Lesafos Issur Beyadayaim – Assisting a child in transgressing a prohibition:[1]

Throughout this chapter, we have emphasized that the mitzvah of chinuch—educating a child to observe Torah and mitzvot and reprimanding a child who transgresses a prohibition—is, in general, a Rabbinic obligation. The sole Biblical obligation of education rests upon a father to teach Torah to his son. All other aspects of chinuch, including training a child to observe mitzvot and refrain from prohibitions, are Rabbinically mandated. Nevertheless, there exists one notable exception in which the Torah itself imposes a Biblical prohibition with regard to a child’s transgression. This prohibition is known as “Lesapos Lo Issur”—the prohibition against actively feeding or causing a child to transgress an issur. In this case, the Torah explicitly forbids an adult from actively causing a child to violate a prohibition, such as feeding the child forbidden food or directly instructing the child to perform a forbidden act. Unlike the general laws of chinuch, this prohibition is Biblical in nature and applies not only to the father, but to every Jew, without distinction. The parameters, scope, and practical applications of this Biblical prohibition—and how it differs from the general Rabbinic obligation of chinuch—will be explained at length in this Halacha.

1. The general rule:[2]

It is Biblically[3] prohibited for any[4] individual [including his mother[5]] to actively feed a child with his hands a [Biblically] forbidden matter.[6] This applies even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, [including even a one-day old child].[7] Furthermore, it is forbidden to even give the child food which contains merely a Rabbinical prohibition [as will be explained in D]. [This Biblical prohibition applies not only to prohibited foods but to all other prohibitions as well.[8]] It is thus forbidden to accustom[9] the child to transgress Shabbos or Holidays even regarding Rabbinical matters. See the Addendum Sicha for Parshas Emor published at the end of this Chapter for a full treatise on this subject!

1. Telling a child to transgress a prohibition:[10]

It is [Biblically[11]] forbidden for any person to tell any child to eat non-Kosher food [or transgress Shabbos[12] or any other prohibition[13]], even if the child is completely below the age of understanding, [such as a mere one-day old infant]. It is forbidden to even ask a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, with exception to the cases to be explained.[14] *See from the Rav’s Desk at the end of this Halacha for a full analysis on this subject!

1. May Rabbinical prohibitions be fed or provided to a child who is in need of it?[15]

If there is no reason or necessity:[16] If there is no necessity for the child to eat the forbidden food, or be provided with the prohibition, then it is forbidden [according to all opinions] to feed [or provide] him even Rabbinical prohibitions [as stated above in A-B]. This applies even if the child is a mere infant.[17]

If there is a necessity:[18] If there is some necessity for a child to eat Rabbinically forbidden foods for his own benefit[19], then it is disputed amongst Poskim whether one may or may not feed him the food. [This same dispute applies also to providing the child with any other Rabbinical prohibition in a case where the prohibition fulfills some need of the child.] The following are the opinions brought in Admur: Some Poskim[20] rule that it is forbidden for any person to give even a Rabbinically forbidden item to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, and even if the child is in need for it. This applies even if the child is sick, so long as he is not in danger. Thus, regarding feeding a child a prohibition they have the same status as an adult irrelevant of the child’s age. Other Poskim[21], however, rule that it is permitted to feed a child, even above the age of education, any Rabbinical prohibition so long as it is being done for the need of the child, such as for the child to eat and drink if he wants to, and there are not other foods available.[22] Practically, one may[23] rely on the lenient opinion to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition [even if the child is above the age of education[24]] if the child needs it and no gentile is available to feed the child himself.[25] However, if a gentile is available to feed the child the rabbinic prohibition, it is forbidden for a Jew to do so—even when it is for the child’s need, and even if the child is ill [and rather it is to be fed to him  by the gentile]. In all circumstances, it is prohibited to feed a child a biblical prohibition.[26]

Definition of necessity:[27] A child’s need which can justify feeding him Rabbinical prohibitions in a time of need is defined as a situation in which the food is required for the child’s physical development, [as opposed to for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah[28]], and no alternative food is available.[29] A child’s mere desire to eat the food because it tastes good is certainly not a sufficient justification.[30] [Accordingly, one should not rely on this ruling without first consulting a competent rav to determine whether the circumstances genuinely constitute a necessity for the child.[31]]

Foods that are intrinsically kosher but temporarily prohibited:[32] Foods that are intrinsically kosher yet prohibited at a given time [whether by biblical[33] or rabbinic law], such as eating before Kiddush or eating on Yom Kippur—may be hand‑fed to a child if the child desires [or requires[34]] food or drink.[35] In such circumstances, it is forbidden to cause the child distress by withholding the food. [If, however, the child does not need to eat or drink the food, it is forbidden to feed it to him, even when the prohibition is merely time‑dependent.[36]]

Summary

It is forbidden to feed a child any prohibition—biblical or rabbinic—when there is no genuine need, regardless of the child’s age. When there is a true necessity for the child’s own physical development, poskim dispute whether rabbinic prohibitions may be fed to him, and in practice one may rely on the lenient view only when no gentile is available to do so. Under all circumstances, a biblical prohibition may never be given to a child.

1. May a child be instructed to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition on behalf of an adult:[37]

Not for the sake of a Mitzva:[38] According to all opinions it is prohibited for any adult to instruct or even permit a child [of any age[39]] to violate even a Rabbinical prohibition solely for the adult’s[40] benefit when no Mitzva is involved.[41] Any such action by the child must be protested against by any adult[42] who sees him doing so, even not the child’s father, and even if child does so of his own initiative on behalf of the adult, as explained in Halacha 7F.

For the sake of a Mitzva – Repeated Transgression:[43] According to all opinions, it is forbidden to instruct or even allow a child [of any age] repeatedly violate even a Rabbinic prohibition for the benefit of an adult, even when performed in pursuit of a Mitzva. This restriction is based on concerns that habitual transgression may lead the child to continue such conduct even after reaching adulthood [i.e. Bar and Bas Mitzvah].[44]

For the sake of a Mitzva – Occasional Transgression: In cases where the transgression occurs only on random occasions and solely for the fulfillment of a Mitzva—thereby eliminating concerns of future repetition—the matter is subject to debate amongst the Poskim. Some Poskim[45] rule that it is forbidden to allow a child [of any age], even on an occasional basis, to transgress a prohibition on behalf of an adult, even for the sake of a mitzvah. However, other Poskim[46] maintain that transgressing a Rabbinical prohibition only on random occasions for the sake of a Mitzva is permitted being that there is no worry that the child may come to repeat the prohibition when older.[47] Practically one may be lenient like this opinion which permits instructing and allowing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzva.[48] [This applies even if the child is above the age of Chinuch. However, one may not allow the child to transgress a biblical prohibition under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence.[49]]

• Case Example:[50] Based on the lenient opinion above, on Friday night a child may be given to drink from the wine of Kiddush customarily recited in shul [even though it is not Bemakom Seuda], since it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, as at times guests eat in shul and drink the Kiddush wine, and it is therefore not a regular practice to give the wine specifically to a child. [In truth, this is permitted even according to the stringent opinion mentioned above, due to an additional consideration[51], as will be explained in Chapter ??, Halacha ??. see there for a full discussion of this matter.]

