of the quality of the match and that it may be detrimental to the child, then some Poskim[127] rule that the child is obligated to listen to his parents. This especially applies if such a marriage will cause the father shame.[128] Likewise, if the parent suspect that the potential spouse may cause grievances and pain to the parents, then some Poskim[129] rule that they are to be listened to. Likewise, if the parent is against the Shidduch due to Halachic reasons which the child is not concerned about, such as a restriction of Rav Yehuda Hachasid, then some Poskim[130] rule that they are to be listened to. Practically, in all cases that the parents voice concern and objection to a prospective match for their child, the child is to consider the matter and consult with a Rav or other suitable individual for direction.[131]]

Parent asks child to divorce spouse:[132] If a parent requests of their son to divorce his wife he is not obligated to listen to them.[133] If however, the wife is evil and causes pain to her husband and his parents, then it is a mitzvah to listen to their request and divorce her. Likewise, if the wife desires a divorce and the parents asked the son to give her a divorce in or to avoid a fight, then some rule that it is a mitzvah to listen to them.[134]

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[1] See Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:64-66 and Miluim 10 p. 639; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Kibud Av Vaeim Vol. 26 p. 385-388; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Morah Av Vaeim Vol. 42 p. 592-594

[2] All Poskim incoming footnotes; Menoras Hamaor Elenkava 4:18; Chareidim 16 Asei 5-1; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 385 footnotes 209-212

[3] The reason: Some Poskim rule that this is due to the obligation to honor one’s parent, as part of honoring them is to provide them with their requests of matters that give them direct benefit as well as that listening to their instructions gives them benefit. [Mizrachi Vayikra 19:3; Rishon Letziyon 240; Maharsha Kiddushin 34a; Implication of Chavos Yair 214 and Chaim Sheol 5; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 1:68 due to both Kavod and Mora; Yad Eliyahu 1:40] Other Poskim, however rule that this is due to the obligation to fear one’s parent, from which we learn that there is a prohibition against contradicting their word. [Maharal in Gur Aryeh Kedoshim 19:3; Ralbag Vayikra 19:3; Kneses Yechezkal 35; Hamakneh Kiddushin 31b; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 1:68 due to both Kavod and Mora; Emek Sheila C.M. 6; Chazon Ish Y.D. 149:8; Minchas Elazar 2:63; Dibros Moshe Kiddushin 50 footnote 14]

The scriptural source: The verse in Mishleiy 23:22 states “Shema Leavicha Zeh Yiladetecha/listen to your father who has born you” and states [Mishleiy 1:9] “Shema Bini Mussar Avicha/listen my son to the chastising of your father.”

[4] Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid footnote 551

[5] Rameh Kiddushin 31b

[6] See Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Morah Av Vaeim Vol. 42 p. 594

[7] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 386-387; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:64-66 and Miluim 10 p. 639

[8] Implication of Rama 240:25 that the son is not obligated to obey his father’s requests regarding who he should marry [as understands Gr”a; however, see Derisha 240; 3^rd reason in Maharik Shoresh 166 and 2^nd reason in Darkei Moshe 240:10 [that the reason for this is because the parent does not receive any direct benefit from this request, as only in relation to matters which give direct benefit to a parent may the parent instruct his child to perform]; Igros Admur Hazakein 81 [printed in Shut Admur Hazakein 75 with many enlightening Biurim, in which he defends the rights of the son to daven the Nussach of his choice despite his parents protests based on the ruling of the Maharik ibid and that so is implied from Kiddushin 31b and the Shulchan Aruch and Yerushalmi 1:7 that one is only obligated to serve the parent, and listen to the parent in matters relating to his service, and not to other matters, and that so is proven from Shita Mekubetzes Bava Metzia 32a, Chidushei Harashba, Ritva, Tosafus Shantz Kiddushin 31a, Tosafus Yevamos 6a]; Maharam Melublin 136; Rashba Yevamos 6a in name of Rabbeinu Chananel; Ramban Yevamos ibid; Ritva Yevamos 6a and Bava Metzia 32a; Michtam Ledavid Y.D. 33; Meshivas Nafesh 1:16; Tirosh Viyitzhar 72; Maharshag O.C. 52:7; Torah Lishma 280; Divrei Yatziv Y.D. 125; Betzel Hachochmah 2:55; Poskim in Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 218-229

