8. Lisafos Issur Beyadayaim – Assisting a child in transgressing a prohibition

8. Lisfos Issur Beyadayaim – Providing or instructing a child with a prohibition:[1]

Throughout this chapter, we have emphasized that the mitzvah of chinuch—educating a child to observe Torah and mitzvot and reprimanding a child who transgresses a prohibition— is, in general, a Rabbinic obligation only upon the child’s father, and only after the child has reached the a1ge of Chinuch. The sole Biblical obligation of education rests upon a father to teach Torah to his son. All other aspects of chinuch, including training a child to observe mitzvot and refrain from prohibitions, are Rabbinically mandated. Nevertheless, there exists one notable exception in which the Torah itself imposes a Biblical prohibition with regard to a child’s transgression. This prohibition is known as “Lesafos Lo Issur”—the prohibition against actively feeding or causing a child to transgress an issur. In this case, the Torah explicitly forbids an adult from actively causing a child to violate a prohibition, such as feeding the child forbidden food or directly instructing the child to perform a forbidden act. Unlike the general laws of chinuch, this prohibition is Biblical in nature and applies not only to the father, but to every Jew, without distinction, and applies to a child of any age. The parameters, scope, and practical applications of this Biblical prohibition—and how it differs from the general Rabbinic obligation of chinuch—will be explained at length in this Halacha.

 

1. The general rule:[2]

It is Biblically[3] prohibited for any[4] individual [including his mother[5]] to actively feed a child with his hands a [Biblically] forbidden matter.[6] This applies even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, [including even a one-day old child[7]].[8] Furthermore, it is [Rabbinically[9]] forbidden to even give the child food which contains merely a Rabbinical prohibition [as will be explained in D, with exception to the cases to be explained in Halachas C-G.[10]]. [This Biblical prohibition applies not only to prohibited foods but to all other prohibitions as well.[11]] It is thus forbidden to accustom[12] the child to transgress Shabbos or Holidays even regarding Rabbinical matters. See the Addendum Sicha for Parshas Emor published at the end of this Chapter for a full treatise on this subject!

Foods that are intrinsically kosher but temporarily prohibited:[13] Foods that are intrinsically kosher yet prohibited at a given time [whether by biblical[14] or rabbinic law], such as eating before Kiddush or eating on Yom Kippur—may be hand‑fed to a child if the child desires [or requires[15]] food or drink.[16] In such circumstances, it is forbidden to cause the child distress by withholding the food. [If, however, the child does not need to eat or drink the food, it is forbidden to feed it to him, even when the prohibition is merely time‑dependent.[17]]

A child with developmental challenges: See Halacha 6D!

Child needs the Issur food for general development: See Halacha 6D!

A Sick child: See Halacha 6E!

May the pregnant wife of Kohen enter an Ohel Hameis: See Chapter ?? Halacha ??!

May one dress a boy in a four cornered garment that does not contain Tzitzis?[18]  There is no prohibition for an adult Jew to place a four-cornered garment without tzitzis onto a child who is below this age, even though, in general, it is forbidden to actively cause a child to violate a prohibition at any age.

 

1. ✍️ Telling a child to transgress a prohibition:[19]

It is [Biblically[20]] forbidden for any person to instruct any child to eat non-Kosher food [or transgress Shabbos[21] or any other prohibition[22]], even if the child is completely below the age of understanding, [such as a mere one-day old infant]. It is [Rabbinically[23]] forbidden to even ask a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, with exception to the cases to be explained in Halacha C-G.[24] [It is even prohibited to hint to a child regarding this matter, such as by phrasing one’s words in a way that the child will understand that he should do some transgression.[25] Furthermore, even indirect instruction—such as telling the child, “There is no prohibition for you to do such-and-such,” or similar language intended to prompt the action—is forbidden.[26]] *See from the Rav’s Desk at the end of this Halacha for a full analysis on this subject!

Pesik Reishei – Asking a Child to Perform an Act That Inevitably Results in a Prohibition:[27] With regard to asking a child to perform an action that will result in a prohibited outcome by way of p’sik reisha (an inevitable consequence), the Poskim are divided. Some Poskim rule that it is forbidden to instruct a child to perform an act when a prohibition will inevitably occur as a result, even if the prohibited act is indirect. Other Poskim maintain that such an instruction is permitted, since the child is not being asked to perform the prohibition itself [as we rule by Amira Lenachri]. Practically speaking, the prevailing approach is to be stringent and refrain from doing so. However, in a case where the child has no awareness whatsoever that any prohibited action will result from what he is being told to do, and his conduct is thus comparable to mis’asek, there is greater room to be lenient.

Examples of “Lesafos Lo Issur” — Actively Causing a Jewish Child to Transgress

1. Feeding forbidden food

An adult may not place non-kosher food directly into a child’s mouth or feed it to the child with a spoon, even if the child is an infant who has no awareness whatsoever. This applies equally to Biblical prohibitions (e.g., pork or milk and meat together) and Rabbinic prohibitions (e.g., food cooked by a non-Jew where prohibited). It is forbidden for an adult to give a child forbidden food to eat on their own, even if the adult does not literally feed the child. Handing the food to the child constitutes “actively causing” the transgression and falls under the Biblical prohibition of lesafos lo issur.

• Reuven has a young nephew named Daniel, the son of his brother Shimon. Shimon and his family are not observant, and Daniel regularly eats non‑kosher food in his parents’ home. One day, Daniel, who is only three years old, visits Reuven. During the visit, Reuven is holding a sandwich containing cheese with meat. Even though Daniel is accustomed to eating such food and has no understanding of mitzvot, it is strictly prohibited for Reuven to place the sandwich into Daniel’s mouth or to feed him with his own hands, whether directly or with a spoon. It is even forbidden for him to make the sandwich available for him. This prohibition applies despite the fact that Daniel is not frum, is below the age of comprehension, and would otherwise eat this food on his own. Feeding him constitutes lesafos lo issur—actively causing a child to transgress—which is Biblically forbidden.

 

2. Asking a child to violate Shabbos

An adult may not ask a child—regardless of age—to perform a melachah on Shabbos, such as turning on a light, carrying in a public domain, or extinguishing a flame. This applies even if the melachah is only Rabbinically prohibited and even if the child is far below the age of chinuch.

• Example: Levi is hosting his sister’s son, Avi, a nine‑year‑old child who is being raised in a non‑religious home and routinely turns lights on and off on Shabbos. One Friday night, Levi realizes that the light in his bedroom was accidentally left on and is disturbing his sleep. Even though Avi has no observance of Shabbos and is accustomed to performing such actions, it is Biblically forbidden for Levi to ask Avi to turn off the light. Telling the child to do so constitutes lesafos lo issur—actively causing a child to transgress Shabbos—and is prohibited even though Avi is not religious, is below the age of mitzvos, and would otherwise perform such actions on his own.
• Example: Yaakov has a two‑year‑old son named Shlomo. On Shabbos night, Yaakov realizes that the light in the guests bedroom was mistakenly left on and is disturbing his sleep. Even though Shlomo is only two years old, and has no understanding of Shabbos or prohibited labor, it is Biblically forbidden for Yaakov or the guest to ask Shlomo to turn off the light. Instructing the child to do so constitutes lesafos lo issur—actively causing a child to transgress a prohibition—and is prohibited regardless of the child’s age or level of comprehension.

 

⚖️ Differences Between Chinuch and Lesafos Lo Issur

Category	Chinuch	Lesafos Lo Issur
Nature of Obligation	Primarily Rabbinic	Biblical (De’oraisa)
Primary Source	Rabbinic enactment of educating a child	Explicit Torah prohibition
Who Is Obligated	Generally the father	Every Jew (father, mother, relatives, guests, teachers, etc.)
Age of the Child	Applies only after the child reaches the age of chinuch	Applies to a child of any age, even a newborn
Type of Responsibility	To educate, train, and reprimand the child	To refrain from actively causing the child to sin
Focus	The child’s long‑term spiritual development	The adult’s actions toward the child
Applies When Child Has Understanding	Yes	Yes
Applies When Child Has No Understanding	No	Yes
Active Causing of a Sin	Not the primary issue	Central prohibition
Feeding Forbidden Food	Not the core concern	Biblically forbidden, even Rabbinic issurim
Telling a Child to Transgress	Outside the usual framework	Biblically forbidden
Customary Behavior of the Child	Relevant (education depends on readiness)	Irrelevant
Religious Background of the Child	Relevant	Irrelevant
Underlying Principle	Train the child to observe mitzvos	Do not become the cause of a sin
Violation Consequence	Failure of chinuch	Transgression of a Torah prohibition

 

Case	Child’s Age & Background	Adult’s Action	Type of Prohibition	Halachic Ruling	Reason
Feeding non‑kosher food directly	Infant / toddler, no understanding	Adult feeds child non‑kosher food with spoon or hand	Biblical or Rabbinic issur	Biblically forbidden	Actively causing a child to transgress (lesafos lo issur)
Handing forbidden food to child	Young child	Adult gives forbidden food for child to eat	Biblical or Rabbinic issur	Biblically forbidden	Giving the item is considered active causation
Non‑frum nephew eating non‑kosher	3‑year‑old, non‑observant home	Uncle feeds or provides meat‑and‑milk sandwich	Biblical issur	Biblically forbidden	Applies even if child is not frum or accustomed to the issur
Asking child to turn off light (non‑frum home)	9‑year‑old, not Shabbos‑observant	Adult asks child to turn off light on Shabbos	Biblical melachah	Biblically forbidden	Verbal instruction equals active causation
Asking one’s own child to turn off light	2‑year‑old, frum home	Father or guest asks child to turn off bedroom light	Biblical melachah	Biblically forbidden	Age and lack of understanding are irrelevant
Accustoming child to issur	Any young child	Encouraging repeated Shabbos violations	Rabbinic issur	Biblically forbidden	Causing habitual transgression is included in lesafos lo issur
Who the prohibition applies to	Any child	Father, mother, relative, guest	All prohibitions	Applies to all Jews	Unlike chinuch, this is not limited to the father

 

1. Cases of Necessity for The Child & Rabbinical Prohibitions – May Rabbinical prohibitions be fed or provided to a child?[28]