Summary

It is generally forbidden for an adult to instruct or permit a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the adult’s own benefit, even if the child is below the age of education—such actions must be protested by any adult who witnesses them. However, if the transgression is for the sake of a mitzvah and occurs only occasionally, some authorities permit instructing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition due to the lack of concern that the child will become habituated to the behavior. Nonetheless, it is prohibited to instruct or allow a child to repeatedly violate even a Rabbinical prohibition, even in pursuit of a mitzvah, as this may lead to habitual transgression into adulthood. Under all circumstances, a child may not be instructed to transgress a Biblical prohibition, even for a mitzvah or as a rare event.

1. May one feed a child a Rabbinical Issur for the sake of educating him for a Mitzva?[52]

A Mitzvah that the child will fulfill as an adult: Any matter that serves the purpose of chinuch— for the purpose of educating a child to perform a mitzvah when he reaches bar mitzvah—may be given to a child even if it involves a prohibition. For example, one may feed a child from the Pesach offering even though the child was not included in the original registration at the time of the slaughter, in which case an adult would be prohibited from eating it. Nevertheless, since the intent is to educate the child in the performance of the mitzvah, it is permitted in the case of a minor.

A Mitzvah that the child will not fulfill as an adult:[53] The above allowance only applies if the mitzvah is one that the child will be able to fulfill upon reaching bar mitzvah. However, if the mitzvah is one that the child will be unable to fulfill upon reaching bar mitzvah, then the prohibition may not be given to him, due to concern that he may become accustomed to the act and continue it improperly later.[54] Accordingly, a child may not be given the wine of a brit milah on Yom Kippur so that the blessing should not appear to have been said in vain, since this practice would be prohibited to him as an adult.[55]

1. Asking a gentile to feed a child non-Kosher food or have him perform another prohibition:[56]

It is prohibited for any individual to instruct a non-Jew to provide a child with non-Kosher food [even if the prohibition is only Rabbinical[57]] or to transgress any other prohibition, even if the child is below the age of understanding.[58]

If the child needs to eat the food, such as for medical necessity:[59] If a child requires non-Kosher food for medical reasons, such as mild illness, it is permissible to request that a non-Jew administer the forbidden food to the child, [even if the food is Biblically prohibited[60]].[61] This allowance, however, applies only when no Kosher alternative is available for the child. [62] [For clarification regarding the age at which one is considered a child in this context, see Q&A below.]

1. Giving a child an item with which he may commit a prohibition:[63]

Non-Kosher food: It is forbidden to give a child [of any age] non‑kosher food if there is a chance that he may come to eat.[64] [This applies even to food forbidden merely due to Rabbinic decree.[65]] Moreover, even food that is prohibited only during a specific time period[66] may not be given to a child [when it is forbidden for him to consume it at that time] if there is a chance that he may come to eat it.[67]

Foods prohibited due to repulsiveness:[68] Even foods that are forbidden solely because of their repulsive nature, and thus fall under the prohibition of bal teshaktzu, may not be given to a child if there is concern that the child may come to eat them.

A live creature:[69] It is forbidden to give an infant a live non‑kosher locust to play with, as it may die and the child may come to eat it, in which case it is considered as though one actively fed the child non‑kosher food. However, one may give a child a live treif[70] bird to play with, since even if it dies, it is not fit for consumption in its present state.

Giving the child an item with which he will desecrate Shabbos with:[71] All of the above restrictions apply specifically to prohibited foods, even where the prohibition is time‑dependent.[72] However, with respect to Shabbos, it is permitted to give a child [of any age below Bar and Bas Mitzvah[73]] objects with which he may perform a prohibited act for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so.[74] [This leniency however only applies to individuals other than the child’s father.[75] The father, however, may give such an item to a child only if the child is below the age of chinuch. Once the child reaches the age of chinuch, the father is obligated to educate him in mitzvot and to protest improper behavior, and therefore may not provide him with an item through which he will perform a prohibition.[76]] For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos.[77] Although the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is solely for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him.[78] Nevertheless, an adult may not place the food directly into the child’s mouth[79], [nor instruct the child to eat it, as explained in Halacha B]. [Likewise, it is forbidden for one to tell the baby to eat it.[80]] [Some Poskim[81] maintain that if an item will cause the child to engage in a constant prohibition, it may not be given to him. Others[82] rule that any item whose primary function involves the performance of a prohibited act may not be given to a child at all.]

Giving a child an item with the intent that he desecrate Shabbos:[83]  The above leniency applies only when the item is given to the child without intent that he perform a prohibited act with it. However, if the giver’s intent is specifically that the child commit a transgression using the item, it is forbidden to give it to him.[84]

From the Rav’s Desk: The Prohibition of Instructing a Minor to Transgress: Scope, Severity, and Halachic Basis

Question

I am seeking clarity regarding the parameters and severity of the prohibition against telling a child to perform an act that is prohibited for an adult—such as on Shabbos or with respect to any other prohibition in the Torah. I understand that it is forbidden to ask a child to do a prohibited act. However:

1. Is this prohibition based on the mitzvah of chinuch (education)?
2. Does it apply only to the father, or to any adult?
3. Does it apply only to biblically prohibited acts, or also to rabbinic prohibitions?
4. Is the prohibition itself biblical or rabbinic in nature?
5. Does it apply only to a child who has reached the age of chinuch, or even to very young children?

Answer

It is forbidden for any adult, not only the father, to instruct any minor, even a very young child and even below the age of chinuch, to perform any act that is prohibited for an adult. This prohibition applies to both biblical and rabbinic prohibitions. According to most Rishonim and Poskim, the prohibition to instruct a child to violate a biblical prohibition is itself of biblical status. The prohibition is not based on chinuch, but on an independent Torah commandment known as “לא תאכילום” (lo ta’achilum), which the Sages understood to prohibit adults from actively causing minors to transgress.

Explanation

This concept is known in halachic terminology as ספייה בידיים (safiya b’yadayim), meaning actively causing a minor to transgress. Unlike chinuch, which focuses on guidance and correction, safiya b’yadayim treats the adult’s action as a direct violation of Torah law. Consequently, anything that is forbidden for an adult to do is likewise forbidden for him to cause a child to do, whether through action or instruction, and when the underlying prohibition is biblical, the severity of the prohibition remains biblical as well.