[9] Meshivas Nafesh ibid

[10] Implication of Teurmos Hadeshen 40 [regarding that a son may choose his own Yeshiva due to the mitzvah of Torah study, and no mention is made that this is a matter not relevant to the parent]; Ritva ibid in name of Rashi; Levush 240; Ralbag Vayikra 19:3; Maharal in Gur Aryeh Kedoshim 19:3; Mishneh Lemelech Gezeila Veaveida 11:19; Pnei Yehoshua Kiddushin 32a; Minchas Chinuch Mitzvah 539:3;  Kneses Yechezkal 35; Chavos Yair 214; Biur Hagr”a 240:36; Chaim Sheol 5; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 1:68; Hamakneh Kiddushin 31b; Panim Yafos Vayikra 19; Yad Eliyahu 1:40; Emek Sheila C.M. 6; Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15:19; Riy Perlow on Rasag Asei 9; rugas Habosem O.C. 19; Maharsham 1:101; 2:224-13; Minchas Elazar 2:63; Imrei Yosher 2:165; Chazon Ish Y.D. 149:8; Igros Moshe in Teshuvos of his brother 1:3; Koveitz Teshuvos 1:12 of Rav Elyashiv; Shevet Halevi 10:156; Kaneh Bosem 2:91; Chut Shani 240:2; Sefer Ateres Melech p. 91; See Tehila Ledavid Y.D. 95; Implication of all the following Poskim who explained the allowance for a son to marry a woman of his choice against his parents’ wishes is because this would be considered as if the father is telling his child to go against Torah, and not due to the reason of the Maharik brought above [See Levush 240; Derisha 240:4; Maharsham Y.D. 95; Avnei Tzedek Y.D. 99; Aruch Hashulchan 240:45]; Poskim in Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 230-246; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Morah Av Vaeim Vol. 42 p. 594 footnote 324-325

[11] Some Poskim rule that even according to this opinion this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Agudas Eizov ibid; Amudei Arazim on Yireim; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 242]

[12] The reason: As it is forbidden for a child to contradict the statements of his father or mother due to the obligation to fear one’s father and mother, and hence certainly he may not disobey their commands. [Ralbag ibid; Hamakneh ibid; Rav Akiva Eiger ibid; Kneses Yechezkal ibid; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote ] Alternatively, as a person receives more pleasure when his wishes are obeyed even more than being fed or given to drink, and hence it is included within the command of honoring one’s parents. [Rav Akiva Eiger ibid] Likewise, just as we are commanded to obey G-d’s command so too one is commanded to obey his parents’ commands. [Riy Perlow ibid] As for the opinion of the Rama and Maharik ibid who allow the child to marry a woman of his choice even against his parents’ wishes, there are three reasons recorded by the Maharik behind this ruling and it is only with the joint of all three reasons that he was lenient, and it is for this reason that the Rama did not record any reason behind the ruling. [Yad Eliyahu ibid; Sefer Ha?mkneh ibid; Arugas Habosem ibid; Chazon Ish ibid]

[13] Shut Rav Akiva Eiger Kama 68; Shevet Halevi 10:156; Sefer Yosher Hori 7:18 in name of Rav Elyashiv; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:65

[14] Shvus Yaakov 1:168

[15] Shut Rav Akiva Eiger Kama 68; Maharsham 2:224-15; Minchas Elazar 2:63; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:65

The reason: As the obligation to listen to his parents’ instructions is due to the obligation of fearing them, which is an offshoot of the prohibition against contradicting their word, of which some Poskim rule that one is required to be stringent even when not in front of them. Furthermore, even according to the main opinion [Taz 240:3] which permits one to contradict their word when not in their presence, listening to their instructions is of greater severity. [Rav Akiva Eiger ibid]

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this matter is purely dependent on the dispute regarding if one may contradict his parents when not in their presence and the main opinion is that it is permitted to do so. [Emek Sheila C.M. 6]

[16] See Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15:19; Chut Shani 240:2; Yosher Horai; Divrei Yoel 105:2; Shevet Halevi 10:156

[17] Chazon Ish Y.D. 149:8

[18] Kneses Hagedola 240:29 in name of Maharshach 1:136; Marachei Leiv 2 Derush 73; Shoel Vinishal 3:307

[19] Meshivas Nafesh 1:16; Birchas Shmuel Yevamos 3; Sefer Yismach Moshe Toldos; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 387 footnote 229

