Chapter 11: Shabbos – Laws of Chinuch and Katan [1]

 

Introduction – The Spirit of Shabbos in Chinuch

Shabbos is one of the most powerful and influential forces in the education of a Jewish child. More than classes, lectures, or even formal instruction, it is often the experience of Shabbos that shapes a child’s feelings towards Torah and Yiddishkeit for life. The atmosphere of the Shabbos home, the warmth of the family, the beauty of the Shabbos table, the songs, the food, and the spirit of rest and holiness all leave an indelible impression upon a child’s heart.

For this reason, parents should recognize that Shabbos is not merely another day in which they educate their children; rather, Shabbos itself is one of the greatest tools of chinuch. A child who experiences Shabbos as a source of warmth, joy, serenity, and family closeness develops a natural love for Torah and mitzvos. On the other hand, when Shabbos becomes associated with anger, tension, criticism, or punishment, a child’s emotional connection to Shabbos can be negatively affected.

Indeed, as explained in Halacha 2, we find that the Torah and Chazal emphasized that Shabbos is a day free of punishment and judgment. Beis Din does not conduct court proceedings on Shabbos, nor are punishments administered on Shabbos. Chazal explain that Hashem desired Shabbos to be a day of rest and tranquility for everyone—even those deserving of punishment. So profound is this concept that Chazal state that even the punishments of Gehinnom cease on Shabbos. Accordingly, although parents are technically permitted to discipline children on Shabbos when necessary, it is certainly not in the spirit of Shabbos to exhibit anger, wrath, or punitive behavior. Rather, one should make every effort to preserve the peace, joy, and pleasantness of the day.

This concept was illustrated in a story brought below of a father whose son had drifted far from the path of Torah observance. Seeking guidance, he approached the Rebbe for advice on how to bring his son back. Rather than focusing on rebuke or arguments, the Rebbe instructed him to make the Shabbos table more beautiful, inviting, and joyous. The father followed this guidance and transformed the atmosphere of his Shabbos home. In time, the warmth and beauty of the Shabbos experience drew the child back and played a significant role in rekindling his connection to Torah and mitzvos.

This story encapsulates a fundamental principle of chinuch: children are often influenced far more by what they experience than by what they are told. A beautiful Shabbos table, joyful singing, words of Torah spoken pleasantly, and a home filled with peace and happiness can accomplish what many educational techniques cannot.

Accordingly, the halachos discussed in this chapter are not merely technical obligations. They are practical tools through which parents can cultivate within their children a lifelong love for Shabbos, Torah, and Yiddishkeit. By filling Shabbos with warmth, dignity, joy, and holiness, parents provide their children with one of the greatest gifts possible—a deep and enduring attachment to the sanctity of Shabbos and to Jewish life itself.

 

A Maaseh Shehayah – The Transformative Power of a Shabbos Atmosphere

A powerful story is told in the name of Rabbi Twersky of Crown Heights, who related that he personally heard it from the individual to whom it occurred.

Shortly after the Rebbe accepted the leadership of Chabad, there was a sixteen-year-old boy who had abandoned Torah observance and was wandering the streets. The boy came from a large family and, due to the tensions that had developed, was eventually no longer living at home. His father was heartbroken and did not know how to bring him back. He therefore turned to the Rebbe for guidance.

The Rebbe’s response was both surprising and profound: “Make your Shabbos shine.”

At the time, Shabbos in that home was far from inspiring. The father worked hard all week and would often arrive exhausted. On Friday night and Shabbos day he would frequently fall asleep at the table. The meals were adequate, but not particularly special. More importantly, because Shabbos was one of the few times that the entire family was together, much of the household discipline and criticism took place specifically on Shabbos. As a result, for the children—and especially for the son who had left—Shabbos had become associated with tension rather than warmth.

Taking the Rebbe’s words to heart, the father completely transformed his approach.

First and foremost, he made a firm decision that Shabbos would no longer be a time for discipline. Corrections and punishments would wait until after Shabbos whenever possible. During Shabbos, every child would feel loved, welcomed, and valued.

He purchased beautiful dishes to honor the day. He made sure to rest on Friday afternoon so he could be fully awake and present for his family. At the meals he engaged his children in conversation, asked about their lives, and showed genuine interest in their thoughts and concerns. He prepared meaningful words of Torah, sang zemiros with enthusiasm, and made sure that each child was served foods and delicacies that he especially enjoyed.

Within a short time, one of the siblings encountered the estranged brother and told him about the dramatic change that had taken place at home. The young man was astonished. Over time the siblings continued telling him about the new atmosphere and repeatedly urged him to come join them for a Shabbos meal.

Eventually he agreed.

One Shabbos meal led to another. Soon he was coming regularly. Before long he returned home. Ultimately, he returned to a life of Torah and mitzvos and became fully observant once again.

Years later, he himself related the story.

 

The Lesson From The story

The lesson of this story is both simple and profound. A child’s connection to Yiddishkeit is often formed less by what he is taught and more by what he experiences. When Shabbos is filled with warmth, joy, love, attention, singing, meaningful conversation, and genuine family connection, it creates memories and emotions that can remain with a child for a lifetime.

Chazal teach that Shabbos is a day of rest even for those deserving punishment. Accordingly, while discipline may at times be necessary in raising children, Shabbos should be utilized, whenever possible, as a time of closeness rather than confrontation, encouragement rather than criticism, and connection rather than correction.

A beautiful Shabbos table can accomplish what many lectures cannot. A child who feels cherished at the Shabbos table will naturally develop a love for the Shabbos table, and through it, a love for Torah, mitzvos, and Yiddishkeit. Indeed, sometimes the greatest gift a parent can give a child is not another rebuke or lesson, but a radiant, joyous, and loving Shabbos.

 

 

 

1. The Mitzvah – The Chiyuv For Children Observing Shabbos: [2]

Before discussing the specific laws of a child performing melachah on Shabbos, it is important to recognize that there are three separate halachic principles that may apply:

1. The Prohibition of Sefiyah – It is forbidden to cause a child to transgress a prohibition. Accordingly, anything that is forbidden for an adult to do on Shabbos may not be instructed to a child to perform. This prohibition applies even to a child who is only one day old, as one may not actively cause a child to violate Shabbos.
2. The Obligation of “You, Your Son, and Your Daughter” – Some authorities maintain that the verse “You shall not do any melachah—you, your son, and your daughter” establishes a special obligation upon a parent regarding his child’s observance of Shabbos.
3. The Mitzvah of Chinuch – There is a rabbinic obligation to educate a child in the observance of mitzvos and to separate him from transgressions. Accordingly, a parent must train a child who has reached the age of chinuch to refrain from performing prohibited acts on Shabbos and to observe its mitzvos properly.

These three principles are distinct from one another and each possesses its own parameters, as will be explained throughout the coming halachos.

 

A. The Lack of a Biblical Obligation on Children to keep Shabbos

As is the case with all mitzvos, children below the age of Bar and Bas Mitzvah are not personally obligated by Torah law to observe Shabbos. Although the verse regarding Shabbos states, “You, your son, and your daughter,” this is not understood to mean that minor children bear an independent obligation to keep Shabbos. Rather, the obligation regarding children rests upon the parents. Accordingly, all obligations related to a child’s observance of Shabbos stem from the general Chinuch responsibility of the father to educate and guide their children in the proper observance of Torah and mitzvos. As will be discussed below, although some authorities understand the verse as creating a unique obligation regarding a child’s observance of Shabbos, the majority of poskim—and so is the accepted halachic ruling—maintain that the obligation is simply part of the general mitzvah of chinuch, requiring a father to train their children in the observance of Shabbos just as they are required to educate them in all other mitzvos of the Torah.

 

1. Is there a Biblical Command upon a father to ensure his children keep Shabbos?[3]

Under the general directive of chinuch, a father is required to educate and restrain a child who has reached the age of understanding from engaging in prohibited conduct on Shabbos. Furthermore, some Poskim[4] maintain that, in addition to the general obligation of chinuch, there exists a special Biblical obligation upon a father to prevent his children from performing melachah on Shabbos, even if he is below the age of Chinuch. This opinion is based on the verse[5], “Lo Saseh Kol Melacha, Ata Ubincha Ubitecha – You shall not do any melachah—you, your son, and your daughter,” which they interpret as placing a direct obligation upon a parent to ensure that his children refrain from desecrating Shabbos.[6] However, the Alter Rebbe[7] as well as the vast majority of poskim[8] do not accept this opinion. They rule that there is no unique Biblical obligation upon a parent to prevent his child from performing melachah on Shabbos beyond the general laws of chinuch.[9] Rather, the obligation to train and restrain a child from desecrating Shabbos is rabbinic in nature and falls under the standard obligation of educating one’s children to observe all the mitzvos of the Torah from when the child has reached the age of chinuch, as will be explained next. This is with the exception of the prohibition of sefiyah—actively causing or feeding a child a prohibition—which is a Biblical prohibition and applies even to very young children who have not yet reached the age of chinuch. However, this prohibition is not unique to Shabbos and does not stem from any special obligation of shevisas bno. Rather, it is a general Torah prohibition that applies throughout the entire Torah whenever one actively causes a child to transgress a prohibition, as explained in detail in Chapter 1 Halacha 9.

 

C. The Mitzvah of Chinuch to educate one’s children in observing Shabbos [10]

Regardless of the previous discussion regarding whether there is a Biblical Mitzvah of Shabbos observance applicable to ones children, there remains a rabbinic obligation upon a father to educate his children—both boys and girls—who have reached the age of chinuch, in the observance of Shabbos. This obligation encompasses all aspects of Shabbos observance, including both its positive commandments, such as Kiddush, Havdalah, and honoring and enjoying Shabbos, as well as its negative commandments, requiring the child to refrain from performing prohibited forms of melachah. Accordingly, once a child has reached the level of understanding appropriate for his age and development, the father is obligated to train and accustom him to observe Shabbos properly in all of its details, just as he is obligated to educate him in the observance of the other mitzvos of the Torah.

 

D. Reprimanding a Child Who Desecrates Shabbos [11]

As part of the obligation of chinuch, a father is required to reprimand and prevent his son or daughter who has reached the age of chinuch from transgressing the laws of Shabbos. This applies whether the child is violating a Biblical prohibition or a rabbinic prohibition. However, a father is not obligated to reprimand or restrain a child who has not yet reached the age of chinuch, as such a child lacks the level of understanding necessary for education in mitzvah observance.^[12]  [This applies even if the child who is below the age of Chinuch is performing a transgression in public.^[13]] Likewise, bystanders are generally not obligated to reprimand another person’s child for desecrating Shabbos, even if the child has reached the age of chinuch, unless it is a public transgression. Rather, the primary obligation of chinuch rests upon the child’s parents. These laws follow the general principles governing a child’s transgression of Torah prohibitions and the parental obligation of chinuch, as explained at length in Chapter 1.

Performing on behalf of others:[14] If a child performs a prohibited act on Shabbos for the benefit of an adult Jew—for example, extinguishing a fire or performing another melachah on the adult’s behalf—then every Jew who is aware of the situation is obligated to stop or reprimand the child. This obligation applies even if the child is below the age of chinuch, provided that he is mature enough to understand and act for the benefit of another person.

 

 

 

E. The Issur of Sefiyah in instructing a child to transgress Shabbos: [15]

See Chapter 1 Halacha 8 in great length!

Biblical Prohibition: It is [Biblically^[16]] forbidden to cause a child to transgress any prohibition [including the Shabbos prohibitions[17]]. Accordingly, anything that is forbidden for an adult to do on Shabbos may not be instructed to a child to perform. This prohibition applies even to a child who is only one day old, as one may not actively cause a child to violate Shabbos.

Rabbinical Prohibition: It is forbidden to accustom^[18] the child to transgress Shabbos or Holidays even regarding Rabbinical matters. However, if a child requires a rabbinic prohibition to be transgressed for his physical well being or development, and no non Jew is available to perform the act, there is room to be lenient and allow the child himself to transgress a rabbinic[19] prohibition. Likewise, if the transgression is for the sake of a mitzvah and occurs only occasionally, some authorities permit instructing a child to transgress a Rabbinical prohibition even when not being done for his sake.  See Chapter 1 Halacha 8 for the full details of this matter!

Telling a Child on Friday to Perform a Melachah on Shabbos:[20] Just as it is forbidden to instruct a child on Shabbos to perform an act that is prohibited, so too it is forbidden to tell a child before Shabbos to perform that act on Shabbos. Accordingly, one may not circumvent the prohibition by giving the instruction on Friday and having the child carry it out on Shabbos. Any act that may not be requested of a child on Shabbos may likewise not be requested of him before Shabbos for performance on Shabbos.

 

F. Giving the child an item with which he will desecrate Shabbos with: [21]

All of the above restrictions apply specifically to prohibited foods, even where the prohibition is time‑dependent.^[22] However, with respect to Shabbos, it is permitted to give a child [of any age below Bar and Bas Mitzvah^[23]] objects with which he may perform a prohibited act for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so [and even if the act is Biblically forbidden].^[24] [Some Poskim^[25] rule that this leniency applies even in a case where the child would be unable to reach the item without the assistance of an adult. This leniency however only applies to individuals other than the child’s father.^[26] The father, however, may give such an item to a child only if the child is below the age of chinuch.^[27] Once the child reaches the age of chinuch, the father is obligated to educate him in mitzvot and to protest improper behavior, and therefore may not provide him with an item through which he will perform a prohibition.^[28]] For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos.^[29] Although the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is solely for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him.^[30] Nevertheless, an adult may not place the food directly into the child’s mouth^[31], [nor instruct the child to eat it, as explained in Halacha B]. [Likewise, it is forbidden for one to tell the baby to eat it.^[32]] [Some Poskim^[33] maintain that if an item will cause the child to engage in a constant prohibition, it may not be given to him. Others^[34] rule that any item whose primary function involves the performance of a prohibited act, in which case it will most certainly be performed by the child, may not be given to a child at all. Likewise, if providing the item to the child implicitly conveys to him that he is expected to perform a prohibited act with it, this would seemingly fall under the standard category of sefiya, and is no different from explicitly instructing the child to perform the prohibition. Accordingly, only in a case where the child has not yet reached a level of maturity or understanding to recognize that the adult, by providing the item, is asking him to perform a prohibited act, may there be room to permit it.^[35]]

Giving a child an item with the intent that he desecrate Shabbos: Some Poskim^[36] rule that the above leniency applies only when the item is given to the child without intent that he perform a prohibited act with it. However, if the giver’s intent is specifically that the child commits a transgression using the item, it is forbidden to give it to him.^[37]

 

2. The Age – The Age of Chinuch for Shabbos Observance [38]

For a more detailed discussion of the age of chinuch and the criteria used to determine when a child has reached an age of understanding, see Chapter 2.

 

A. The Age of Chinuch Regarding Refraining from Shabbos Melachah:

The obligation to educate a child to refrain from performing prohibited melachos on Shabbos begins once the child reaches an age of understanding. This means that the child understands when he is told that a particular act is forbidden to be done on Shabbos. However, an infant or very young child who lacks such comprehension is not subject to the obligation of chinuch, and a father is not required to prevent him from transgressing, since the child does not understand the significance of what he is being prevented from doing. The exact age varies from child to child and depends on his level of understanding. The poskim offer several approximate age ranges:

• Some write that it is reached at approximately two to three years old.^[39]
• Others suggest that the age is approximately four to five years old.^[40]

Accordingly, there is no fixed age, and the determining factor is the child’s level of comprehension and ability to understand that a particular act is forbidden on Shabbos.

 

B. Chinuch for Mitzvos of Shabbos – Kiddush, Havdalah, Meals: [41]

The age at which a child becomes obligated in chinuch for positive commandments is not uniform, but rather depends on the individual child’s understanding and aptitude with respect to each particular mitzvah, whether biblical or rabbinic. For example, a child who understands the concept of Shabbos is obligated to be educated to hear Kiddush and Havdalah.^[42] [It would seem that the Admur specifically emphasizes Kiddush and Havdalah because he is referring to a child who has already grasped the basic concept of a sacred day called Shabbos. Once a child has reached that level of awareness, he is immediately capable—on an educational level—of understanding Kiddush and Havdalah, which express the sanctification of Shabbat and its distinction from the other days of the week. However, with regard to other Shabbos commandments, it is not necessarily the case that the child has yet reached the requisite level of understanding or readiness for education in those specific matters, as each mitzvah requires its own degree of comprehension and developmental maturity.]

 

3. Maaseh Shabbos – Benefiting from a Melachah Performed by a Child on Shabbos [43]

The laws governing benefit from a melachah performed by a child on Shabbos generally parallel the laws of amira lenachri.

On behalf of Adult: Accordingly, if a child performs a prohibited act on behalf of an adult Jew, it is forbidden to benefit from that act on Shabbos, and one must wait until after Shabbos the amount of time required to perform the act (kdei she’ya’asu) before deriving benefit from it.

On behalf of Child: If, however, the child performed the act entirely for his own benefit and not on behalf of an adult, then it is permitted to benefit from the result on Shabbos, just as one may benefit from a prohibited act performed by a non-Jew for his own purposes. [This allowance applies even to the father of the child, and even if the father is above the age of Chinuch and the father witnessed the child transgress and did not stop him.]

Under Direction of Adult: If an adult instructed, encouraged, or otherwise caused a child to perform a prohibited act on Shabbos, then the act is considered as though the adult himself performed the transgression. Accordingly, if the adult knowingly caused the prohibition to be done, the usual laws of Maaseh Shabbos apply and it may become forbidden for him to benefit from it. This rule applies when the child has reached an age at which he understands instructions and can act on behalf of the adult. If, however, the child is so young that he lacks sufficient understanding to follow instructions or appreciate what he is being told to do, then one may benefit from his actions even if they resulted in a prohibited act being performed on Shabbos.

 

✍️ From the Rav’s Desk: Child turned on fan on Shabbos

Question:

My two year old child loves playing with the fan on Shabbos, turning it off and back on. There is no stopping her and she simply won’t listen to our protests. Is there any issue with us benefiting from the fan if she turned it off and then back on, or if it was originally off and then she turns it on, on Shabbos? Likewise, would the law be any different if she turned it off and we screamed at her and then she turned it back on?

 

Answer:

You may receive benefit on Shabbos from the fan that your child turned on. However, you may never explicitly tell your child to turn it on.

 

Explanation: In general, it is forbidden for one to benefit from forbidden actions that are done by a Jew on Shabbos. Likewise, it is forbidden to benefit from the forbidden actions done by a Gentile on Shabbos when done on behalf of a Jew. Now, regarding whether one may benefit from the action of a child who transgressed Shabbos, the Poskim explain that if a child on his own does a prohibition on behalf of an adult, then it follows the same laws as Amirah Lenachri to a Gentile, and hence, it is forbidden for all Jews to benefit from it on Shabbos and one must wait after Shabbos Kdei Sheyasu. If, however, the child did so on his own behalf, then it is permitted to benefit from it on Shabbos, just like is the law regarding a Gentile who did an action on his own behalf. If, however, one instructed or encouraged the child to do the forbidden action on Shabbos, then it is considered as if the adult himself has done the forbidden action, and if he knew that it was forbidden, then it is forbidden for him to benefit from it forever. This, however, only applies to a child who has reached the age of Chinuch for negative commands. If, however, the child has not reached the age of understanding at all, and hence does not listen when told to do something or not to do something due to lack of understanding, then one may benefit from his actions done on Shabbos. Based on all the above it is clear that in the event that the child turned off the fan and turned it back on, that one may still continue to benefit from it, as the child does so on his own behalf. Furthermore, another concept in Maaseh Shabbos is that one cannot prohibit a benefit that one would have anyways had if not for his actions, and hence since the fan was originally on, the child does not have ability to prohibit its use upon the adults due to him turning it off and then back on. This would apply even regarding a Gentile. Furthermore, in our case above one would be able to be lenient to benefit from the fan even if the fan was not on before Shabbos, and was initially turned on by him on Shabbos as the child in the above case is not of an age of understanding, and even if he was, he is doing so for his own behalf. If, however, the child has reached the age of understanding and turned on the fan due to a direct instruction or encouragement of the adult, then it is forbidden to benefit from it.

