8C. May Rabbinical prohibitions be fed or provided to a child if there is necessity to do so?

  1. May Rabbinical prohibitions be fed or provided to a child?[1]

If there is no reason or necessity:[2] If there is no necessity for the child to eat the forbidden food, or be provided with the prohibition, then it is forbidden [according to all opinions] to feed [or provide] him even Rabbinical prohibitions [as stated above in A-B]. This applies even if the child is a mere infant.[3]

If there is a necessity:[4] If there is some necessity for a child to eat Rabbinically forbidden foods for his own benefit[5], then it is disputed amongst Poskim whether one may or may not feed him the food. [This same dispute applies also to providing the child with any other Rabbinical prohibition in a case where the prohibition fulfills some need of the child.] The following are the opinions brought in Admur: Some Poskim[6] rule that it is forbidden for any person to give even a Rabbinically forbidden item to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, and even if the child is in need for it. This applies even if the child is sick, so long as he is not in danger. Thus, regarding feeding a child a prohibition they have the same status as an adult irrelevant of the child’s age. Other Poskim[7], however, rule that it is permitted to feed a child, even above the age of education, any Rabbinical prohibition so long as it is being done for the need of the child, such as for the child to eat and drink, and there are not other foods available.

Practically, one may[8] rely on the lenient opinion to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition [even if the child is above the age of education[9]] if the child needs it and no gentile is available to feed the child himself.[10] However, if a gentile is available to feed the child the rabbinic prohibition, it is forbidden for a Jew to do so—even when it is for the child’s need, and even if the child is ill [and rather it is to be fed to him  by the gentile]. In all circumstances, it is prohibited to feed a child a biblical prohibition.[11]

Definition of necessity:[12] A child’s need which can justify feeding him Rabbinical prohibitions in a time of need is defined as a situation in which the food is required for the child’s physical development, [as opposed to for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah[13]], and no alternative food is available.[14] [Accordingly, one should not rely on this ruling without first consulting a competent rav to determine whether the circumstances genuinely constitute a necessity for the child.[15]]

Foods that are intrinsically kosher but temporarily prohibited:[16] Foods that are intrinsically kosher yet prohibited at a given time [whether by biblical[17] or rabbinic law], such as eating before Kiddush or eating on Yom Kippur—may be hand‑fed to a child if the child desires [or requires[18]] food or drink.[19] In such circumstances, it is forbidden to cause the child distress by withholding the food. [If, however, the child does not need to eat or drink the food, it is forbidden to feed it to him, even when the prohibition is merely time‑dependent.[20]]

[1] See Admur 343:5-8; See also Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Tiferes Yisarel Pesicha Miseches Eiruvin; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:11 in great length; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Beir Moshe 6:18; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 197; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13 footnote 145

[2] Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law….. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 343:6 “But if he does not need it, it is forbidden to feed him even if he is not yet capable of understanding (and his father must protest if he is capable of understanding), even with regard to a rabbinic prohibition. For it is forbidden to nurse him with his mother’s milk after twenty‑four months, even though the prohibition of a woman’s milk is only rabbinic, since he no longer needs it after twenty‑four months.” Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Michaber 343:1; Y.D. 81:7; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Tosafus Rosh Hashanah 32a; Mordechai Shabbos 369; M”A 343:3; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma 2a; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Rebbe Eliezer in Braisa Kesubos 60a; Kaf Hachaim 343:27; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 544

The source: This law is learned from the ruling in Michaber Yoreh Deah 81:7 in which it states that it is forbidden for a toddler past 24 months to restart nursing, even though nursing is a mere rabbinical prohibition, being that the child no longer needs the milk. [Admur 343:6]

[3] Admur ibid; 266:10; M”A 343:2

[4] See Admur 343:5-6

[5] Meaning that he is hungry or thirsty and there is nothing else available to eat, or he needs to eat for medical reasons.

[6] Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549

[7] Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 “And there are those who say that anything which is for the need of an infant—such as eating and drinking—the Sages did not decree against it at all, and it is permitted to feed him by hand any matter whose prohibition is only rabbinic, if he needs it, even if he has reached the age of education (Chinuch).” Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548

[8] May one be stringent like the first opinion if he so chooses? If one chooses to however he may be stringent like the first opinion, and on this it was not stated that one may not oppress a child. [Tzemach Tzedek Miluim 13]

[9] As the lenient opinion does not differentiate in this matter between a child who is above or beneath the age of Chinuch