[20] Michaber 240:5; Admur C.M. Mechira Halacha 7 “Mitzvas Kibbud Av Eino Ela Bemamon Shel Av”; Kiddushin 32a, as instructed Rabanon to Rebbe Yirmiyah; Rambam Mamrim 6:3; Sheilasos Rav Achaiy Parshas Yisro Sheila’s 56; Tosafus Kiddushin ibid in name of Sheilasos ibid and Riy and Rabbeinu Chanel; Rif Kiddushin 13b; Rosh Kiddushin 1:50; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:18-23; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Kibud Av Vaeim Vol. 26 p. 406 footnote 480-482

[21] Maharsham 2:224-16; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 3:275; See Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid footnote 594

[22] Maharsham ibid

[23] Maharik Shoresh 166 in first reason; Sefer Darkei Hayam p. 146 that this applies according to all opinions; Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15:15; Chazon Ish Y.D. 149:8; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 3:27; Koveitz Hayashar Vehatov 13:31 article of Rav Shpurn; See Beis Meir 239:8; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:66 footnote 562-563

[24] See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 3:27; Koveitz Hayashar Vehatov 13:31 article of Rav Shpurn; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:66 footnote 563

[25] The reason: As the obligation to listen to his parents instructions is only in a case that it will not cause the child a monetary loss, as stated above, and something that will cause the child great everlasting distress is no less of significance than monetary loss for which the child is exempt. [Poskim ibid; See Pesakim Uteshuvos 240 footnote 562 for how he resolves the seeming contradictions to this point]

[26] Maharsham 2:224-16; Betzel Hachochmah 2:55; Implication of wording of Maharik ibid and other Poskim ibid

[27] Maharam Melublin ibid

[28] Meishiv Davar 2:50; Arugas Habosem O.C. 19

[29] Torah Lishma 270 based on Mishneh Kesubos 71b

[30] Igros Kodesh Rayatz 13:505 “Honoring one’s parents is dependent to a certain degree also on the form of speech and therefore when speaking with one’s parents it must be in a very gentle manner and with true Derech Eretz, even if one’s final response to them must be an emphatic no [for a request they make which one is not obligated to listen to]”; Igros Kodesh 13:205;  Chut Shani 240:4; Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid

[31] Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:64

[32] See Shelah Shaar Haosiyos Derech Vatranus 10 that he testifies of himself that he was instructed by his father not to guarantee a loan for any of the person, and that he must listen to these instructions

[33] Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid footnote 549

[34] Chaim Sheol 5; Mishkanos Haroim Mareches Gimel 11

[35] Shoel Vnishal 4 Y.D. 69; Kinyan Torah 5:100; Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid footnote 595

[36] Maharsham 2:224-16; Meishiv Davar 2:50; Arugas Habosem O.C. 19; Betzel Hachochmah 2:55.

[37] See Igros Admur Hazakein 81; Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15; Meshivas Nafesh Y.D. 16; Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid and 240:64

[38] Maharsham 2:224-16; Betzel Hachochmah 2:55; Implication of wording of Maharik ibid and other Poskim ibid

[39] Maharam Melublin ibid

[40] Divrei Yoel 105:2

[41] Bach 240

[42] Rameh Kiddushin 31b; Yam Shel Shlomo Kiddushin ibid; Chacham Tzvi Tosafus Chadashim 20

[43] Michaber Y.D. 240:15; C.M. 266:5; Rambam Mamarim 6:12; Gezeila Veaveida 11:19; Mishneh Bava Metzia 32a; Yevamos 6a; Mechilta Rashbi Shemos 23:8; Toras Kohanim Vayikra 19; Bamidbar Raba 14:6; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:44-46 and Miluim p. 637-638; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Kibud Av Vaeim Vol. 26 p. 382-383 footnotes 240-246; 443; p. 430-439, 443 [regarding positive commands]; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Morah Av Vaeim Vol. 42 p. 568 footnote 76-81

[44] The reason: As everyone is obligated in the honor of G-d, including one’s parents, as is learned from the fact that after the verse commands one to fear one’s parents, it commands one to guard the Shabbos and then states that “I am G-d. ” This comes to teach us that although one must listen to his parents, this is limited to instructions which do not transgress G-d’s instructions. [Shach 240:17; Rambam ibid; Yevamos 6a; Bava Metzia ibid; See Rashi and Tosafos Yevamos ibid that this is learned from the words “and I am G-d”, however other Midrashim learn it from a Hekish to Shabbos; Rashi Vayikra 19 brings both approaches] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnotes 240-246 and 799-865

[45] Michaber ibid; Rambam ibid; See Kneses Yechezkal 35; Beir Heiytiv 254:3; Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:13; Encyclopedia p. 437 footnotes 872-877