If there is no reason or necessity:[29] If there is no necessity for the child to eat the forbidden food, or be provided with the prohibition, then it is forbidden [according to all opinions] to feed [or provide] him even Rabbinical prohibitions [as stated above in A-B]. This applies even if the child is a mere infant.[30]

If there is a necessity:[31] If there is some necessity for a child to eat Rabbinically forbidden foods for his own benefit[32], then it is disputed amongst Poskim whether one may or may not feed him the food. [This same dispute applies also to providing the child with any other Rabbinical prohibition in a case where the prohibition fulfills some need of the child.] The following are the opinions brought in Admur: Some Poskim[33] rule that it is forbidden for any person to give even a Rabbinically forbidden item to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, and even if the child is in need for it. This applies even if the child is sick, so long as he is not in danger. Thus, regarding feeding a child a prohibition they have the same status as an adult irrelevant of the child’s age. Other Poskim[34], however, rule that it is permitted to feed a child, even above the age of education, any Rabbinical prohibition so long as it is being done for the need of the child, such as for the child to eat and drink if he wants to, and there are not other foods available.[35] Practically, one may[36] rely on the lenient opinion to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition [even if the child is above the age of education[37]] if the child needs it and no gentile is available to feed the child himself.[38] However, if a gentile is available to feed the child the rabbinic prohibition, it is forbidden for a Jew to do so—even when it is for the child’s need, and even if the child is ill [and rather it is to be fed to him  by the gentile]. In all circumstances, it is prohibited to feed a child a biblical prohibition.[39] [Furthermore, even when a child requires food for medical reasons, every possible effort must be made to provide a kosher alternative. This is because consuming non-kosher food can nevertheless have a negative impact on the child’s character.[40] This principle is evident from the ruling that even a pregnant[41] or nursing[42] mother who must eat non-kosher food for medical reasons should avoid doing so whenever possible, and if she does partake of non-kosher food, she should refrain from nursing the child.[43]]

Definition of necessity:[44] A child’s need which can justify feeding him Rabbinical prohibitions in a time of need is defined as a situation in which the food is required for the child’s physical development, [as opposed to for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah[45]], and no alternative food is available.[46] A child’s mere desire to eat the food because it tastes good is certainly not a sufficient justification.[47] [Accordingly, one should not rely on this ruling without first consulting a competent rav to determine whether the circumstances genuinely constitute a necessity for the child.[48]]

 

Summary

It is forbidden to feed a child any prohibition—biblical or rabbinic—when there is no genuine need, regardless of the child’s age. When there is a true necessity for the child’s own physical development, poskim dispute whether rabbinic prohibitions may be fed to him, and in practice one may rely on the lenient view only when no gentile is available to do so. Under all circumstances, a biblical prohibition may never be given to a child.

 

1. Sake of a Mitzvah, Loss Prevention – May a child be instructed to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition on behalf of an adult:[49]

Not for the sake of a Mitzva:[50] According to all opinions it is prohibited for any adult to instruct or even permit a child [of any age, even below the age of Chinuch[51]] to violate even a Rabbinical prohibition solely for the adult’s[52] benefit when no Mitzva is involved [and there is no great loss, as will be explained next].[53] Any such action by the child must be protested against by any adult[54] who sees him doing so, even not the child’s father, and even if child does so of his own initiative on behalf of the adult, as explained in Halacha 7F.

To prevent great loss:[55] In general, it is forbidden to instruct a child to perform even a rabbinically prohibited act, even for the purpose of preventing a significant financial loss.[56] However, in certain specific cases—where a person is so distressed over the potential loss that there is a real concern he may transgress himself—the Sages permitted him to have the rabbinically prohibited act performed through a child, even if the child has reached the age of Chinuch and even if the child is ones own son[57], in order to prevent him from committing the prohibition personally.[58] This leniency applies exclusively to rabbinic prohibitions. A biblical prohibition may never be transgressed, even in a case of great panic or severe financial loss.[59]

For the sake of a Mitzva – Repeated Transgression:[60] According to all opinions, it is forbidden to instruct or even allow a child [of any age] repeatedly violate even a Rabbinic prohibition for the benefit of an adult, even when performed in pursuit of a Mitzva. This restriction is based on concerns that habitual transgression may lead the child to continue such conduct even after reaching adulthood [i.e. Bar and Bas Mitzvah].[61]

For the sake of a Mitzva – Occasional Transgression:[62] In cases where the transgression occurs only on random occasions and solely for the fulfillment of a Mitzva—thereby eliminating concerns of future repetition—the matter is subject to debate amongst the Poskim. Some Poskim[63] rule that it is forbidden to allow a child [of any age], even on an occasional basis, to transgress a prohibition on behalf of an adult, even for the sake of a mitzvah. However, other Poskim[64] maintain that transgressing a Rabbinical prohibition only on random occasions for the sake of a Mitzva is permitted being that there is no worry that the child may come to repeat the prohibition when older.[65] Practically one may be lenient like this opinion which permits instructing and allowing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzva.[66] [This applies even if the child is above the age of Chinuch, and even to the child’s parents.[67] However, one may not allow the child to transgress a biblical prohibition under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence.[68]]

• Case Example:[69] Based on the lenient opinion above, on Friday night a child may be given to drink from the wine of Kiddush customarily recited in shul [even though it is not Bemakom Seuda], since it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, as at times guests eat in shul and drink the Kiddush wine, and it is therefore not a regular practice to give the wine specifically to a child. [In truth, this is permitted even according to the stringent opinion mentioned above, due to an additional consideration[70], as will be explained in Chapter 11, Halacha 21H. see there for a full discussion of this matter.]

 

Summary

It is generally forbidden for an adult to instruct or permit a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition for the adult’s own benefit, even if the child is below the age of education—such actions must be protested by any adult who witnesses them. However, if the transgression is for the sake of a mitzvah and occurs only occasionally, some authorities permit instructing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition due to the lack of concern that the child will become habituated to the behavior. Nonetheless, it is prohibited to instruct or allow a child to repeatedly violate even a Rabbinical prohibition, even in pursuit of a mitzvah, as this may lead to habitual transgression into adulthood. Under all circumstances, a child may not be instructed to transgress a Biblical prohibition, even for a mitzvah or as a rare event.

 

 

 

1. May one feed a child a Rabbinical Issur for the sake of educating him for a Mitzva?[71]

A Mitzvah that the child will fulfill as an adult: Any matter that serves the purpose of chinuch— for the purpose of educating a child to perform a mitzvah when he reaches bar mitzvah—may be given to a child even if it involves a prohibition. For example, one may feed a child from the Pesach offering even though the child was not included in the original registration at the time of the slaughter, in which case an adult would be prohibited from eating it. Nevertheless, since the intent is to educate the child in the performance of the mitzvah, it is permitted in the case of a minor.

A Mitzvah that the child will not fulfill as an adult:[72] The above allowance only applies if the mitzvah is one that the child will be able to fulfill upon reaching bar mitzvah. However, if the mitzvah is one that the child will be unable to fulfill upon reaching bar mitzvah, then the prohibition may not be given to him, due to concern that he may become accustomed to the act and continue it improperly later.[73] Accordingly, a child may not be given the wine of a brit milah on Yom Kippur so that the blessing should not appear to have been said in vain, since this practice would be prohibited to him as an adult.[74]

 

1. Asking a gentile to feed a child non-Kosher food or have him perform another prohibition:[75]

It is prohibited for any individual to instruct a non-Jew to provide a child with non-Kosher food [even if the prohibition is only Rabbinical[76]] or to transgress any other prohibition, even if the child is below the age of understanding.[77]

If the child needs to eat the food, such as for medical necessity:[78] If a child requires non-Kosher food for medical reasons, such as mild illness, it is permissible to request that a non-Jew administer the forbidden food to the child, [even if the food is Biblically prohibited[79]].[80] This allowance, however, applies only when no Kosher alternative is available for the child. [81]

 

1. Giving a child an item with which he may commit a prohibition:[82]

Non-Kosher food: It is forbidden to give a child [of any age] non‑kosher food if there is a chance that he may come to eat.[83] [This applies even to food forbidden merely due to Rabbinic decree.[84]] Moreover, even food that is prohibited only during a specific time period[85] may not be given to a child [when it is forbidden for him to consume it at that time] if there is a chance that he may come to eat it.[86]

Foods prohibited due to repulsiveness:[87] Even foods that are forbidden solely because of their repulsive nature, and thus fall under the prohibition of bal teshaktzu, may not be given to a child if there is concern that the child may come to eat them.

A live creature:[88] It is forbidden to give an infant a live non‑kosher locust to play with, as it may die and the child may come to eat it, in which case it is considered as though one actively fed the child non‑kosher food. However, one may give a child a live treif[89] bird to play with, since even if it dies, it is not fit for consumption in its present state. [Furthermore, in modern times being that it is no longer customary to eat locusts, a live non-Kosher locust may be given to children to play with, as there is no concern that they will eat it.[90]]

Giving the child an item with which he will desecrate Shabbos with:[91] All of the above restrictions apply specifically to prohibited foods, even where the prohibition is time‑dependent.[92] However, with respect to Shabbos, it is permitted to give a child [of any age below Bar and Bas Mitzvah[93]] objects with which he may perform a prohibited act for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so [and even if the act is Biblically forbidden].[94] [Some Poskim[95] rule that this leniency applies even in a case where the child would be unable to reach the item without the assistance of an adult. This leniency however only applies to individuals other than the child’s father.[96] The father, however, may give such an item to a child only if the child is below the age of chinuch.[97] Once the child reaches the age of chinuch, the father is obligated to educate him in mitzvot and to protest improper behavior, and therefore may not provide him with an item through which he will perform a prohibition.[98]] For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos.[99] Although the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is solely for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him.[100] Nevertheless, an adult may not place the food directly into the child’s mouth[101], [nor instruct the child to eat it, as explained in Halacha B]. [Likewise, it is forbidden for one to tell the baby to eat it.[102]] [Some Poskim[103] maintain that if an item will cause the child to engage in a constant prohibition, it may not be given to him. Others[104] rule that any item whose primary function involves the performance of a prohibited act, in which case it will most certainly be performed by the child, may not be given to a child at all. Likewise, if providing the item to the child implicitly conveys to him that he is expected to perform a prohibited act with it, this would seemingly fall under the standard category of sefiya, and is no different from explicitly instructing the child to perform the prohibition. Accordingly, only in a case where the child has not yet reached a level of maturity or understanding to recognize that the adult, by providing the item, is asking him to perform a prohibited act, may there be room to permit it.[105]]