 

Sources: See regarding the status of Maaseh Shabbos of a Katan: Biur Halacha 325:10 “Eino Yehudi Shemila”; P”M 325 A”A 22; Maor Hashabbos 18 footnote 14; Piskeiy Teshuvos 318:11; See regarding benefiting from an unnecessary Maaseh Shabbos-such as if person on his own turned light off and then back on: See Chulin 40b; Zayis Ranan 2:5; Imreiy Yosher 1:129; Mahrshag 2:130; M”B 253:96; Migdanos Eliyahu 2:150; 3:16; Michzeh Eliyahu 1:53; Piskeiy Teshuvos 318:5; See regarding the Biblical prohibition to tell or encourage any child of any age to do a prohibition: Admur 343:5; 265:10; Michaber 343:1; M”B 343:4; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:54; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 53; See regarding the definition of the age of Chinuch for a child regarding negative commands: Admur 343:3; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and 7

 

4. General Rules of Prohibited Melacha applicable to children on Shabbos

A. Heter in Time of Need – Having a Child Perform a Melachah Rather Than An Adult [44]

Whenever a matter may be performed on Shabbos in a time of need, it is preferable, when possible, to have a child perform the act rather than an adult. It is even preferable for a child to perform an act in the ordinary manner rather than for an adult to perform the act with a shinui.

 

1. Child Performing Matters Subject to Halachic Dispute^[45]

In matters of Hilchos Shabbos that are subject to a dispute among the poskim, where there are authorities who permit the act even lechatchilah, some Poskim learn that one may instruct a child to perform the act, even if the child has already reached the age of chinuch. This applies even to one’s own child. Nevertheless, when feasible, it is proper and praiseworthy for parents to educate their children to follow the more stringent opinion and accustom them to a higher standard of observance. [That said, in specific circumstances many are lenient, particularly in commonly encountered cases such as opening bottle caps on Shabbos, opening a refrigerator door when the motor may turn on^[46], and similar situations. In such cases, reliance on the lenient opinions is widespread. Likewise, it is permitted for a child to perform melachah on one’s behalf after nightfall of the Geonim’s time, even if the person himself follows the later time based on Rabbeinu Tam. Since this too is a matter of halachic dispute, one may rely on the lenient position with respect to instructing or benefiting from the actions of a child.]

 

1. Hefsed Merubah – A child doing Melacha in order to prevent great loss:^[47]

In general, it is forbidden to instruct a child to perform even a rabbinically prohibited act, even for the purpose of preventing a significant financial loss.^[48] However, in certain specific cases—where a person is so distressed over the potential loss that there is a real concern he may transgress himself—the Sages permitted him to have the rabbinically prohibited act performed through a child, even if the child has reached the age of Chinuch and even if the child is ones own son^[49], in order to prevent him from committing the prohibition personally. This leniency applies exclusively to rabbinic prohibitions. A biblical prohibition may never be transgressed, even in a case of great panic or severe financial loss. [This prohibition applies even if the Biblical Melacha is defined as Melacha Sheiyno Tzericha Legufa, such as extinguishing a fire, which is merely Rabbinical according to some opinions.^[50]]

 

1. Bein Hashmashos – Child doing Melacha During Bein Hashmashos:[51]

One may not instruct a child to perform a melachah during Bein Hashmashos, whether at the onset of Shabbos or at the conclusion of Shabbos. Likewise, if a child who has reached the age of Chinuch performs a melachah on his own during Bein Hashmashos, his father must protest his actions.

Rabbinical Prohibition in case of Need of Mitzvah or Great Loss:[52] Although one may not ordinarily instruct a child to perform a melachah during Bein Hashmashos, in a case of need of a Mitzvah or to prevent a great loss one may be lenient regarding rabbinic prohibitions, including carrying in our public domains, through a child during Bein Hashmashos. [In truth, even an adult may perform a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzvah or in a case of great need, during Bein Hashmashos, and hence certainly a child may be asked to do so.[53]]

Child Performing Melachah After Shabbos Before Rabbeinu Tam:[54] A child may perform melachah after the standard conclusion of Shabbos, even before the time of Tzeis HaKochavim according to Rabbeinu Tam. Accordingly, there is no obligation to prevent a child from doing melachah during this period, even for those who personally observe the stringency of Rabbeinu Tam.

 

E. Pesik Reishei – A Child Performing an Act That Inevitably Results in a Prohibition: [55]

It is forbidden to instruct a child to perform an act that will inevitably result in a prohibited action (pesik reishei), even if the child does not intend for the prohibition to occur. Likewise, if a child performs such an act on his own initiative, a child who has reached the age of chinuch must be prevented from doing so and educated not to engage in it. [Accordingly, it is forbidden to tell a child to open or close a hot-water faucet when doing so will inevitably cause the boiler to turn on or off, or to open a refrigerator door when doing so will inevitably cause a light to turn on.]]

For need of child or Need of Mitzvah: With regard to a child performing an action that will result in a prohibited outcome by way of p’sik reisha for his own benefit or for the sake of a Mitzvah for which we permit Rabbinical transgression as explained in Chapter 1 Halacha 8, it depends on the intent of the child. If the child knows that a Melacha will occur as a result of his action, then the Melacha remains Biblical and it is forbidden to instruct or allow a child to perform the act.[56] If, however, the child has no awareness whatsoever that any prohibited action will result from what he is being told to do, then some Poskim[57] rule that such Melacha is comparable to mis’asek and is merely Rabbinical, and hence an instruction is permitted for the child’s benefit.]

 

F. Meleches Machsheves – Is a Childs Melacha Biblical With Kavana: [58]

Some argue that since many prohibitions of Shabbos require meleches machsheves—a deliberate and purposeful act—and a child is halachically deemed incapable of possessing legally significant intent (machshavah), perhaps his actions of Melacha should not constitute a Shabbos violation at all. Nevertheless, the Acharonim clarify that all of the ordinary prohibitions of Shabbos apply with respect to a child’s actions. Thus, one may not instruct a child to perform a melachah on Shabbos, and we do not say that since a child lacks halachically recognized intent, his act is insignificant. Various explanations are offered by the authorities as to why the requirement of meleches machsheves does not exempt a child’s performance of melachah from the laws of Shabbos.

 

G. Melachah She’einah Tzerichah Legufah – May Child Perform in Time Of Need [59]

It is forbidden to instruct or cause a child to perform even a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah on Shabbos.[60] [This prohibition applies even in a time of need for the child, or for the sake of a Mitzvah[61], unlike the leniency applied to other Rabbinical commands.[62]] Likewise, the mitzvah of chinuch applies here as well, and a child who has reached the age of chinuch must be educated not to perform a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah, just as the Mitzvah of Chinuch applies to all Rabbinical prohibitions and commands. [This applies even in a time of need for the child, or for the sake of a Mitzvah, as stated above.]

 

H. Amira Lenachri

Asking a Non-Jew to Perform a Rabbinic Prohibition for the Needs of a Child:^[63]  When a child has a genuine need, there is greater room for leniency regarding amirah lenachri than exists for adults. Accordingly, in certain situations involving a bona fide need of the child—such as for his health, nourishment, comfort, or proper development—one may ask a non-Jew to perform the act on the child’s behalf.^[64] Nonetheless, this leniency is limited to cases of genuine need and should not be invoked merely for convenience or pleasure. See Halacha 9B for the full details of this subject!

Having a Child Ask a Non-Jew to Perform a Melachah:[65] In general, anything that is forbidden to ask a non-Jew to do on Shabbos on one’s behalf is likewise forbidden to ask a child to request from a non-Jew. Accordingly, one may not circumvent the laws of amira lenachri by having a child serve as an intermediary and relay the request to the non-Jew. Nevertheless, in a pressing situation, there is room for leniency when the child himself also needs the particular act to be performed, and the non-Jew will be doing the work primarily for the child’s benefit rather than for the adult’s benefit, as explained in Chapter 1 Halacha 8C and F.

Having a Non-Jew Tell a Child to Perform a Melachah:[66] Anything that is forbidden for an adult to tell a child to do on Shabbos is likewise forbidden for the adult to ask a non-Jew to tell the child to do. This applies not only when the child knows that the melachah is being performed for the benefit of the Jew, but even when the child performs it on behalf of the non-Jew.[67]

I. Ribuiy Beshiurim – Having a Child Increase a Permitted Melachah for the Benefit of an Adult [68]

The poskim discuss a case in which a child is performing a permitted act for his own needs, and whether an adult may ask the child to increase or expand that activity in order to also benefit the adult. This is comparable to the concept of ribui b’shiurim—adding to an otherwise permitted act.

The question is whether, since the child is already engaged in the activity for his own benefit, there is room to permit asking him to do more for the sake of the adult as well, or whether this would constitute an improper use of the child to perform a prohibited act on behalf of the adult. This matter is subject to halachic discussion among the authorities.

Example of Ribui B’Shiurim by a Child: An example of this question would be a case where a child is already carrying an item for his own need, and an adult wishes to add to the amount being carried for the adult’s benefit. The Be’er Moshe rules simply that the prohibition of ribui b’shiurim applies even with respect to a child. Accordingly, even according to those authorities who permit a child to carry a siddur or other mitzvah item for his own use, one may not give the child a larger challah or other object to carry in excess of his own needs merely in order to benefit the adult.

 

J. Rabbinical Melacha For His Sake

See Halacha 1E regarding possible leniencies to permit a child to perform Rabbinical Melacha on Shabbos for his sake.

 

5. Pikuach Nefesh Laws Involving Children

A. Saving the Life of a Child on Shabbos [69]

One is obligated to desecrate Shabbos in order to save the life of a Jewish child, even though the child has not yet reached the age of mitzvah observance. Thus, all necessary Shabbos prohibitions may be performed whenever a child is in a situation of possible danger.[70]

 

B. Saving a Kidnapped Child on Shabbos [71]

If one discovers on Shabbos that a Jewish child has been kidnapped or taken away with the intent of removing him or her from Jewish life and observance, it is a mitzvah to make every effort to rescue the child. Accordingly, one may transgress Shabbos—even Biblical prohibitions if necessary—in order to secure the child’s return. This applies even if the child has not yet reached the age of mitzvos. Thus, just as one desecrates Shabbos to save a child’s physical life, so too one may desecrate Shabbos to save a child from spiritual destruction and assimilation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C. A Child Being Delegated to Be Michalel Shabbos In Case Of Sakana

Instructing a Child to Desecrate Shabbos for Pikuach Nefesh:[72] Just as an adult may desecrate Shabbos in order to save a life, so too one may instruct a child to perform a Shabbos prohibition when necessary for pikuach nefesh. This applies equally to one’s own child and to any other child.[73]

Who Should Desecrate – Child or Adult?^[74] In a case of pikuach nefesh, one should not specifically delegate the necessary Shabbos desecration to a child. On the contrary, according to the primary halachic ruling, an adult Jew should perform whatever is necessary to save the ill person, even if a child is readily available to do so.[75]

 

D. May One Ask a Child to Perform Melachah for a Non-Dangerously Ill Person?

Biblical prohibition: No. A child has the same status as an adult regarding Biblical prohibitions.^[76]  Accordingly, just as an adult may only perform a Biblical prohibition for a choleh she’ein bo sakanah with a shinui and only when a non-Jew is unavailable, so too a child may only be asked to do so under those same conditions. This applies even if the child himself is the patient and the melachah is needed for his own treatment.^[77]

Rabbinic prohibition: If no non-Jew is available, and the matter cannot be performed with a shinui^[78], there is room to be lenient for a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition for his own medical needs.^[79]  This is based on the ruling that a child may, under certain circumstances, perform a rabbinic prohibition for his own benefit or need. However, whether a child may perform a rabbinic prohibition on behalf of another person who is ill requires further analysis.^[80]

Practical rule: Whenever the matter can be accomplished by an adult with a shinui, that option is preferable and one should not ask a child to perform the act in the ordinary manner.

 

E. May a child be asked to plug in or turn on a nebulizer for one who needs it?

No. A child should not be instructed to plug in or turn on a nebulizer on Shabbos, even if the treatment is needed for the child himself. Since operating electrical devices can be treated as a Biblical prohibition, asking a child to perform such an act is likewise forbidden.

Exception – Danger or Possible Danger: If the situation involves a danger to life or a risk that could develop into danger, then the nebulizer may be turned on, and it is preferable for an adult to do so rather than a child.

For a Non-Dangerously Ill Person: If the patient is a choleh she’ein bo sakanah (e.g., bedridden or ill in his entire body), and no non-Jew is available, then an adult may perform the act with a shinui (an unusual manner of operation), just as other Biblical prohibitions may be performed with a shinui for such a patient. What constitutes an effective shinui for a nebulizer requires further halachic clarification.

 

F. A Child Who Comes to Extinguish a Fire [81]

A child who comes to extinguish a fire on Shabbos must be stopped and protested. This applies even if the child acts on his own initiative, as it is assumed that he is doing so for the benefit of the owner of the property and not for his own benefit. This applies even if he has not yet reached the age of chinuch and even if his father is not present. Accordingly, all those present are obligated to prevent the child from extinguishing the fire.

 

 

 

6. Desecrating Shabbos for The Needs of a Child [82]

A. Young Children Have a Status of Choleh She’ein Bo Sakanah: [83]

A young child [who is still dependent on his mother for feeding^[84]] and care has the halachic status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah (a sick person who is not in danger). Accordingly, any leniency that Chazal permitted for the needs of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, such as Amirah Lenachri, may likewise be relied upon for the needs of a young child.[85] This special status reflects the Sages’ recognition that young children have unique needs and vulnerabilities that often require greater leniency on Shabbos.

What needs of a child may be done for him on Shabbos?[86] Some Poskim^[87] distinguish between a child’s food-related needs and his other needs. They write that the status of a child as a choleh she’ein bo sakanah applies specifically to matters of eating and nourishment, but not necessarily to other needs. However, other Poskim^[88] do not accept this distinction. Rather, they treat a young child as having the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah with respect to all of his ordinary needs, and this is the primary ruling accepted in practice.^[89] [Nonetheless, the leniencies granted due to a young child’s status as a choleh she’ein bo sakanah apply only when there is a substantial need for the child. One should not assume that every convenience or desire of a child qualifies for these leniencies. Rather, the permission is limited to matters that the child genuinely needs. Furthermore, even in cases of genuine need, the leniency applies only when the need cannot reasonably be met in another manner. Accordingly, whenever it is possible to prepare or arrange the matter before Shabbos, one should do so and not rely on these leniencies on Shabbos itself.[90]]

Until What Age Is a Child Considered a Choleh She’ein Bo Sakanah?^[91] The Poskim dispute until what age a child is considered to have the halachic status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah regarding having his ordinary needs performed for him on Shabbos. Some Poskim^[92] rule that this depends on whether the child still requires his mother to feed him, and once he eats independently he no longer receives this status. Other Poskim^[93] extend the status until approximately nine years of age, and others[94] until Bar and Bas Mitzvah. Other Poskim^[95] limit it to two or three years of age, and other Poskim^[96] limit it to six years of age. Accordingly, the matter depends on both the child’s age and level of dependence, and there is no universally accepted age limit.

 

B. Amirah Lenachri – A Gentile doing Melacha for a child’s needs: [97]

When necessary for the child’s nourishment, it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to prepare food for him even if doing so involves a Melacha, if no suitable alternative is available. ^[98] [The same applies regarding any other melachah needed for the child’s wellbeing or ordinary needs.[99] Since a young child has the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, one may ask a non-Jew to perform for the child any act, as explained in the conclusion above.]

Examples of Leniencies for a Child: Since a young child has the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, one may ask a non-Jew to perform any of the follwoing acts for the child’s needs that would otherwise be forbidden on Shabbos.

• Cooking:[100] If a child has no suitable food available, one may ask a non-Jew to cook food for him even when no danger is involved.
• Heating:[101] Likewise, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on the heat or a heater for young children, even if the cold is not severe enough to cause discomfort to adults, as children are more sensitive to cold.
• Darkness:[102] Similarly, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on a light for a child when the child has a significant need for it, such as when he is afraid of the dark or may become frightened.
• Mashing or Grating an Apple:[103] One may ask a non-Jew to mash or grate an apple for a child who requires it for eating.
• Extinguishing a Light for Sleep:[104] One may ask a non-Jew to extinguish a light so that a child can sleep.
• Transporting a Sick Child:[105] One may ask a non-Jew to carry a sick child who is not in danger through a public domain or transport him by car to a doctor when medically necessary.
• Soaking Clothing for a Child:[106] One may have a non-Jew soak a garment in water when needed for the care of a child in circumstances discussed by the poskim.
• Bathing a Child in Hot Water: One may have a non-Jew bathe a child in hot water on Shabbos or Yom Kippur when permitted for the child’s needs.
• Heating Water for a Child: One may ask a non-Jew to heat water when necessary for a child’s care or bathing.
• Squeezing Juice for a Child:[107] If a child requires fruit juice, one may ask a non-Jew to squeeze the juice for him, even from fruits such as grapes or olives.

 

C. A Jew Performing a Melachah for the Needs of a Child [108]

If a young child requires food or another necessity that involves a Shabbos transgression, one should ideally have a non-Jew perform the act rather than perform it himself, as stated above.^[109]

Biblical Melacha:[110] If no non-Jew is available, then according to the ruling of the Alter Rebbe[111], a Jew may perform even Biblical melachah with a shinui (irregular manner) on behalf of a young child who has the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, as explained in A. However, according to the Mishnah Berurah[112], a Jew may not perform a Biblical prohibition even for the needs of a young child unless the circumstances reach a greater level of necessity. However, if delaying the child’s food or care could lead to illness or danger, then all necessary Shabbos prohibitions may be performed just as they would be for a dangerously ill patient.^[113]

Rabbinical Melacha: According to all, Rabbinical Melacha may be performed with a Shinuiy.

Melachah She’einah Tzerichah Legufah:[114] It is forbidden to perform a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah on Shabbos even on behalf of even a small child just as we rule with all Biblical prohibitions. This prohibition applies even in a time of need for the child, unlike the leniency applied to other Rabbinical commands. However, it may be performed with a Shinuiy for the sake of a true need of the child, as explained above.

Pesik Reishei: Some Poskim[115] rule that it is permitted to perform an action that causes an unintentional Melacha in a way of p’sik reisha for the sake of a young child who is defined as a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. It may be performed even without a Shinuiy.

Uvdin Dechol:[116] Activities that are forbidden on Shabbos due to uvdin dechol (weekday-like conduct) may nevertheless be performed for the needs of a young child.[117]

 

 

 

 

 

 

D. Feeding Muktzah to a Child: [118]

When required for the child’s wellbeing, one may even feed the child muktzah food^[119] directly if it cannot be done in another manner [such as if no gentile is available^[120]]. [Likewise, one move any Muktzah item on his behalf.^[121]]

 

E. Laws relating to breastfeeding and breast milk on Shabbos: [122]

It is permitted without restriction for a woman to breast-feed a child on Shabbos, even if the child does not need to breast-feed such as if he is already satiated, or has formula or other foods available. Thus, a woman may nurse her child on Shabbos even if her child is already satiated and is doing so simply to release breast pain or due to feeling engorged, or it is close to the end of Shabbos.^[123] The following will discuss various regulations relating to releasing the breastmilk not in the form of nursing:

Squeezing the milk into a cup and the like:^[124] It is Biblically^[125] forbidden for a woman to squeeze breast milk into a cup or other vessel in order to feed it to her child [or for any other purpose], unless it is a case of Pikuach Nefesh.^[126]

Trickling the milk in order to stimulate the child to nurse:^[127] However, it is permitted for a woman to squeeze out some milk [and have it trickle down her skin onto the ground^[128]] having it go to waste, in order to stimulate the child to nurse.^[129] [However, she may not squeeze the milk directly into his mouth even in order to stimulate him to nurse.^[130]]

Squeezing out the milk to relieve breast pain?^[131] It is for permitted a mother to squeeze out breast milk with her hands in order to relieve breast pain [that is caused by the engorged breast].^[132] However, this allowance only applies if the milk will be going to waste [however, to pump into a vessel is Biblically forbidden, as explained above].^[133] [See Q&A regarding using a pump]

Squeezing out breast milk for other reasons: Based on the above, it is understood that it is forbidden to squeeze breastmilk on Shabbos even if the milk will be going to waste, unless it is being done for the sake of the nursing child or to relieve breast pain. Thus, she may not squeeze out the milk simply to look at its color, or to see how much she has, and the like.