[46] Michaber 240:12; Maharam Ben Chaviv 112; Meiah Shearim p. 270; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 434-435 footnote 850-853

[47] Piskei Riaz Kiddushin 1:8-10; Kneses Yechezkal 35; Ashel Avraham Butchach 89; Chaim Sheol 1:5; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 954

[48] See Chaim Sheol 1:5; Chavos Yair 214, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:23; However, see Kneses Yechezkal 35, Vetzaruch Iyun

[49] Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 443 footnote 952-953

[50] Rama 376:4; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Kiddushin 63; Hagahos Rabbeinu Peretz on Tashbeitz Katan 425, brought in Bies Yosef 403; Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:14; Mateh Efraim Dinei Kaddish Alef Lamateh 4; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:43 and Miluim pp. 637-638; See M”A 132:2; Chaim Sheol 1:5; Birkeiy Yosef 240:8; Betzel Hachochmah 5:15-8; Beir Moshe 1:60; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 421 footnote 664-674 and 878-879

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule the son is not allowed to say Kaddish for his mother if his father protests. [Rivash 115, brought in M”A 132:2; Poskim brought in Pnei Baruch 34 footnote 38; See Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:10-11 in name of Teshuvos Rav Akiva Eiger 68]

[51] The reason: As the father transgresses the Mitzvah of Veahavta Lereiacha Kamocha and it is considered as if he is telling the child to transgress a matter of the Torah of which he is not obligated to listen to him. Alternatively, it is because saying Kaddish after a parent is considered similar to a rabbinical obligation and hence one is not required to listen to his parent who tells him not to say it. [Rashal ibid, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:14; 376:5; See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid]

[52] Arugas Habosem O.C. 19; Mishnas Binyamin 52; Divrei Yatziv Y.D. 125:4; Beir Moshe 1:60; Peas Sadecha 1:111; Sefer Kibbud Horim 12 footnote 2 in name of Rav Elyashiv; Chut Shani 240:19; Igros Kodesh Rayatz 7:309;  Igros Kodesh 22:390, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:175; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 437 footnotes 878-879

Other opinions: Some Poskim imply that by a mere stringency, one is required to adhere to his parents’ wishes if they instruct him not to follow a certain stringency, and they receive direct benefit from their wishes being followed, as following a stringency does not defer listening to one’s parents which is a Torah command. [See Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:44 footnote 389; Avnei Tzedek E.H. 18; The following Poskim imply that by those matters which the father has personal benefit from, one must listen to his parents even by a stringency that has a basis in Torah: Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15; Meshivas Nafesh Y.D. 16; Halichos Shlomo Tefila 4 footnote 95]

[53] Igros Kodesh 22:390, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:175

[54] Avnei Yashpei 1:186 Anaf 2, based on the following Poskim who rule that one can choose to Daven in whatever shul he has more Kavana [Chamudei Daniel, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:22; Tirosh Veyitzhar 72; Aruch Hashulchan 240:45; Maharsham E.H. 95; Chaim Sheol 1:5]; Igros Kodesh Rayatz 7:309;

[55] Rashal Kiddushin 1:63 regarding Kaddish, and all Poskim who rule accordingly, brought above; Beir Moshe 1:60; Divrei Yatziv Y.D. 125:4; Yabia Omer 3 Y.D. 26:2; Chut Shani 240:19; Mishpitei Tzedek 83

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule the son is not allowed to say Kaddish for his mother if his father protests being that this is a custom that is not mentioned in the Talmud. [Chida in Birkeiy Yosef 240:8 and Chaim Sheol 1:5; Rivash 115, brought in M”A 132:2; Poskim brought in Pnei Baruch 34 footnote 38; See Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:10-11 in name of Teshuvos Rav Akiva Eiger 68] From here it can be understood that one is required to let go of a custom that does not have Talmudic basis for the sake of adhering to his parents’ wishes.