Giving a child an item with the intent that he desecrate Shabbos: Some Poskim[106] rule that the above leniency applies only when the item is given to the child without intent that he perform a prohibited act with it. However, if the giver’s intent is specifically that the child commits a transgression using the item, it is forbidden to give it to him.[107]

 

General Summary ·         It is forbidden to instruct any child—even an infant—to transgress a prohibition, whether biblical or rabbinic. ·         However, if a child requires a rabbinic prohibition to be transgressed for his physical well‑being or development, and no non‑Jew is available to perform the act, there is room to be lenient and allow the child himself to transgress a rabbinic prohibition. ·         Likewise, if the transgression is for the sake of a mitzvah and occurs only occasionally, some authorities permit instructing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition even when not being done for his sake. ·         Additionally, foods that are intrinsically kosher but prohibited only during a specific time period may be fed to a child, even if he has reached the age of chinuch. ·         One may always instruct a non‑Jew to transgress a prohibition on behalf of a child when the child is in need, such as in cases of illness. ·         It is forbidden to give any child—even an infant—non‑kosher food, or any non‑kosher item that he may come to eat, even if the item is given to him merely to play with. ·         It is permitted to give a child an item with which he may desecrate Shabbat, provided that the item is not given with the intent that he perform a prohibited act. Some authorities maintain that if the item will lead to a constant transgression, it may not be given to the child. Others rule that any item whose primary function is the performance of a prohibited act may not be given to a child at all.

 

Topic	Core rule	Key conditions / exceptions
Overall	“Lesafos Issur” is an independent prohibition (not the general mitzvah of chinuch) against actively causing a child to transgress.	Applies to every Jew, even when the child is very young.
A. Actively feeding an issur	It is Biblically forbidden to actively feed a child a Biblical prohibition.	Applies even below the age of understanding (even an infant).
Time‑dependent foods	Foods that are intrinsically kosher but temporarily prohibited may be hand‑fed to a child when needed.	E.g., before Kiddush / on Yom Kippur; do not cause distress by withholding. If no need, do not feed.
B. Instructing a child to transgress	It is forbidden to instruct a child to transgress; even asking a child to do a Rabbinic prohibition is forbidden.	Includes indirect prompting/hinting; some discussion re p’sik reisha—practice is to be stringent (with limited room to be lenient if the child has no awareness of the prohibited result).
C. Rabbinic prohibitions for child’s need	Without genuine need: forbidden to feed/provide even Rabbinic prohibitions.	With true need for child’s physical development: dispute; in practice rely on lenient view only if no gentile is available. A Biblical issur is never permitted.
D. Child transgressing for an adult	Generally forbidden for an adult to instruct/permit a child to do even a Rabbinic prohibition for the adult’s benefit.	Great loss: limited cases allow using a child for a Rabbinic act to prevent the adult from sinning. For a mitzvah: repeated transgression forbidden; occasional transgression—some permit, and practice may be lenient for Rabbinic only.
E. “For chinuch” via an issur	An act done for chinuch may be allowed even if it involves a prohibition.	Only when it trains for a mitzvah the child will fulfill as an adult; if not applicable as an adult, do not do it (concern of habituation).
F. Asking a gentile	In general, one may not instruct a non‑Jew to provide a child with non‑kosher food / do a prohibition.	If the child needs it medically and no kosher alternative exists, one may ask a non‑Jew to administer (even a Biblical issur).
G. Giving an item that may lead to issur	Forbidden to give non‑kosher (or other prohibited) items to a child when there’s a chance he may come to consume them.	Includes items “to play with” if there’s concern of eating. For Shabbos items: may be permitted to give items for the child’s own benefit, but not with intent that he desecrate.

 

✍️ From the Rav’s Desk: The Prohibition of Instructing a Minor to Transgress: Scope, Severity, and Halachic Basis

Question

I am seeking clarity regarding the parameters and severity of the prohibition against telling a child to perform an act that is prohibited for an adult—such as on Shabbos or with respect to any other prohibition in the Torah. I understand that it is forbidden to ask a child to do a prohibited act. However:

1. Is this prohibition based on the mitzvah of chinuch (education)?
2. Does it apply only to the father, or to any adult?
3. Does it apply only to biblically prohibited acts, or also to rabbinic prohibitions?
4. Is the prohibition itself biblical or rabbinic in nature?
5. Does it apply only to a child who has reached the age of chinuch, or even to very young children?

 

Answer

It is forbidden for any adult, not only the father, to instruct any minor, even a very young child and even below the age of chinuch, to perform any act that is prohibited for an adult. This prohibition applies to both biblical and rabbinic prohibitions. According to most Rishonim and Poskim, the prohibition to instruct a child to violate a biblical prohibition is itself of biblical status. The prohibition is not based on chinuch, but on an independent Torah commandment known as “לא תאכילום” (lo ta’achilum), which the Sages understood to prohibit adults from actively causing minors to transgress.

 

Explanation

This concept is known in halachic terminology as ספייה בידיים (safiya b’yadayim), meaning actively causing a minor to transgress. Unlike chinuch, which focuses on guidance and correction, safiya b’yadayim treats the adult’s action as a direct violation of Torah law. Consequently, anything that is forbidden for an adult to do is likewise forbidden for him to cause a child to do, whether through action or instruction, and when the underlying prohibition is biblical, the severity of the prohibition remains biblical as well.

 

The foundation of this prohibition is found in the Gemara (Yevamos 114a), which teaches that it is forbidden for an adult to feed non‑kosher food to a child. The Gemara derives this from three separate biblical contexts: the prohibition of eating non‑kosher creeping creatures, the prohibition of consuming blood, and the prohibition for Kohanim to become defiled through contact with the dead. In each case, the Torah’s language is expounded by Chazal to include not only a prohibition on the individual, but also a prohibition upon adults to actively cause minors to transgress. In particular, the verse “לא תאכלום” is traditionally read as “לא תאכילום”—do not feed them. Although these verses explicitly address only three categories of prohibitions, the Rishonim and Poskim explain that they are not isolated cases. Rather, they serve as paradigms from which a general principle is derived. From these examples, Chazal establish that it is forbidden for an adult to actively cause a child to violate any prohibition of the Torah. This includes all biblical prohibitions, not merely those mentioned explicitly in the verses. Thus, the prohibition is comprehensive in scope and applies across the entirety of Torah law.

 

This prohibition is fundamentally distinct from the rabbinic mitzvah of chinuch. Chinuch is an educational obligation intended to train a child to observe mitzvos so that he will continue to do so upon reaching adulthood. It is primarily incumbent upon the father, applies only once the child has reached an age of understanding, and is rabbinic in nature. By contrast, the prohibition of לא תאכילום is not educational at all. It is an independent prohibition that applies to all adults, regardless of parental relationship, and applies even to children who are far below the age of chinuch, including infants.

 

Because this prohibition is not rooted in chinuch, it applies universally and without regard to the child’s cognitive ability. Even if the child has no understanding of the act and no halachic responsibility, the adult who causes the transgression bears full responsibility. For this reason,

even a one‑year‑old child may not be instructed to perform a prohibited act.

 

However, a further question arises regarding whether there is a distinction between actively feeding a child a prohibited item and merely instructing the child to perform a prohibited act himself. One might argue that instructing a child resembles amira le‑nochri, which is generally a rabbinic prohibition. However, many Rishonim and Poskim reject this comparison. They maintain that instructing a child to transgress constitutes direct causation and is therefore included in the biblical prohibition of לא תאכילום. According to this view, the adult’s verbal instruction is functionally equivalent to physically feeding the child the prohibition.

 

Sources:

See regarding the general prohibition of Sefiyah Beyadayim: Admur 343:5 “All of the above applies only with regard to the obligation to separate a child from a transgression. However, to actively feed a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden for every person, even if the child is not at all capable of understanding, as it is stated: “Do not eat them”—which the Sages expounded to mean: “Do not feed them to minors.” This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 266:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41; Michaber 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Yevamos 114a; Terumos Hadeshen 62; M”B 343:4 “As for forbidden food—everyone is prohibited from it, and if the infant eats it, the infant has no understanding at all. And this matter is prohibited by the Torah, for we derive it from what is written regarding creeping creatures: “You shall not eat them” (lo tochelum), and the verse is read thus, and the Sages received it as an exposition to mean: “You shall not feed them to minors.” And likewise regarding blood it is written: “Any soul among you shall not eat blood,” and the Sages received this as an exposition to mean: “Do not feed [blood] to minors.” And likewise regarding the impurity of priests it is written: “Say and you shall say,” and the Sages said: “Say”—to the adults, that they should say [it] to the minors. And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress. Therefore it is forbidden to give a child any food that is forbidden, or to give it to him to play with, lest he come to eat it, for this is considered as though one feeds him directly by hand. [This is the ruling of the Magen Avraham], even [in such a case], etc., and [one may not avoid this] by saying [to do so] to a non‑Jew.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 194; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1

See regarding that the prohibition is Biblical: Admur ibid; 262:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41 in end; Bach 343 and Taz 343 that so applies according to Tur; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Achiezer 3:1 in name of Noda Beyehuda; M”B ibid; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that the prohibition to cause a child to eat non-Kosher food is merely Rabbinical. [P”M 343 M”Z 2 in opinion of Tur and possibly Rambam]

See regarding that the Biblical prohibition applies to all Issurim: Implication of Admur ibid “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food; Implication of Shut Admur 41; Implication of Yevamos ibid as learn many Rishonim, Achronim, and Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Ramban Vayikra 21:1; Mishneh Berurah 343:4 and Shaar Hatziyon 434:12 as is learned from the Gedolei Harishonim on Talmud [Yevamos 112] which brings three verses which teach that it is forbidden for a Gadol to help a child transgress “And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 506; Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1 “And only from the combination of all three of these matters do we learn, by means of the common denominator, that in all prohibitions the adults are warned with regard to the minors.” 