The foundation of this prohibition is found in the Gemara (Yevamos 114a), which teaches that it is forbidden for an adult to feed non‑kosher food to a child. The Gemara derives this from three separate biblical contexts: the prohibition of eating non‑kosher creeping creatures, the prohibition of consuming blood, and the prohibition for Kohanim to become defiled through contact with the dead. In each case, the Torah’s language is expounded by Chazal to include not only a prohibition on the individual, but also a prohibition upon adults to actively cause minors to transgress. In particular, the verse “לא תאכלום” is traditionally read as “לא תאכילום”—do not feed them. Although these verses explicitly address only three categories of prohibitions, the Rishonim and Poskim explain that they are not isolated cases. Rather, they serve as paradigms from which a general principle is derived. From these examples, Chazal establish that it is forbidden for an adult to actively cause a child to violate any prohibition of the Torah. This includes all biblical prohibitions, not merely those mentioned explicitly in the verses. Thus, the prohibition is comprehensive in scope and applies across the entirety of Torah law.

This prohibition is fundamentally distinct from the rabbinic mitzvah of chinuch. Chinuch is an educational obligation intended to train a child to observe mitzvos so that he will continue to do so upon reaching adulthood. It is primarily incumbent upon the father, applies only once the child has reached an age of understanding, and is rabbinic in nature. By contrast, the prohibition of לא תאכילום is not educational at all. It is an independent prohibition that applies to all adults, regardless of parental relationship, and applies even to children who are far below the age of chinuch, including infants.

Because this prohibition is not rooted in chinuch, it applies universally and without regard to the child’s cognitive ability. Even if the child has no understanding of the act and no halachic responsibility, the adult who causes the transgression bears full responsibility. For this reason,

even a one‑year‑old child may not be instructed to perform a prohibited act.

However, a further question arises regarding whether there is a distinction between actively feeding a child a prohibited item and merely instructing the child to perform a prohibited act himself. One might argue that instructing a child resembles amira le‑nochri, which is generally a rabbinic prohibition. However, many Rishonim and Poskim reject this comparison. They maintain that instructing a child to transgress constitutes direct causation and is therefore included in the biblical prohibition of לא תאכילום. According to this view, the adult’s verbal instruction is functionally equivalent to physically feeding the child the prohibition.

Sources:

See regarding the general prohibition of Sefiyah Beyadayim: Admur 343:5 “All of the above applies only with regard to the obligation to separate a child from a transgression. However, to actively feed a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden for every person, even if the child is not at all capable of understanding, as it is stated: “Do not eat them”—which the Sages expounded to mean: “Do not feed them to minors.” This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 266:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41; Michaber 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Yevamos 114a; Terumos Hadeshen 62; M”B 343:4 “As for forbidden food—everyone is prohibited from it, and if the infant eats it, the infant has no understanding at all. And this matter is prohibited by the Torah, for we derive it from what is written regarding creeping creatures: “You shall not eat them” (lo tochelum), and the verse is read thus, and the Sages received it as an exposition to mean: “You shall not feed them to minors.” And likewise regarding blood it is written: “Any soul among you shall not eat blood,” and the Sages received this as an exposition to mean: “Do not feed [blood] to minors.” And likewise regarding the impurity of priests it is written: “Say and you shall say,” and the Sages said: “Say”—to the adults, that they should say [it] to the minors. And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress. Therefore it is forbidden to give a child any food that is forbidden, or to give it to him to play with, lest he come to eat it, for this is considered as though one feeds him directly by hand. [This is the ruling of the Magen Avraham], even [in such a case], etc., and [one may not avoid this] by saying [to do so] to a non‑Jew.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 194; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1

See regarding that the prohibition is Biblical: Admur ibid; 262:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41 in end; Bach 343 and Taz 343 that so applies according to Tur; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Achiezer 3:1 in name of Noda Beyehuda; M”B ibid; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that the prohibition to cause a child to eat non-Kosher food is merely Rabbinical. [P”M 343 M”Z 2 in opinion of Tur and possibly Rambam]

See regarding that the Biblical prohibition applies to all Issurim: Implication of Admur ibid “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food; Implication of Shut Admur 41; Implication of Yevamos ibid as learn many Rishonim, Achronim, and Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Ramban Vayikra 21:1; Mishneh Berurah 343:4 and Shaar Hatziyon 434:12 as is learned from the Gedolei Harishonim on Talmud [Yevamos 112] which brings three verses which teach that it is forbidden for a Gadol to help a child transgress “And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 506; Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1 “And only from the combination of all three of these matters do we learn, by means of the common denominator, that in all prohibitions the adults are warned with regard to the minors.” 

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by prohibitions other than non-Kosher foods, the prohibition to cause a child to sin is merely Rabbinical. [Levush 343:1; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Pesicha Koleles 2:9 in opinion of Tur; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 508]

Opinion of Admur: Admur does not explicitly write that the above prohibition of feeding a child an Issur extends to all other prohibitions in the Torah, although it is implied from his beginning wording which states “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food. The same is implied from Shut Rabbeinu ibid

See regarding that the prohibition applies to even instructing the child to do so: Admur 343:5 “It is forbidden for any Jew to instruct a non‑Jew to feed the child prohibited items, since instructing a non‑Jew (amira lenochri) is forbidden with regard to all Torah prohibitions—and certainly one may not instruct the child himself to do so.”; So rule regarding even Amirah Lenachri, and certainly this would apply even more so to instructing the child directly: M”A 343:2; Rashi Yevamos 114a; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 p. 13; Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Mishneh Berura 343:4; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

See regarding that the prohibition to even instructing the child to do so is also Biblical: Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Shiltei Giborim Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M ibid; M”B 343:4 “And this matter is prohibited by the Torah…And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Mishneh Lemelech in name of Rashba, brought and negated in Tehila Ledavid ibid]

Opinion of Admur: It is not clear from Admur whether the prohibition he mentions against instructing a child to perform a prohibited act is biblical or rabbinic. On the one hand, Admur discusses this prohibition toward the end of the halakhah in the context of Amirah Lenachri, which suggests that instructing a child may itself be only rabbinically prohibited. This would imply that the biblical prohibition applies specifically to actively feeding a child a forbidden substance. This reading is further supported by siman 265:10, where Admur does not indicate that a biblical prohibition is involved in simply telling a child to carry a wallet or money from place to place and refers consistently to a case in which the wallet was placed onto the child. This approach appears to follow those authorities who maintain that instructing a child is prohibited only on a rabbinic level, whereas the biblical prohibition is limited to directly causing the child to consume or perform the prohibited matter. Vetzarcuh Iyun! See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