[56] Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:526; See regarding fasting: Sefer Chassidim 340; Beis Lechem Yehuda 240:8; Beir Moshe 1:60; See regarding Peiyos: Beir Moshe 1:60; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:529

Stringencies that are based on the teachings of Kabbalah and not Halacha: Some write that any stringency which does not of any root in Halacha but rather in the teachings of Kabbalah, is to be deferred in face of a request of one’s parents. [See Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:44 footnote 384] However, aside from the fact that from the ruling of many of the Poskim is implied that while one may choose to let go such a custom he is not obligated to do so, some Poskim explicitly write that one is never obligated to permanently let go of his even Kabbalistic custom due to his parents’ wishes, and is only to do so if the parents request it as a one-time thing. [Likkutei Teshuvos Minchas Yitzchak 105]

[57] Igros Admur Hazakein 81; Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15; Meshivas Nafesh Y.D. 16; Pesakim Uteshuvos ibid and 240:64

[58] Meishiv Davar 2:50; Chut Shani 240:19; Kinyan Torah 2:87 regarding Gebrochts

[59] Piskei Riaz Kiddushin 1:8-10; Kneses Yechezkal 35; Ashel Avraham Butchach 89; Chaim Sheol 1:5

[60] See Michaber Yoreh Deah 214:1; Admur 249:13; 161:8; 468:17; Alef Hamagen 581:102; Glosses of Rav Raskin on Siddur [Miluim 25]

[61] M”A 581:12; Elya Raba 240:20; Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Degul Merivava ibid and Yoreh Deah 214:1; Rama 568:2; 581:2 [regarding a Bris during Bahab or Aseres Yimei Teshuvah]; Mateh Efraim 581:38; Shaar Hatziyon 568:133 permits in time of need if one cannot find someone to be Matir the Neder; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 568:4

Other Opinion-Opinion of Michaber and Shach: Some Poskim rule that Hataras Nedarim is required even if an unexpected circumstance requires one to break his custom. [Shach Y.D. 214:2; Peri Chadash O.C. 470; Chayeh Adam 127:8;  M”B 581:19; The Michaber 214:1 rule regarding the Hiddur of fasting during Aseres Yimei Teshuvah, that even if one became weak, he is required to do Hataras Nedarim. The Shach 214:2 explains that the reason for this is because only those circumstances that are publicly known not to be included within the Hiddur, such as eating during a Bris Mila during Aseres Yimei Teshuvah, do not require Hataras Nedarim. However, an unexpected circumstance is included in the Hiddur and thus requires Hataras Nedarim. The Degul Merivava ibid argues against the Shach’s explanation and says the Michaber’s ibid ruling referred to a case that due to weakness the person wanted to revoke his custom forever, and for this everyone agrees that Hatarah is required.

[62] M”B 581:19 and Shaar Hatziyon 568:133 to suspect of the stringent opinion from above

[63] Igros Admur Hazakein 81 in length based on the fact that one is never obligated to listen to his parents when they do not receive direct benefit; Igros Kodesh Rayatz 7:256; Koveitz Teshuvos 1:12; Heichal Menachem 7; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 68:3

[64] Chut Shani 240:19

[65] Halichos Shlomo Tefila 4 footnote 95

[66] Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:44 footnote 385

[67] See Beir Heiytiv 181:5; Pischeiy Teshuvah 181:6

[68] Mishnas Binyamin 52; Divrei Yatziv Y.D. 125:4; Beir Moshe 1:60; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:529; Maaseh Ish 1:165; Sefer Hadarta Panim Zakein Chapter 15 p. 531 and 802; See Igros Kodesh Rayatz 7:309-310; 13:505; Igros Kodesh 5:35, brought in Shulchan Menachem 6:108; Igros Kodesh 22:390, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:175; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Hosafos Parshas Kedoshim; Toras Menachem 20^th Av p. 164; Minchas Yitzchak 1:64-13 and Likkutei Teshuvos Minchas Yitzchak 105; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:44 footnote 384 [Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on what he writes that regarding trimming one may be lenient to listen to his parents. This is contradicted by the sources above.]

[69] See Peas Sadecha 1:111 due to the prohibition of Bloris

[70] Meishiv Nefesh 1:16; Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15

[71] Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:44 footnote 387

[72] Arugas Habosem O.C. 19.

[73] Beir Moshe 1:60; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:529

[74] Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240 footnote 392

[75] Sefer Chassidim 340; Beis Lechem Yehuda 240:8; ; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 385 footnote 205; See Beir Moshe 1:60

[76] Ashel Avraham; Beis Yehuda Y.D. 1:54

[77] Kneses Yechezkal 35

[78] Avnei Yashpei 1:186 Anaf 2

[79] Kibbud Horim 12 footnote 17 in name of Rav Elyashiv; See Vayivarech Dovid 1:68

[80] Halichos Shlomo Tefila 3:3 in name of Rav SZ”A; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240: footnote 380