 

Summary: Is forbidden for a woman to squeeze breast milk into a vessel due to the Biblical detaching prohibition. However, it is permitted for a woman to squeeze out some milk and have it trickle down her skin in order to stimulate her child to nurse. As well, it is permitted for her to squeeze milk onto the ground in order to relieve breast pain caused by the milk. It is forbidden to squeeze breastmilk on Shabbos for other purposes.   Q&A During nursing, may woman press on her breasts in order to help more milk come out into the baby’s mouth?[134] Yes.[135] Q&A on squirting to stimulate child May one squirt the milk directly into the baby’s mouth in order to stimulate it to eat?[136] Some Poskim[137] rule that it is permitted to squeeze the milk directly into the baby’s mouth, and some[138] understand that this is in fact the preferred method. Other Poskim[139], however, rule that it is forbidden to squirt the milk into the mouth of the baby, as in such a case it is not going to waste and thus squeezing it contains a Biblical prohibition. Practically, Admur[140] implies like the latter opinion and hence one is to be stringent and have the milk trickle down the skin and go to waste.   May one squirt the milk in order for the baby to see it and desire to nurse?[141] Yes.   May one squeeze out some milk in order so it does not overflow into the child’s mouth?[142] Yes. Q&A on squirting to release pain and other purposes May a woman use a pump to release milk in order to relieve breast pain?[143] If enters a vessel and she plans to use this milk:[144] If the pump contains a bottle which will store the milk, then according to all opinions, it is forbidden to use this pump if she plans to save and use the milk. If enters a vessel and she plans to throw out the milk: If the pump contains a bottle which will store the milk but she plans to throw out the milk from the bottle, then some Poskim[145] rule that it is nevertheless forbidden for her to pump the milk into the bottle for the purpose even though it is done for the sake of relieving breast pain and she will eventually throw out the milk from the bottle.[146] Other Poskim[147], however, rule that this is permitted to be done. Some Poskim[148] arbitrate that one may be lenient like these opinions to pump out less than a Grogeres[149] worth of milk at a time and then spill it out prior to pumping again.[150] If the milk goes directly to waste from the pump: According to all opinions, it is permitted to pump milk in order to relieve pain if the pump squeezes out the milk directly onto the floor or garbage.   May one squeeze out milk for the sake of relieving future breast pain, even if at the moment there is no pain? Some Poskim[151] arbitrate that doing so is allowed.   If a woman is particular not to nurse her child after she gets angry or frightened due to danger[152], may she squeeze out this milk on Shabbos?[153] Yes, so long as it will go to waste.   May a woman squeeze out her milk on Shabbos in order to prevent herself from getting wet from the milk [during sleep, or when going to Shul etc]?[154] No.[155] This applies even if the milk will go to waste.   May a woman squeeze out her milk on Shabbos in order to prevent her milk supply from drying up, if for whatever reason she’s not currently nursing her child?[156] Some Poskim[157] rule that it is permitted to do so if the milk goes to waste. Some[158], however, write that according to the experts, not nursing for one day will not affect the milk supply or its quality, with exception to unique cases. Accordingly, a woman should not squeeze out her milk simply because she doesn’t want to go one day without nursing due to worry of losing her milk supply. Q&A on pumping if child won’t breast feed May a woman pump milk to bottle feed her baby if she can’t breast-feed him?[159] If a child is unable to breast-feed, such as if he is a preemie and cannot nurse, or if the child is sick or weak, or cannot nurse any other reason, and during the week the mother pumps her milk to bottle feed the child, then the following is the law regarding if this may also be done on Shabbos: If it is still possible to nurse the child, then even if doing so entails difficulty, the mother may not pump her milk to bottle feed the child and she must nurse him on Shabbos.[160] If the child will absolutely not nurse, then during the week the mother is to pump her milk in order to store for use on Shabbos, as will be explained below. If for whatever reason this was not or could not be done [such as if she has a small milk supply], then if there are no breastmilk Gemachim in one’s area [see below], and there’s nothing else available for the child to eat [such as formula, as explained below], then since there is possible danger involved for the child to go hungry, therefore, she may pump milk on Shabbos for the sake of feeding her baby from a bottle.[161] Baby formula-If available but not medically recommended: If formula or other breast milk alternatives are available, but one’s doctor states that he does not recommend it based on the health situation of this child, and that in his opinion the child needs specifically to be having mother’s milk, then the above allowance of pumping on Shabbos applies. If formula, or other supplements, are available and there is no medical reason for the child to avoid taking it instead of breastmilk, then it is forbidden for her to pump on Shabbos for this purpose. In all cases that one is unsure how the baby will react to the formula, one is to consult with one’s health care provider, and try to feed the baby some of the formula during the week to see the baby’s reaction.[162] Some Poskim[163], however, are lenient and rule that there is no need to try feeding formula to the baby simply for the sake of not pumping on Shabbos, and only if one anyways gives him formula during the week is it forbidden to pump on Shabbos. This especially applies with a premature baby. The amount of milk that she may pump at a time: Some Poskim[164] rule that she should not pump out more than a Grogeres[165] worth of milk at a time.[166] Hence, she is to pump out less than a Grogeres worth of milk and feed it to the child, and then pump out another Grogeres worth and feed him it. She should not pump out more milk until the child is fed the previous milk that was pumped. However, other Poskim[167] negate this and rule that it is permitted[168], and even Halachically advantageous[169], for her to pump as much as necessary for that Shabbos, in one session. Using an electric pump versus hand pump: Ideally, even if a woman is required to pump her milk on Shabbos for the sake of feeding her child due to Pikuach Nefesh, she should only use a manual hand pump, [if an electric pump was not set up on a timer before Shabbos and a gentile is not available, as will be explained]. If, however, there is difficulty in doing so using a hand pump, or it is not available, then she may use an electric pump and even plug it in on Shabbos through a gentile[170], or using a Shinuiy.[171] This preference of using a manual pump, however, only applies if the electric pump was not set up before Shabbos on a timer, however, initially it is better to use an electric pump that was set to a timer before Shabbos than to use a manual pump.[172] [One is to plug in an electric pump before Shabbos and set it up on a timer to turn on at set intervals for her to pump her milk.] When using an electric pump, she should place the pump on her breast prior to it turning on, in order so it be considered like Gerama.[173] Pumping before Shabbos and storing the milk:[174] In order to avoid the need of desecrating Shabbos through pumping the milk, a woman should pump during the week and store the milk in the freezer and the like in order to then use on Shabbos. There is no problem in the defrosting this milk on Shabbos[175], and one may even do so near a source of heat so long it cannot reach Yad Soledes.[176] One may also place it in a bowl of Keli Sheiyni hot water in order for it to melt and become warm.[177] However, one may not completely submerge it within the water if one intends for the milk to warm up.[178] Milk Gemachim: Certain communities have breast milk Gemachim for women who are not able to pump enough milk to feed their child. If such a Gemach is available, one is to use their milk rather than to pump on Shabbos.   Q&A on Muktzah and carrying Is breastmilk Muktzah on Shabbos?[179] Breastmilk that was pumped before Shabbos is considered like any other food and therefore is not Muktzah. However, breastmilk that was removed on Shabbos itself is considered Muktzah due to Nolad.   May a woman wear nursing pads on Shabbos? It is permitted for a woman to wear nursing pads on Shabbos. Area without Eiruv: See Piskeiy Teshuvos 303:10   May a woman wear a milk collector cup on Shabbos? It is permitted for a woman to wear milk collector cup on Shabbos.[180] However, the milk that is collected in the cup is considered Muktzah.[181] What to do with the milk in the collector cups:[182] Being that the milk is Muktzah, therefore, it may not be dealt with, poured into a bottle, and fed to a child on Shabbos. However, seemingly, to remove it from the body and spill it into the sink is permitted to be done.[183] Likewise, if one places some water into the cup and has the milk drip into the water, then the milk does not become Muktzah at all, and it is permitted to move the nursing cup to spill out the milk for any purpose on Shabbos, even to save it and place it in the fridge.[184] However, Tzaruch Iyun if it may be fed to the baby on Shabbos.[185]]

 

1. May One Use a Noise-Making Toy to Calm or Put a Baby to Sleep?^[186]

If the toy produces musical sounds, it is forbidden to use it on Shabbos, even for the purpose of calming or putting a baby to sleep. If, however, the toy merely produces ordinary noise and not music, then in a case of need—such as when a baby is crying and cannot otherwise be soothed—one may be lenient to use a toy specifically designed for infants, such as a rattle, in order to calm the child or lull him to sleep. This leniency applies only to toys that create simple noise and not musical melodies.[187]

 

7. Sakana: Special Matters of Danger for Children which Permit Chillul Shabbos [188]

A. A Child Locked in a Room [189]

If a young child becomes locked in a room on Shabbos, it is permitted to break down the door in order to remove him. The reason is that there is a concern that the child may become severely frightened, and such fear can potentially endanger his life. Accordingly, the situation is treated as one involving possible danger (safek pikuach nefesh), for which the laws of Shabbos are set aside.

 

B. A Lost Child on Shabbos [190]

Searching for a Lost Child: If there is concern for the safety or wellbeing of a lost child, one may desecrate Shabbos and perform any necessary Shabbos prohibitions in order to locate and rescue the child. Such situations are treated as a case of possible danger (safek pikuach nefesh), for which Shabbos is set aside.

Contacting the Police or Relatives: If a lost child is found and is distressed or hysterical to be reunited with his parents or relatives, one may contact the police or the child’s family on Shabbos in order to arrange his safe return and calm the child.

 

1. Desecrating Shabbos to arrange for a babysitter:^[191]

If a couple have only small children at home and must travel to the hospital on Shabbos then one may even desecrate Shabbos for the sake of arranging for a babysitter on Shabbos, if the children are too young or scared to stay alone at home.

 

8. Medical Needs: Illness & First Aid For Children

A. Medicine:

Since a young child has the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah as explained in the previous Halacha, the rabbinic decree against taking medicines on Shabbos (gezeiras shechikas samamanim) does not apply to him as we rule regarding a Choleh.[192] Accordingly, a child may be given any medication that he needs on Shabbos, including syrups, pills, nose drops, ear drops, eye drops, powders, baby oil, and similar treatments.

May a Child Be Given Medicine Even If He Is Not Considered a Choleh She’ein Bo Sakanah?[193] Seemingly, one may give medicine to a sick child even if he is not bedridden and even if he is above the age at which children are generally considered to have the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. Since the prohibition against taking medicine on Shabbos is rabbinic, there is room to argue that so long as the child is below Bar or Bas Mitzvah, medicine may be administered when needed.

 

B. Vitamins: [194]

Children may take vitamins on Shabbos. Nevertheless, when possible, it is preferable to arrange the vitamin schedule so that the vitamins are taken before or after Shabbos rather than on Shabbos itself.

 

C. Applying Creams and Oils to a Child on Shabbos [195]

Medicinal Oil:^[196] Since a young child is considered a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, it is permitted to administer medications and medicinal treatments that are ordinarily restricted on Shabbos. Accordingly, medicinal oils may be applied to a baby’s skin for conditions such as rashes and the like.

Smearing Medicinal Creams:^[197] Smearing creams and ointments raise the concern of the prohibition of memarei’ach (smoothing). Therefore, a cream may only be applied on a young child if it is the type that is completely absorbed into the skin and is not normally left visible on the surface. If the cream is typically spread and left visibly on the skin, it may not be applied on Shabbos.^[198] [Some authorities^[199] are nevertheless lenient even regarding visible creams, although the accepted practice is to be stringent.]

Dabbing Medicinal Creams:[200] For young children who have the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, there is an additional leniency regarding creams and ointments. Even if one is stringent not to smear a cream onto the child, one may nevertheless dab the cream onto the affected area without spreading or smoothing it. Accordingly, a medicinal cream may be placed on the child’s skin for treatment purposes, provided that one does not rub it in or smooth it over the skin.

Older children: The above leniencies apply only to children who are within the age range that the poskim consider to have the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. However, regarding older children who are beyond that age, there is no general dispensation to apply creams or ointments on Shabbos. Accordingly, all of the ordinary laws of medicine and memarei’ach apply to them, just as they do to adults. Therefore, unless the child independently qualifies as a choleh she’ein bo sakanah due to illness, one may not apply creams or ointments to him on Shabbos in a manner that would be forbidden for an adult.

 

D. Inducing Diarrhea: [201]

It is forbidden to press upon the stomach of a [constipated] baby in order to help the feces come out as one may come to give [the baby] to drink medications which causes diarrhea. [However, if the child is in pain and cannot release the bowel movement on his own, then certainly one may even give him medicine, as the needs of a child are like the needs of one who is bedridden.^[202]]

 

E. Treating eye irritation: [203]

Question:

May my son use eyedrops on Shabbos to prevent his lens number from going up?

 

Answer:

Yes, if he is under 9 years old, or if lack of doing so can cause a significant loss of eyesight later on.

 

Background: Ideally, eyedrops are forbidden on Shabbos for medicinal purposes unless it is done for a specific active condition such as an eye infection [as opposed to mere dryness of the eye, or slight pain]. It is questionable as to how to judge the purpose for which the eyedrops are intended for, and if it is to be viewed similar to dryness, which is forbidden, or like a Sakanas Eiver which is permitted. Practically, if your son is under 9 years old you may do so for any medicinal purpose including the one you mentioned. If he is above age 9, then seemingly this matter would depend on how bad the eyesight can be damaged if the eyedrops are not given during the 24 hours period of Shabbos, and whether one can rely on those Poskim who rule that if one started a treatment before Shabbos than one may continue on Shabbos. However, my leaning stance would be that if it can damage the eyesight to the point that one will have abnormal difficulty seeing, or higher than average eye prescriptions even later on in life, then one may do so.

 

Sources: See Admur 328: 9,22, 26-27; 51; Michaber 328:9; Minchas Yitzchak 1:78; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:22; Choveret Asia 48:79

 

Question:

My daughter has a stye pimple by the side of her eye which is very much irritating her. May she place a bag of tea on her eyes for the sake of healing it on Shabbos. The pimple is causing her eyelid to close up and it is difficult for her to see.

 

 

 

Answer:

If she is below the age of nine then this may be done. If she is above age 9 then she should not do so unless she is in so much pain that she is bedridden or feels weak in her entire body, or the infection has begun to spread into the actual eye. Even in the above cases of allowance, this may only done if the intent is to relieve the pain from the eye or reduce the infection, and not in order to help release blood and puss from the stye.

 

Explanation: In general, the rule is that it is forbidden to give medical treatment on Shabbos to a child above age 9 unless he is bedridden or weak in his entire body, even if the treatment does not involve any independent prohibition. Particularly, the Talmud and sages explicitly state regulations regarding eye treatment on Shabbos, prohibiting the placing of ointment onto it, and the same would apply regarding a teabag. The only time that is permitted to treat an eye on Shabbos is if either a) there is danger of life or limb involved [various forms of eye infections], or the pain is so great that one is bedridden or feels weak in his entire body as a result, or b) it is not apparent to the onlooker that one is treating the eye and merely appears like he’s washing it, or c) the eye does not have any real ailment, such as one who cannot open his eye due to dry puss and therefore is allowed to wash it even with ointment in order to open it. Likewise, it is permitted to place a vessel over his eye in order to cool it down. Likewise, one who is suffering from eye inflammation a place a ring around his eye in order to prevent it from spreading being that this does not actually heal the eye or perhaps because it is not apparent to others that one does so for healing. From all the above it is understood that it is forbidden to place a teabag on the eye for the sake of healing a stye if it does not fall under the exemptions of a). Furthermore, placing it on a stye in order so it release blood and puss can fall under the biblical Mifarek prohibition which prohibits placing ointment on a wound in order to release blood and pus.

 

Sources: See Admur 328:9; 328:25-27, 32-33, 328:51, 54; Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:22

 

 

 

 

 

9. The Detailed Melachos of Shabbos Relevant to Children

A. Children Learning by Candlelight on Shabbos [204]

Although Chazal generally prohibited reading by candlelight on Shabbos out of concern that one may adjust the flame, an exception was made for schoolchildren studying under the supervision of their teacher. Since the children are under the authority of their regular teacher and are accustomed to acting only according to his instructions, there is no concern that they will come to adjust the flame. This applies even if the teacher is not currently in the room. [However, this leniency appears to apply specifically when the children are learning under a permanent teacher whom they genuinely fear and respect. In more informal settings, such as occasional Torah classes, Tehillim groups, or similar gatherings where the children do not possess the same level of awe for the supervisor, this leniency would not apply.]

May a Child Serve as a Shomer to Prevent Adjusting the Flame?[205] If an adult wishes to read near a candle on Shabbos, it does not help, according to the stricter opinion, to have a child stand nearby as a shomer to remind him not to adjust the flame. Since a child is not generally relied upon for this purpose, the presence of the child does not remove the rabbinic concern. However, some authorities[206] are lenient and permit relying on a child as a shomer. According to this view, a child who is mature enough to call out “Shabbos!” or otherwise warn the adult upon seeing him reach toward the lamp may serve as a valid reminder and supervisor.

 

B. Children Running, Jumping, Skipping on Shabbos: [207]

The General Law: The verse^[208] states “Im Tashiv Mishabbos Raglecha…Vechibadeto Meiasos Derachecha etc/If from walking you will rest and honor Shabbos by not doing weekday activity.” From here the Sages^[209] learned that one’s walking on Shabbos should not be like one’s walking during the week. Practically, due to this, various regulations are recorded in Poskim regarding different forms of walking.^[210] Thus, it is forbidden to run, jump, or skip on Shabbos, and one should likewise avoid taking unusually large strides or walking farther than necessary when a shorter route is available.

Law by Children:^[211] Despite the above general ruling, it is permitted [even initially^[212]] for children/lads [who are playing together^[213]] to jump and run for the sake of pleasure and fun if they enjoy doing so.

 

C. Bells – Children Wearing Bells or Ornaments on Shabbos

The Law If There Is No Eruv:[214] Children may go out on Shabbos wearing gold bells or ornaments that are woven into or sewn onto their clothing for decorative purposes even in an area without an Eruv. However, if the bells are merely attached through a knot or similar temporary means and are not permanently affixed, they may not be worn outside on Shabbos. This prohibition applies even to young children.[215]

The Law if The Bells Make Noise:^[216] A child may not be provided to wear on Shabbos a garment containing bells that are designed to produce sound.^[217] This prohibition applies even if the child is below the age of understanding and is not yet subject to the ordinary obligations of chinuch.^[218] Certainly it is forbidden to dress the child in these clothes.^[219] However, it is permitted for an adult to walk with clothing which has a bell attached to it that makes sounds of music being that one has no intent to do so.^[220] However, if he consciously intends to make the sounds of the bell then it is forbidden for even an adult to wear such clothing.^[221]

Shaking a bell to quite down a child:^[222] One may not shake a bell in order to quiet down a child.

 

D. Girls Wearing Earrings-Placeholders in Pierced Ears on Shabbos [223]

It is customary to pierce the ears of young girls in preparation for wearing earrings when they become older. To prevent the holes from closing, small sticks or splinters are often inserted into the pierced holes. Such girls may go out with these inserts on Shabbos. The same law applies if threads are placed in the holes instead of small sticks. However, this permission applies only if the threads are not dyed. If the threads are colored or dyed for decorative purposes, it is forbidden to go out with them on Shabbos.

 

E. Tzeida – A Child Catching Escaped Poultry [224]

If one’s geese, chickens, or other poultry escape, and the circumstances are such that an adult may not capture them on Shabbos, nevertheless, if a child on his own initiative chases after the birds in order to catch them and return them, one is not required to protest or stop him. Since the child is acting on his own and was not instructed to do so, there is no obligation to object to his actions.

 

F. Children Feeding Animals on Shabbos: [225]

It is permitted for one to feed home and farm animals, food and drink, if they are dependent on him for their food. It is however forbidden to feed home and farm animals if they are not dependant on him for their food. Thus, it is forbidden to feed bees, or pigeons.^[226] It is forbidden to even simply place food in front of them.^[227] It goes without saying that it is forbidden to feed wild animals or birds. [This applies even to children.^[228]]

Shabbos Shira:^[229] Some are accustomed to place wheat^[230] in front of birds on Shabbos Shirah^[231], [even if the animals are not dependent on people for their food]. However, based on the above ruling, doing so is incorrect being that these animals are not dependent on people for their food. [Practically, the Chabad custom is not do so, or even allow children above Chinuch to do so, on Shabbos.^[232] Rather one who wants to honor the custom is to set up food for the animals from before Shabbos.^[233] Likewise, one is to explain to children the importance of being merciful to animals.^[234]]

Force-feeding – Gavaging:[235] It is forbidden to force-feed an animal on Shabbos by stuffing food into his stomach, even if it is dependent on one for its food.^[236] However, if one owns geese or other animals that have become accustomed to being force-fed by people and will suffer if they are not fed, it is permitted for an adult to even force-feed them on Shabbos due to the concern of tza’ar ba’alei chaim. Nevertheless, where possible, it is preferable to have a child provide the food rather than an adult.