[10] Admur 343:6 “One may rely on their words to be lenient with rabbinic prohibitions when the child needs it and there is no non‑Jew available to feed him.”; [Vetzaruch Iyun from all the following areas where Admur makes no mention of this lenient opinion: Admur 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; See Tzemach Tzedek O.C. Safek Lemi 4; Hearos Ubiurim 829 p. 64]; Taz 346:6 [regarding child brining key through a Karmalis]; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Rav Akiva Eiger Kama 15; Kesav Sofer 47 [not to protest against one who is lenient]; Maharam Shick O.C. 173 is  Milameid Zecgus on the Makilim; Shoel Umeishiv Mahdurah Gimel 117; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 records the lenient opinion Lehalacha; Implication of Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that he is lenient (unlike M”B 362:44); Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 145 concludes that there is no final arbitration on this matter

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that one must be stringent like the former opinion which prohibits a Jew from directly feeding a child even a Rabbinically forbidden food even in a time of need. [M”B 362:44 (unlike Biur Halacha ibid); Kesav Sofer 47 that initially we do not rule Lekula; Mahariy Asad 84; Levushei Mordechai 1:51; Arugas Habosem 1:69; Maharshag 2:24; Maharam Shick O.C. 173; Livyas Chen 128 and Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid that so rule Sephardim as is Setimas Maran]

Ruling of Ketzos Hashulchan: Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 Indeed, in Badei HaShulchan 11:11 he addresses this omission, explaining that he intentionally refrained from publicizing this lenient ruling of Admur, since there are Rishonim who maintain that one should not rely on the lenient view. Nevertheless, this itself requires further iyun: if the Alter Rebbe himself ruled leniently, then who are we—who follow his rulings—to diverge from his pesak?

Contradiction from Admur 343:7: Regarding that which the Alter Rebbe rules explicitly in 343:7, which appears to imply that one must never withhold a rabbinic prohibition from a child: There the Alter Rebbe writes that a child may be fed any rabbinic prohibition for his need, and that it is forbidden to oppress him, and he concludes that the same applies to all rabbinic prohibitions. The Tzemach Tzedek (Miluim 13) raises several difficulties with this ruling:

  1. In the previous halachah, the Alter Rebbe merely rules that one may be lenient in accordance with the second opinion—and only under specific conditions, such as when no gentile is available—whereas here he appears to rule that one must be lenient.
  2. In truth, the specific case discussed in Halacha 7 (tasting before Kiddush) is permitted even according to the first opinion, as the Alter Rebbe explicitly rules in 269:3, since this is not an intrinsic prohibition. Why, then, is this distinction not mentioned here?
  3. Moreover, with regard to these matters, one may be lenient even with a biblical prohibition, as is evident from the allowance to feed a minor on Yom Kippur.

The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 7) resolves these questions by explaining that Halacha 7 is not an independent ruling, but rather a continuation and clarification of the second opinion. The Alter Rebbe’s intent is to explain that, according to this opinion, any rabbinic prohibition may be given to a child for his own need—this in contrast to actions performed for the needs of adults, which were prohibited in the previous halachah even according to the second opinion. See there for his resolution of the remaining difficulty raised by the Tzemach Tzedek.

In conclusion: The ruling of 343:7 does not represent the Alter Rebbe’s final and absolute position regarding all rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, it is stated within the framework of the second opinion, and the practical ruling therefore remains as stated above: this leniency applies only under specific circumstances, such as when no gentile is available.

[11] Pashut from all Poskim ibid! Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[12] See Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill”; 343:7 “Whatever is for the need of the child and for his Takanaso – development and benefit”

[13] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[14] So is evident from the source of the ruling regarding nursing a toddler pass 24 months which is forbidden. Thus one must conclude that even when the child needs to eat, if other Kosher foods are available it is forbidden for him to eat it.

[15] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[16] Admur 269:3; 471:10; Magen Avraham 269:1; Mishneh Berura 269:1; This ruling applies even according to the stringent opinion cited by the Alter Rebbe, which prohibits feeding a child even a rabbinic prohibition. That stringency, however, is limited to foods that are intrinsically prohibited in and of themselves, such as a piece of neveilah.

[17] As is proven from that a child may eat on Yom Kippur. Vetzaruch Iyun regarding Chameitz.

[18] Ketzos Hashulchan 147

[19] The reason: As the [Sages] only prohibited feeding [Rabbinically] forbidden foods [to a child] when the food is forbidden in it of itself, such as a piece of Treifa [Niveila] and the like. However, if the food is Kosher in it of itself and it is just forbidden to be eaten within a certain time slot, then it is permitted to be fed to a child. A proof for this is the ruling regarding feeding a child on Yom Kippur in which case one may do so even if there is no danger involved for the child to fast. [Admur 269:3; M”A 269:1; Yevamos 114b; Machatzis Hashekel on M”A 106:3]

[20] This implication emerges from the Alter Rebbe’s wording here, and is further supported by 621:4, which indicates that a child may not be given wine from a bris on Yom Kippur, despite this too being only a temporary prohibition—whereas for this very reason a child may otherwise be fed on Yom Kippur. See the footnote in the Questions and Answers section regarding eating before Kiddush for a more detailed analysis of this distinction.

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