[81] See Shvus Yaakov 2:99 [permitted in all cases for father and mother due to Kibbud Av Vaeim]; Beis Lechem Yehuda [forbidden for Kibbud Av Vaeim]; Pischeiy Teshuvah 393:7; Nitei Gavriel 112:30; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 440 footnote 921

 [82] Rameh and Meiri and Hamakneh on Kiddushin 31b; Tashbeitz 3:288; Maharsha Chidushei Agados Kiddushin 31b; Minchas Chinuch Mitzvah 212; Pesakim Teshuvos 240:46; See Kiddushin 31b “Rav Assi had an elderly mother and would do whatever she asked. If she asked for jewelry, he would give her jewelry. When she asked for a husband, he replied that he would search for one on her behalf. When however, she asked for a husband like him, he realized that she lost her mind, and he therefore left her for Israel. When he heard that she was coming to see him in Israel he approached Rebbe Yochanon and asked him if he may leave Israel to the Diaspora? He replied that it is forbidden to leave Israel. So, he asked him if it is permitted to leave Israel in order to greet his mother? He replied that he does not know. After some time, Rav Assi asked Rebbe Yochanon a second time the same question, to which he replied that since he sees that he really wants to leave Israel, may God return him to Babylon in peace. Rav Assi approached Rebbe Elazar asked him if Rebbe Yochanon was angry with him and therefore answered him in this manner. Rebbe Elazar replied that since Rebbe Yochanon blessed him, he was therefore serious in his answer not angry. In the end, his mother passed away after he left Israel to greet her, and Rav Assi exclaimed that if he would have known he would have not left Israel.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 439 footnotes 494

[83] See Michaber O.C. 511:6; Y.D. 372:1; Rambam Melachim 5:9; Kesubos 11a; Avoda Zara 13a; Kiddushin 31b; M”B 511:14; Birkeiy Yosef 568; Peri Haretz E.H. 3:11; Shaareiy Teshuvah 568:20; Sdei Chemed Eretz Yisrael 37; Nitei Gavriel 90:4; Likkutei Sichos 15:202 footnote 15; 18:399; 25:151; Shulchan Menachem 7:147-148; Sichos Kodesh 5716 34, 2^nd day of Chag Shavuos p. 276; Sichas night of Gimel Tamuz p. 290; Igros Kodesh 18:404; Gilyon Kefar Chabad 93 p. 12; 86

[84] The reason: The reason behind all this is because it is permitted for one to leave Eretz Yisrael for the sake of fulfilling a mitzvah, and by visiting one’s parents and certainly by caring for them in the diaspora, one fulfills the Mitzvah of Kibbud Av Vaeim.

[85] Poskim in Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 906

[86] See Noda Beyehuda Tinyana E.H. 45; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Kibud Av Vaeim Vol. 26 footnote 1089-1095

[87] Meiri and Rameh ibid

[88] Tashbeitz ibid; Peas Hashulchan 2:8 in the opinion of Rashi; Beis Shlomo Y.D. 2:94

[89] Pesakim Teshuvos 240:46; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 446 footnote 981-992

[90] Maharam Merothenberg 28; 79; Mabit 1:139, brought in Shiyurei Kneses Hagedola 240:28; Peas Hashulchan 2:21; Mel Tzedakah 26; See Rashi end of Parshas Noach regarding Avraham; Maharsha Kesubos 111a; Mishpitei Aretz 11:5 leaves this matter in question; See Likkutei Sichos 39:298

[91] Beis Shlomo Y.D. 2:94 based on Rishonim who rule that the Mitzvah to live in Israel is not an obligation; Panim Yafos Bereishis 12; Binas Adam on Mishpitei Aretz 11:3; Bereishis Raba 39:7; See Pischeiy Teshuvah E.H. 75:6; Sefer Hamakneh Kiddushin 31b; Vayoel Moshe Mamar Yishuv Eretz Yisrael 81

[92] Pesakim Teshuvos ibid; See Sefer Nishmas Kol Chaiy 1:48; Maaseh Avraham Y.D. 43

[93] Sefer Chassidim 234; Beis Lechem Yehuda 240:8; Birkeiy Yosef 240:8-10; Mahariy Molko 113; Beir Moshe 6:160-9; Yalkut Yosef Kibbud Av Vaeim p. 385; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:14; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Kibud Av Vaeim Vol. 26 p. 385-386 footnote 214

[94] Leket Yosher 2:37; Maharam Ben Chaviv Kol Gadol 54; Kneses Hagedola 240:33; Beis Lechem Yehuda 240; Aruch Hashulchan 240:41; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 215