____________________________

[1] See Admur 343:5-10; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[2] Admur 343:5 “All of the above applies only with regard to the obligation to separate a child from a transgression. However, to actively feed a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden for every person, even if the child is not at all capable of understanding, as it is stated: “Do not eat them”—which the Sages expounded to mean: “Do not feed them to minors.” This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 266:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41; Michaber 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Yevamos 114a; Terumos Hadeshen 62; M”B 343:4 “As for forbidden food—everyone is prohibited from it, and if the infant eats it, the infant has no understanding at all. And this matter is prohibited by the Torah, for we derive it from what is written regarding creeping creatures: “You shall not eat them” (lo tochelum), and the verse is read thus, and the Sages received it as an exposition to mean: “You shall not feed them to minors.” And likewise regarding blood it is written: “Any soul among you shall not eat blood,” and the Sages received this as an exposition to mean: “Do not feed [blood] to minors.” And likewise regarding the impurity of priests it is written: “Say and you shall say,” and the Sages said: “Say”—to the adults, that they should say [it] to the minors. And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress. Therefore it is forbidden to give a child any food that is forbidden, or to give it to him to play with, lest he come to eat it, for this is considered as though one feeds him directly by hand. [This is the ruling of the Magen Avraham], even [in such a case], etc., and [one may not avoid this] by saying [to do so] to a non‑Jew.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 194; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1

[3] Admur ibid; 262:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41 in end; Bach 343 and Taz 343 that so applies according to Tur; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Achiezer 3:1 in name of Noda Beyehuda; M”B ibid; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that the prohibition to cause a child to eat non-Kosher food is merely Rabbinical. [P”M 343 M”Z 2 in opinion of Tur and possibly Rambam]

[4] Admur ibid; Shut Rabbeinu 41 “However, to feed a minor a prohibition directly is forbidden according to all opinions—not because of chinuch, but rather because it is written “You shall not eat them,” which is expounded as “You shall not feed them,” as stated in the chapter Cheresh. For the obligation of chinuch is not imposed upon the father alone, as the Rambam writes—see Orach Chaim, siman 343.”; Levush 343:1; See Yevamos ibid; Rashi Yevamos 90a

[5] See Admur 616:4; 640:4

[6] The source: This is learned from the verse [Vayikra 11:42] “Do not feed them” which h the Sages learned to mean that one may not feed a prohibited food to Ketanim, Lehazhir Gedolim Al Haketanim. [Yevamos 112a] See also Toras Kohanim end of Shemini; and beginning of Parshas Emor; See Likkutei Sichos ibid that every Jew—regardless of age—possesses the same essential G‑dly soul. From the perspective of the soul’s essence, there is no difference between a newborn child and an adult; all share an equal and identical level of essential G‑dliness. Differences between individuals exist only in the revelation and expression of the soul’s faculties, such as intellect and emotion, which are far more developed in adults than in children. This distinction is comparable to physical life‑force: the same life energy animates all bodies equally, regardless of size, while other faculties vary. Accordingly, the true difference between Jews lies only in external soul faculties, not in the soul’s essence. This principle explains why the Torah holds adults responsible not to cause a child to transgress—since, at their core, a child and an adult share the same essential sanctity. [Likkutei Sichos ibid] Alternatively, the reason for this prohibition is because the child may become used to performing the prohibition even when an adult. [Terumos Hadeshen 62; See Chasam Sofer O.C. 83; Achiezer 3:81]

[7] Admur ibid and 266:10; M”A 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 509; See M”B  343 Shaareiy Tziyon 6

[8] Implication of Admur ibid “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food; Implication of Shut Admur 41; Implication of Yevamos ibid as learn many Rishonim, Achronim, and Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Ramban Vayikra 21:1; Mishneh Berurah 343:4 and Shaar Hatziyon 434:12 as is learned from the Gedolei Harishonim on Talmud [Yevamos 112] which brings three verses which teach that it is forbidden for a Gadol to help a child transgress “And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 506; Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1 “And only from the combination of all three of these matters do we learn, by means of the common denominator, that in all prohibitions the adults are warned with regard to the minors.”

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by prohibitions other than non-Kosher foods, the prohibition to cause a child to sin is merely Rabbinical. [Levush 343:1; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Pesicha Koleles 2:9 in opinion of Tur; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 508]

Opinion of Admur: Admur does not explicitly write that the above prohibition of feeding a child an Issur extends to all other prohibitions in the Torah, although it is implied from his beginning wording which states “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food. The same is implied from Shut Rabbeinu ibid

[9] This is going on Rabbinical matters of which there are opinions which rule one may have a child transgress them on an occasional basis. [Admur 343:6] However a biblical prohibition is always forbidden to ask a child to perform. [Admur 265:10] The Mishneh Berura 343:6 explains an example of this to mean to ask a child to carry a key in a public domain on Shabbos.

[10] Admur 343:5 “It is forbidden for any Jew to instruct a non‑Jew to feed the child prohibited items, since instructing a non‑Jew (amira lenochri) is forbidden with regard to all Torah prohibitions—and certainly one may not instruct the child himself to do so.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited even if only by rabbinic law.”; So rule regarding even Amirah Lenachri, and certainly this would apply even more so to instructing the child directly: M”A 343:2; Rashi Yevamos 114a; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 p. 13; Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Mishneh Berura 343:4; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[11] Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Shiltei Giborim Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M ibid; M”B 343:4 “And this matter is prohibited by the Torah…And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Mishneh Lemelech in name of Rashba, brought and negated in Tehila Ledavid ibid]

Opinion of Admur: It is not clear from Admur whether the prohibition he mentions against instructing a child to perform a prohibited act is biblical or rabbinic. On the one hand, Admur discusses this prohibition toward the end of the halakhah in the context of Amirah Lenachri [and in 343:6], which suggests that instructing a child may itself be only rabbinically prohibited. This would imply that the biblical prohibition applies specifically to actively feeding a child a forbidden substance. This reading is further supported by siman 265:10, where Admur does not indicate that a biblical prohibition is involved in simply telling a child to carry a wallet or money from place to place and refers consistently to a case in which the wallet was placed onto the child. This approach appears to follow those authorities who maintain that instructing a child is prohibited only on a rabbinic level, whereas the biblical prohibition is limited to directly causing the child to consume or perform the prohibited matter. Vetzarcuh Iyun! See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[12] Admur 265:10; Rishonim ibid; Poskim ibid; In Admur 343:5 the Halacha is referring to telling a child to eat non-Kosher. The Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3 adds that this includes telling a child to desecrate Shabbos. This is explicitly stated by Admur in 265:10; VeTzaruch Iyun based on this from 328:13 that implies that asking a child to transgress Shabbos in a case of danger is better than having an adult do it, hence implying there is no Biblical prohibition involved in asking him! A. Perhaps one can say that the Issur in asking a child is not in having him do the transgression but in asking him to do something which he is not allowed to do. However, in a case of danger since even a Jew may do so, asking the child is not forbidden at all, and hence there is no prohibition at all taking place, as the child is not commanded in Mitzvos and the adult was allowed to ask him. If, however, an adult transgresses, then although it is allowed and a Mitzvah, it is merely Dechuyah and is like the mashal of an amputation. Hence the advantage of asking a child is that it goes from dechuyah or Hutrah