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by prohibitions other than non-Kosher foods, the prohibition to cause a child to sin is merely Rabbinical. [Levush 343:1; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Pesicha Koleles 2:9 in opinion of Tur; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 508]

Opinion of Admur: Admur does not explicitly write that the above prohibition of feeding a child an Issur extends to all other prohibitions in the Torah, although it is implied from his beginning wording which states “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food. The same is implied from Shut Rabbeinu ibid

See regarding that the prohibition applies to even instructing the child to do so: Admur 343:5 “It is forbidden for any Jew to instruct a non‑Jew to feed the child prohibited items, since instructing a non‑Jew (amira lenochri) is forbidden with regard to all Torah prohibitions—and certainly one may not instruct the child himself to do so.”; So rule regarding even Amirah Lenachri, and certainly this would apply even more so to instructing the child directly: M”A 343:2; Rashi Yevamos 114a; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 p. 13; Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Mishneh Berura 343:4; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

See regarding that the prohibition to even instructing the child to do so is also Biblical: Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Shiltei Giborim Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M ibid; M”B 343:4 “And this matter is prohibited by the Torah…And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

• Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Mishneh Lemelech in name of Rashba, brought and negated in Tehila Ledavid ibid]
• Opinion of Admur: It is not clear from Admur whether the prohibition he mentions against instructing a child to perform a prohibited act is biblical or rabbinic. On the one hand, Admur discusses this prohibition toward the end of the halakhah in the context of Amirah Lenachri, which suggests that instructing a child may itself be only rabbinically prohibited. This would imply that the biblical prohibition applies specifically to actively feeding a child a forbidden substance. This reading is further supported by siman 265:10, where Admur does not indicate that a biblical prohibition is involved in simply telling a child to carry a wallet or money from place to place and refers consistently to a case in which the wallet was placed onto the child. This approach appears to follow those authorities who maintain that instructing a child is prohibited only on a rabbinic level, whereas the biblical prohibition is limited to directly causing the child to consume or perform the prohibited matter. Vetzaruch Iyun! See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

 

[1] See Admur 343:5-10; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150; Toras Hakatan Chapters 15 – 28

[2] Admur 343:5 “All of the above applies only with regard to the obligation to separate a child from a transgression. However, to actively feed a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden for every person, even if the child is not at all capable of understanding, as it is stated: “Do not eat them”—which the Sages expounded to mean: “Do not feed them to minors.” This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 266:10; Admur 616:1 “This applies even if the water was heated before Yom Kippur, since bathing in hot water is not prohibited solely because of the mitzvah of affliction. After all, throughout the year on Shabbat it is permitted to wash with hot water. Rather, there is also a rabbinic decree concerning bathhouses—meaning that bath attendants are suspected of heating water on Shabbat. For this reason, entering a bathhouse on Shabbat was prohibited, as explained in the relevant section. Therefore, these acts may be done for the minor directly by hand, just as one feeds him directly, in all matters prohibited by rabbinic law, as explained in סימן שמ״ג.”; 616:2 “Likewise, it is forbidden for an adult to put sandals on the minor, since this does not constitute affliction for the minor, who does not feel the deprivation as strongly. However, if the minor puts them on himself, whether one is required to protest is explained in סימן שמ״ג—see there.”; Shut Rabbeinu 41; Michaber 343:1; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Yevamos 114a; Terumos Hadeshen 62; M”A 616:2; M”B 343:4 “As for forbidden food—everyone is prohibited from it, and if the infant eats it, the infant has no understanding at all. And this matter is prohibited by the Torah, for we derive it from what is written regarding creeping creatures: “You shall not eat them” (lo tochelum), and the verse is read thus, and the Sages received it as an exposition to mean: “You shall not feed them to minors.” And likewise regarding blood it is written: “Any soul among you shall not eat blood,” and the Sages received this as an exposition to mean: “Do not feed [blood] to minors.” And likewise regarding the impurity of priests it is written: “Say and you shall say,” and the Sages said: “Say”—to the adults, that they should say [it] to the minors. And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress. Therefore, it is forbidden to give a child any food that is forbidden, or to give it to him to play with, lest he come to eat it, for this is considered as though one feeds him directly by hand. [This is the ruling of the Magen Avraham], even [in such a case], etc., and [one may not avoid this] by saying [to do so] to a non‑Jew.”; Kaf Hachaim 343:6; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 194 and 187; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and 7; Toras Hakatan 15:1-14; 21

Is there Issur Sefiyah for a gentile child? See Toras Hakatan 16:12

[3] Admur ibid; 262:10; Shut Rabbeinu 41 in end; Bach 343 and Taz 343 that so applies according to Tur; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Achiezer 3:1 in name of Noda Beyehuda; M”B ibid; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid p. 195 footnote 506; Toras Hakatan 15

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that the prohibition to cause a child to eat non-Kosher food is merely Rabbinical. [P”M 343 M”Z 2 in opinion of Tur and possibly Rambam]

[4] Admur ibid; Shut Rabbeinu 41 “However, to feed a minor a prohibition directly is forbidden according to all opinions—not because of chinuch, but rather because it is written “You shall not eat them,” which is expounded as “You shall not feed them,” as stated in the chapter Cheresh. For the obligation of chinuch is not imposed upon the father alone, as the Rambam writes—see Orach Chaim, siman 343.”; M”A 616:2; Levush 343:1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4; See Yevamos ibid; Rashi Yevamos 90a; Toras Hakatan 17

[5] See Admur 616:4; 640:4

[6] The source: This is learned from the verse regarding creeping creatures [Vayikra 11:42] “Do not feed them” which the Sages learned to mean that one may not feed a prohibited food to Ketanim, Lehazhir Gedolim Al Haketanim. [Admur ibid; Yevamos 112a] And likewise regarding blood it is written: “Any soul among you shall not eat blood,” and the Sages received this as an exposition to mean: “Do not feed [blood] to minors.” And likewise regarding the impurity of priests it is written: “Say and you shall say,” and the Sages said: “Say”—to the adults, that they should say [it] to the minors. And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress. [M”B ibid; Yevamos ibid] See also Toras Kohanim end of Shemini; and beginning of Parshas Emor; See Likkutei Sichos ibid that every Jew—regardless of age—possesses the same essential G‑dly soul. From the perspective of the soul’s essence, there is no difference between a newborn child and an adult; all share an equal and identical level of essential G‑dliness. Differences between individuals exist only in the revelation and expression of the soul’s faculties, such as intellect and emotion, which are far more developed in adults than in children. This distinction is comparable to physical life‑force: the same life energy animates all bodies equally, regardless of size, while other faculties vary. Accordingly, the true difference between Jews lies only in external soul faculties, not in the soul’s essence. This principle explains why the Torah holds adults responsible not to cause a child to transgress—since, at their core, a child and an adult share the same essential sanctity. [Likkutei Sichos ibid] Alternatively, the reason for this prohibition is because the child may become used to performing the prohibition even when an adult. [Terumos Hadeshen 62; See Chasam Sofer O.C. 83; Achiezer 3:81]

[7] See M”B 343:4; Tehila Ledavid 343:1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[8] Admur ibid and 266:10; M”A 343:2; M”B 343:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:19; Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1; See Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 509; See M”B  343 Shaareiy Tziyon 6; Toras Hakatan 16

[9] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[10] Admur 343:7-8

[11] Admur 616:1-2 regarding bathing and placing sandals on a child on Yom Kippur; Implication of Admur ibid “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food; Implication of Shut Admur 41; Implication of Yevamos ibid as learn many Rishonim, Achronim, and Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos; Rashba Shabbos 153, brought in Tehila Ledavid 343:7; Ramban Vayikra 21:1; Mishneh Berurah 343:4 and Shaar Hatziyon 434:12 as is learned from the Gedolei Harishonim on Talmud [Yevamos 112] which brings three verses which teach that it is forbidden for a Gadol to help a child transgress “And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 506; Rebbe in Likkutei Sichos Vol. 7 Sicha 1 “And only from the combination of all three of these matters do we learn, by means of the common denominator, that in all prohibitions the adults are warned with regard to the minors.”

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that by prohibitions other than non-Kosher foods, the prohibition to cause a child to sin is merely Rabbinical. [Levush 343:1; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Pesicha Koleles 2:9 in opinion of Tur; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 508] See Toras Hakatan 15

Opinion of Admur: Admur does not explicitly write that the above prohibition of feeding a child an Issur extends to all other prohibitions in the Torah, although it is implied from his beginning wording which states “To provide a child a prohibited item with one’s own hands is Biblically forbidden” which implies that it includes all Issurim and not just non-kosher food. The same is implied from Shut Rabbeinu ibid

[12] This is going on Rabbinical matters of which there are opinions which rule one may have a child transgress them on an occasional basis. [Admur 343:6] However a biblical prohibition is always forbidden to ask a child to perform. [Admur 265:10] The Mishneh Berura 343:6 explains an example of this to mean to ask a child to carry a key in a public domain on Shabbos; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[13] Admur 269:3 “It is permitted to feed a minor before Kiddush, whether at night or during the day. One may not cause affliction to a minor, for the prohibition against actively feeding a child applies only when the food itself is intrinsically forbidden, such as non‑kosher food and the like. However, when the food is intrinsically permitted but the time is one during which eating is prohibited, it is permitted to feed it to a minor. Thus, minors are fed on Yom Kippur, even one for whom there is no concern of danger were he to fast.”; 471:10; 616:1 “Accordingly, it is permitted for an adult to feed a minor, give him drink, apply ointment to him, and wash him with cold water.”; Rama 612:10; 616; Magen Avraham 269:1; Tur 616; Sefer Hayashar Rabbeinu Tam Chidushei Hateshuvos 52; Rashba and Meiri Eiruvin 40b and Yevamos 114a; Mishneh Berura 269:1; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 187; This ruling applies even according to the stringent opinion cited by the Alter Rebbe, which prohibits feeding a child even a rabbinic prohibition as that stringency is limited to foods that are intrinsically prohibited in and of themselves, such as a piece of neveilah.