 

G. Giving a child cake with lettering to eat: [237]

Due to the erasing prohibition, it is generally forbidden to break a cake which has on it forms of letters, even though one’s intent is simply to eat [the cake] as he is [nevertheless] erasing [these letters]. [It is thus forbidden to eat this cake on Shabbos.^[238]] However, it is permitted to give this cake to a child [who is below the age of Chinuch^[239], even though one knows for certain that the child will eat it^[240]], as a child who does [transgressions] for his own benefit does not need to be separated [from the act]. However, one may not place the cake directly into the mouth of the child.^[241] [Likewise, it is forbidden for one to tell the baby to eat it.^[242]]

 

H. Pushing a Stroller on Shabbos: [243]

It is permitted to push a baby carriage or stroller over dirt, grass, or other earthen surfaces in an area that has a valid eiruv.^[244]  This remains permitted even if the wheels leave tracks or depressions in the ground, as one is not intending to create a furrow and the stroller’s movement generally compresses the earth rather than excavates it.^[245] There is likewise no concern of uvdin dechol (weekday activity) in pushing a stroller, since carrying a baby without a stroller would be difficult and burdensome. However, in an area that does not have a valid eiruv, it is forbidden to push a stroller, just as it is forbidden to carry the child or other items there. [246]

 

I. Hanging a Child’s Soiled Diapers or Clothing for Drying [247]

The poskim write that diapers and similar cloths used for infants may be hung up to dry on Shabbos.[248] Nevertheless, they may not be hung near a heater, stove, or other location where the heat reaches yad soledes bo, as this raises other halachic concerns.

 

10. Muktzah Laws: [249]

A. Chinuch in Muktzah [250]

As with all areas of Shabbos observance, once a child reaches the age of chinuch, a father is obligated to educate him in the laws of muktzah and train him not to move items that are forbidden to handle on Shabbos. Prior to reaching the age of chinuch, however, the parents are not obligated to protest if the child moves or holds muktzah items on his own initiative.

The following halachos discuss a number of common scenarios involving children and muktzah, and the circumstances under which certain leniencies may be applied for the benefit or needs of the child.

 

B. Moving Muktzah on Behalf Of Young Child’s Needs: [251]

When required for the child’s wellbeing and basic needs, one may move a Muktzah item on his behalf even directly, if it cannot be done in another manner [such as if no gentile is available^[252]].

 

C. Hazmanah – A Child’s Designation Does Not Affect Muktzah [253]

The poskim rule that whenever the laws of muktzah depend on a person’s intent or designation (hazmanah), only the intent of an adult is halachically effective.[254]

If a Child placed a Muktzah object on a non-Muktzah item is it considered a Basis?^[255] If a child under Bar Mitzvah placed the Muktzah on the base then it is not Muktzah if this does not benefit the father.^[256]

 

 

 

D. Lifting a Child Holding a Muktzah Item: [257]

If the child is holding a stone:^[258]  One may lift a child who is holding a stone only in a case of need, such as when the child strongly desires to be held and may become ill if not comforted.^[259] This applies only when the stone cannot easily be removed from the child’s hand without causing significant crying or distress.^[260] If there is no special need to lift the child, he may not be lifted while holding the stone.[261]

If the child is holding money:^[262] One may not lift a child who is holding money or coins or any other Muktzah item of value. Even when the child strongly desires his parent and may become distressed, one may not lift him—or even hold his hand while he walks^[263]—if he is holding money.[264]

If One Already Lifted the Child While He Was Holding Muktzah:[265] If one already lifted a child who was holding a muktzah item, the law follows the discussion regarding one who already picked up muktzah in his hands. The poskim debate whether one may continue carrying the child or whether he must immediately put him down. Furthermore, many authorities distinguish between muktzah machmas gufo (such as a stone) and muktzah machmas issur. The same discussion applies if the child picked up the muktzah item after he was already being carried. In a case where one is permitted to continue carrying the child because he is already in his arms, the poskim further discuss whether one may carry the child wherever he wishes, or whether he must proceed directly to the nearest location where the muktzah can be removed. Practically: If one accidently picked up a completely Muktzah object [MM”G; MMC”K], he is to put it down as soon as he remembers unless it will cause one a monetary loss, in which case he may bring it immediately to its destination. If the Muktzah is MM”I one may carry it to its destination. The same applies for a child holding Muktzah.

Carrying a Child in a Public Domain While He Is Holding an Item:[266] The above leniencies apply only in a private domain. In a public domain, however, it is Biblically forbidden to carry a child who is holding a stone, coin, or other item, due to the prohibitions of carrying, transferring, or transporting objects four cubits in a public domain. If one merely holds the child’s hand while the child is walking and holding a coin, the law is subject to the distinction between a child holding a valuable item versus a non-valuable item.

 

E. Giving a Child a Muktzah Item to Stop Him From Crying [267]

If a child is crying because a Muktzah item fell from his hand, the father may not pick up the Muktzah and place it back into the child’s hand. However, the father may allow the child himself to pick up the stone, and once the child is again holding it, the father may lift the child in the circumstances discussed above when there is a significant need, such as to calm the child.

 

F. Moving a Potty for a Child [268]

A potty may be moved for the sake of a child. Since it is needed for a child’s use and dignity, Chazal did not apply the ordinary restrictions of muktzah in this case.

 

G. Apricot Pits [269]

Apricot pits are generally muktzah unless they were designated before Shabbos for use as children’s playthings. Some authorities suggest that for children themselves they may not be considered muktzah even if they were not designated before Shabbos.

 

H. Moving a Pen to Prevent a Child from Coloring

If a child is likely to color with a pen on Shabbos, it is preferable to move the pen with a shinui, such as with one’s foot, elbow, or the back of one’s hand.^[270] Alternatively, one may move the pen in the regular manner if he also needs the space on which the pen is resting (tzorech mekomo), and then use that space after removing the pen.^[271]

 

I. May one play with seashells on Shabbos or are they Muktzah?

Question:

When my children go to the beach they love to collect seashells as many children do. Are they allowed to play with them on Shabbos or are they considered Muktzah?

 

Answer:

Seashells which have been collected before Shabbos and are kept for personal use to serve as a collection, are not considered Muktzah and be moved on Shabbos regularly. Random seashells that are on the beach floor and have not been collected before Shabbos, are considered Muktzah on Shabbos and may not be collected until after Shabbos.

 

Explanation: Seashells are considered similar to any other raw material, similar to pieces of wood and stone, which are considered Muktzah on Shabbos unless they were predesignated before Shabbos. Now, although we find in certain cases, such as a rock or stone, that pre-designation is not enough and one must actually modify the item to show its purpose, this only applies if the use that one is designating it for is not a common use. If, however, it is a common use, then pre-designation suffices and it does not require any modification. Furthermore, even by a noncommon use, if a designated for this use forever, it does not require a modification. Accordingly, it is clear that seashells which were collected before Shabbos and designated by the individual to be part of his collection to enjoy, and they are considered designated for the sake of a use, and are no longer considered Muktzah. Now, although one could argue that a collection is not considered a use at all, in truth we find that designating an item for memorabilia purposes is considered a use according to Halacha, aside from the fact that kids play with the seashells to put by their ear and listen to the “waves,” and it is no different than any other toy, such as apricot pits and sand that are predesignated for children’s playing and are not considered Muktzah.

 

Sources: See regarding pre-designating Muktzah items before Shabbos: Admur 308:36, 50-53; Michaber 308:10, 20, 22; Biur Halacha 308:22 “Beyichud”; Ketzos Hashulchan 110:5 See regarding apricot pits: SSH”K 16:10; Piskeiy Teshuvos 308:43  See regarding sand: SSH”K 16:4; See regarding memorabilia items: Tehila Ledavid 336:6; Toras Shabbos 308:2; Ketzos Hashulchan 121 footnote 4; Rav SZ”A in SSH”K 20 footnote 214

 

11. Child Carrying In Area without Eruv [272]

A. General Prohibition For A Child To Carry:

It is generally forbidden to instruct a child to carry in an area where carrying is prohibited, whether the prohibition is Biblical (reshus harabim) or rabbinic (karmelis), due to the prohibition of sefiyah.

 

B. A Child Carrying for His Own Need or for a Mitzvah need – General Rule: [273]

In earlier generations it was common in many communities to rely on children to carry items through a karmelis, such as bringing food, a siddur, or a tallis.[274] Some Poskim[275]  rule that there is room to be lenient regarding carrying in a karmelis when the child is carrying an item for his own benefit and need. Their reasoning is based on the opinion[276] that, when a child has a genuine need, one may allow him to transgress a rabbinic prohibitions. Nevertheless, the practical ruling is that one should initially be stringent and not rely on this leniency unless he is below the age of Chinuch, or it is a pressing situation and it is done on a mere occasion, as will be explained next. See Chapter 1 Halacha 8C for the full details of this subject.

Carrying Less Than Four Amos in a Karmelis:[277] Although one may not generally instruct a child to carry on Shabbos, it is permitted to have a child carry an item less than four amos at a time in a karmelis when the carrying is being done for the child’s own need or benefit.

 

C. Child Carrying Food to Shul in an Area Without an Eruv: [278]

Below the age of understanding:^[279] If the child is below the age of understanding (approximately under three years old), he may be given food to carry to shul for his own consumption, even on a regular basis, in an area that is only a karmelis. Some learn that this may be done even on a constant basis, and even if one instructs the child to carry it.[280] However, it is forbidden to give the child food to carry on behalf of the father.[281] All the above refers to a Karmalis, however in a Biblical Reshus Harabim, it is completely forbidden to tell a child to carry any item even for his own use.

Above the age of understanding: As explained in Chapter 1 Halacha 8C, a child, even if he is above the age of Chinuch, may be given food to carry outside in an area without an Eruv, if the food is needed for his own consumption, and no non-Jew is available to do the carrying, and the area does not have the status of a Biblical public domain, and it is done only on mere occasion. However, one may not give the child food to carry on behalf of an adult. The leniency applies only when the carrying serves the child’s own need. All the above refers to a Karmalis, however in a Biblical Reshus Harabim, it is completely forbidden to tell a child to carry any item even for his own use.

• Even where a child is permitted to carry, the adult should not place the item directly into the child’s hand, but should instead leave it before him and allow the child to pick it up himself, as explained in E.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D. Child Carrying a Siddur, Chumash in an Area Without an Eruv [282]

Below the age of understanding:^[283] If a child is below the age of understanding (approximately under three years old), one may give him a siddur, chumash which he will carry for his own use in an area defined as a Karmalis.[284] One may even instruct the child to carry it with him to Shul. Some learn that this may be done even on a constant basis, and even if one instructs the child to carry it.[285] Later, the father may use the siddur together with the child if desired.^[286] However, it is forbidden to give the child a siddur to carry on behalf of the father or for the father’s use, unless the father needs it for the sake of a Mitzvah (such as there are no siddurim or Talleisim in Shul).[287] [All the above refers to a Karmalis, however in a Biblical Reshus Harabim, it is completely forbidden to tell a child to carry any item even for his own use. However, if the child happens to walk out with the item, there is no need to protest him, as explained in Chapter 2 Halacha 3. Furthermore, one may even give him a siddur, chumash, or Tallis in a private domain even if he will end up carrying it outside, and even for the use of the adult, so long as one does not instruct him to carry it outside.[288]]

Above the age of understanding:[289] If the child is above the age of understanding, he may not on a set basis be given a siddur or chumash to carry, even for his own use, even in a Karmalis, and must be protested if he does so.^[290] However, this may be done on mere occasion in a Karmalis, in a time of need.[291] Such an exception may exist in a community that normally has a valid eiruv and it unexpectedly became invalid for a particular Shabbos, as this is an uncommon circumstance that is unlikely to affect the child’s future observance.^[292] However, it is forbidden to give the child a siddur to carry on behalf of the father or for the father’s use, unless the father needs it for the sake of a Mitzvah (such as there are no siddurim or Talleisim in Shul).[293] [All the above refers to a Karmalis, however in a Biblical Reshus Harabim, it is completely forbidden to tell a child to carry any item even for his own use.]

• Even where a child is permitted to carry, the adult should not place the item directly into the child’s hand, but should instead leave it before him and allow the child to pick it up himself, as explained in E.

 

Child Carrying Food or Sefarim in an Area Without an Eruv (Karmelis)

 

Scenario	Food for Child’s Consumption	Siddur/Chumash for Child’s Use
Below age of understanding (approx. under 3)	Permitted. May be given food to carry for his own consumption, even regularly. Some permit even instructing him to carry it.	Permitted. May be given a siddur or chumash for his own use and may even be instructed to carry it. Some permit this even on a regular basis.
Adult benefits as well	Not permitted if being carried primarily on behalf of the adult.	Father may later use the siddur together with the child, but it may not be given primarily for the father’s use.
For adult’s use alone	Forbidden.	Forbidden, unless needed for a mitzvah purpose (e.g., no siddurim or talleisim available in shul).
Above age of understanding	Permitted only occasionally in a time of need, if the food is for the child’s own consumption, no non-Jew is available, and the area is only a karmelis.	Not permitted on a regular basis. May be permitted only occasionally in a time of need in a karmelis.
Normally has an eiruv, which unexpectedly failed	Additional grounds for leniency.	Additional grounds for leniency, as this is considered an unusual occurrence.
Biblical Reshus Harabim	Forbidden to instruct a child of any age to carry, even for his own use.	Forbidden to instruct a child of any age to carry, even for his own use.

 

E. Placing an Item into a Child’s Hand to Carry [294]

Even in cases where a child is permitted to carry an item, the adult should not place the item directly into the child’s hand for the purpose of carrying it. Rather, the item should be placed in front of the child, and the child should pick it up on his own.[295]

 

F. Holding Hands or Assisting a Child Who Is Carrying an Item [296]

Even in cases where a child is permitted to carry an item for his own needs, the father should be careful not to assist him in carrying the load.

Picking Child Up: Accordingly, the father may not pick up the child while he is holding the item, even in situations where there would otherwise be no prohibition in carrying the child himself due to the principle of chai nosei es atzmo. See the next Halacha!

Holding Hands: Likewise, the father should not hold the child’s hand that is carrying the object, as this constitutes assisting him in transporting the item.[297] All of the above concerns apply only when the adult is holding the same hand in which the child is carrying the object. However, if the adult is holding the child’s other hand, there is no concern according to all opinions, since the adult is not assisting in the carrying of the item in any way. Accordingly, one may hold the child’s free hand even while the child is carrying an object.

 

G. Adding the Adult’s Items to the Child’s Load ( Ribui B’Shiurim ) [298]

Some authorities write that in the laws of carrying there is room for leniency when a child is already carrying an item for his own need. In such a case, an adult may add his own items to the child’s bundle, since the child is not carrying the adult’s belongings as a separate act, but rather the adult’s items are included in the child’s existing load as a case of ribui b’shiurim (increasing the amount being carried). Nevertheless, this leniency is not universally accepted and is subject to halachic discussion.

 

H. Carrying Through a Child in a Place Where There Is an Eruv [299]

In a place where there is a valid eiruv, even those who are personally stringent not to rely upon it may nevertheless have significant grounds to permit asking their young children to carry on their behalf. Accordingly, it is common practice among many to be lenient and have children carry items in an area with an eiruv, even when the carrying is being done solely for the benefit of the adult.

 

I. Giving Money, Wallet, or Other Valuables to a Child to Carry When Stranded Before Shabbos [300]

If a person is stranded on the road as Shabbos begins and is carrying money or other valuables, and there is no non-Jew or animal available, Chazal permitted him to give the item to a child to carry. This leniency applies even if the child has reached the age of chinuch and is the person’s own son.[301]

Nevertheless, the adult may not cause the child to perform a complete Biblical act of carrying. Therefore, the item must be given to the child when he is already in motion, and taken from him before he stops, so that the child does not perform both the akirah and hanachah.[302] If a donkey is available, the item should be placed on the donkey rather than given to a child, as this is the preferable alternative established by Chazal.

 

J. Retrieving an Item Left in a Public Domain Through a Child? [303]

Asking a child to carry it:^[304] It is forbidden to instruct any child, even one below the age of understanding, to carry an item home from a public domain.

Leading a child under the age of Chinuch to the area:^[305] Nevertheless, if a child below the age of understanding does not know that the item belongs to anyone, one may bring him to the area and allow him to pick up the item on his own, assuming it to be a lost object, and carry it home. This applies even to one’s own child

Leading another person’s child which is over the age of Chinuch to the area: One may bring another person’s child^[306]—even if the child has reached the age of chinuch—to the area where the item was left, provided that the child does not know who owns the item. If the child then picks up the item and carries it home thinking that he has found a lost object, there is no obligation to stop him, since he is acting for his own benefit and not on behalf of the owner.^[307] However, if the child knows who the item belongs to and is carrying it in order to return it to the owner, then all adults are obligated to stop him, as he is no longer acting for himself but on behalf of another person.^[308] Thus, if the owner’s child finds the object and begins carrying it, and the child knows that the object belongs to his father, all bystanders are obligated to stop him.^[309]

Leading one’s own child to the area: A father may not bring his own child who has reached the age of understanding to retrieve the item, even if the item belongs to someone else, and if he sees his child carrying it he must protest due to the obligation of chinuch.

A father who sees his child carrying the object: In any of the above cases that the father of a child which is over the age if understanding sees his child carrying the object, then even if the child is doing so for his own sake he must be reprimanded by his father and stopped.

 

 

 

K. Placing an Item in a Child’s Pocket on Shabbos [310]

Some authorities discuss whether one may place an item into the pocket of a child’s clothing without the child’s knowledge, so that the child will carry it outside on Shabbos. There is room to argue that, from the strict letter of the law, this may not be considered a true act of hotza’ah on the child’s part, since he is completely unaware that he is carrying the item and is therefore acting as a mis’asek. Likewise, since the child does not know that the item was placed there by his father, it may not be considered that he is acting on his father’s behalf. Nevertheless, in practice, this should not be done, as it constitutes a disrespectful attitude toward Shabbos. However, in a case where there are already other grounds for leniency to allow carrying through a child, it may be preferable to do so in this manner—where the child is unaware of the item—rather than in a way where the child knowingly carries it.

 

L. Child Carrying During Bein Hashmashos: [311]

Although one may not ordinarily instruct a child to perform a melachah during Bein Hashmashos, in a case of need of a Mitzvah or to prevent a great loss one may be lenient regarding rabbinic prohibitions, including carrying in our public domains, through a child during Bein Hashmashos. [In truth, even an adult may perform a Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzvah or in a case of great need, during Bein Hashmashos, and hence certainly a child may be asked to do so.[312]]

 

12. Carrying a Child In Area Without An Eruv: [313]

A. General Rule and Background:

The Principle of Chai Nosei Es Atzmo: The Gemara[314] teaches that a living person is considered to be, in a sense, carrying himself. This principle is known as chai nosei es atzmo (“a living being carries himself”). Accordingly, one who carries a living person on Shabbos is exempt from Biblical liability, since the person being carried assists in his own movement and is not comparable to an inanimate object. This principle applies to a living human being, unlike animals, which do not assist the one carrying them.

Does Chai Nosei Es Atzmo Apply to a Child? The Talmudic Sages agree that chai nosei es atzmo applies to a living adult, but the Rishonim[315] debate whether it also applies to very young children. The practical question is whether a child is considered sufficiently capable of assisting in his own movement for the rule of chai nosei es atzmo to apply. Although several opinions exist, according to the majority of the Rishonim, and so rules the Alter Rebbe and other Achronim[316], any infant who is capable of moving himself by crawling or shuffling (deduy) is subject to the principle of “chai nosei es atzmo”. Accordingly, carrying such a child does not involve a Biblical prohibition of hotza’ah. However, if the infant is unable to move himself at all, then the principle of chai nosei es atzmo does not apply, and carrying him in a reshus harabim constitutes a Biblical prohibition.

Rabbinical Prohibition and Law By Karmelis:[317] Even when chai nosei es atzmo applies and one is exempt from Biblical liability, carrying a child remains rabbinically forbidden. Even in a karmelis it remains forbidden, although it is considered a shvus d’shvus.[318] The Alter Rebbe concludes that the public should be warned about this matter, as many mistakenly assume that carrying a child is entirely permitted.[319] [However, other Poskim[320] rule that it is better not to protest if in any event the person won’t listen.]

A Sleeping Child:[321] A sleeping child is generally treated like a child who is unable to walk on his own. Accordingly, according to the majority of poskim, the principle of chai nosei es atzmo does not apply to a sleeping child. Furthermore, if the child has been sedated or anesthetized in a manner that prevents him from awakening, then certainly chai nosei es atzmo does not apply.

