May a child be instructed to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition on behalf of an adult:[1]

Not for the sake of a Mitzva:[2] According to all opinions it is prohibited for any adult to instruct or even permit a child [of any age[3]] to violate even a Rabbinical prohibition solely for the adult’s[4] benefit when no Mitzva is involved.[5] Any such action by the child must be protested against by any adult[6] who sees him doing so, even not the child’s father, and even if child does so of his own initiative on behalf of the adult, as explained in Halacha 7F.

For the sake of a Mitzva – Repeated Transgression:[7] According to all opinions, it is forbidden to instruct or even allow a child [of any age] repeatedly violate even a Rabbinic prohibition for the benefit of an adult, even when performed in pursuit of a Mitzva. This restriction is based on concerns that habitual transgression may lead the child to continue such conduct even after reaching adulthood [i.e. Bar and Bas Mitzvah].[8]

For the sake of a Mitzva – Occasional Transgression: In cases where the transgression occurs only on random occasions and solely for the fulfillment of a Mitzva—thereby eliminating concerns of future repetition—the matter is subject to debate amongst the Poskim. Some Poskim[9] rule that it is forbidden to allow a child [of any age], even on an occasional basis, to transgress a prohibition on behalf of an adult, even for the sake of a mitzvah. However, other Poskim[10] maintain that transgressing a Rabbinical prohibition only on random occasions for the sake of a Mitzva is permitted being that there is no worry that the child may come to repeat the prohibition when older.[11] Practically one may be lenient like this opinion which permits instructing and allowing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzva.[12] [This applies even if the child is above the age of Chinuch. However, one may not allow the child to transgress a biblical prohibition under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence.[13]]

• Case Example:[14] Based on the lenient opinion above, on Friday night a child may be given to drink from the wine of Kiddush customarily recited in shul [even though it is not Bemakom Seuda], since it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, as at times guests eat in shul and drink the Kiddush wine, and it is therefore not a regular practice to give the wine specifically to a child. [In truth, this is permitted even according to the stringent opinion mentioned above, due to an additional consideration[15], as will be explained in Chapter ??, Halacha ??. see there for a full discussion of this matter.]

Summary

It is generally forbidden for an adult to instruct or permit a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the adult’s own benefit, even if the child is below the age of education—such actions must be protested by any adult who witnesses them. However, if the transgression is for the sake of a mitzvah and occurs only occasionally, some authorities permit instructing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition due to the lack of concern that the child will become habituated to the behavior. Nonetheless, it is prohibited to instruct or allow a child to repeatedly violate even a Rabbinical prohibition, even in pursuit of a mitzvah, as this may lead to habitual transgression into adulthood. Under all circumstances, a child may not be instructed to transgress a Biblical prohibition, even for a mitzvah or as a rare event.

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[1] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older. But when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah. Therefore, it is permitted to give a taste to a child who has reached the age of education from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no need at all for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated to do so. Nevertheless, since the prohibition of tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, and the only reason to prohibit it would be out of concern lest the child become habituated to it—and this concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, because children are not given to taste on a fixed basis every single Shabbat. For sometimes there are guests who stay and eat in the rooms of the synagogue and hear Kiddush there, and then there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”

[2] Admur ibid regarding even a Rabbinical prohibition “provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah”; Admur 343:1 regarding general law “If he does so on behalf of an adult, one must protest and stop him, by rabbinic law, as explained in סימן של״ד.”; Admur 334:26 in parentheses regarding Kibuiy on Shabbos which is possibly only Rabbinical; Beis Yosef 334; Rosh 1:1; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:13

[3] Admur 334:26 “Even if he has not reached the age of Chinuch”; Bach 334; Tosafus Shabbos 121a

[4] This applies whether the child is doing so on behalf of his father or on behalf of any other adult: Admur 343:1 “Bishvil Gadol”; 334:26 “on behalf of his father (or another Jew)”; M”B 334:65 in name of P”M; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

Father versus other person: So rules also Admur in 334:26 that if the child is going to extinguish the fire even on behalf of a person other than his father, he must be reprimanded. Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur in 334:26 stated this addition (another person) in parentheses. To note however that in the Gemara [Yevamos 104a] explains that the reason the child must be reprimanded is because he is doing so on behalf of his father, and thus perhaps here Admur novelizes that even when done on behalf of others he must be reprimanded. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11] This is also explicitly implied in Rashi there which equates this case to the case brought earlier in the Gemara regarding having children carry keys in a public domain on behalf of another person, of which there it was allowed because they were not doing so on behalf of that person. Nevertheless, tzaruch Iyun why the need to place this addition in parentheses. The Mishneh Berurah [334:65] rules in the name of the Peri Megadim as above that the child is to be reprimanded even when he goes to extinguish another person’s fire.