[14] As is proven from that a child may eat on Yom Kippur. Vetzaruch Iyun regarding Chameitz.

[15] Ketzos Hashulchan 147

[16] The reason: As the [Sages] only prohibited feeding [Rabbinically] forbidden foods [to a child] when the food is forbidden in it of itself, such as a piece of Treifa [Niveila] and the like. However, if the food is Kosher in it of itself and it is just forbidden to be eaten within a certain time slot, then it is permitted to be fed to a child. A proof for this is the ruling regarding feeding a child on Yom Kippur in which case one may do so even if there is no danger involved for the child to fast. [Admur 269:3; M”A 269:1; Yevamos 114b; Machatzis Hashekel on M”A 106:3]

[17] This implication emerges from the Alter Rebbe’s wording here, and is further supported by 621:4, which indicates that a child may not be given wine from a bris on Yom Kippur, despite this too being only a temporary prohibition—whereas for this very reason a child may otherwise be fed on Yom Kippur. See the footnote in the Questions and Answers section regarding eating before Kiddush for a more detailed analysis of this distinction.

[18] See Sefas Emes Sukkah 42a based on Tosafus Erechin 2b; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 175 footnote 207

[19] Admur 343:5 “It is forbidden for any Jew to instruct a non‑Jew to feed the child prohibited items, since instructing a non‑Jew (amira lenochri) is forbidden with regard to all Torah prohibitions—and certainly one may not instruct the child himself to do so.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited even if only by rabbinic law.”; Rashbatz in Piskeiy Nida ; Kisei Eliyahu 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4; So rule regarding even Amirah Lenachri, and certainly this would apply even more so to instructing the child directly: M”A 343:2; Rashi Yevamos 114a; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 p. 13; Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M 343 M”Z 1; Mishneh Berura 343:4; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150; Toras Hakatan 18

[20] Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Shiltei Giborim Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M ibid; M”B 343:4 “And this matter is prohibited by the Torah…And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2; See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Mishneh Lemelech in name of Rashba, brought and negated in Tehila Ledavid ibid; Toras Hakatan 18:1]

Opinion of Admur: It is not clear from Admur whether the prohibition he mentions against instructing a child to perform a prohibited act is biblical or rabbinic. On the one hand, Admur discusses this prohibition toward the end of the halakhah in the context of Amirah Lenachri [and in 343:6], which suggests that instructing a child may itself be only rabbinically prohibited. This would imply that the biblical prohibition applies specifically to actively feeding a child a forbidden substance. This reading is further supported by siman 265:10, where Admur does not indicate that a biblical prohibition is involved in simply telling a child to carry a wallet or money from place to place and refers consistently to a case in which the wallet was placed onto the child. This approach appears to follow those authorities who maintain that instructing a child is prohibited only on a rabbinic level, whereas the biblical prohibition is limited to directly causing the child to consume or perform the prohibited matter. Vetzarcuh Iyun! See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[21] Admur 265:10; Rishonim ibid; Poskim ibid; In Admur 343:5 the Halacha is referring to telling a child to eat non-Kosher. The Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3 adds that this includes telling a child to desecrate Shabbos. This is explicitly stated by Admur in 265:10; VeTzaruch Iyun based on this from 328:13 that implies that asking a child to transgress Shabbos in a case of danger is better than having an adult do it, hence implying there is no Biblical prohibition involved in asking him! A. Perhaps one can say that the Issur in asking a child is not in having him do the transgression but in asking him to do something which he is not allowed to do. However, in a case of danger since even a Jew may do so, asking the child is not forbidden at all, and hence there is no prohibition at all taking place, as the child is not commanded in Mitzvos and the adult was allowed to ask him. If, however, an adult transgresses, then although it is allowed and a Mitzvah, it is merely Dechuyah and is like the mashal of an amputation. Hence the advantage of asking a child is that it goes from dechuyah or Hutrah

Instructing a child before Shabbat to perform a transgression on Shabbos: One may not direct a child, even prior to Shabbat, to carry out an act on Shabbat that constitutes a transgression. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3]

[22] Mishneh Berura 343:4; Rishonim and Poskim ibid

[23] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[24] Admur 343:7-8

[25] Implication of Poskim that doing so is within the realm of Lesafos Lo Issur; Sefer Shevisaso Shel Katan 2:3; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[26] Rashbatz in Piskeiy Nida ; Kisei Eliyahu 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[27] See Pnei Meivin 198; Beis Yitzchak 44; Chelkas Yoav 1; Maor Hashabbos 4:13; Chut Shani 4:95; Teshuvos Vehanahgos 1:230; 3:82; Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnotes 64-66

[28] See Admur 343:5-8; See also Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Tiferes Yisarel Pesicha Miseches Eiruvin; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:11 in great length; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Beir Moshe 6:18; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 197; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13 footnote 145; Toras Hakatan Chapters 21-24

[29] Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law….. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 343:6 “But if he does not need it, it is forbidden to feed him even if he is not yet capable of understanding (and his father must protest if he is capable of understanding), even with regard to a rabbinic prohibition. For it is forbidden to nurse him with his mother’s milk after twenty‑four months, even though the prohibition of a woman’s milk is only rabbinic, since he no longer needs it after twenty‑four months.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited even if only by rabbinic law.”; Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Michaber 343:1; Y.D. 81:7; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Tosafus Rosh Hashanah 32a; Mordechai Shabbos 369; M”A 343:3; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma 2a; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Rebbe Eliezer in Braisa Kesubos 60a; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 544

The source: This law is learned from the ruling in Michaber Yoreh Deah 81:7 in which it states that it is forbidden for a toddler past 24 months to restart nursing, even though nursing is a mere rabbinical prohibition, being that the child no longer needs the milk. [Admur 343:6]

[30] Admur ibid; 266:10; M”A 343:2

[31] See Admur 343:5-6 and 8; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 198 footnotes 5244-549

[32] Meaning that he is hungry or thirsty and there is nothing else available to eat, or he needs to eat for medical reasons.

[33] Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; M”B 362:44; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549

[34] Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 “And there are those who say that anything which is for the need of an infant—such as eating and drinking—the Sages did not decree against it at all, and it is permitted to feed him by hand any matter whose prohibition is only rabbinic, if he needs it, even if he has reached the age of education (Chinuch).” Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 “But anything that is for the infant’s own need and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he might become accustomed to it and do the same when he grows up. This is because it is known to him that they permit his needs only because he is small, and he will not be misled by this to do so when he grows up. Therefore, it is permitted to feed him before Kiddush if he wishes to eat, and likewise to give him to drink, and it is forbidden to afflict him. And so too with all similar cases regarding all other rabbinic prohibitions.” [See Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 7 that this Halacha in Admur is a continuation of the lenient opinion in 343:6]; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; M”A 556:1; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548

[35] The reason we don’t suspect the child will do so also when older: When an action serves the child’s own needs and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he would become habituated to it and continue the practice as an adult. Since it is understood that such permission is granted only because he is a minor, there is no risk that he will be misled to act similarly when he matures. [Admur 343:7; M”A 556:1; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Ran 57a]

[36] May one be stringent like the first opinion if he so chooses? If one chooses to however he may be stringent like the first opinion, and on this it was not stated that one may not oppress a child. [Tzemach Tzedek Miluim 13]

[37] As the lenient opinion does not differentiate in this matter between a child who is above or beneath the age of Chinuch

[38] Admur 343:6 “One may rely on their words to be lenient with rabbinic prohibitions when the child needs it and there is no non‑Jew available to feed him.”; Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 follows the lenient opinion, although without depending it on a gentile not being available – see below for the explanation on this contradiction; [Vetzaruch Iyun from all the following areas where Admur makes no mention of this lenient opinion: Admur 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; See Tzemach Tzedek O.C. Safek Lemi 4; Hearos Ubiurim 829 p. 64]; Taz 346:6 [regarding child brining key through a Karmalis]; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Rav Akiva Eiger Kama 15; Kesav Sofer 47 [not to protest against one who is lenient]; Maharam Shick O.C. 173 is  Milameid Zecgus on the Makilim; Shoel Umeishiv Mahdurah Gimel 117; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27 records the lenient opinion Lehalacha; Implication of Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that he is lenient (unlike M”B 362:44); Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 145 concludes that there is no final arbitration on this matter although writes that Ashkenazim are accustomed to be lenient in this while Sephardim are stringent

Other opinions – Sephardim: Some Poskim rule that one must be stringent like the former opinion which prohibits a Jew from directly feeding a child even a Rabbinically forbidden food even in a time of need. [M”B 362:44 (unlike Biur Halacha ibid); Kesav Sofer 47 that initially we do not rule Lekula; Mahariy Asad 84; Levushei Mordechai 1:51; Arugas Habosem 1:69; Maharshag 2:24; Maharam Shick O.C. 173; Livyas Chen 128 and Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid that so rule Sephardim as is Setimas Maran]

Ruling of Ketzos Hashulchan: Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 who omits this final conclusion of Admur. However, indeed, in Badei HaShulchan 11:11 he addresses this omission, explaining that he intentionally refrained from publicizing this lenient ruling of Admur, since there are Rishonim who maintain that one should not rely on the lenient view. Nevertheless, this itself requires further iyun: if the Alter Rebbe himself ruled leniently, then who are we—who follow his rulings—to diverge from his pesak?

Contradiction from Admur 343:7: Regarding that which the Alter Rebbe rules explicitly in 343:7, which appears to imply that one must never withhold a rabbinic prohibition from a child: There the Alter Rebbe writes that a child may be fed any rabbinic prohibition for his need, and that it is forbidden to oppress him, and he concludes that the same applies to all rabbinic prohibitions. The Tzemach Tzedek (Miluim 13) raises several difficulties with this ruling:

1. In the previous halachah, the Alter Rebbe merely rules that one may be lenient in accordance with the second opinion—and only under specific conditions, such as when no gentile is available—whereas here he appears to rule that one must be lenient.
2. In truth, the specific case discussed in Halacha 7 (tasting before Kiddush) is permitted even according to the first opinion, as the Alter Rebbe explicitly rules in 269:3, since this is not an intrinsic prohibition. Why, then, is this distinction not mentioned here?
3. Moreover, with regard to these matters, one may be lenient even with a biblical prohibition, as is evident from the allowance to feed a minor on Yom Kippur.