 

B. Helping a Child Walk on Shabbos In Area Without Eruv [322]

Child Who Can Already Walk: By a child who can already walk on his own, one may help a child walk in a public domain, provided that the child is supporting himself and is not being dragged. Thus, one may lift one foot at a time while the child remains standing on the other foot.[323] However, dragging both of the child’s feet is considered carrying and is [Rabbinically] forbidden, even in an area defined as a Karmalis.[324]

Child Who Cant Yet Walk:[325] It is forbidden to help a child who cannot walk independently move about in a reshus harabim or other area where carrying is prohibited, as doing so is considered carrying the child. Dragging both of a child’s feet in a reshus harabim, and certainly carrying a child, who cannot walk at all, constitutes a Biblical prohibition.[326]

 

C. Piggy Back Rides on Shabbos: Carrying a Child on One’s Shoulders [327]

Based on the above, it is strictly forbidden to carry a child on one’s shoulders on Shabbos in an area without an Eruv even if it is defined as a Karmalis and the child can walk on his own.[328]

 

D. When a Child Refuses to Continue Walking [329]

Some Poskim[330] are lenient to carry a child who is capable of walking on his own in a karmelis when, after beginning a walk, the child refuses to continue due to exhaustion or lack of strength and cries or insists on being carried.[331] Other Poskim[332] permit in such a case carrying the child in a karmelis less than four amos at a time, and then having the child enter the house on his own once they reach the destination. Practically, however, according to Admur all of the above remains forbidden as in his opinion, one may not perform a shvus d’shvus even in a case of need[333], and seemingly this applies even for the needs of a child.[334] [However, if the child is truly exhausted and is otherwise unwilling to continue walking home despite every effort to persuade him, there may be greater room for leniency to carry him through a karmelis if the child is also hungry and needs to go home to eat.[335]] Accordingly, despite the various grounds for leniency suggested by some authorities, one may not clearly rely upon them in practice according to the ruling of Admur. Practically, if a non-Jew is available, one should ask the non-Jew to carry the child. If no non-Jew is available, the parent should remain with the child and attempt to persuade him to continue walking on his own. If, despite all efforts, the child refuses to walk and cannot be convinced to proceed, those who are lenient to carry the child in such circumstances have authorities upon whom to rely.

Non safe Location – Middle of Street: All of the above, however, applies only when the child stops in a safe location, such as on a sidewalk. If the child stops in the middle of the street or another area where there is potential danger, then certainly one may move the child, even directly, in order to remove him from harm.

Initially Avoiding taking such a child outside: Since the above situation is common, one should be careful from the outset not to take young children on long walks in areas without an eiruv, lest the child become tired and demand to be carried home.

 

Practical Guide: When a Child Refuses to Continue Walking

Situation	What to Do
Child stops walking but is in a safe place (sidewalk, park, etc.)	Remain with the child and encourage him to continue walking on his own.
A non-Jew is available	Ask the non-Jew to carry the child.
No non-Jew is available	Wait with the child and attempt to calm, rest, or persuade him to continue walking.
Child eventually agrees to walk	Continue home on foot.
Child refuses to walk despite all efforts	Although Admur does not clearly permit carrying the child, those who are lenient to carry a child who can walk in a karmelis have authorities upon whom to rely.
Child is genuinely exhausted, hungry, or unable to continue	There is greater room for leniency, especially if the child needs to get home for food or rest.
Child can walk independently (chai nosei es atzmo applies)	Carrying in a karmelis is a shvus d’shvus and is the primary basis for the lenient opinions.
Child cannot walk independently at all	Carrying the child remains much more severe and the above leniencies generally do not apply.
Child stops in a dangerous location (middle of a street, traffic area, etc.)	One may immediately move the child, even directly, in order to remove him from danger.
Before leaving home	Avoid taking young children on long walks in areas without an eiruv if there is a realistic possibility that they will need to be carried home.

 

E. Having a Non-Jew Carry a Child in an Area Without an Eruv [336]

As a general rule, it is forbidden to ask a non-Jew to perform on Shabbos an act that a Jew himself may not perform.[337] Accordingly, just as a Jew may not carry a child in an area without an eiruv, so too he may not instruct a non-Jew to do so on his behalf.[338]

Karmalis – Time of Need or Mitzvah: Despite the above ruling, where the area is a karmelis and not a Biblical reshus harabim, Chazal permitted amirah l’nochri in certain situations of mitzvah, great need, significant loss, or illness. Accordingly, one may ask a non-Jew to carry a child or push a stroller when doing so is necessary for the fulfillment of an actual mitzvah, a substantial need, or when the child is considered ill. This leniency is limited, however, to situations in which the need cannot reasonably be met without transporting the child. Thus, the mitzvah or need must require the child’s presence elsewhere and cannot be fulfilled in the child’s current location. Furthermore, the mitzvah must be an actual mitzvah requirement and not merely a hiddur mitzvah. Accordingly, where a bris milah may be performed in the child’s home, one may not have a non-Jew carry the child to the synagogue merely for the enhancement of conducting the bris there. [Thus, a Shabbos Bris Milah is to take place in the home of the child, rather than in Shul, in areas in which there is no Eiruv and one would need to have a gentile carry the child to Shul.^[339]] Likewise, this only applies if the travel is needed in order to fulfill an actual Mitzvah and not just a Hiddur Mitzvah. Thus, one may not ask a non-Jew to carry a child in order to attend synagogue services or a Shabbos meal when these can be attended by remaining at home. Certainly, one may not have a non-Jew carry a child merely for a family outing or leisurely walk.

Custom of Leniency: Despite the above ruling, some communities^[340] have adopted a more lenient practice and permit non-Jews to carry children even in circumstances that do not involve a clear mitzvah need or pressing necessity, such as going to Shul or a Shabbos meal. While some Poskim^[341] have learned a justification for their custom^[342], especially when done for the sake of Shabbos, other authorities view this practice as lacking a firm basis in the letter of the law. Certainly, even according to the lenient custom, one should not have a non-Jew carry a child merely for a family outing or leisurely walk unless the child knows how to walk on his own. Accordingly, G-d-fearing Jews should not rely on this leniency unless it is defined as a true Shabbos need, as explained previously. This is especially true according to the rulings of Admur, who adopts a stringent position regarding several of the underlying issues upon which such leniencies are based.^[343] Likewise, according to the rulings of the Michaber and many Sephardic authorities, who view many contemporary streets as having the status of a reshus harabim, there is even less room for leniency.[344] Nonetheless, in communities where the lenient practice has long been accepted, one should not protest those who rely upon it.

Reshus Harabim:[345] All of the above accustomed leniencies apply only in an area that is considered a karmelis. In a Biblical reshus harabim, one may not ask a non-Jew to carry a child or push a stroller who cannot walk on his own, even for the sake of a mitzvah or other ordinary need. Exceptions would apply only in situations where the child can walk on his own and it is a case of illness, danger, or for the sake of a mitzvah or other circumstances for which Chazal specifically permitted amirah l’nochri. Accordingly, communities and individuals who regard contemporary streets as having the status of a reshus harabim have far less room for leniency in this area.

 

F. Carrying a Child in a Stroller [346]

Whenever it is permitted to have a non-Jew carry a child, it is likewise permitted for the non-Jew to push the child in a stroller, as the stroller is considered secondary (tafel) to the child. However, care must be taken that no other items are placed in or underneath the stroller, as the leniency applies only to transporting the child and not to carrying additional objects, as explaiend next.

Items in the Stroller:[347] According to all opinions, there is no basis to permit having a non-Jew push additional items in the stroller together with the child merely because the child himself is being transported. Accordingly, even those who are lenient to have a non-Jew push a stroller in an area without an eiruv must ensure that no unnecessary items are placed in the stroller. Only items that are themselves needed for a mitzvah, a significant necessity, the child’s health, or another circumstance that independently justifies amirah l’nochri may be transported in this manner.

 

G. Carrying a Sick Child in a Reshus Harabim and Karmelis [348]

A child who is ill but not in danger: If a child who is a choleh she’ein bo sakanah needs to be taken to a doctor on Shabbos, and the child is able to walk on his own such that the rule of chai nosei es atzmo applies, he may be carried even through a Biblical reshus harabim. If, however, the child is unable to walk independently, he may not be carried through a Biblical reshus harabim. In a karmelis, however, one may be lenient and carry even such a child, since the prohibition is rabbinic and rabbinic prohibitions were relaxed for the needs of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. Certainly, there is greater room for leniency when both factors are present—that the area is a karmelis and the child is capable of walking on his own.

A child who is dangerously ill: If the child is a choleh she’yesh bo sakanah, then he may be carried to a doctor even through a Biblical reshus harabim, even if he is completely unable to walk. Likewise, he may be transported in a stroller. When possible, it is preferable for two people to push the stroller together.

 

H. Carrying a Child in a Place Where There Is an Eruv But One Is Machmir Not To Carry [349]

In many communities today there is a valid eiruv, although some individuals are stringent and do not rely upon it, nevertheless, they may certainly be lenient regarding carrying a child who can walk on his own.[350] Furthermore, if the matter is a mere Chumra, they may be lenient even regaridng a child who cannot walk on his own, relying on those who hold that even such a child is considered to carry himself and not be a Biblical prohibition.

 

 

 

I. Carrying a Child Who Is Holding an Item in a Public Domain [351]

All of the above discussion applies only to carrying the child himself, regarding whom the principle of chai nosei es atzmo may apply. The same is true regarding the child’s clothing, which is considered secondary to him. However, if the child is holding an object in his hand, the law is different. Since the object is not considered secondary to the child, carrying the child is viewed as carrying the object as well. Accordingly, carrying such a child in a reshus harabim may involve a Biblical prohibition, and in a karmelis it is rabbinically forbidden.

 

13. Eruv laws Relevant to a Child:

A. Laws of Eruv Techumin Relating to Children [352]

The laws of Eruvei Eruvei Techumin as they relate to children are largely beyond the scope of this chapter. In general, the primary issue discussed is whether an eiruv established by a parent also takes effect on behalf of his child. Practically, a child is included in the parent’s eiruv if the parent had him in mind when making the eiruv, or if the child is of an age that is halachically considered dependent on his parent or mother. The precise details of these laws, including the age parameters and various distinctions discussed by the poskim, require a separate treatment. For further discussion, the reader is referred to the sources cited in the footnotes.

These include the following topics:

• Must an Eruv Techumin be made for a child?
• Who may make an eiruv on a child’s behalf?
• Until what age is a child considered dependent on his mother?
• Is there a difference between a boy and a girl?
• The laws of a child who is dependent on his mother.
• Does every child who is dependent on his mother follow her eiruv?
• A child under six years old who is not dependent on his mother.
• A child who is not dependent on his mother.
• A child who becomes Bar Mitzvah on Friday when no eiruv was made on his behalf.
• Sending an eiruv through a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor.
• The opinions of the Rishonim and their practical ramifications.
• The practical halachah regarding when an eiruv is valid.
• A nine- or ten-year-old on the Shabbos before his Bar Mitzvah.
• A thirteen-year-old whose signs of maturity have not been verified.
• Whether a minor may make an eiruv for himself.
• Whether a minor may acquire the eiruv on behalf of others.
• The credibility of a minor regarding testimony on the limits of the Shabbos boundary.

 

B. Laws of Eruvei Chatzeros and Eruvei Tavshilin Relating to Children [353]

The laws of Eruvei Chatzeiros and Eruv Tavshilin as they pertain to children are discussed in detail in the relevant chapters of Hilchos Eruvin. These include the following topics:

• A child residing in a courtyard.
• Placing the eiruv in a child’s home.
• Collecting the eiruv through a child.
• Acquiring the eiruv on behalf of others through children.
• A child who has his own independent residence.
• Acquiring the eiruv through a thirteen-year-old.
• Acquiring an Eruv Tavshilin on behalf of others.
• Whether a minor may set aside an Eruv Tavshilin.
• Whether a minor may count toward participation in an eiruv.

Accordingly, while certain basic principles may be relevant to the laws discussed in this chapter, the detailed laws and practical applications of Eruvei Chatzeiros and Eruv Tavshilin as they relate to children are addressed there at length.

 

14. Hygiene

A. Bathing a Child on Shabbos: [354]

It is generally forbidden to bathe a child in hot water on Shabbos in the same manner that it is forbidden for an adult.^[355] Accordingly, even a newborn may not be bathed in hot water that was heated on Shabbos.^[356] Likewise, even when using water heated before Shabbos, one may only wash a minority of the child’s body, just as is the law for adults.[357]

Child is dirty:^[358] However, if the child is dirty, uncomfortable, or in pain, then one may be lenient to bathe him in hot water, just as Chazal permitted hot-water bathing for an adult who is suffering.[359]

Gentile bathing child:[360] One may not ask a non-Jew to heat water for a child on either Shabbos or Yom Tov, even though a typical young child has the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. Nevertheless, one may ask a non-Jew to bathe the child in hot water that is already available, if a child experiences discomfort from not being bathed.[361] However, without significant discomfort for the child, one may not be lenient to bathe them in hot water even through a non-Jew.[362]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B. Diapers on Shabbos [363]

Velcro diapers: May be used without concern on Shabbos.

Diapers fastened with adhesive tape: This is subject to a dispute among the poskim. Some Poskim[364] rule that one should open the protective tape coverings before Shabbos, due to concerns of tearing^[365] and attaching. Furthermore, some Poskim^[366] hold that placing the tape on the diaper to fasten it is forbidden due to the sewing prohibition.^[367] Other Poskim^[368] rule that one may open, fasten, and unfasten the diaper on Shabbos, since the attachment is temporary and is not intended to last.^[369] Practically, many rely on the lenient opinions for ordinary disposable diapers, especially when needed for infant care. Nevertheless, those who wish to satisfy the stringent opinions should prepare the diapers before Shabbos by opening the tape covers.

Removing a Used Diaper: According to all one is to avoid re-taping the diaper up after having removed it and then throw it out as is commonly done during the week.

The poskim dispute whether the adhesive tabs may be separated when removing a diaper on Shabbos. Some authorities^[370] permit doing so only discreetly and not in the presence of those who may misunderstand the halachah and mistakenly derive leniencies in other areas.^[371] Other authorities^[372] permit removing the adhesive tabs in the normal manner without any restriction. Practically, however, all agree that once the diaper has been removed, one should not reattach the adhesive tabs before discarding it. Rather, it should be thrown away without re-fastening it, even though re-sealing the diaper is common practice during the week.

Diapers with Letters, Pictures, or Designs:[373] Diapers may be used even if fastening or opening them will cause letters, pictures, or designs printed on the diaper to become separated or erased. Since one has no intention to erase the writing and is merely using the diaper for its intended purpose, this is permitted.

 

15. Electricity and electrical appliances

A. Having a Child Open the Refrigerator When It Will Affect the Motor [374]

General Law for Adult: The poskim dispute whether one may open a refrigerator door on Shabbos when doing so will cause the motor to activate sooner or remain running for a longer period. Practically, it is preferable to open the refrigerator only while the motor is already running. When the motor is off, one should be stringent and avoid opening the door, as doing so may hasten the activation of the motor.^[375] Some who are particularly meticulous attach a timer to the refrigerator and open it only while the timer has disabled the motor, thereby avoiding any concern of causing the motor to start or continue running. [376]

Asking a child to open the fridge: Many are accustomed to allowing a child to open the fridge when the fridge is off.^[377] However some Poskim^[378] have ruled against even having a child do so.

 

B. Having a Child Open a Refrigerator with a Light Left Active [379]

It is forbidden to ask a child to open a refrigerator if doing so will cause a light to turn on, even if the child is below the age of chinuch and even if he is a mere infant. [There is, however, room to argue for leniency in a case where the refrigerator contains only an LED or fluorescent light which is Rabbinic, and the food inside is needed for a hungry child. In such a circumstance, one could contend that even a child who has reached the age of chinuch may open the refrigerator, and be instructed to do so for his benefit.[380] Furthermore, even by a lightbulb with a filament which is Biblical, some Poskim[381]  rule that if the child has no awareness whatsoever that the light in fridge will turn on, then it is permitted to instruct the child to open it for the child’s benefit, as explained in Halacha 4??.]

Removing Plug Of Fridge:^[382]  Some authorities, however, are lenient in certain circumstances and permit asking a child to disconnect the refrigerator from the outlet while the motor is off, although this leniency applies only to older refrigerators in which no electrical system remains active when the motor is not running and does not apply to modern fridges of today.[383]

Placing small child by fridge:^[384] Nevertheless, it is permitted to place a child who is below the age of chinuch in front of the refrigerator door without instructing him to open it. If the child then opens the refrigerator on his own initiative, one may leave the refrigerator slightly ajar for the remainder of Shabbos.

 

 

C. May One Lift a Child Up to Turn a Light On or Off? [385]

See Chapter 1 Halacha 8F!

Above the age of three: A child above the age of understanding (generally around age three and up) should not be lifted up to turn a light on or off, as such a child may already be subject to the laws of chinuch and must be educated not to violate Shabbos.

Below the age of three: A child below the age of understanding may be lifted up near a light switch, provided that he is not instructed to operate it. According to this view, since the child does not yet understand the prohibitions of Shabbos, the concerns of chinuch do not apply.^[386] However, in all cases it is forbidden to tell a child to turn a light on or off, even if the child is only one day old. Likewise, one should not hold the child up to the light and have him play with it while holding him, and may certainly not lift up an infant and have the infant kick and use reflexes to turn on and off a light.

 

Question: [Thursday, 27^th Adar, 5781]

We accidentally left the light on in our fridge and only discovered this after Shabbos began and opened up the fridge and lo and behold noticed the light was on. I let go of the door and it automatically close. I know we are allowed to ask a gentile to open up the door but we don’t have any available in our area that I know of that I can ask. My question is if it is allowed for me to ask my two-year-old toddler to open up the fridge, or can I at least put her in front of the fridge and have her open the door. I guess my same question would apply regarding lights, and forgot to turn off or on a light before Shabbos can I lift up my child and have her turn it off or on.

 

Answer:

To tell the child to perform a prohibition [i.e. open the fridge or turn on or off the light]: It is absolutely forbidden for any Jew to tell a child of any age, theoretically even one day old, to perform a prohibition, whether Biblical or rabbinical. Thus, it is clear that it is forbidden for one to ask their toddler to open the door of the fridge which contains a light that will turn on upon the fridge being open, or tell him to close the door of the fridge if doing so will shut off the light. And it goes without saying that it is forbidden to tell him to turn on or off a light on Shabbos. However, if one does not talent directly to do a prohibition and simply places the prohibition in front of him, then there is room for discussion as to whether it is allowed as will be explained next.

To give the child an item with which a prohibition may be done without telling him to do so: It is debated amongst the Poskim, and is likewise debatable within the rulings of Admur, as to whether it is permitted to lift up a child who is below the age of 3 to a light for him to turn on or off without telling him or hinting to him anything about doing so. If the child is above the age of three, and understands instructions of his parents when they tell him that something is permitted or forbidden, then it is forbidden according to all to place the child by the light to turn on and off. Likewise, it is debated even by a child below the age of three if one may place the child by the door of the fridge and have him open it or close it. Practically, in the case of the door of the fridge that had its light left on, one may be lenient to place a child who is below the age of three in front of the door of the fridge and have him potentially open it or close it, without instructing him or encouraging him to do so in anyway, and also without hinting him to do so in anyway. One should not however actually take his child’s hands and place them by the door handle of the fridge, and the allowance is simply to place him in front of the fridge and whatever he does he does. Regarding lifting him up and having him turn on or off a light: This matter is more stringent than the previous case of the fridge, although practically one may be lenient in a time of need [i.e. light on in bedroom and can’t sleep, or will not be able to have relations as a result, or will end up eating or learning in the dark] here as well, and place the child who is under three years old on a chair next to the switch, and let him play with it and if he turns it on or off, then so be it. However, one should not hold the child up to the light and have him play with it while holding him, and may certainly not lift up an infant and have the infant kick and use reflexes to turn on and off a light.

Summary: One may never instruct, or encourage, a child of any age to turn on or off a light or open or close the door of the fridge. One may place a child below the age of 3 next to the fridge and have him open or close it, and in a time of need may place them on a chair next to the light switch and have him open or close it. If the child is above the age of three then this may not be done.

 

Explanation: Everyone is in agreement that it is forbidden to instruct a child of any age to do a prohibition. Likewise, everyone is in agreement that one who sees a child below the age of education performing a prohibition does not need to stop him from doing so. Likewise, everyone is in agreement that in certain cases it is permitted for one to even give the child who is below the age of education, an item with which a prohibition may be done with by him. What is debated amongst the Poskim, however, is in which cases and circumstances this latter matter is permitted to be done. May such an item with which a prohibition may be done with only be given to a child below the age of education if the person giving him the item has no intent for the child to perform the prohibition or may it be done even if the adult has intent for the child to do the prohibition? May it be done even if the prohibition benefits the adult? May it be done even if the prohibition will be transgressed once the child is given the item? May it be done even if the prohibition will occur constantly and is not a one-time thing? May be done if the only usage of the item is with performing the prohibition and hence giving the child the item is synonymous with instructing him to do the prohibition. Is lifting up a child and holding him while he does the prohibition considered as if one is instructing him to do so? Is simply placing the child in front of the item without placing the item in his hand considered more lenient and allowed to be done in all cases? All these questions are debated amongst the Poskim, and play a pivotal role in the answer to our question above. Even in the opinion of Admur, who was the first Posek to clearly spell out the allowance of giving a child below the age of education an item with which he will do a prohibition with, we find contradictions between this ruling and other rulings in other places in his Shulchan Aruch which prohibit giving children item that prohibitions may be performed with, which has led to various different ways of answering the contradictions and which carry practical ramifications to our questions above. Practically, we have ruled leniently in the above cases for the following reasons: In the fridge case there are many additional reasons to be lenient even if one were to accept the most stringent approach in the understanding of Admur as a) One is simply placing the child in front of the fridge and not giving him the item. We do not allow him to place the child’s hands on the fridge handle for the sake of him opening it. b) Some Poskim hold that we do not prohibit Pesik Reishei by a child. C) most likely the child will also receive personal benefit from opening the fridge as he will be able to eat his food. In the turning on and off the light case we were only lenient in a time of actual need, and only to place the child on a chair as opposed to lifting him up, in order to suspect for the stringent approach in Admur. However, in a time of need, we allowed following the lenient approach as so seems to be the more logical understanding of solving the contradiction in Admur, and so rule a number of today’s Poskim based on Admur that it is allowed even initially without a time of need.