[13] Mishneh Berura 343:4; Rishonim and Poskim ibid

[14] Admur 343:7-8

[15] See Admur 343:5-8; See also Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Tiferes Yisarel Pesicha Miseches Eiruvin; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:11 in great length; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Beir Moshe 6:18; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 197; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13 footnote 145

[16] Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law….. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 343:6 “But if he does not need it, it is forbidden to feed him even if he is not yet capable of understanding (and his father must protest if he is capable of understanding), even with regard to a rabbinic prohibition. For it is forbidden to nurse him with his mother’s milk after twenty‑four months, even though the prohibition of a woman’s milk is only rabbinic, since he no longer needs it after twenty‑four months.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited even if only by rabbinic law.”; Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Michaber 343:1; Y.D. 81:7; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Tosafus Rosh Hashanah 32a; Mordechai Shabbos 369; M”A 343:3; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma 2a; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Rebbe Eliezer in Braisa Kesubos 60a; Kaf Hachaim 343:27; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 544

The source: This law is learned from the ruling in Michaber Yoreh Deah 81:7 in which it states that it is forbidden for a toddler past 24 months to restart nursing, even though nursing is a mere rabbinical prohibition, being that the child no longer needs the milk. [Admur 343:6]

[17] Admur ibid; 266:10; M”A 343:2

[18] See Admur 343:5-6 and 8

[19] Meaning that he is hungry or thirsty and there is nothing else available to eat, or he needs to eat for medical reasons.

[20] Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549

[21] Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 “And there are those who say that anything which is for the need of an infant—such as eating and drinking—the Sages did not decree against it at all, and it is permitted to feed him by hand any matter whose prohibition is only rabbinic, if he needs it, even if he has reached the age of education (Chinuch).” Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 “But anything that is for the infant’s own need and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he might become accustomed to it and do the same when he grows up. This is because it is known to him that they permit his needs only because he is small, and he will not be misled by this to do so when he grows up. Therefore, it is permitted to feed him before Kiddush if he wishes to eat, and likewise to give him to drink, and it is forbidden to afflict him. And so too with all similar cases regarding all other rabbinic prohibitions.” [See Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 7 that this Halacha in Admur is a continuation of the lenient opinion in 343:6]; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; M”A 556:1; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548

[22] The reason we don’t suspect the child will do so also when older: When an action serves the child’s own needs and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he would become habituated to it and continue the practice as an adult. Since it is understood that such permission is granted only because he is a minor, there is no risk that he will be misled to act similarly when he matures. [Admur 343:7; M”A 556:1; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Ran 57a]

[23] May one be stringent like the first opinion if he so chooses? If one chooses to however he may be stringent like the first opinion, and on this it was not stated that one may not oppress a child. [Tzemach Tzedek Miluim 13]

[24] As the lenient opinion does not differentiate in this matter between a child who is above or beneath the age of Chinuch

[25] Admur 343:6 “One may rely on their words to be lenient with rabbinic prohibitions when the child needs it and there is no non‑Jew available to feed him.”; Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 follows the lenient opinion, although without depending it on a gentile not being available – see below for the explanation on this contradiction; [Vetzaruch Iyun from all the following areas where Admur makes no mention of this lenient opinion: Admur 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; See Tzemach Tzedek O.C. Safek Lemi 4; Hearos Ubiurim 829 p. 64]; Taz 346:6 [regarding child brining key through a Karmalis]; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Rav Akiva Eiger Kama 15; Kesav Sofer 47 [not to protest against one who is lenient]; Maharam Shick O.C. 173 is  Milameid Zecgus on the Makilim; Shoel Umeishiv Mahdurah Gimel 117; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 records the lenient opinion Lehalacha; Implication of Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that he is lenient (unlike M”B 362:44); Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 145 concludes that there is no final arbitration on this matter

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that one must be stringent like the former opinion which prohibits a Jew from directly feeding a child even a Rabbinically forbidden food even in a time of need. [M”B 362:44 (unlike Biur Halacha ibid); Kesav Sofer 47 that initially we do not rule Lekula; Mahariy Asad 84; Levushei Mordechai 1:51; Arugas Habosem 1:69; Maharshag 2:24; Maharam Shick O.C. 173; Livyas Chen 128 and Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid that so rule Sephardim as is Setimas Maran]

Ruling of Ketzos Hashulchan: Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 Indeed, in Badei HaShulchan 11:11 he addresses this omission, explaining that he intentionally refrained from publicizing this lenient ruling of Admur, since there are Rishonim who maintain that one should not rely on the lenient view. Nevertheless, this itself requires further iyun: if the Alter Rebbe himself ruled leniently, then who are we—who follow his rulings—to diverge from his pesak?

Contradiction from Admur 343:7: Regarding that which the Alter Rebbe rules explicitly in 343:7, which appears to imply that one must never withhold a rabbinic prohibition from a child: There the Alter Rebbe writes that a child may be fed any rabbinic prohibition for his need, and that it is forbidden to oppress him, and he concludes that the same applies to all rabbinic prohibitions. The Tzemach Tzedek (Miluim 13) raises several difficulties with this ruling:

1. In the previous halachah, the Alter Rebbe merely rules that one may be lenient in accordance with the second opinion—and only under specific conditions, such as when no gentile is available—whereas here he appears to rule that one must be lenient.
2. In truth, the specific case discussed in Halacha 7 (tasting before Kiddush) is permitted even according to the first opinion, as the Alter Rebbe explicitly rules in 269:3, since this is not an intrinsic prohibition. Why, then, is this distinction not mentioned here?
3. Moreover, with regard to these matters, one may be lenient even with a biblical prohibition, as is evident from the allowance to feed a minor on Yom Kippur.

The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 7) resolves these questions by explaining that Halacha 7 is not an independent ruling, but rather a continuation and clarification of the second opinion. The Alter Rebbe’s intent is to explain that, according to this opinion, any rabbinic prohibition may be given to a child for his own need—this in contrast to actions performed for the needs of adults, which were prohibited in the previous halachah even according to the second opinion. See there for his resolution of the remaining difficulty raised by the Tzemach Tzedek.