The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 7) resolves these questions by explaining that Halacha 7 is not an independent ruling, but rather a continuation and clarification of the second opinion. The Alter Rebbe’s intent is to explain that, according to this opinion, any rabbinic prohibition may be given to a child for his own need—this in contrast to actions performed for the needs of adults, which were prohibited in the previous halachah even according to the second opinion. See there for his resolution of the remaining difficulty raised by the Tzemach Tzedek.

In conclusion: The ruling of 343:7 does not represent the Alter Rebbe’s final and absolute position regarding all rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, it is stated within the framework of the second opinion, and the practical ruling therefore remains as stated above: this leniency applies only under specific circumstances, such as when no gentile is available.

[39] Pashut from all Poskim ibid! Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[40] Rama Yoreh Deah 81:7 regarding an infant eating milk from a gentile, as explained in Shach 81:26; M”A 343:2; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 4; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:9; See Pri Chadash (Yoreh De’ah, siman 81, se’if katan 26) who already protested and cried out sharply about this matter, stating as follows: Since in our times people are not careful with these matters of forbidden foods, most children go astray, and most of the insolent individuals of our generation lack any fear of Heaven that penetrates their hearts. Even when they are rebuked directly, they are not receptive to moral instruction. And who is greater for us than Elisha ben Avuyah? For he did not come to that path because of any later deed of his own, but rather because his mother, who was pregnant with him, passed by a place where food was being cooked for idolatry. She smelled it and felt a need to eat from it, and that substance permeated him like the venom of a snake.”

Time‑Dependent Prohibitions: The Achronim have discussed whether this negative effect applies also to permitted foods that become prohibited due to time-related restrictions, such as chametz on Passover, eating on Yom Kippur, and eating matzah on the day before Passover. [See Darkei Teshuvah 81:90; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 4] From the words of the Gemara in Yoma (82b), which discusses a pregnant woman who smelled food on Yom Kippur, it is evident that this category is also included. [Arugas Habosem O.C. 138] Nevertheless, it is certainly forbidden to be stringent in a situation involving even a possible danger to life, and the ruling must be determined according to the judgment of the halachic authority in each case. However, allowing a minor to eat before kiddush or havdalah is clearly more lenient according to all opinions, since this prohibition is merely a rabbinic safeguard enacted out of respect for the sanctity of the day. [Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:9]

[41] Darkei Moshe O.C. 617:1 “One must be careful that a pregnant woman guard herself as much as possible that she does not eat pork and non-kosher meats as this will cause that her child will be God fearing”; Or Zarua 279; Yerushalmi Chagiga 9b regarding the mother of Acher that she had once eaten a non-Kosher food during her pregnancy due to having smelled it and lusted after it, and this is what caused her son to become a heretic; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 142:1; Shevach Habris 1:24; Nitei Gavriel 3 56:5

[42] Rama Y.D. 81:7; Taz Y.D. 81:12; Shach Y.D. 81:24; Arugas Habosem O.C. 138; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 142:1; 147:2;

[43] Shach Y.D. 81:24; P”M 81 M”Z 12; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 147:3; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:9

[44] See Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill”; 343:7 “Whatever is for the need of the child and for his Takanaso – development and benefit”

[45] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[46] So is evident from the source of the ruling regarding nursing a toddler pass 24 months which is forbidden. Thus one must conclude that even when the child needs to eat, if other Kosher foods are available it is forbidden for him to eat it.

[47] See Admur 343:9-10 [This is demonstrated by Admur 343:9-10, who rules that even rabbinically prohibited foods may not be given to a child and the only allowance to feed him cake with lettering is because the Melacha is not the main purpose of the item. This makes clear that a child’s mere desire to eat a food because it tastes good is not considered a legitimate justification. Furthermore, he explicitly rules there that even by cake with lettering it may not be placed into the child’s mouth directly.

[48] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11

[49] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older. But when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah. Therefore, it is permitted to give a taste to a child who has reached the age of education from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no need at all for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated to do so. Nevertheless, since the prohibition of tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, and the only reason to prohibit it would be out of concern lest the child become habituated to it—and this concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, because children are not given to taste on a fixed basis every single Shabbat. For sometimes there are guests who stay and eat in the rooms of the synagogue and hear Kiddush there, and then there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited—even if only by rabbinic law.”; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Toras Hakatan Chapters 25 and 27-28

[50] Admur 343:6 regarding even a Rabbinical prohibition “provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah” and 343:7; Admur 343:1 regarding general law “If he does so on behalf of an adult, one must protest and stop him, by rabbinic law, as explained in סימן של״ד.”; Admur 334:26 in parentheses regarding Kibuiy on Shabbos which is possibly only Rabbinical; Beis Yosef 334; Rosh 1:1; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:13

[51] Admur 334:26 “Even if he has not reached the age of Chinuch”; Bach 334; Tosafus Shabbos 121a

[52] This applies whether the child is doing so on behalf of his father or on behalf of any other adult: Admur 343:1 “Bishvil Gadol”; 334:26 “on behalf of his father (or another Jew)”; M”B 334:65 in name of P”M; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

Father versus other person: So rules also Admur in 334:26 that if the child is going to extinguish the fire even on behalf of a person other than his father, he must be reprimanded. Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur in 334:26 stated this addition (another person) in parentheses. To note however that in the Gemara [Yevamos 104a] explains that the reason the child must be reprimanded is because he is doing so on behalf of his father, and thus perhaps here Admur novelizes that even when done on behalf of others he must be reprimanded. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11] This is also explicitly implied in Rashi there which equates this case to the case brought earlier in the Gemara regarding having children carry keys in a public domain on behalf of another person, of which there it was allowed because they were not doing so on behalf of that person. Nevertheless, tzaruch Iyun why the need to place this addition in parentheses. The Mishneh Berurah [334:65] rules in the name of the Peri Megadim as above that the child is to be reprimanded even when he goes to extinguish another person’s fire.

[53] The reason: This can be inferred from 343:6, where Admur limits the allowance to cases performed for the sake of a mitzvah. The reason is that asking a child to transgress is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress, which is forbidden when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that only when there is a mitzvah need did the Sages not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, even if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[54] Implication of Admur 343:1-2 and 334:26 “even if his father is not there” and in parentheses “or for another Jew”; See Admur 343:2 that this obligation to reprimand and correct improper behavior is not limited to the Beit Din, even though they are the primary subject discussed in this halacha. Rather, this obligation applies to every individual. This is made explicit by the wording in the beginning of the next halacha, where Admur states that all of the above applies when dealing with “other people”, clearly indicating that the responsibility is not confined to judicial authorities alone.

[55] See Toras Hakatan 14:22

[56] So is implied from the ruling of the Admur, who mentions an opinion of leniency to ask a child to perform a rabbinic melachah on behalf of an adult only in a case involving a mitzvah. He does not mention, even once, that such an allowance exists in a case of great loss or pressing need alone. This is likewise implied from the ruling of the Admur (266:10), who permits instructing a child to carry one’s wallet [and today we don’t have a Reshus Harabim Min Hatorah] specifically due to a state of panic, and not merely because of a significant financial loss. Now, although with regard to Amirah Lenachri we are lenient even in cases of great loss or great need to permit the performance of a rabbinic prohibition, it nevertheless appears that we are more stringent when it comes to a Jewish child. In that context, the leniency is limited exclusively to the sake of a mitzvah. The reason for this distinction is that only in the context of a mitzvah is a child’s involvement viewed as an isolated and exceptional act, such that there is no concern he will come to perform similar prohibitions upon reaching maturity. However, if a child is instructed to transgress even a rabbinic prohibition merely due to need or financial loss—even if the need is great—there is concern that this will train him to act similarly later in life. Therefore, greater stringency is required, limiting the leniency solely to cases involving a mitzvah. [See Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11–6] A further point to consider is that even in a case that it is done for the sake of a Mitzvah the matter is subject to dispute, as cited by Admur. The Alter Rebbe conclusion for leniency applies only in the context of a mitzvah, and no broader allowance is stated for cases of loss. Accordingly, there is no basis to assume that the more lenient opinion would extend this leniency to other circumstances, nor is there any justification to conclude that the final ruling of the Admur permits leniency in cases beyond those involving a mitzvah.

Other opinions: Some Poskim understand that according to those authorities who are lenient to permit, on occasion, instructing a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah, they are likewise lenient in cases of great need or substantial financial loss. According to this view, any situation in which it is permitted to ask a non‑Jew to perform a rabbinic prohibition would equally permit, on occasion, asking a Jewish child to do so. This would apply even to the child’s parents, and even if the child is above the age of Chinuch. Hence, they conclude that one may rely on this lenient approach whenever a gentile is not available. [Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 40 in name of Poskim, including Admur!] As stated above, however, this significant leniency is notably omitted from the ruling of the Admur. Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[57] However, some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos it is better that the Melacha be done by a Katan who is not one’s son, if possible. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5]

[58] See Admur 266:10 regarding having one’s child carry ones wallet on Shabbos; Michaber 266:6; Piskeiy Rid Shabbos 153b; Piskeiy Riad 24:1; Shiltei Giborim 66a; Piskeiy Teshuvos 266:1; 343:3; See also Admur 244:13; 301:40; 311:1; 332:3; 334:2 and 25; Kuntrus Achron 266:2

[59] See Admur 334:25-26; Beis HaLevi 1:13; Shaareiy Deiah 2:66; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:180; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 37

[60] Admur 343:6 “there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf—except when one gives it to him on a fixed, regular basis, in which case there is concern lest the child become accustomed to doing this act and continue doing it even when he grows older.”; Admur 343:8 “Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”;  Tur 559 in name of Tosafus; Shut Rashba 1:323; Tosafus Shabbos 139a; Eruvin 40b in name of Rabbeinu Shmuel; Beis Efraim Y.D. 62; Mechzeh Avraham 36; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 49; Toras Hakatan Chapter 25

[61] Admur ibid; Eruvin 40b; Rashi ibid

The reason: As he has already become accustomed as a child to transgress.