 

Sources: See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; 3:82 and Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144 who permit to have a child below age 6 to open the fridge; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 who allows placing a child below age 3 in front of the fridge and in front of the light switch; See regarding the Biblical prohibition to tell or encourage any child of any age to do a prohibition: Admur 343:5; 265:10; Michaber 343:1; M”B 343:4; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:54; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 53; See regarding the prohibition to give a child above the age of Chinuch an item with which a prohibition will be done with:  Admur 343:1-2; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61; See regarding cases of allowance and prohibition to give a child below the age of Chinuch an item with which a prohibition will be done with: Admur 340:9 [It is forbidden to give any child non-Kosher food.] 343:10 [permitted to give cake with letters]; M”A 343:2; Shabbos 90b; Admur 266:10 [forbidden to give wallet to carry], 301:21 [prohibits dressing child with clothing that contain  bells that make noise]; See regarding how to answer the contradiction in Admur: Tehila Ledavid 343 [leaves with Tzaruch Iyun]; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11 [in order to solve the contradiction in Admur rules that a child even below Chinuch may only be given an object if the adult has no intent for the child to perform the prohibition with that object]; Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54 [in order to solve the contradiction in Admur learns that by an item which a baby will do a constant prohibition with, it is forbidden to give the child that item.]; Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79 article of Rav Avraham Elyashvili [explains like Ketzos Hashulchan]; My own personal understanding of the contradiction is very simple, and is unlike any of the above opinions, and that is that when the only option of making a use of the item is through doing the prohibition then it is as if one has told the child to the prohibition and is similar to the prohibition against placing the cake with lettering in the mouth of the child, as it is as if one has told him to eat it, and thus in all cases that the child can make a choice of whether to do a prohibition with the item or not then it is permitted for him to be given the item, and based on this there is no problem in placing the child in front of the item without placing it in his hand as the child has the choice of taking the item and doing the prohibition or not, and hence the allowance of place in front of the fridge in front of the like will even though the intent of the parent is the benefit from his actions, and so I later found to be also the understanding of Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 as is understood from his ruling of allowance based on Admur and as he explains in footnote 55; Meorei Haeish 4:13 footnote 182 prohibits allowing child to turn on and off the light; See regarding lifting up the child to reach the item with which the prohibition will be done: Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 58 and 61 [permits, although brings opinion of Ashel Avraham Butchach who only permits placing on chair and not holding him while he does a prohibition due to Misayeia, and explains that according to all its forbidden to lift up an infant that kicks]; See regarding the definition of the age of Chinuch for a child regarding negative commands: Admur 343:3; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and 7; See regarding if we apply the prohibition of Pesik reishei even by instructing a child: Pnei Meivin 198; Beis Yitzchak 44:8; Maor Hashabbos ibid; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; 3:82; Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144;  Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4

 

D. Using an Intercom or Baby Monitor for a Child on Shabbos [387]

The authorities discuss whether one may leave an intercom, microphone, baby monitor, or similar device operating in a child’s room so that the parents can hear the child if he cries on Shabbos. The poskim analyze whether this involves a concern of a child causing a melachah to occur on behalf of his parents. Some arguments for leniency are raised, since the child is not intending to activate any electrical system and is merely crying naturally. Furthermore, the child is not acting specifically on behalf of his parents. Nevertheless, several authorities hesitate to permit such an arrangement. Among the concerns raised is that the child’s voice is causing sound to be transmitted electronically, and this may involve the prohibition of producing sound through electrical devices on Shabbos. Accordingly, although various halachic distinctions are discussed, several leading authorities conclude that one should not rely on such arrangements lechatchilah on Shabbos. The discussion is generally limited to situations where the device is activated solely by the child’s natural crying and not by any deliberate action on his part.

 

Question:

I have a baby monitor which I usually take out before Shabbos, but this Shabbos totally forgot to remove. It works with a sensor that turns on the monitor in my office and shows sound and video of the upstairs whenever someone makes noise near it. What was I supposed to do? Not enter the room the whole Shabbos? Its in our dining room, and would make it virtually impossible to get food from the kitchen and would force us to eat elsewhere and be very quiet the whole Shabbos, as it is very sensitive to noise, as it should be.

 

Answer:

Assuming that the camera works with LED light [or any light that does not become hot, as exist by all cameras that I am aware of], then this enters into the subject of a Rabbinical Melacha Shelo Nicha Lei, of which some Poskim are lenient, although some are stringent. Thus, while initially one must unplug the sensor from before Shabbos, if it was accidentally not unplugged one may be lenient to pass by the area and live life as normal without needing to tippy toe down the house.

 

See here for details of this matter: Piskeiy Teshuvos 277:7-8; Lo Nicha Lei: https://shulchanaruchharav.com/halacha/squeezing-liquid-from-cloths/ Halacha 3C

 

E. Scolding child for turning on or off light, which will cause him to turn it back on: [388]

If a child turned a light on or off on Shabbos, one may not scold him or even give him a disapproving look in a manner that will cause him to realize that he should restore the light to its previous state. Since the child may infer from the parent’s reaction that he is expected to turn the light back on or off, this is considered akin to instructing him to perform a prohibited act. Accordingly, if one rebukes the child for what he did, he should explicitly clarify that the child is not to correct the situation by operating the light switch again. This applies equally whether the child turned the light on or off, as one may not indirectly cause or encourage a child to perform a melachah on Shabbos.

 

 

 

 

16. Toys and Games on Shabbos:

One of the most common and natural activities of children on Shabbos is playing with toys and games. While the Sages and later authorities speak critically of adults who spend their Shabbos engaged in games and recreation rather than Torah study and other meaningful Shabbos pursuits, the same approach does not apply to children. Since play is a natural and important part of childhood, there is considerably more room for leniency regarding children’s games and recreational activities on Shabbos.

Accordingly, the discussion in this Halacha focuses primarily on children and the toys and games commonly played by them and their Halachic status. Nevertheless, even children should be educated from a young age that Shabbos is a holy day, and therefore part of their time should be devoted to Torah study, prayer, and other appropriate Shabbos activities. The goal is not to eliminate children’s play, but to ensure that their recreation is conducted in a manner consistent with the sanctity and spirit of Shabbos.

The following halachos will discuss which toys and games are permitted, which are prohibited, and the various restrictions and customs that apply to children’s recreational activities on Shabbos.

 

A. The Letter Of The Law: [389]

From the letter of the law, it is permitted to play games on Shabbos so long as they do not involve any other Shabbos prohibition, as will be explained throughout this Halacha.

 

B. The Spirit of Shabbos and Children’s Games [390]

Despite the letter of the law ruling, due to the holiness of Shabbos, adults should avoid spending their time playing games, even when no specific halachic prohibition is involved. Chazal relate that the city of Tur Shimon was destroyed because of playing ball on Shabbos, which some explain as a criticism of those who devoted their Shabbos to recreation rather than Torah study.^[391]  Likewise, the Taz^[392], in the name of the Maharshal, strongly criticizes the practice of adults playing ball games, stating that such activities are appropriate for children and not for adults. The Ketzos HaShulchan^[393] similarly writes that recreational ball games are not befitting those whose primary occupation should be Torah study. As well, certain games should be avoided being that some of the games were taken from the gentiles. Nevertheless, these concerns apply primarily to adults. Children naturally require recreation and play, and therefore the poskim were considerably more lenient regarding children’s games and toys on Shabbos.

 

C. Games That Involve Rolling Objects on the Floor: [394]

People, including children, should not play on Shabbos games that involve rolling balls, marbles, nuts, apples, or similar objects across the floor or ground, even indoors on a tiled floor.^[395] This is due to a rabbinic concern that one may come to smooth out holes or uneven areas in the ground in order to improve the playing surface. However, such games may be played on a table. Some authorities, however, are also lenient to permit these games on the floor of a tiled house.^[396]

 

D. Gambling Games [397]

It is forbidden to play games of gambling on Shabbos. This prohibition applies to any game in which the participants stand to gain or lose money, items, or anything else of value. The reason for this prohibition is that such activity resembles commerce and business transactions, which are inappropriate on Shabbos. Accordingly, while games played purely for enjoyment may be permitted, any game involving actual winnings, losses, wagers, or prizes is forbidden.

 

E. Raffles and Lotteries [398]

One may not conduct a lottery on Shabbos to determine how items will be distributed among different people, even within one’s own household.^[399] This prohibition applies even when all of the items are similar, due to the rabbinic concern that one may come to measure and compare the portions and because lotteries resemble gambling and business transactions.

Food portions: It is permitted among members of one’s household to draw lots to determine who receives which portion of food, provided that all the portions are approximately equal in size and value. If the portions are noticeably different, then conducting a lottery is forbidden even during the week.^[400] Although some authorities^[401] permit this even with unequal portions within one’s own family, the practical ruling is to be stringent.^[402]

Lotteries for mitzvah purposes:^[403] It is permitted to conduct a lottery for the distribution of mitzvah honors in the synagogue, such as determining who will serve as shaliach tzibbur or receive an aliyah. Although some authorities^[404] object to any form of lottery on Shabbos, the accepted ruling follows the lenient opinion and permits lotteries conducted for mitzvah purposes.^[405]

 

Lottery for Children Gathering

Question:

May one do a raffle on Shabbos or Yom Tov for a children’s gathering? Some places are accustomed to do so for all types of children gatherings on Shabbos and Yom Tov for the sake of garnering their interest in attending and behaving during the gathering. I’ve seen this done by children minyanim, on Shavuos by Mivtza Aseres Hadibros, and by Shabbos afternoon activities for the kids. Some places, however, avoid doing the raffle on Shabbos and only do it after Shabbos. What is the proper approach?

 

Answer:

To avoid all halachic issues, if one desires to have a raffle by a children’s gathering, then one is to make sure before Shabbos or Yom Tov to cut the raffle tickets that will be distributed, and to only do the raffle after Shabbos, in which case the children will be able to call and discover the winning numbers and claim their prize, and so is done amongst many Frum organizations that have children gatherings. One is not to do the raffle on Shabbos or Yom Tov itself. Nonetheless, those who are lenient to do so for the sake of garnering the children’s interest and attention in order to teach the children Torah and Mitzvos, may have upon whom to rely especially on Yom Tov, and especially if they don’t use raffle tickets but rather a chosen number, even though initially, as we stated, all raffles should be deferred until after Shabbos and Yom Tov.

 

Explanation: Doing a raffle on Shabbos and Yom Tov for the sake of distributing prizes touches upon two possible prohibitions, one being the prohibition against giving presents out on Shabbos and Yom Tov, and the second being an intrinsic prohibition against doing raffles. Now, while the first prohibition against giving out presents is waived in the event that the present is a food which can be eaten on Shabbos, such as if one is raffling a chocolate bar, [and the same seemingly applies to any item which has a Shabbos use for the child such as a game or toy which can be used on Shabbos], nonetheless, the second prohibition still applies, as the sages prohibited one against doing raffles on Shabbos even to food items being that it is similar to gambling and doing business which is forbidden to be done on Shabbos. Now, although the above is being done for the sake of a mitzvah, to garner the attention of the children for the sake of involving them in a Torah activity, nonetheless, according to most Poskim, we do not waive the raffling prohibition even when done for the sake of a mitzvah, if one is raffling out an actual item. Likewise, it is not clear and unanimous amongst the Poskim that the gifting prohibition is unequivocally waived for the sake of a Mitzvah when the item being gifted is not Shabbos need, even though there are authorities who indeed rule this way. Furthermore, even if we were to agree that the prohibition is waived, it is unclear if the allowance would apply when the item being gifted is not intrinsically a necessary mitzvah item. The above applies equally to Yom Tov, just as it applies to Shabbos. Accordingly, due to all the above, obviously the best route to follow is to simply have the raffle be done after Shabbos and Yom Tov and avoid all the possible Shabbos prohibitions, although nonetheless, those who are lenient, we cannot say that they have nothing to rely upon if it is considered done for the sake of a mitzvah. This leniency especially applies on Yom Tov when there are authorities who hold that a raffle may be done for items that could not have been raffled the day before. Likewise, this leniency especially applies if the raffles been done by simply choosing a number as opposed to choosing a raffle ticket.

 

Sources: Shevet Halevi 9:78; SSH”K p. 242; Piskeiy Teshuvos 322:10; Shut Hashluchim 1 p. 205;  See regarding the raffling prohibition: Michaber 322:6; Admur 338:6; M”A 322:9; M”B 322:24; Ketzos Hashulchan 146:32 footnote 70 [lenient regarding using Sefer or by heart]; Piskeiy Teshuvos 322:10; See regarding raffling for the sake of a Mitzvah on Shabbos and Yom Tov: M”A 322:9 forbids on Shabbos, and even on Yom Tov if could have done the day before; Nezer Hakodesh, in name of Shevus Yaakov, brought in M”B 322:24; Tzemach Tzedek 26; Ketzos Hashulchan 146:32 footnote 70-71 [is lenient by all needs of Mitzvah]; Piskeiy Teshuvos 322:0; See regarding the prohibition of gifting: Admur 306:15-16; 323:1; 8; 252:12; 261:2; 444:9; 448:16; 517:1; 527:28; Kuntrus Achron 444:2; M”A 306:15 in name of Beis Yosef 527 and Mordechai Beitza 676; Elya Raba 306:19; Tosefes Shabbos 306:20; M”B 306:33; See Mahariy Asad 83; Kesav Sofer 59; Toras Chesed 27; Binyan Shlomo 17; Aruch Hashulchan 306:17; Pischeiy Teshuvah Even Haezer 45:1; Kaf Hachaim 306:44; SSH”K 29:29; Beis Meir E.H. 45; Maharam Shick 24; Piskeiy Teshuvos 306:22; See regarding gifting for the sake of a Mitzvah: Admur 444:9; 448:16; Kuntrus Achron 444:2; 261:2 rules one may not make a Kinyan on Shabbos even for the sake of a Mitzvah, even during Bein Hashmashos. Likewise, Admur 306:15 rules that one may not make something Hekdish on Shabbos, thus implying it is forbidden to do so even for the sake of a Mitzvah. Likewise, the ruling in 306:16 implies that an Esrog may only be given on condition to return. These rulings contradict the above statement of Admur. See Hearos Ubiurim 822 p. 54; M”A ibid in name of Beis Yosef 527 and Mordechai ibid; Elya Raba ibid; M”B ibid; Aruch Hashulchan ibid; Hagahos Chasam Sofer on M”A 306:15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 306:22; Toras Chesed 27 See regarding the allowance for gifting the raffle tickets: Piskeiy Teshuvos 323:6

 

F. Toys That Produce Music or Noise

Some poskim^[406] permit giving young children toys that produce noise^[407], such as rattles and similar playthings, and allow their use until approximately the age of six. This leniency is based on the view that the prohibition of noisemaking is primarily a matter of uvdin dechol (weekday activity), which is less applicable to children’s toys. However, according to Admur, it would appear that once a child has reached the age of chinuch—defined as the age at which he can understand being told not to do something, approximately three years old^[408]—he should not be permitted to play with toys that intentionally produce noise, even if they do not produce music.^[409] This is because Admur understands the prohibition as a rabbinic decree lest one come to repair the instrument. Furthermore, according to Admur, even a child below the age of chinuch should not be given toys whose designated purpose is to produce music.^[410] Seemingly, the same concern may apply even to toys whose primary function is to create noise, although this matter requires further analysis, as the prohibition of ordinary noisemaking toys is itself subject to debate.^[411]

 

G. Chess, Five Stones, and Similar Games [412]

It is permitted for children to play games such as chess, five stones (kugalach), and similar games on Shabbos, provided that no gambling, wagering, or prizes are involved. This ruling is based on the allowance to play with pre-designated game pieces, even if they make noise during play, since the noise is incidental and not one’s intent.

 

 

 

H. Dreidel – Playing Dreidel on Shabbos

Question:

Is it permitted on Shabbos to play Dreidel? Also, may I play using beans that we designated for this purpose or are they considered Muktzah?

 

 

Answer:

This is a complex question, as the playing of Dreidel on Shabbos can involve a “gambling” prohibition, and when playing with beans we have the added issue of Muktzah, and Bizuiy Ochlin. Practically, the following is the directive on this matter in accordance to the different forms of playing:

 

Playing Dreidel for the sake of winning and losing items of value/food: It is forbidden to play Dreidel on Shabbos for the sake of meriting something with each spin. Thus, it is forbidden on Shabbos to play dreidal in the typical way that it is played during the week even if money is not used, such as to use chocolate coins or chocolate lentils or any food or other item of the like in which there is a benefit for the players to win. This applies even to children, and the father is therefore obligated to educate them not to play dreidal in this fashion on Shabbos.

Playing Dreidel without any item to win or lose: It is permitted for children below the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah to play dreidal without any purpose of gain or loss simply to spin it and see who gets what. Accordingly, it is permitted to play dreidal using items that have no value or importance if gained, or if there will be no gain or loss, such as if the children will have to return everything they won back into the pile when they are done playing, and they will not gain or lose any more or less than any other child due to the game. Thus, they may play using almonds even if they are in their shell if at the end of the game they will return it back to the bag and no one will keep what they won. It is proper to designate a special beautiful Shabbos dreidel for this purpose in order to avoid any question of Muktzah or Uvdin Dechol that may be relevant to a Dreidel that is commonly only used for playing for gain and loss which is forbidden on Shabbos, as explained above. Regarding adults: It is best for them to avoid playing Dreidel on Shabbos both due to the general negation of playing games on Shabbos, as well as the stringency against playing games that involve luck.

Playing Dreidel using predesignated beans: It is permitted for children to play Dreidel on Shabbos using beans that have been predesignated for this purpose to be used annually for Dreidel playing. Here too, a special Shabbos dreidel should be designated for this purpose as explained above. If the beans are not designated to be put away for annual use on Shabbos Chanukah and will be thrown out right after Shabbos, then it is best to avoid doing so, although those who do so have upon whom to rely. Even when playing with beans in which there is no true gain or loss for the players, there’s a stringency to avoid doing so as explained above, and thus it should only be done by children below the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah.

 

Explanations:

Explanation regarding playing Dreidel: The sages decreed against playing “gambling” games on Shabbos which refers to all games that involve a gain and loss of items of the players, even if it is not money but rather food, if the items gained and lost retain a monetary value. This is due to their general decree against doing business on Shabbos. Now, although in the case of children the items that will be won by the players belongs to the father of the home and is hence not exactly similar to business, nonetheless, this would still seemingly fall under the lottery prohibition applicable on Shabbos which is itself forbidden due to the gambling prohibition which is similar to business. Now, if there is no gain or loss at all achieved through playing the game then seemingly it would be permitted. When permitted to be played, seemingly it may be played even on a tiled floor and not just specifically on a table, being that it is never common to play Dreidel on a dirt floor, and hence it is not similar to the prohibition recorded in the Poskim against playing rolling games on even tiled floors. Now, although there are Poskim who prohibit playing any luck game on Shabbos, practically we do not rule this way, and therefore certainly children may be lenient to do so. However, since there are Poskim who rule that using a regular weekday Dreidel can transgress the prohibition of Muktzah and Uvdin Dechol, therefore, to avoid all issues one should designate a special Shabbos dreidel for playing on Shabbos. Likewise, it is best for adults and as well all children above bar/bas mitzvah to avoid playing it in order to avoid all the halachic issues and use one’s time properly on Shabbos.

Explanation regarding using beens-Muktzah: Any item that is Muktzah Machmas Gufo because it doesn’t have the status of a vessel may receive the status of a vessel- before Shabbos if we designated to be used forever for this purpose. This applies even if it is not common to designate the item for this purpose, although in such a case a permanent designation must be done in a temporary one does not suffice. Now regarding our question of designating beans for Dreidel playing on Shabbos: Although beans are not commonly designated for such use, and hence a mere temporary designation does not suffice, nevertheless, if one designates it for this purpose alone and then throws it in the garbage when done playing, then this itself can be considered permanent use. It goes without saying that designating it for annual dreidal playing would suffice to remove its Muktzah state and practically this is the best option to be done rather than designate it only for one Shabbos.