In conclusion: The ruling of 343:7 does not represent the Alter Rebbe’s final and absolute position regarding all rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, it is stated within the framework of the second opinion, and the practical ruling therefore remains as stated above: this leniency applies only under specific circumstances, such as when no gentile is available.

[26] Pashut from all Poskim ibid! Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[27] See Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill”; 343:7 “Whatever is for the need of the child and for his Takanaso – development and benefit”

[28] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[29] So is evident from the source of the ruling regarding nursing a toddler pass 24 months which is forbidden. Thus one must conclude that even when the child needs to eat, if other Kosher foods are available it is forbidden for him to eat it.

[30] See Admur 343:9-10 [This is demonstrated by Admur 343:9-10, who rules that even rabbinically prohibited foods may not be given to a child and the only allowance to feed him cake with lettering is because the Melacha is not the main purpose of the item. This makes clear that a child’s mere desire to eat a food because it tastes good is not considered a legitimate justification. Furthermore, he explicitly rules there that even by cake with lettering it may not be placed into the child’s mouth directly.

[31] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[32] Admur 269:3; 471:10; Magen Avraham 269:1; Mishneh Berura 269:1; This ruling applies even according to the stringent opinion cited by the Alter Rebbe, which prohibits feeding a child even a rabbinic prohibition. That stringency, however, is limited to foods that are intrinsically prohibited in and of themselves, such as a piece of neveilah.

[33] As is proven from that a child may eat on Yom Kippur. Vetzaruch Iyun regarding Chameitz.

[34] Ketzos Hashulchan 147

[35] The reason: As the [Sages] only prohibited feeding [Rabbinically] forbidden foods [to a child] when the food is forbidden in it of itself, such as a piece of Treifa [Niveila] and the like. However, if the food is Kosher in it of itself and it is just forbidden to be eaten within a certain time slot, then it is permitted to be fed to a child. A proof for this is the ruling regarding feeding a child on Yom Kippur in which case one may do so even if there is no danger involved for the child to fast. [Admur 269:3; M”A 269:1; Yevamos 114b; Machatzis Hashekel on M”A 106:3]

[36] This implication emerges from the Alter Rebbe’s wording here, and is further supported by 621:4, which indicates that a child may not be given wine from a bris on Yom Kippur, despite this too being only a temporary prohibition—whereas for this very reason a child may otherwise be fed on Yom Kippur. See the footnote in the Questions and Answers section regarding eating before Kiddush for a more detailed analysis of this distinction.

[37] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older. But when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah. Therefore, it is permitted to give a taste to a child who has reached the age of education from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no need at all for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated to do so. Nevertheless, since the prohibition of tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, and the only reason to prohibit it would be out of concern lest the child become habituated to it—and this concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, because children are not given to taste on a fixed basis every single Shabbat. For sometimes there are guests who stay and eat in the rooms of the synagogue and hear Kiddush there, and then there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited—even if only by rabbinic law.”

[38] Admur 343:6 regarding even a Rabbinical prohibition “provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah” and 343:7; Admur 343:1 regarding general law “If he does so on behalf of an adult, one must protest and stop him, by rabbinic law, as explained in סימן של״ד.”; Admur 334:26 in parentheses regarding Kibuiy on Shabbos which is possibly only Rabbinical; Beis Yosef 334; Rosh 1:1; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:13

[39] Admur 334:26 “Even if he has not reached the age of Chinuch”; Bach 334; Tosafus Shabbos 121a

[40] This applies whether the child is doing so on behalf of his father or on behalf of any other adult: Admur 343:1 “Bishvil Gadol”; 334:26 “on behalf of his father (or another Jew)”; M”B 334:65 in name of P”M; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

Father versus other person: So rules also Admur in 334:26 that if the child is going to extinguish the fire even on behalf of a person other than his father, he must be reprimanded. Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur in 334:26 stated this addition (another person) in parentheses. To note however that in the Gemara [Yevamos 104a] explains that the reason the child must be reprimanded is because he is doing so on behalf of his father, and thus perhaps here Admur novelizes that even when done on behalf of others he must be reprimanded. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11] This is also explicitly implied in Rashi there which equates this case to the case brought earlier in the Gemara regarding having children carry keys in a public domain on behalf of another person, of which there it was allowed because they were not doing so on behalf of that person. Nevertheless, tzaruch Iyun why the need to place this addition in parentheses. The Mishneh Berurah [334:65] rules in the name of the Peri Megadim as above that the child is to be reprimanded even when he goes to extinguish another person’s fire.

[41] The reason: This can be inferred from 343:6, where Admur limits the allowance to cases performed for the sake of a mitzvah. The reason is that asking a child to transgress is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress, which is forbidden when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that only when there is a mitzvah need did the Sages not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, even if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[42] Implication of Admur 343:1-2 and 334:26 “even if his father is not there” and in parentheses “or for another Jew”; See Admur 343:2 that this obligation to reprimand and correct improper behavior is not limited to the Beit Din, even though they are the primary subject discussed in this halacha. Rather, this obligation applies to every individual. This is made explicit by the wording in the beginning of the next halacha, where Admur states that all of the above applies when dealing with “other people”, clearly indicating that the responsibility is not confined to judicial authorities alone.

[43] Admur 343:6 “there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older.”; Admur 343:8 “Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”;  Tur 559 in name of Tosafus; Shut Rashba 1:323; Tosafus Shabbos 139a; Eruvin 40b in name of Rabbeinu Shmuel

[44] Admur ibid; Eruvin 40b; Rashi ibid

The reason: As he has already become accustomed as a child to transgress.

[45] Implication of Admur 343:6 that so rule all Poskim who prohibit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition even in a case that he needs to eat it: Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549

[46] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf….when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah.”; Admur 343:8 “Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”; Rashba 1:92; Shut Rashba 323; Tosafus Eruvin 40b; All Poskim who permit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition even in a case that he needs to eat it: Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548

Background: According to the lenient opinion which allows one to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition in a case that he needs to eat it, they hold that the entire prohibition of giving a Rabbinical prohibition to a child [even above the age of education] is only due to that he may come to transgress this sin also after he matures and becomes Bar Mitzva. Thus, if the incident is not a common occurrence, they allow the child to transgress it, if it is a mere Rabbinical prohibition.