[5] The reason: This can be inferred from 343:6, where Admur limits the allowance to cases performed for the sake of a mitzvah. The reason is that asking a child to transgress is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress, which is forbidden when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that only when there is a mitzvah need did the Sages not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, even if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[6] Implication of Admur 343:1-2 and 334:26 “even if his father is not there” and in parentheses “or for another Jew”; See Admur 343:2 that this obligation to reprimand and correct improper behavior is not limited to the Beit Din, even though they are the primary subject discussed in this halacha. Rather, this obligation applies to every individual. This is made explicit by the wording in the beginning of the next halacha, where Admur states that all of the above applies when dealing with “other people”, clearly indicating that the responsibility is not confined to judicial authorities alone.

[7] Admur 343:6 “there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older.”; Tur 559 in name of Tosafus; Shut Rashba 1:323; Tosafus Shabbos 139a; Eruvin 40b in name of Rabbeinu Shmuel

[8] Admur ibid; Eruvin 40b; Rashi ibid

The reason: As he has already become accustomed as a child to transgress.

[9] Implication of Admur 343:6 that so rule all Poskim who prohibit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition even in a case that he needs to eat it: Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549

[10] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf….when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah.”; Rashba 1:92; Shut Rashba 323; Tosafus Eruvin 40b; All Poskim who permit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition even in a case that he needs to eat it: Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548

Background: According to the lenient opinion which allows one to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition in a case that he needs to eat it, they hold that the entire prohibition of giving a Rabbinical prohibition to a child [even above the age of education] is only due to that he may come to transgress this sin also after he matures and becomes Bar Mitzva. Thus, if the incident is not a common occurrence, they allow the child to transgress it, if it is a mere Rabbinical prohibition.

[11] The reason: The reason for this allowance is because asking a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, which is permitted when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8 and 307:12). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that when there is a mitzvah need the Sages did not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[12] This is implied from the wording of Admur, who states, “therefore it is permitted,” even though he is addressing the lenient opinion, and likewise follows his final ruling in the previous debate on which this debate is dependent, in which he permits one to be lenient in a time of need for the child. Nevertheless, there is no explicit final ruling in Admur on this matter, unlike the case of feeding a child a rabbinic prohibition for his own sake, regarding which Admur issues a definitive ruling.

[13] Admur 621:4

The law by a Biblical prohibition: A biblical prohibition may not be transgressed under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence. This is because with respect to biblical prohibitions, the Sages were concerned that permitting a child to transgress, even for the sake of a mitzvah and on a rare occasion, could lead him to do so later in life. Accordingly, it is forbidden to give a child the wine of a bris on Yom Kippur [Admur 621:4]

[14] Admur 343:6 “Therefore, it is permitted to give a child who has reached the age of education a taste from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no actual need for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated in this matter. Nevertheless, since the prohibition against tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, it should not be prohibited except out of concern that the child may become accustomed to it. Such concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, as children are not given to taste from it on a regular basis every Shabbat, since at times there are guests who stay and eat in the synagogue premises and hear Kiddush there, in which case there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”; See Admur 269:3; 471:10; M”A 269:1; Rashba 92 regarding Kiddush on Yom Kippur;

Other reasons for allowance: Regarding the rationale for this leniency, there is an apparent discrepancy between Admur 269:3 and 343:6. In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. However, in 343:6, Admur bases the allowance on the opinion of the Rashba, who permits giving the wine to a child because it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, since at times there are guests who eat in the synagogue and drink the Kiddush wine, and it therefore does not become a regular practice to give the wine to the child.

[15] In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. Hence, its permissibility is not dependent on the above debate, and it is allowed even according to the stringent opinion above.