[62] See Admur 343:6-7; Toras Hakatan Chapters 28

[63] Implication of Admur 343:6 that so rule all Poskim who prohibit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition even in a case that he needs to eat it: Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Chasam Sofer 6:13; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549; [See, however the following Poskim who understand that even this opinion agrees to permit it on occasion and hence there is no dispute between the sides: Beis Efraim Y.D. 62; Mechzeh Avraham 36; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 49]

[64] Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf….when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah.”; Admur 343:8 “Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”; Rashba 1:92; Shut Rashba 323; Tosafus Eruvin 40b; See M”A 269 and 289; Darkei Moshe 325:8; Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Meishiv Davar 20; Eretz Tzevi 75; All Poskim who permit feeding a child a Rabbinical prohibition in a case that he needs to eat it: Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 40

Background: According to the lenient opinion which allows one to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition in a case that he needs to eat it, they hold that the entire prohibition of giving a Rabbinical prohibition to a child [even above the age of education] is only due to that he may come to transgress this sin also after he matures and becomes Bar Mitzva. Thus, if the incident is not a common occurrence, they allow the child to transgress it, if it is a mere Rabbinical prohibition.

[65] The reason: The reason for this allowance is because asking a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition is comparable to asking a gentile to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition, which is permitted when not done for the purpose of a mitzvah (see 343:8 and 307:12). The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11–6) explains that when there is a mitzvah need the Sages did not suspect that the child might continue to transgress when older, if the act occurred only on a random occasion. However, regarding non-mitzvah matters, the Sages were concerned that the child might come to persist in such transgressions later in life, even if he engaged in them only incidentally during his youth.

[66] Setimas Admur 343:8; Implication of Admur 343:6 [This is implied from the wording of Admur, who states, “therefore it is permitted,” even though he is addressing the lenient opinion, and likewise follows his final ruling in the previous debate on which this debate is dependent, in which he permits one to be lenient in a time of need for the child. Nevertheless, there is no explicit final ruling in Admur on this matter, unlike the case of feeding a child a rabbinic prohibition for his own sake, regarding which Admur issues a definitive ruling.]; M”A 269 and 289; Darkei Moshe 325:8; Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Shut Harim O.C. 3; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 2:53; Pnei Mevin O.C. 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Eretz Tzevi 75; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnotes 40-42

Ruling of Ketzos Hashulchan: Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 who omits this final conclusion of Admur. However, indeed, in Badei HaShulchan 11:11 he addresses this omission, explaining that he intentionally refrained from publicizing this lenient ruling of Admur, since there are Rishonim who maintain that one should not rely on the lenient view and if it were to be publicized it could lead to a destruction of Halacha. Nevertheless, this itself requires further iyun: if the Alter Rebbe himself ruled leniently, then who are we—who follow his rulings—to diverge from his pesak?

[67] However, some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos it is better that the Melacha be done by a Katan who is not one’s son, if possible. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5]

[68] Admur 621:4; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Toras Hakatan Chapter 27:1-11

The law by a Biblical prohibition: A biblical prohibition may not be transgressed under any circumstances, according to all opinions—even for the sake of a mitzvah, and even if the act would be an uncommon occurrence. This is because with respect to biblical prohibitions, the Sages were concerned that permitting a child to transgress, even for the sake of a mitzvah and on a rare occasion, could lead him to do so later in life. Accordingly, it is forbidden to give a child the wine of a bris on Yom Kippur [Admur 621:4]

[69] Admur 343:6 “Therefore, it is permitted to give a child who has reached the age of education a taste from the cup of Kiddush that is recited in the synagogue, even though the child has no actual need for this tasting and could wait to taste until he hears Kiddush at the place of the meal in his father’s home, where he is educated in this matter. Nevertheless, since the prohibition against tasting before Kiddush is rabbinic, and we have a need for this tasting, it should not be prohibited except out of concern that the child may become accustomed to it. Such concern does not apply to Kiddush in the synagogue, as children are not given to taste from it on a regular basis every Shabbat, since at times there are guests who stay and eat in the synagogue premises and hear Kiddush there, in which case there is no need at all to give the children to taste, as explained in siman 269.”; See Admur 269:3; 471:10; M”A 269:1; Rashba 92 regarding Kiddush on Yom Kippur;

Other reasons for allowance: Regarding the rationale for this leniency, there is an apparent discrepancy between Admur 269:3 and 343:6. In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. However, in 343:6, Admur bases the allowance on the opinion of the Rashba, who permits giving the wine to a child because it is done for the sake of a mitzvah and is not a common occurrence, since at times there are guests who eat in the synagogue and drink the Kiddush wine, and it therefore does not become a regular practice to give the wine to the child.

[70] In 269:3, Admur explains that the allowance is based on the fact that eating before Kiddush constitutes merely a time‑based prohibition, as opposed to a kashrus prohibition, and with respect to such prohibitions, no restriction was ever enacted against feeding the food to a child, even if he has reached the age of education. Hence, its permissibility is not dependent on the above debate, and it is allowed even according to the stringent opinion above.

[71] Admur 343:8 “Anything that falls under the category of chinuch (educational training for mitzvot), it is permitted to actively give a child a prohibited item—for example, to feed the Paschal offering to a minor who has reached the age of chinuch, even though he was not formally registered for it. Although the Paschal offering may be eaten only by those registered for it, nevertheless, since one’s intent is to educate him in the mitzvah, it is permitted. However, a mitzvah for which chinuch does not apply—meaning a mitzvah that he will not be able to perform when he grows up, which is the fundamental rationale of chinuch—such as giving him a taste from the cup of wine of a circumcision on Yom Kippur so that the blessing should not appear to have been said in vain: even though this is a mitzvah-related need, nevertheless, since when he grows up it will be forbidden to him, it is also forbidden now, due to concern that he may become accustomed to it and drink from it even when he is older, as will be explained in סימן תרכ״א. Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”; M”A 343:3; Rabbeinu Yerucham 1:13; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Tosafus Pesachim 88a; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Elya Raba 343:3; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:17; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 198 footnote 550-555; Likkutei Sichos 26:69-74; Toras Hakatan 21:1-44

[72] Admur ibid; See also Admur 186:3; Shut Admur Hazakein 41 in end; Rashi Sukkah 20b; Chagiga 6a; Eruvin 40b

[73] Admur ibid; Mordechai Yuma Remez 727

[74] Admur ibid; 2^nd opinion in Admur 190:4; 621:4 and 5-6; Rashi Eruvin 40b

[75] Admur 343:5 “If a gentile feeds a prohibited item to a child who is not yet capable of understanding, the child’s father is not required to protest. However, it is forbidden for any Jew to tell a gentile to feed the child, since instructing a gentile is prohibited with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah. All the more so is it forbidden to tell the child himself to do so.”; M”A 343:3; Rabbeinu Yerucham Nesiv 1 in name of Rameh; M”B 343:5; Kaf Hachaim 343:15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and 12; Toras Hakatan 20:1-17

[76] So is implied from Setimas Admur here; however, see the continuation where he writes “since instructing a gentile is prohibited with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah.” Vetzaruch Iyun as Halachically, asking a non-Jew to instruct a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition constitutes a threefold rabbinic prohibition (shevut de‑shevut de‑shevut): instructing a non-Jew is itself rabbinically prohibited; a minor performing a prohibited act involves a separate rabbinic concern; and the underlying prohibition itself is rabbinic. This stands in contrast to instructing a child directly to perform a rabbinic prohibition, which constitutes a double rabbinic prohibition (shevut de‑shevut) and remains prohibited, as explained above.

[77] The reason: This is because asking a non-Jew to perform a prohibited act on one’s behalf is forbidden with respect to all biblical prohibitions. [Admur 343:5; 243:1]

[78] Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill—it is permitted to tell a gentile to feed him, for the needs of a minor are treated as those of a sick person who is not in danger. In such a case, the Sages permitted instructing a gentile even regarding biblical prohibitions, as explained in siman 328. Similarly, if the child requires wine to drink and no Jewish wine is available, but only ordinary wine of gentiles, and the wine is not strong enough to be rendered permissible through dilution of six parts water to one part wine (as explained in Yoreh De’ah siman 134), it is permitted to tell a gentile to give him to drink.”; M”A 343:3; M”B 343:5; See also Admur 328:19; 22; 450:24-25 regarding Chametz; Tehila Ledavid 343:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:15-16; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:12

[79] Admur 450:24-26 regarding Chametz; So is also evident from the reason of Admur, brought in next footnote; Mishneh Berura 343:5

[80] The reason: Since the needs of a child are halachically equated with those of a non‑dangerously ill person, by which the Sages permitted instructing a non‑Jew to transgress on his behalf even by a biblical prohibition. [Admur ibid; 328:19; 22; 450:24-25; Tehila Ledavid 343:4] As for why Admur limits this leniency here to a case where the child is slightly ill—despite the general principle that even the needs of a healthy child carry the status of one who is ill—this is because there is no necessity for a healthy child to consume specifically non‑kosher food, absent medical need. Accordingly, such a case would not arise with respect to a healthy child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 5]

[81] This is evident from the fact that if possible Admur [ibid] requires one to dilute non-Kosher wine of a gentile with water in a way that it no longer retains its prohibition, rather than ask a gentile to feed it to the child in its current state.

[82] Admur 343:9 “It is forbidden to give a child a live non‑kosher locust to play with, lest it die and the child eat it, in which case one would be actively feeding him a prohibited item, since he himself gave him the prohibition. All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is. Even something that is prohibited only because of bal teshaktzu (repulsiveness) may not be given to him if there is concern that he might eat it. However, it is permitted to give him a non‑kosher bird to play with, since even if it dies it is not fit for consumption.” Admur 343:10 “(All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food, even when the prohibition is time‑dependent.) However, on Shabbat it is permitted to give a child objects with which he can perform a prohibited labor for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so. For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbat, as explained in siman ש״מ. Even though the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him, as explained above—provided that an adult does not place the food directly into the child’s mouth.” Admur 616:4 “All of this applies to a minor who has not yet reached the age of education for the mitzvah of affliction. However, if he has reached the age of education, it is permitted to feed him, give him drink, anoint him, and wash him directly, in the manner explained above. If the minor performs any of these acts on his own, there is no need to protest, except for his father, who is required to protest and to educate his son in the mitzvot. His mother, however, is not obligated in this. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for her to place food before him, since doing so is considered as if she were feeding him directly.”; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

[83] Admur 343:9 “All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is… if there is concern that he might eat it.” and 10 in parentheses “All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food”; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Toras Hakatan 19:1-29

The reason: As this is considered as if he is actively feeding him a prohibited item. [Admur ibid; M”A ibid; rashi ibid]

[84] As rules Admur next regarding Bal Tishaktzu

[85] Such as Matzah on Erev Pesach for a child who has reached the age of understanding, or a child on Yom Kippur which has reached the age of Chinuch for fasts.