[47] The reason: The reason for this allowance is because asking a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, which is permitted when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8 and 307:12). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that when there is a mitzvah need the Sages did not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[48] Setimas Admur 343:8; Implication of Admur 343:6 [This is implied from the wording of Admur, who states, “therefore it is permitted,” even though he is addressing the lenient opinion, and likewise follows his final ruling in the previous debate on which this debate is dependent, in which he permits one to be lenient in a time of need for the child. Nevertheless, there is no explicit final ruling in Admur on this matter, unlike the case of feeding a child a rabbinic prohibition for his own sake, regarding which Admur issues a definitive ruling.]

[49] Admur 621:4

The law by a Biblical prohibition: A biblical prohibition may not be transgressed under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence. This is because with respect to biblical prohibitions, the Sages were concerned that permitting a child to transgress, even for the sake of a mitzvah and on a rare occasion, could lead him to do so later in life. Accordingly, it is forbidden to give a child the wine of a bris on Yom Kippur [Admur 621:4]

[50] Admur 343:6 “Therefore, it is permitted to give a child who has reached the age of education a taste from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no actual need for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated in this matter. Nevertheless, since the prohibition against tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, it should not be prohibited except out of concern that the child may become accustomed to it. Such concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, as children are not given to taste from it on a regular basis every Shabbat, since at times there are guests who stay and eat in the synagogue premises and hear Kiddush there, in which case there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”; See Admur 269:3; 471:10; M”A 269:1; Rashba 92 regarding Kiddush on Yom Kippur;

Other reasons for allowance: Regarding the rationale for this leniency, there is an apparent discrepancy between Admur 269:3 and 343:6. In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. However, in 343:6, Admur bases the allowance on the opinion of the Rashba, who permits giving the wine to a child because it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, since at times there are guests who eat in the synagogue and drink the Kiddush wine, and it therefore does not become a regular practice to give the wine to the child.

[51] In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. Hence, its permissibility is not dependent on the above debate, and it is allowed even according to the stringent opinion above.

[52] Admur 343:8 “Anything that falls under the category of chinuch (educational training for mitzvot), it is permitted to actively give a child a prohibited item—for example, to feed the Paschal offering to a minor who has reached the age of chinuch, even though he was not formally registered for it. Although the Paschal offering may be eaten only by those registered for it, nevertheless, since one’s intent is to educate him in the mitzvah, it is permitted. However, a mitzvah for which chinuch does not apply—meaning a mitzvah that he will not be able to perform when he grows up, which is the fundamental rationale of chinuch—such as giving him a taste from the cup of wine of a circumcision on Yom Kippur so that the blessing should not appear to have been said in vain: even though this is a mitzvah-related need, nevertheless, since when he grows up it will be forbidden to him, it is also forbidden now, due to concern that he may become accustomed to it and drink from it even when he is older, as will be explained in סימן תרכ״א. Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”; M”A 343:3; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Tosafus Pesachim 88a; Likkutei Sichos 26:69-74

[53] Admur ibid; See also Admur 186:3; Shut Admur Hazakein 41 in end; Rashi Sukkah 20b; Chagiga 6a; Eruvin 40b

[54] Admur ibid; Mordechai Yuma Remez 727

[55] Admur ibid; 2^nd opinion in Admur 190:4; 621:4 and 5-6; Rashi Eruvin 40b

[56] Admur 343:5 “If a gentile feeds a prohibited item to a child who is not yet capable of understanding, the child’s father is not required to protest. However, it is forbidden for any Jew to tell a gentile to feed the child, since instructing a gentile is prohibited with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah. All the more so is it forbidden to tell the child himself to do so.”; M”A 343:3; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 in name of Rameh

[57] So is implied from Setimas Admur here; however, see the continuation where he writes “since instructing a gentile is prohibited with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah.” Vetzaruch Iyun as Halachically, asking a non-Jew to instruct a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition constitutes a threefold rabbinic prohibition (shevut de‑shevut de‑shevut): instructing a non-Jew is itself rabbinically prohibited; a minor performing a prohibited act involves a separate rabbinic concern; and the underlying prohibition itself is rabbinic. This stands in contrast to instructing a child directly to perform a rabbinic prohibition, which constitutes a double rabbinic prohibition (shevut de‑shevut) and remains prohibited, as explained above.

[58] The reason: This is because asking a non-Jew to perform a prohibited act on one’s behalf is forbidden with respect to all biblical prohibitions. [Admur 343:5; 243:1]

[59] Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill—it is permitted to tell a gentile to feed him, for the needs of a minor are treated as those of a sick person who is not in danger. In such a case, the Sages permitted instructing a gentile even regarding biblical prohibitions, as explained in siman 328. Similarly, if the child requires wine to drink and no Jewish wine is available, but only ordinary wine of gentiles, and the wine is not strong enough to be rendered permissible through dilution of six parts water to one part wine (as explained in Yoreh De’ah siman 134), it is permitted to tell a gentile to give him to drink.”; M”A 343:3; See also Admur 328:19; 22; 450:24-25; Tehila Ledavid 343:4

[60] So is evident from the reason of Admur, brought in next footnote, and so rules Mishneh Berura 343:5

[61] The reason: Since the needs of a child are halachically equated with those of a non‑dangerously ill person, by which the Sages permitted instructing a non‑Jew to transgress on his behalf even by a biblical prohibition. [Admur ibid; 328:19; 22; 450:24-25; Tehila Ledavid 343:4] As for why Admur limits this leniency here to a case where the child is slightly ill—despite the general principle that even the needs of a healthy child carry the status of one who is ill—this is because there is no necessity for a healthy child to consume specifically non‑kosher food, absent medical need. Accordingly, such a case would not arise with respect to a healthy child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 5]

[62] This is evident from the fact that if possible Admur [ibid] requires one to dilute non-Kosher wine of a gentile with water in a way that it no longer retains its prohibition, rather than ask a gentile to feed it to the child in its current state.

[63] Admur 343:9 “It is forbidden to give a child a live non‑kosher locust to play with, lest it die and the child eat it, in which case one would be actively feeding him a prohibited item, since he himself gave him the prohibition. All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is. Even something that is prohibited only because of bal teshaktzu (repulsiveness) may not be given to him if there is concern that he might eat it. However, it is permitted to give him a non‑kosher bird to play with, since even if it dies it is not fit for consumption.” Admur 343:10 “(All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food, even when the prohibition is time‑dependent.) However, on Shabbat it is permitted to give a child objects with which he can perform a prohibited labor for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so. For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbat, as explained in siman ש״מ. Even though the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him, as explained above—provided that an adult does not place the food directly into the child’s mouth.”

[64] Admur 343:9 “All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is… if there is concern that he might eat it.” and 10 in parentheses “All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food”; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b

The reason: As this is considered as if he is actively feeding him a prohibited item. [Admur ibid; M”A ibid; rashi ibid]

[65] As rules Admur next regarding Bal Tishaktzu

[66] Such as Matzah on Erev Pesach for a child who has reached the age of understanding, or a child on Yom Kippur which has reached the age of Chinuch for fasts.