[95] See Birkeiy Yosef 240:8-10; Bris Olam of Sefer Chassidim ibid; Mahariy Molko 113; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 216

[96] Rav Elyashiv in Mivakshei Torah 20 p. 151; Yalkut Yosef Hilchos Kibbud Av Vaeim 7:16 in name of his father Rav Ovadia; Beir Moshe 1:60-10

[97] Michaber 240:16; Tur 240; Shut Rosh 15:5; Pesakim Ueteshuvos 240:47; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 439 footnotes893-897

[98] The reason: As it is forbidden to hate any Jew unless one witnessed him transgressing a prohibition, and hence this instruction of his father is similar to an instruction to transgress words of Torah. [Shach 240:18; Taz 240:16; Beir Hagoleh ibid; Shut Rosh ibid] Now, although there is no actual prohibition against hating a Jew if one simply stops speaking with them due to his father’s instruction and not do to an intrinsic hate, nonetheless, since the father’s intent is so the son hate him, therefore it is forbidden to be done. Alternatively, since the father himself transgresses the prohibition against hating a Jew by instructing his son as such, therefore the son is no longer obligated to listen to him. [Kneses Yechezkal 35; Shem Aryeh O.C. 1] See Pesakim Ueteshuvos 240:47 footnote 407

[99] Shemiras Halashon Shaar Hazechira 17

[100] Chesed Lealafim 240:12

[101] Sefas Emes 240; Pesakim Ueteshuvos 240:47

[102] Rama 376:4; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Kiddushin 63; Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:14

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule the son is not allowed to say Kaddish for his mother if his father protests. [Rivash 115, brought in M”A 132:2; Option brought in Birkeiy Yosef 240:8-10 being that saying Kaddish is not a Rabbinical Mitzvah but a custom; Poskim brought in Pnei Baruch 34 footnote 38; See Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:10-11 in name of Teshuvos Rav Akiva Eiger 68] Some Poskim suggest that possibly the son may choose to do whatever he wishes, and if he wishes to respect his father, he may stop saying Kaddish. [Option in Birkeiy Yosef 240:8-10]

[103] The reason: As the father transgresses the Mitzvah of Veahavta Lereiacha Kamocha. [Rashal ibid, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:14; 376:5]

[104] Maharam Mintz 15

[105] Birkeiy Yosef 334:7 in name of Mishpat Tzedek 3; Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:24 footnote 204

[106] See Admur C.M. Hilchos Ovrei Derachim Halacha 10 “Or his friend sinned against him and caused him a pain of the body in which case he is not required to remove the hatred from his heart and forgive him until he asks for forgiveness”; Admur O.C. 156:3 [implies allowance is only for Torah scholar]; 608:4; M”A O.C. 156:2; Yuma 23a; P”M O.C. 156 A”A 2; Imrei Yaakov Biurim on Admur C.M. ibid in great length

Monetary damage: If an individual caused one’s father monetary damage and loss and did not shame or belittle him, then if this was done for no reason then some Poskim rule that one may hate the person who did so. [P”M O.C. 156 A”A 2] However, from other Poskim it is evident that one may not hate a person who caused him monetary pain and it is only permitted if he shamed him and caused him pain of the body. [See Admur C.M. Hilchos Ovrei Derachim Halacha 10; Imrei Yaakov Biurim on Admur C.M. ibid in great length] See Shut Maharshag 2:53

[107] Minchas Elazar 4:13; Pesakim Ueteshuvos 240:47; See Pischeiy Teshuvah C.M. 426 in name of Tzemach Tzedek 111 regarding the mitzvah of Goel Hadam

[108] Sefer Chassidim 336; Beis Lechem Yehuda 240:9

[109] Michaber 240:25; Terumas Hadeshen  40; Igros Kodesh Rayatz 13:447 and 505; Igros Kodesh 28:279, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:176; See also Toras Menachem 1:131; Igros Kodesh 9:110; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Kibud Av Vaeim Vol. 26 p. 344-345 footnotes 960-974 and p. 443; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Morah Av Vaeim Vol. 42 p. 569 footnotes 82-90

[110] The reason: As so can be derived from our forefather Jacob who was not punished for all those years that he spent learning in the home of Shem and Eiver, even though he nullified the mitzvah of honoring his parents while he was there. [Shach 240:15; See Megillah 16b] Likewise, when a child is successful in his Torah learning this itself gives honor to his parents and is considered to fulfill the mitzvah of honoring and fearing one’s parents, and it is for this reason that this Halacha is recorded here in Hilchos Kibbud Av Vaeim and not in Hilchos Talmud Torah. [Likkutei Sichos 22:214 and Igros Kodesh 28:279, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:176]