Explanation regarding using beens-Bizuiy Ochlin: Although using beans for dreidal playing will cause them to not be used anymore for eating being that they must be permanently designated for dreidal playing as explained above, as well as become dirty, nonetheless this does not transgress the prohibition of Bizuiy Ochlin being that is being done for a meaningful purpose to be able to create this game of entertainment. It is no different than the allowance that was followed throughout history to use flour for various nonfood purposes, such as to make playdoh, dolls, and to stuff up holes in the wall, which created a discussion in the laws of Passover regarding Chametz.

 

Sources: Regarding the prohibition of playing games for the sake of gain and loss and against doing a lottery: See Admur 338:6; Rama 338:5; Rambam Shabbos 23:17; Shabbos 23 and 148; Beis Yosef 338 in name of Igor 521; Bach 338; Michaber 322:6; M”A 322:9; Mur Uketzia 338 [forbids even for food]; Aruch Hashulchan 338:13; SSH”K 16:32; Piskeiy Teshuvos 338:11 [old] 14 [new]; Chayeh Halevi 10:58; Mishnas Yosef 7:128; Avnei Yashpei 126-2; Metziyon Teitzei Torah 117; AkeidasMoshe 4:33-3; Maaglei Eliyahu 3:30; Emes Leyaakov 679 footnote 593; Mishnas Aaron Leiberman Muktzha 88; Avnei Derech 13: 83; Chevel Nachalaso 20:10; Regarding the prohibition of playing what games, see: Bach 338; Olas Shabbos 338:5; Kaf Hachaim 338:41; omitted from the majority of Poskim, including Admur; Regarding the prohibition of playing rolling games on a floor see: Admur 338:6; Aruch Hashulchan 338:12; Ketzos Hashulchan 146 footnote 60; Shevisas Hashabbos; SSH”K 16:5; Piskeiy Teshuvos 338:9; Regarding if the above prohibition applies to children see: Admur 338:6; Rama 338:5 and Darkei Moshe 338; Piskeiy Teshuvos 338:14 footnote 123 Regarding having a special designated Dreidel just for Shabbos see: Igros Moshe 5:22-10 [not Muktzah]; Mikdash Yisrael  274-275; Chayeh Halevi 10:58; Regarding designating beans so they are no longer considered Muktzah see: Admur 308:8; 53; Michaber 308:22; Ketzos Hashulchan 110:5; Regarding the prohibition of wasting food see: Admur Shemiras Haguf 14; Michaber 171:1, 4, 5; Torah Lishma 401; Mayan Omer 11:5

 

 

 

 

 

I. Playing ball: [413]

Some Poskim[414] rule that it is forbidden to play with a ball on Shabbos or Yom Tov because a ball is considered muktzah and does not have the status of a utensil (kli). However, other Poskim[415] who permit moving and playing with a ball in a private domain, viewing it as an object designated for play and therefore not muktzah. Practically, the longstanding custom is to be lenient and permit children to play with a ball, and those who follow this practice are not to be protested, as they have halachic authorities upon whom to rely.[416] Nevertheless, as discussed above, even where technically permitted, ball games are generally viewed as activities more appropriate for children than for adults. Thus, although it is ruled in Shulchan Aruch that one may play ball on Shabbos, nevertheless it is forbidden to do so on a steady basis as part of one’s Shabbos schedule, as doing so is a great belittling of Shabbos, and is what caused a great city^[417] to be destroyed.^[418] However, children below the age of Mitzvas may be lenient in this matter.

A ball which is inflatable with air: Some Poskim^[419] rule that all inflatable balls are forbidden to be played with on Shabbos, due to a decree that one may come to inflate it with air upon noticing its need of air, and he will thus transgress the fixing prohibition. According to other Poskim^[420] however it is even initially permitted to inflate a ball with air on Shabbos, and thus it remains permitted to play with such balls. [Furthermore, perhaps today even according to the stringent opinion it would be permitted, as it is not common to inflate the balls with air but rather to purchase new ones.]

Playing on a dirt floor:^[421] It is forbidden to play ball on a dirt floor due to a decree that one may come to smoothen holes in the ground and thus come to transgress the building prohibition. Hence playing soccer is forbidden. [422]

Playing in an area without an Eiruv:^[423] It is forbidden to play ball in an area without an Eiruv.

 

J. Play dough: [424]

It is forbidden, even for children, to play with play dough, modeling clay, or similar materials on Shabbos. The reason for this is that manipulating and shaping the dough involves the prohibition of Memarei’ach (smoothing and spreading), and related concerns of forming and molding shapes.

Accordingly, play dough is considered muktzah on Shabbos and may not be handled or used.

 

K. Playing in a Sandbox [425]

Children may play in a sandbox on Shabbos, provided that the sand is dry and was designated for play. However, it is forbidden to add water or any other liquid to the sand, as doing so may involve the prohibition of Lash (kneading). Accordingly, playing with dry sand in a sandbox is permitted, but making sandcastles or other forms with wet sand is forbidden.

 

L. Lego: [426]

The poskim dispute whether children may assemble Lego and similar building toys on Shabbos.

Some Poskim^[427] permit the assembly of Lego and similar building toys in all cases, since the structures are not intended to remain assembled for any significant amount of time and are constantly built and dismantled.^[428] This leniency extends even to the construction of model ships, vehicles, and similar items. However other Poskim^[429] prohibit the use of Lego and similar toys that involve firmly connecting pieces together. Still others^[430] distinguish between ordinary structures, and those that create a roof (ohel)^[431] or form a functional vessel, permitting the former while prohibiting the latter.

Structures intended to remain assembled:^[432] According to all opinions, building sets that are intended to remain assembled for an extended period of time may not be assembled on Shabbos.

Adults:^[433] In addition to the question of building, many authorities discourage adults from engaging in such activities on Shabbos, as they are not considered a genuine Shabbos need and are inconsistent with the spirit of Shabbos. Accordingly, the primary discussion regarding these leniencies relates to children.

 

M. Puzzles [434]

Puzzles are made up of various pieces, each piece containing some part of the picture or letter/word that the puzzle desires to portray. Putting a puzzle together on Shabbos touches upon the question of whether it transgresses the prohibition of writing on Shabbos, and taking apart a puzzle raises the question of whether it transgresses the prohibition of erasing on Shabbos. The following is an analysis on this subject:

The general law: It is forbidden to write or erase the letters of a word on Shabbos.^[435] Likewise, it is forbidden to draw or erase pictures on Shabbos.^[436] It is Rabbinically forbidden to do so even if the letter or picture will not last a long time.^[437] It is however disputed as to whether the prohibition applies even in a case that the parts of the letter or picture already exist, and one simply places them near each other, or distances them from each other on a temporary basis.^[438] An example of such a case is opening or closing a book that had letters or pictures written/drawn on the side pages of a book. Practically, the custom is to be lenient to allow opening and closing such books on Shabbos [although it should initially be avoided^[439]].^[440]  The question of whether it is permitted to put together, or take apart jigsaw puzzles, on Shabbos, is dependent on how one understands the above dispute, as will now be explained.

The law by jigsaw puzzles:^[441] Some Poskim^[442] rule that even according to the lenient opinion, and custom, brought above, it is forbidden to put together, or take apart, jigsaw puzzles which contain pieces that create letters or pictures.^[443] Other Poskim^[444] however rule that this case follows the same leniency brought above, and hence it is permitted to build or take apart a puzzle on Shabbos even if it creates letters and pictures.^[445] Practically, from Admur it is implied like the latter approach, that the leniency applies in this case as well.^[446] Nonetheless, as stated above, initially one is to avoid entering the dispute and hence should not build, or take apart such puzzles on Shabbos, although one does not need to protest those who do so.^[447] Likewise, one may be lenient to allow children below Bar/Bas Mitzvah to play with such puzzles on Shabbos.^[448] If placing the pieces together does not create new letters or pictures, it is permitted according to all to put together or take apart, even if it creates a word, such as if each piece contains a complete letter.^[449]

 

Summary: It is disputed whether one may play with jigsaw puzzles on Shabbos. Practically, one is to avoid doing so, although those who are lenient have upon whom to rely. This leniency especially applies to young children.

 

N. Blowing bubbles: [450]

Blowing bubbles on Shabbos enters into the question of whether it transgresses the Molid prohibition due to it changing the form of the water into foam. Practically, the mainstream approach follows that it does not contain a Molid prohibition, and therefore children may blow bubbles on Shabbos.^[451] However, it is best for adults to abstain from doing so.^[452] Furthermore, some Poskim^[453] rule that even children who have reached the age of Chinuch are to avoid blowing bubbles on Shabbos.^[454]

 

O. Snowballs and Snowmen:

It is forbidden to make snowballs on Shabbos.^[455]

Children: Some poskim^[456] rule that children under the age of nine may be allowed to make snowballs on Shabbos in an area that has a valid eiruv. However, in an area without an eiruv, any child who has reached the age of chinuch may not throw snowballs due to the prohibition of carrying. Other poskim^[457] maintain that all children who have reached the age of chinuch should refrain from making snowballs on Shabbos, even where there is an eiruv.

Snowman:^[458] It is forbidden for children who have reached the age of chinuch to make snowmen or similar snow structures on Shabbos. This prohibition applies in all cases, even in an area with a valid eiruv.

 

P. Riding a bicycle [459]

Children below the age of chinuch: Children below the age of chinuch may ride bicycles on Shabbos.

Children above the age of chinuch: Children who have reached the age of chinuch may ride a bicycle on Shabbos according to the letter of the law. Nevertheless, it is proper to refrain from allowing them to ride a regular bicycle, as the concerns that apply to bicycle riding also apply to them.^[460]  A tricycle may be ridden without restriction. Likewise, there is greater room for leniency regarding a bicycle equipped with training wheels, as it is clearly recognizable as a child’s toy.^[461]

Adults: Adults may not ride bicycles on Shabbos.^[462]

Repairing a bicycle: One may not repair a bicycle on Shabbos due to the prohibition of Tikkun Keli (repairing a utensil). Some authorities, however, permit a child to place a slipped chain back onto the wheel, as this is not viewed as a true repair. Nevertheless, an adult should not assist the child in doing so.

 

Q. Roller blades and Roller Skates

The status of roller blades and roller skates is similar to that of a bicycle. Accordingly, due to the holiness of Shabbos and the concern of uvdin dechol, children who have reached the age of chinuch should not use them on Shabbos. Children below the age of chinuch, however, may be allowed to do so.

 

R. Running and jumping games: [463]

It is permitted for children who enjoy running, skipping, and jumping to engage in such activities on Shabbos. Accordingly, children may play games such as tag (“chase”), hopscotch, jump rope, and similar running and jumping games. This leniency is based on the fact that such physical activity provides enjoyment and recreation for children and is considered a normal part of their Shabbos experience. Adults, however, may not run or jump on Shabbos for mundane purposes. The detailed laws regarding running on Shabbos are discussed in the laws of

 

17. Disciplining children on Shabbos:

A. General law of Punishments and imprisonment on Shabbos: [464]

Court Punishments are not delivered on Shabbos [and in certain cases it is a Biblical prohibition to do so^[465]].^[466] [Some Rishonim list this prohibition as one of the 365 negative commands, in addition to the other commands listed regarding Shabbos.^[467] Accordingly, Chazal state that the punishment of Gehinnom ceases over Shabbos.^[468]] Therefore, it is forbidden to capture and incarcerate [i.e. arrest] a criminal who is liable for punishment in order so he does not run away, [and one desires to hold him until his due punishment is met]. This applies even if the criminal may become a fugitive if the incarceration is delayed. Rather, if he runs away we have no responsibility.^[469]  Certainly it is forbidden to give lashes on Shabbos.^[470]

Is there a Trapping prohibition involved in trapping humans, such as locking a child in his room, or a lunatic in his room? There is no trapping prohibition involved in trapping humans.^[471] One may thus lock a child in his room if needed^[472], and arrest a man on Shabbos who is trying to leave his wife an Aguna.^[473] However, there are Poskim^[474] who question that perhaps the trapping prohibition applies to a child.^[475] Others^[476] forbid capturing a lunatic which would otherwise run away from society. In any event, it is forbidden to arrest an individual on Shabbos [unless there is extreme reason to do so] due to the prohibition to bestow punishments on Shabbos, irrelevant of the trapping issue.^[477]

 

B. The Law: [478]

Despite the above general ruling, it is permitted to discipline or punish children on Shabbos.^[479] Nonetheless, it is not in the spirit of Shabbos to show anger or fury, or give punishment even for the sake of Chinuch, as learned from the reason why the Torah prohibited a Beis Din from giving punishment on Shabbos. The Torah desired that Shabbos be a day of rest for all, even those who deserve punishment, and hence one is to abstain from punishing or showing any anger on Shabbos to the utmost extreme.^[480]

Locking in room:^[481] One may lock a child in his room for disciplinary purposes.

Spanking:^[482] It is possibly even Biblically forbidden to hit or spank a child if doing so can cause a bruise to the child. Hence one is to avoid hitting or spanking a child on Shabbos in a way that can cause a wound.

 

18. Chinuch In Erev Shabbos

A. Bathing Children in Honor of Shabbos [483]

Just as it is a mitzvah for an adult to bathe and cleanse his body in honor of Shabbos, so too one should be particular to bathe his children and ensure that they are clean and presentable for Shabbos. This forms part of the general obligation to honor the holy day and to instill in children a sense of respect and preparation for Shabbos. Nonetheless, when necessary, one may be lenient to bathe the children beginning already from Thursday, particularly when doing so will help ensure that they are properly prepared for Shabbos.

 

B. Taking a Child to the Mikvah [484]

There is no obligation to take a child to the mikvah in honor of Shabbos, even if he has reached the age of chinuch, as immersion in a mikvah is not a formal obligation even for adults. Nonetheless, many are accustomed to do so as a pious custom and in order to accustom the child to practices of holiness and purity. Those who bring their children to the mikvah must ensure that the child is properly supervised at all times. Special care should be taken to safeguard the child’s wellbeing and to maintain an environment of modesty, safety, and respect.

 

C. Helping Prepare for Shabbos [485]

Children should be educated to assist in the preparations for Shabbos, just as adults are obligated to personally participate in honoring and preparing for the holy day. By involving children in the various tasks associated with Shabbos preparation, they develop a sense of excitement, responsibility, and appreciation for the sanctity of Shabbos. Accordingly, parents should train their children, each according to their age and ability, to take part in the household preparations and thereby fulfill their own mitzvah of chinuch in honoring Shabbos.

 

D. Cutting a Child’s Nails in Honor of Shabbos [486]

Just as it is customary and proper for adults to cut their nails in honor of Shabbos, so too one should be particular to cut the nails of his children before Shabbos. This is included in the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos and ensuring that the child enters the holy day in a clean and respectable manner. In addition, it serves as an opportunity to educate children in proper hygiene and in preparing themselves appropriately for Shabbos.

Must one wash his hands after cutting another person’s nails, such as one’s children?^[487] No. One is only obligated to wash his hands after cutting his own nails.^[488]

 

E. Wearing Shabbos Clothing [489]

Children should be accustomed to wearing special clothing in honor of Shabbos, just as adults are required to honor the day through respectable attire. Dressing in Shabbos clothing helps instill within the child a sense of the sanctity and uniqueness of Shabbos and distinguishes the holy day from the rest of the week.

 

F. Avoiding holding a dirty child: [490]

Every person is obligated to strive based on his affordability, to have elegant clothing for Shabbos.^[491] These clothing are to be designated specifically^[492] for Shabbos (and are to be nicer than the clothing he wears during the week).^[493] [Hence one is to avoid wearing these clothing at all during the week.^[494] Furthermore, even on Shabbos itself one is to avoid doing activities that can dirty the clothing. For this reason, one should not hold a child (which can cause one to become dirty) unless he places a covering over his clothes.^[495]]

 

1. Shnayim Mikra:^[496]

Children who are of the age of chinuch, and are able to read the entire Parshah fluently and understand its content, are to be educated to recite Shnayim Mikra V’echad Targum. Nevertheless, all of the various leniencies that apply to Shnayim Mikra may likewise be relied upon for children. Furthermore, when a particular section is unusually lengthy or poses a significant burden for the child, one should exercise discretion and proceed in a manner appropriate to the child’s age, abilities, and level of understanding, taking care not to overburden him. The goal of this area of chinuch, as with all aspects of Torah education, is to foster a positive and lasting connection to the mitzvah.

 

 

1. Adding to and Extending Shabbos (Tosefes Shabbos)[497]

One should educate his children in the mitzvah of Tosefes Shabbos—adding from the weekday onto Shabbos, both before the onset of Shabbos and at its conclusion. Accordingly, children who have reached the age of chinuch should be trained to refrain from prohibited activities for a short time before Shabbos begins and likewise to wait a short time after Shabbos ends before resuming weekday activities.

 

19. Chinuch in Hadlakas Neros Shabbos:

A. Mivtza Neshek – The General Mitzvah and Custom [498]

From the letter of the law, the obligation to light the Shabbos candles rests upon the mother of the home[499], or upon the father when the mother is absent.[500] It is not an intrinsic obligation upon the other members of the household.[501] Nonetheless, it is well known that the Rebbe strongly encouraged and campaigned that all girls, beginning from the age of three—and even younger, from the time they are able to speak and understand the concept—light Shabbos candles in their homes.[502] This practice is rooted in an ancient Ashkenazi custom[503] and serves to increase the light of Torah and mitzvos within the home. In addition to its educational value, it is regarded as having a profound spiritual effect. While the precise halachic basis for girls lighting Shabbos candles is debated among the poskim[504], the accepted Ashkenazi custom has long been to permit and encourage it.[505] Furthermore, many authorities permit this practice even for Sephardic families.[506] Through lighting their own candles, girls develop a personal connection to the holiness of Shabbos and become active participants in bringing light and blessing into the Jewish home.

 

B. How Many Candles Should a Girl Light? [507]

The established custom is that girls who light Shabbos candles before marriage light one candle. After marriage, a woman follows the custom of lighting the number of candles customary in her family. Until that time, girls participating in Mivtza Neshek light a single candle.

 

C. When Should the Girls Light? [508]

Girls should light their Shabbos candles before their mother lights. This allows the mother to supervise, assist, and ensure that the candles are lit properly and safely. In addition, by lighting first, the girls can participate in the mitzvah under their mother’s guidance and instruction, thereby enhancing the educational value of the practice. Furthermore, when the girls light before their mother, there is no question whatsoever regarding the mother’s obligation to subsequently light with a blessing. Since the primary obligation of Shabbos candle lighting rests upon an adult of the home, her lighting remains clearly recognizable as the principal fulfillment of the mitzvah, while the daughters’ lighting serves as an additional act of chinuch and an increase of spiritual light in the home.

 

D. Does a Child’s Lighting Fulfill the Obligation of the Household? [509]

The lighting of a child who is below the age of Bar or Bas Mitzvah does not fulfill the obligation of Shabbos candle lighting on behalf of the household. Since the child’s lighting is performed only as part of the mitzvah of chinuch, it cannot discharge the obligation of those who are fully obligated in the mitzvah. Accordingly, in addition to the child’s lighting, an adult who bears the obligation of the household—generally the mother, or the father in her absence—must light the Shabbos candles and recite the blessing. The child’s lighting serves as an act of education and an increase in the light of the mitzvah, but not as the household’s fulfillment of the obligation.

 

E. Not to stand naked in front of the Shabbos candles: [510]

It is customary to cover the children so they not be naked in front of the [Shabbos] candles due to it being a belittlement of the Mitzvah [Bizuiy Mitzvah]. [This applies even if one is at a distance from the candles, and even if the child is not standing in front of the candles.^[511] This applies even if only the Erva is revealed while the remainder of the body remains covered.^[512] Thus, one is not to change a baby’s diaper in the same room as the Shabbos candles. The same applies against doing any belittling matter in front of the candles.^[513] The same applies to any other Mitzvah candle such as a Havdala candle, Chanukah candles, and candles of a Shul.^[514] It however does not apply to a Yartzite or Yizkor candle that is lit at home.]

 

20. Chinuch in Shabbos Davening

See Chapter 9 for the detailed laws relating to educating children in davening, which applies likewise to the Shabbos Davening. See also Halacha 7 there regarding bringing children to shul, as well as the discussion of whether children should remain for Krias HaTorah and other portions of the davening.