[67] Admur 343:10 in parentheses; 616:4

[68] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Implication of Shabbos ibid; See Admur Basra 3:11; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 10

[69] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b

[70] Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur mentions a Treif bird, as even by a kosher bird it is forbidden to be eaten without slaughtering and thus the same suspicion applies.

[71] Admur 343:10 “(However all the above is regarding prohibited foods, even if it is forbidden due to time) However it is permitted to give to a baby on Shabbos items which he is able to do prohibited actions with for himself, and even if one knows that he will do these actions with them , such as to give a baby a cake which has letters written on it which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos as explained in chapter 340, even though the young child will for certain eat it, [nevertheless] since he intends for his own benefit one need not separate him [from doing the prohibition] as was explained above [in Halacha 1]. Nevertheless one [a Gadol] may not place [the cake] into the mouth of the baby.”; See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; 3:82 and Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144 who permit to have a child below age 6 to open the fridge; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 who allows placing a child below age 3 in front of the fridge and in front of the light switch; Other contradictory rulings of Admur and their resolution: See Admur 266:10 [forbidden to give wallet to carry], 301:21 [prohibits dressing child with clothing that contain  bells that make noise]; Tehila Ledavid 343:2; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11; Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54; Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79;

The contradiction in Admur: There is an apparent contradiction within the rulings of Admur regarding the permissibility of giving a child below the age of chinuch an item with which a prohibition will be performed. Here in 343:10, Admur explicitly permits giving a child cake that contains letters, notwithstanding that the inevitable result of eating the cake will be the erasure of the letters, a rabbinic prohibition of mechikas ksav. This ruling implies that even where the adult is aware that a prohibition will certainly occur (pesik reisha), and even where the adult benefits from the child’s action, it is nevertheless permitted to give the item to a child below the age of chinuch. However, this ruling appears to contradict numerous other rulings of Admur, including 343:9 (prohibiting giving a child non‑kosher food), 266:10 (forbidding handing a child an object to carry in a public domain), and 301:21 (prohibiting dressing a child in garments with bells that will inevitably cause prohibited noise), all of which indicate that one may not actively place a child in a situation where a prohibition will certainly be transgressed.

The resolutions to the contradictions: This internal inconsistency has led to multiple approaches among the Poskim in explaining Admur’s position. Some make note of the contradiction and leave it unresolved (tzaruch iyun). [Tehila Ledavid 343:2] Others resolve the contradiction by sharply limiting the scope of 343:10, ruling that a child below chinuch may only be given an item with which a prohibition might occur if the adult has no intent for the child to perform the prohibition; if the adult’s intent is that the prohibition be done, even indirectly, it is forbidden. According to this approach, the cake-with-letters case is permitted only because the adult’s intent is feeding the child, not erasing letters. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147, fn. 11; Article of Rav Avraham Elyashvili in Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79] A different resolution that is suggested distinguishes between a one‑time prohibition and a constant or ongoing prohibition. They explain that Admur permits giving a child an item that will result in a single, incidental transgression (such as erasing letters while eating cake), but forbids giving items that will cause continuous violations (such as bells that ring repeatedly or objects that will be carried for an extended period). [Chikrei Halachos vol. 4 p. 54] Other contemporary Poskim adopt a more expansive reading of Admur. According to this approach, the decisive factor is whether the item inherently compels a prohibition or merely enables it. If the child retains a genuine choice whether or not to perform the prohibited act, then giving the item—or even placing the child in proximity to it—is not equivalent to instructing the child to sin, even if the adult hopes to benefit from the result. This reading understands 343:10 as the governing principle, with the stricter rulings in other simanim applying only where the item’s sole or unavoidable use is the prohibition itself. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 55]

[72] Admur ibid in parentheses

[73] Setimas Admur ibid

[74] This is learned from the Gemara Shabbos 90b which does not differentiate [and neither does any Posek] and seemingly allows to give a child a kosher locust to play with even though the child may kill, trap, detach a wing or the like to the locust. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11]. As for the reason that there is a difference between giving the child a food or an item meant for desecrating Shabbos, Tzaruch Iyun.

[75] Hearah 85 in new Shulchan Aruch

[76] See Admur 343:1-2; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61

[77] Admur ibid and 340:4; M”A 343:5; Mordechai Remez 369 in name of Maharam, brought in Beis Yosef 340

[78] Admur ibid; 640:4; Mordechai ibid

[79] Admur ibid; Mordechai ibid

[80] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

[81] Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54 based on Admur’s ruling in 301:21 that it is forbidden to give a child clothing with bells, addresses the apparent contradiction between that ruling and the leniency discussed here. He explains that permission is granted only where the child will perform a single, isolated prohibition—such as eating a cake with letters on it—whereas an item that leads to a constant prohibition is forbidden to give to a child. Others (see He’aros U’Biurim, Ohalei Torah no. 831, p. 79) explain that the prohibition in 301:21 is due to the father’s intent: the clothing is given specifically so that the child will ring the bells in order to amuse or calm himself. In such a case, it is prohibited, as explained by the Ketzos HaShulchan (266:10; see the next halacha). However, this explanation is not entirely compelling. While it may be assumed that the child intends to play with the bells, it is not evident that the adult necessarily has such intent; perhaps the garment was given simply for the child to wear. Rather, it may be explained that since the garment’s primary purpose is to produce sound, giving it to the child—regardless of the adult’s subjective intent—is tantamount to instructing the child to perform a prohibited act. As such, it is treated as though the adult is actively “feeding” the child the prohibition. This differs from the case of the cake: although eating it necessarily entails erasing the letters, that is not the cake’s primary function. Its essential purpose is consumption, and therefore giving it to the child is not considered equivalent to directly causing him to perform a prohibited act.

[82] Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 55; See previous footnotes

[83] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11 based on Admur 266:10

Background and Other approaches: This ruling is based on Admur 266:10, and is likewise codified by the Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11). However, in light of the explanation above, it may be suggested that the prohibition in siman 266 is not dependent on the giver’s subjective intent. Rather, since it is evident to all that the wallet is being given for the purpose of carrying it—and thereby performing a prohibited act—this is considered akin to actively “feeding” the child a prohibition. In such a case, giving the item is halachically equivalent to instructing the child to perform the transgression, which is forbidden. In other words, whenever an item is given to a child and its sole understood purpose is for the performance of a prohibited act, it is treated as though the child has been explicitly told to commit that prohibition.

[84] With respect to the case of lettering on a cake discussed above, since the giver’s intent is not that the letters be erased but rather that the child eat the cake, it is therefore permitted to give it to the child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11]