[111] Terumos Hadeshen  ibid, brought in Darkei Moshe 240:3; See Hamakneh Kiddushin 31b; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 970

[112] Terumos Hadeshen  ibid; Tirosh Viyitzhar; Pnei Aaron Y.D. 11; See Eiruvin 47b that one does not merit to learn from everyone; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 968

[113] Chamudei Daniel, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:22

[114] Chazon Ish in Maaseh Ish 5:147; See also Mishneh Halachos 6:158

[115] Maharam Mintz 15; Leket Yosher 2:37; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 443 footnote 956

[116] Igros Kodesh 13:205, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:175

[117] Igros Kodesh 13:393 

[118] Chamudei Daniel, brought in Pischeiy Teshuvah 240:22; Tirosh Veyitzhar 72; Aruch Hashulchan 240:45; Maharsham E.H. 95; Chaim Sheol 1:5; Igros Kodesh 12:49, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:174; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 443 footnote 958

[119] Igros Kodesh 12:49, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:174

[120] Igros Kodesh 12:49, printed in Shulchan Menachem 4:174

[121]  Rama 240:25; Maharik Shoresh 166; See Igros Admur Hazakein 81 [Shut Admur Hazakein 75]; Igros Kodesh 9:110; See Pesakim Uteshuvos 240:64; 66; Encyclopedia Talmudit Erech Kibud Av Vaeim Vol. 26 p. 407 footnote 485-498; p. 437-438 footnotes 880-890

[122] The reason: The reason for this is because one is only obligated to honor his father and mother using the money of his parents. Accordingly, the child is also not obligated to do something against his will which will cause him pain, simply because of the request of his parents, if the parents do not receive any direct benefit from the request. [1^st reason in Maharik Shoresh 166] Alternatively, the reason is because such an instruction is considered to contradict Torah, as one is only to marry a woman whom he desires. [2^nd reason in Maharik Shoresh 166; 1^st reason in Darkei Moshe 240:10; Levush 240; Derisha 240:4; Maharsham Y.D. 95; Avnei Tzedek Y.D. 99; Aruch Hashulchan 240:45] Alternatively, since the parent does not receive any direct benefit from this request, he therefore does not contain the power to instruct his child regarding it, as it is not included within the Mitzvah of honoring or fearing ones parent, as only in relation to matters which give direct benefit to a parent may the parent instruct his child to perform. [3^rd reason in Maharik Shoresh 166; 2^nd reason in Darkei Moshe 240:10] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid

[123] Sefer Chassidim 562; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 437-438 footnotes 880-890

[124] Noda Beyehuda Tinyana 45; Avnei Tzedek Y.D. 99; Tzitz Eliezer 13:78; Koveitz Teshuvos [Elyashiv] 3:143; 5:152; Shevet Halevi 4:124

[125] Igros Kodesh 9:110

[126] See Michaber Y.D. 239:8, based on Teshuvos Harashba Meyuchasos Leramban 272, “If one swore to live by his wife’s family, then even though that by doing so he will nullify honoring his father and mother, it is not considered that he is swearing to nullify a Mitzvah of the Torah”; See Maharam Shick Y.D. 208; Avnei Tzedek Y.D. 99; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid P. 445 footnote 975-980

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that if entering such a marriage will require the child to move out of town away from his parents then one is obligated to listen to their parents if the parents desire the child to remain living nearby and have no one else to help support and assist them. [Sefer Chassidim 564]

[127] Agudas Eizov Y.D. 15:19; Hagahos on Beis Hillel 240 based on Shut Maharsham; Sdei Chemed Mareches Chaf Kelal 147; Shevet Halevi 2:111-17; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 495 and 498; However, see Kaneh Bosem 2:91 that from the ruling in the case of the Maharik ibid it is implied that one is not required to listen to the parents even in such a case; See also Igros Kodesh 9:110

[128] Meishiv Davar 2:50; Tzitz Eliezer 15:34

[129] Sefer Chassidim 561; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 493-494

[130] Michtam Ledavid 33; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 496

[131] See Shevet Halevi ibid; Koveitz Mivakshei Torah 21

[132] See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 408 footnote 499-502

[133] Sefer Chassidim 561

[134] Tashbeitz 1:1

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