[86] Admur 343:10 in parentheses; 616:4

[87] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Implication of Shabbos ibid; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 10; See Admur Basra 3:11

[88] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b; Kaf Hachaim 343:13

[89] Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur mentions a Treif bird, as even by a kosher bird it is forbidden to be eaten without slaughtering and thus the same suspicion applies.

[90] Chidushei Rashal on Hagahos Ashri of Shabbos; Pischei Olam 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:13

[91] Admur 343:10 “(However all the above is regarding prohibited foods, even if it is forbidden due to time) However it is permitted to give to a baby on Shabbos items which he is able to do prohibited actions with for himself, and even if one knows that he will do these actions with them , such as to give a baby a cake which has letters written on it which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos as explained in chapter 340, even though the young child will for certain eat it, [nevertheless] since he intends for his own benefit one need not separate him [from doing the prohibition] as was explained above [in Halacha 1]. Nevertheless one [a Gadol] may not place [the cake] into the mouth of the baby.”; M”A 343:2; See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; 3:82 and Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144 who permit to have a child below age 6 to open the fridge; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 who allows placing a child below age 3 in front of the fridge and in front of the light switch; Other contradictory rulings of Admur and their resolution: See Admur 266:10 [forbidden to give wallet to carry], 301:21 [prohibits dressing child with clothing that contain  bells that make noise]; Tehila Ledavid 343:2; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11; Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54; Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79;

The contradiction in Admur: There is an apparent contradiction within the rulings of Admur regarding the permissibility of giving a child below the age of chinuch an item with which a prohibition will be performed. Here in 343:10, Admur explicitly permits giving a child cake that contains letters, notwithstanding that the inevitable result of eating the cake will be the erasure of the letters, a rabbinic prohibition of mechikas ksav. This ruling implies that even where the adult is aware that a prohibition will certainly occur (pesik reisha), and even where the adult benefits from the child’s action, it is nevertheless permitted to give the item to a child below the age of chinuch. However, this ruling appears to contradict numerous other rulings of Admur, including 343:9 (prohibiting giving a child non‑kosher food), 266:10 (forbidding handing a child an object to carry in a public domain), and 301:21 (based on M”A 301:35 prohibiting dressing a child in garments with bells that will inevitably cause prohibited noise), all of which indicate that one may not actively place a child in a situation where a prohibition will certainly be transgressed.

The resolutions to the contradictions: This internal inconsistency has led to multiple approaches among the Poskim in explaining Admur’s position. Some make note of the contradiction and leave it unresolved (tzaruch iyun). [Tehila Ledavid 343:2] Others resolve the contradiction by sharply limiting the scope of 343:10, ruling that a child below chinuch may only be given an item with which a prohibition might occur if the adult has no intent for the child to perform the prohibition; if the adult’s intent is that the prohibition be done, even indirectly, it is forbidden. According to this approach, the cake-with-letters case is permitted only because the adult’s intent is feeding the child, not erasing letters. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147, fn. 11; Article of Rav Avraham Elyashvili in Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79] A different resolution that is suggested distinguishes between a one‑time prohibition and a constant or ongoing prohibition. They explain that Admur permits giving a child an item that will result in a single, incidental transgression (such as erasing letters while eating cake), but forbids giving items that will cause continuous violations (such as bells that ring repeatedly or objects that will be carried for an extended period). [Chikrei Halachos vol. 4 p. 54] Other contemporary Poskim adopt a more expansive reading of Admur. According to this approach, the decisive factor is whether the item inherently compels a prohibition or merely enables it. If the child retains a genuine choice whether or not to perform the prohibited act, then giving the item—or even placing the child in proximity to it—is not equivalent to instructing the child to sin, even if the adult hopes to benefit from the result. This reading understands 343:10 as the governing principle, with the stricter rulings in other simanim applying only where the item’s sole or unavoidable use is the prohibition itself. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 55 and 62]

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is possibly forbidden to arrange for a child to perform a prohibition due to Gerama. [See Bear Sarim 5:74; Meorei Haeish 4:13 footnote 182; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 61]

[92] Admur ibid in parentheses

[93] Setimas Admur ibid

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that anyone who sees a child who has reached the age of education transgressing a prohibition, then he must reprimand and stop the child even if he is not the child’s father, and hence certainly it would be forbidden to provide an Issur to such a child. [Bikurei Yaakov 640:5; Kaf Hachaim 343:28; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 footnote 19 in opinion of Rama ibid, based on Yevamos 114a that Beis Din is Lav Davka and the same applies to any person; So rule regarding a Beis Din: 1^st opinion in Rama 343:1; M”A 640:3; Elya Raba 640:4; P”M 640 A”A 4; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yereim; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Rashi Eruvin 96b; Chayeh Adam 66:3] Some Poskim conclude based on this opinion that by a Biblical transgression one is to be stringent and reprimand a child which has reached the age of education even if the child is not his son. However, by Rabbinical prohibitions there is no need to be stringent. [Chayeh Adam ibid; Mishneh Berura 343:7] Based on this, by one may not provide a child who has reached the age of c=Chinuch with an item with which he may do a Biblical prohibition, but may provide him with an item with which he can perform a Rabbinical prohibition if he is not the child’s father. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4]

[94] This is learned from the Gemara Shabbos 90b which does not differentiate [and neither does any Posek] and seemingly allows to give a child a kosher locust to play with even though the child may kill, trap, detach a wing or the like to the locust. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11]. As for the reason that there is a difference between giving the child a food or an item meant for desecrating Shabbos, Tzaruch Iyun.

[95] See Tehila Ledavid 343:6; Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 57

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that in a case where the child would have been unable to reach the item or perform the act independently, and required the assistance of an adult, the matter constitutes a Biblical prohibition of Sefiyas Issur, and is therefore forbidden. [Achiezer 3:81-7]

[96] Hearah 85 in new Shulchan Aruch; See previous footnotes for other opinions

[97] Admur 343:3; M”A 343:2; Issur Viheter Shaar 48:8; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; M”B 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; See Tosafus Erechin 3a; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3; Beir Moshe 6:20; Mishneh Halachos 3:49; 7:36; Sheilas Shaul 32; Shevet Halevi 7:104; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2 footnote 32 and 61

Other Opinions – Shabbos Melachah Performed by a Child Below the Age of Chinuch: The above Poskim all rule that a child who is below the age of chinuch does not require protest if he performs a melachah on Shabbos, as is the general principle by all prohibitions performed by a child who lacks mental maturity. However, some Poskim rule that Shabbat melachah is an exception to this general principle. According to this view, parents are biblically obligated to prevent their children from performing melachah on Shabbat even if the child has not yet reached the age of understanding or education. The reason given is that the Torah explicitly commands that one’s children rest on Shabbat, as stated in the verse: “You shall not do any work—you, your son, or your daughter.” Under this approach, young children are likened to one’s animals, which are likewise commanded to rest on Shabbat, and therefore parents bear a direct obligation to ensure that their children refrain from labor on Shabbat regardless of age. [Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118] This opinion is a Daas Yachid. [Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid]

[98] See Admur 343:1-2; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61

[99] Admur ibid and 340:4; M”A 343:5; Mordechai Remez 369 in name of Maharam, brought in Beis Yosef 340

[100] Admur ibid; 640:4; Mordechai ibid

[101] Admur ibid; Mordechai ibid

[102] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

[103] Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54 based on Admur’s ruling in 301:21 that it is forbidden to give a child clothing with bells, addresses the apparent contradiction between that ruling and the leniency discussed here. He explains that permission is granted only where the child will perform a single, isolated prohibition—such as eating a cake with letters on it—whereas an item that leads to a constant prohibition is forbidden to give to a child. Others (see He’aros U’Biurim, Ohalei Torah no. 831, p. 79) explain that the prohibition in 301:21 is due to the father’s intent: the clothing is given specifically so that the child will ring the bells in order to amuse or calm himself. In such a case, it is prohibited, as explained by the Ketzos HaShulchan (266:10; see the next halacha). However, this explanation is not entirely compelling. While it may be assumed that the child intends to play with the bells, it is not evident that the adult necessarily has such intent; perhaps the garment was given simply for the child to wear. Rather, it may be explained that since the garment’s primary purpose is to produce sound, giving it to the child—regardless of the adult’s subjective intent—is tantamount to instructing the child to perform a prohibited act. As such, it is treated as though the adult is actively “feeding” the child the prohibition. This differs from the case of the cake: although eating it necessarily entails erasing the letters, that is not the cake’s primary function. Its essential purpose is consumption, and therefore giving it to the child is not considered equivalent to directly causing him to perform a prohibited act.

[104] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 55; See previous footnotes

[105] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 62

[106] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11 based on Admur 266:10

Background and Other approaches: This ruling is based on Admur 266:10, and is likewise codified by the Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11). However, in light of the explanation above, it may be suggested that the prohibition in siman 266 is not dependent on the giver’s subjective intent. Rather, since it is evident to all that the wallet is being given for the purpose of carrying it—and thereby performing a prohibited act—this is considered akin to actively “feeding” the child a prohibition. In such a case, giving the item is halachically equivalent to instructing the child to perform the transgression, which is forbidden. In other words, whenever an item is given to a child and its sole understood purpose is for the performance of a prohibited act, it is treated as though the child has been explicitly told to commit that prohibition.

[107] With respect to the case of lettering on a cake discussed above, since the giver’s intent is not that the letters be erased but rather that the child eat the cake, it is therefore permitted to give it to the child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11]