 

A. Tehillim Shabbos Mevarchim: [515]

The Rebbe Rayatz instituted that the entire Tehillim be recited prior to Shacharis^[516] on Shabbos Mevarchim.^[517] Following the Seder of Shabbos Mevarchim is extremely pertinent to the public, and is a great and lofty Mitzvah which brings an abundance of blessing in physical and spiritual matters.^[518] The saying of Tehillim daily after Davening and on Shabbos Mevarchim has future effects on one’s children and grandchildren.^[519]

 

B. Farbrengen of Shabbos Mevarchim: [520]

After Davening on Shabbos Mevarchim, the congregation is to hold a Chassidic gathering.

Children:^[521] It is proper for even little children of three years of age to attend Farbrengens in order so they squeeze themselves between the Chassidim [and learn from them].

 

21. Chinuch in Kiddush: [522]

A. General Mitzvah:

Biblical Exemption:[523] A child is Biblically exempt from the mitzvah of Kiddush, just as he is exempt from all other mitzvos in the Torah.[524]

Chinuch in Kiddush:[525] Although a child is Biblically exempt from the mitzvah of Kiddush, nevertheless, on a rabbinic level, children are educated to fulfill the mitzvah from the time they reach the age of chinuch, just as with all other mitzvos. This applies not only to the nighttime Kiddush, which is of Biblical origin, but even to the daytime Kiddush, which is rabbinic, and likewise to Kiddush of Yom Tov, both by night and by day.

The Age: The age at which a child becomes obligated in chinuch for positive commandments is not uniform, but rather depends on the individual child’s understanding and aptitude with respect to each particular mitzvah, whether biblical or rabbinic.^[526] Regarding Kiddush, a child who understands the concept of Shabbos is obligated to be educated to hear Kiddush.^[527] [Thus, the age of chinuch for Kiddush is defined not merely by a child’s ability to recite or listen to the text, but by his understanding of the concept of Shabbos. This includes knowing that Hashem rested on Shabbos after the creation of the world and sanctified the day. If a child does not yet grasp the concept of Shabbos, then even if he is able to repeat or recite the entire Kiddush, he has not yet reached the stage of chinuch. This is because the essence of the mitzvah is not the verbal recitation alone, but the act of sanctifying Shabbos through understanding.[528]]

 

B. Tashlumin – A Child Who Did Not Recite Kiddush on Friday Night: [529]

It is questionable whether a child who did not recite Kiddush on Friday night must be educated to make up (tashlumin) the nighttime Kiddush during the day.[530] This depends on a broader discussion among the authorities whether the daytime recital is considered a true continuation of the original obligation or merely a compensation.[531]  Practically, we rule stringently in this matter. Accordingly, any child who did not fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush on Friday night should be educated to recite it for himself during the day on Shabbos.

Making Kiddush for a Child:[532] A child who did not hear Kiddush on Friday night should be educated to make it up during its designated makeup period; Kiddush on Shabbos day. Nevertheless, one should be stringent that an adult who has already fulfilled his own obligation not recite the Kiddush on the child’s behalf during this makeup period. Rather, the child should recite it himself if capable, or otherwise it should be arranged through one who has not yet fulfilled his own obligation.

 

C. Kiddush for A Child Who Goes to Sleep Early on Friday Night [533]

If a child needs to go to sleep early on Friday night, it is proper to educate him to recite Kiddush from Plag HaMinchah and onward—after accepting Shabbos. This is preferable to delaying and having him make up the Kiddush the next day. However, if the child already fell asleep before Kiddush, it is not necessary to wake him; rather, he may make it up the next day. [However, some Poskim[534] are stringent to awaken the child.]

 

D. Chinuch for Kiddush in the Place of the Meal ( Kiddush B’Makom Seudah ): [535]

A child should be educated to recite or hear Kiddush specifically in the place where the meal is held, just as by an adult. Although there are opinions[536] that allow some leniency—arguing that the primary focus of chinuch is the basic mitzvah of Kiddush itself—even if it is not done in the proper location, practically one should not rely on this. Rather, a child’s education should include all the details of the mitzvah, training him to fulfill Kiddush properly in every respect.

 

E. How much must a child drink if he makes Kiddush [537]

A child who makes Kiddush is required to drink a malei lugmav. It suffices for the child to drink a malei lugmav according to his own cheeks, even if this amount is less than the majority of a revi’is, since his obligation is only for the sake of chinuch. Some Poskim^[538] however question this matter, and suggest that perhaps in all cases one must drink at least the majority of a Revius. Practically, by a child below Bar/Bas Mitzvah one may be lenient.^[539]

 

F. Eating Before Kiddush: May a child eat or drink before Kiddush? [540]

If a child wants^[541] or needs^[542] to eat or drink, he may do so even before Kiddush. This applies both to the Kiddush of night and day.^[543] It is forbidden to oppress a child and make him wait until after Kiddush.^[544] This applies even if the child is above the age of Chinuch/education [so long as he is under Bar or Bas Mitzvah^[545]]. If, however, the child does not want to eat and does not need to eat at this time, and is simply being fed for the benefit of others^[546], then [once he reaches the age of Chinuch^[547]] he is to be educated not to eat until he hears Kiddush.^[548] Nevertheless, it is permitted to give a child who has reached the age of Chinuch to drink from the Kiddush wine in Shul.^[549] [Despite the above ruling, as the child becomes older, one may encourage the child to not eat before Kiddush by stating to him that it is proper for him to abstain on his own from eating or drinking until after Kiddush, even though if he needs or wants to eat, one may not stop him from doing so.^[550]]

Feeding a Child Before Kiddush – Issur Sefiyah: It is permitted to even actively feed a child before Kiddush. Accordingly, they should be fed even before Kiddush in the morning so that they do not go hungry until after the completion of prayers in the synagogue.

 

Summary: It is permitted for a child to eat or drink before Kiddush until the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah, if they desire to eat. It is forbidden to oppress the child by making him wait. Nonetheless, one may encourage the child as he gets older to not eat or drink before Kiddush, even though he may do so from the letter of the law. Q&A May children eat candies before Kiddush?[551] Yes. This applies even if the child has reached the age of Chinuch, until the child is Bar or Bas Mitzvah. Nevertheless, as stated above, it is proper to encourage the child, as the child becomes older, that it is proper for him to refrain on his own from eating candies until after Kiddush. Nonetheless, if the child needs or wants to eat, one may not stop him from doing so.

 

G. Repeating Kiddush for a child: [552]

One may repeat Kiddush in order to fulfill the obligation of children^[553] [that have reached the age of education^[554] and do not know to say Kiddush themselves^[555]]. Based on this even if one heard Kiddush in Shul he may still say Havdalah for his younger children upon his return home.

 

H. Giving a child the Kiddush wine to drink: [556]

Distributing the wine to one’s children: As part of the Mitzvah Min Hamuvchar of Kiddush, it is a mitzvah to distribute some of the Kiddush wine to one’s children and household members so that they too partake of the wine over which the blessing and Kiddush were recited.

Is one Yotzei if only a child drinks the Kiddush wine:[557] Lechatchilah, the one reciting Kiddush should personally drink from the wine, rather than giving it to someone else.[558] However, bedieved, if another person drank the required amount, one has fulfilled his obligation.[559] Some Poskim[560], however, rule that this only applies to a person who is of the age of Mitzvos. However, if a child below the age of Mitzvos drinks the Kiddush wine in place of an adult then no one fulfills their obligation. Other Poskim[561], however, rule that one may give the Kiddush wine even to a child to drink [whether male or female], if the child has reached the age of Chinuch for blessings, and all the adults fulfill their obligation of Kiddush as a result of this child’s drinking of the wine.^[562] Even this opinion however agrees that the wine must be given to a child who has reached the age of Chinuch for blessings.^[563] If the wine was given to a child below the age of chinuch, he cannot fulfill the obligation on behalf of others.[564]  [Practically, whenever possible the wine should initially be given either to an adult who is fulfilling his obligation through the Kiddush. Nevertheless, in a case of need, and certainly after the fact, the accepted practical ruling is that one fulfills his obligation even if the Kiddush wine was drunk by a child above the age of Chinuch.[565]]

How much does the child have to drink?^[566] When giving wine of Kiddush to a child, the child must drink Malei Lugmav, which is enough wine to fill one of his cheeks.

Kiddush Wine in Shul and Giving It to a Child?^[567] In Shul when making the traditional Friday Night Kiddush after prayer, it is permitted to recite the Kiddush even though no adulty will be drinking from it in Shul. Rather, the wine is given to a child to drink. However, it should first be given to a child who has reached the age of Chinuch for Brachos, who dinks from it Malei Lugmav, after which other children may also drink from the cup. ^[568]

 

I. May One Child Fulfill the Obligation of Another Child in Kiddush? [569]

Although an adult cannot fulfill his obligation of Kiddush through a child, one child may fulfill the obligation of another child. Accordingly, children who have reached the age of chinuch may hear Kiddush from another child and thereby fulfill their obligation of chinuch in this mitzvah. This is because both the child reciting the Kiddush and the child listening to it share the same level of obligation, namely the rabbinic obligation of chinuch.

 

J. Adult being Yotzei Kiddush with a child: [570]

Friday Night Kiddush: A child cannot fulfill the obligation of an adult—whether man or woman^[571] —in the mitzvah of Kiddush.[572] Therefore, every adult, whether man or woman, must hear Kiddush from another adult or recite Kiddush themselves. [Nevertheless, the poskim discuss a possible basis for leniency that would allow an adult to fulfill his Friday night Kiddush through a child in a case where the adult has already davened Maariv. The rationale and parameters of this discussion will be explained below. Nevertheless, as we conclude there, due to the various doubts involved, the practical ruling is that an adult should not fulfill his obligation through a child in any circumstance.]

Adult has already Davened Maariv:[573] Some Poskim[574] rule that if the child has not yet Davened Maariv, while the adult has Davened Maariv, then he can be Motzi the adult even if he is below the age of Bar/Bas Mitzvah, as they are both now Chad Derabanon. However, if the child already Davened Maariv, then he cannot be Motzi other adults even if they had Davened Maariv, as this reverts back to a case of Trei Derabanon.[575] However, some Poskim[576] rule that the child can be Motzi the adult even in such a case, as being that the child could potentially be a Chad Derabanon, if he were not to have Davened Maariv, then he can be Motzi another Chad Derabanon, even though he is currently a Trei Derabanon. Furthermore, some Poskim rule that this validity applies even if the child has already been Yotzei Kiddush. On the other hand, some Poskim[577] rule that one can never rely on the fact that the adults have Davened Maariv, as perhaps they did not have in mind to be Yotzei the Biblical Mitzvah of Kiddush in doing so, and hence retain a Biblical obligation. Accordingly, even if the child has not Davened Maariv he cannot be Motzi an adult who Davened Maariv. [Practically, due to the various halachic doubts discussed above, one should never fulfill his obligation of Kiddush through a child. This applies even if the child has not yet davened Maariv while the adult has already davened Maariv, and thus the child may possess a stronger obligation according to certain opinions. Certainly, one may not rely on a child to fulfill his obligation if the child has already davened Maariv while the adult has not, as a child’s obligation remains one of chinuch and is not equivalent to the obligation of an adult.]

When the Adult Recites the Kiddush Along with the Child:[578] All of the above applies only when the adult seeks to fulfill his obligation by listening to the child’s Kiddush without reciting it himself. However, if the adult, whether a man or a woman, recites the entire Kiddush word for word together with the child, then he fulfills his own obligation through his personal recital, [even if the child is the one holding the cup of Kiddush. In such a case, the child is not serving as the one exempting the adult; rather, both are reciting the Kiddush together, and the adult fulfills the mitzvah through his own words. Nonetheless, some poskim[579] rule that, lechatchilah, the adult should also have a cup of wine in front of them while repeating the Kiddush after the child, even if the cup remains resting on the table. In this way, the adults recital of Kiddush is connected to a cup of wine, as is required for the proper fulfillment of the mitzvah.]

Daytime Kiddush:[580] With regard to the daytime Kiddush which is merely Rabbinical, all opinions agree that an adult cannot fulfill his obligation by hearing it from a child. Since the child’s obligation is only one of chinuch while the adult is obligated in the mitzvah itself, the child cannot exempt the adult from his obligation.^[581] Accordingly, an adult must hear the daytime Kiddush from another adult who is obligated in the mitzvah, or recite it himself.

Yom Tov Kiddush:[582] The Kiddush of Yom Tov is rabbinic in nature. Accordingly, according to all opinions, a child cannot exempt an adult from his obligation of Yom Tov Kiddush, and the adult must hear it from another adult who is obligated in the mitzvah or recite it himself.

 

K. Women – May a woman make Kiddush on behalf of children? [583]

A woman may fulfill a child’s obligation in Kiddush. This applies regardless of whether the woman has already davened Maariv or has not yet done so.

Yom Tov Kiddush:[584] Since there are Poskim[585] who maintain that women are exempt from the obligation of Yom Tov Kiddush, it would follow that they cannot fulfill the obligation on behalf of a child. Nevertheless, according to those authorities who are lenient regarding a woman fulfilling a child’s obligation in Havdalah, there is likewise room for leniency in this matter, since the child’s obligation is only one of chinuch, and thus the question involves a rabbinic doubt, regarding which one may be lenient. This applies even if the woman has already fulfilled her obligation of Yom Tov Kiddush.

 

22. Chinuch in Shabbos Meals:

A. Birchas Habanim – Blessing children on Friday night: [586]

It is an old age custom for parents and Rabbis to bless their children and students with Birchas Kohanim on Friday night.^[587] Doing so does not transgress the prohibition^[588] against a non-Kohen reciting Birchas Kohanim^[589], although it is forbidden for the person to raise his hands like a Kohen upon doing so, and he also may not intend to perform the Mitzvah of Birchas Kohanim upon doing so.^[590] The blessing may be said with Hashem’s name.^[591] The blessing is given after Maariv or upon coming home from Shul. The reason for this is because on Shabbos, there is a special holiness that resides on the hands which can be transferred onto the children and students.^[592] Some^[593] are no longer accustomed to bless the children on Friday nights and rather do so only on special occasions, such as Yom Kippur and the day of the wedding, and so is the widespread Chabad custom.^[594]

Placing the hands on the person’s head: Due to the prohibition against lifting the hands while saying Birchas Kohanim, some^[595] are accustomed not to even rest both hands on the head of the person being blessed when blessing him with Birchas Kohanim, and rather rest only one hand on his head. Other Poskim^[596] rule it is permitted and encouraged for one to do so. Practically, the widespread custom is to be lenient and allow the placing of two hands on the head of the person being blessed^[597], and so was the custom of the Chacham Tzevi^[598] and Rebbe Rashab on Erev Yom Kippur.^[599]

 

B. Chinuch in Oneg Shabbos [600]

One should educate a child in the mitzvah of Oneg Shabbos—taking pleasure and delight in Shabbos through enjoyable foods, beverages, rest, and other appropriate forms of enjoyment. However, this education should be tailored to the child’s age, level of understanding, and personal needs. Accordingly, a child is not required to fulfill mitzvot such as oneg Shabbat in the same manner as adults—for example, forcing him to eat fish, meat, or other delicacies. Likewise, there is no requirement to be particular that a child eat three full Shabbat meals in the adult sense, or quantities of food beyond what is reasonable for him.

 

C. Chinuch in the Three Shabbos Meals [601]

One should educate a child to participate in the mitzvah of the three Shabbos meals (Seudos Shabbos). Likewise, a child should be educated in the mitzvah of Lechem Mishneh. Accordingly, he should be trained to recite Hamotzi over two complete loaves of bread at the Shabbos meals, just as adults do, when he is saying Hamotzi on his own and not  being Yotzei with his father.

 

D. Accustoming Children to Eat Fruit on Shabbos [602]

Some authorities write that it is a Jewish custom to distribute fruit to one’s children and other members of the household on Shabbos, in order to accustom them to the enjoyment and honor of Shabbos. It is proper for a parent to have the children recite the appropriate blessings over the fruit and eat it in his presence, thereby providing an opportunity to educate them both in the mitzvah of Oneg Shabbos and in the proper recitation of brachos.

 

23. Chinuch in Havdalah: [603]

A. General Mitzvah: [604]

Chinuch in Havdalah:[605] Although a child is Biblically exempt from the mitzvah of Havdalah, nevertheless, on a rabbinic level, children are educated to fulfill the mitzvah of Havdalah from the time they reach the age of chinuch, just as with all other mitzvos. This applies not only to likewise to Havdalah of Yom Tov.

The Age: The age at which a child becomes obligated in chinuch for positive commandments is not uniform, but rather depends on the individual child’s understanding and aptitude with respect to each particular mitzvah, whether biblical or rabbinic.^[606] Regarding Havdalah, a child who understands the concept of Shabbos is obligated to be educated to hear Havdalah.^[607] [This is at approximately 5-6 years old^[608], or 6-7 years old[609], or 8-9 years old.[610]] [Thus, the age of chinuch for Havdalah is defined not merely by a child’s ability to recite or listen to the text, but by his understanding of the concept of Shabbos. This includes knowing that Hashem rested on Shabbos after the creation of the world and sanctified the day. If a child does not yet grasp the concept of Shabbos, then even if he is able to repeat or recite the entire Havdalah, he has not yet reached the stage of chinuch. This is because the essence of the mitzvah is not the verbal recitation alone, but the act of sanctifying Shabbos through understanding.[611]]

Chinuch for Girls in Havdalah:[612] A girl who has reached the age of chinuch regarding Havdalah, since there is a dispute among the authorities whether women are obligated, it follows that the education of girls in this mitzvah is likewise dependent on this debate. Practically, one should be stringent and train them to listen to Havdalah.

 

B. Chinuch in Refraining from Melachah Before Havdalah: [613]

A child who has reached the age of chinuch for the mitzvah of Havdalah should also be educated not to perform any melachah after Shabbos until he hears Havdalah, or at the very least until he says, “Baruch Hamavdil bein kodesh lechol.”

 

C. Tashlumin – A Child Who Did Not Recite Havdalah on Motzei Shabbos [614]

If a child did not hear Havdalah on Motzei Shabbos he is to hear Havdalah on Sunday.[615] The child should make Havdalah without the blessing of Besamim or Haeish.^[616] However some Poskim^[617] argue that there is no need to a child to make up Havdalah the next day.

Girl:[618] With regard to a girl, since there is an underlying debate whether she is obligated in Havdalah, there is room for leniency, and she may suffice with saying “Baruch Hamavdil bein kodesh lechol.”

Generating response

Making Havdalah for a Child:[619] A child who did not hear Havdalah on Motzaei Shabbos, should be educated to make it up during its designated makeup period, Havdalah on Sunday. Nevertheless, one should be stringent that an adult who has already fulfilled his own obligation not recite the Havdalah on the child’s behalf during this makeup period. Rather, the child should recite it himself if capable, or otherwise it should be arranged through one who has not yet fulfilled his own obligation.

 

D. A Child Who Goes to Sleep Early on Shabbos day [620]

If a child needs to go to sleep early on Shabbos day, although there are theoretical ways to perform Havdala before nightfall, in practice one should not educate the child to do Havdala early. Instead, if he missed Havdalah at the proper time, he should recite it the next day. [However, some Poskim[621] are stringent to awaken the child at night for Havdalah. Likewise, some Poskim^[622] write that in such a case one may be lenient to have them say Havdalah after Plag Hamincha on Shabbos before they go to sleep.]

Regularly Delaying Havdalah for Children: There is an opinion[623] that in places where Motzaei Shabbos occurs late and children go to sleep before nightfall, one should not establish a regular practice of having children recite Havdalah on Sunday morning, and rather they are completely exempt. However, others dispute this view and allow making Havdalah regularly on Sundays in such a case.[624]

 

E. Repeating Havdalah for a child: [625]

One may repeat Havdalah to fulfill the obligation of [male^[626]] children^[627] [that have reached the age of education^[628] and do not know to say Havdalah themselves^[629]]. [One also says the blessings of Besamim^[630] and Meorei Haeish on their behalf.^[631]] Based on this even if one heard Havdalah in Shul he may still say Havdalah for his younger [male] children upon his return home.

Repeating Havdalah for a girl:^[632] A person [whether man or woman] which has already said or heard Havdalah may not repeat Havdalah for a girl who did not yet hear Havdalah unless there is a man or male child who is also fulfilling his obligation with this Havdalah.

 

F. Being Yotzei Havdalah from a child: [633]

An adult, whether a man or woman, may not fulfill his obligation of Havdalah by hearing it from a child who is below Bar Mitzvah. However, other children may fulfill their obligation by hearing Havdalah from that child.[634] Furthermore, even if the child has reached the age of Bar Mitzvah, one may not fulfill his obligation through him unless it is known that he has reached halachic maturity. Accordingly, if he has not yet grown a beard and it is not known with certainty that he has developed two pubic hairs, he should not be relied upon to fulfill the obligation of adults.

If a boy turned Bar Mitzvah on Motzei Shabbos may he say Havdalah for others that Motzei Shabbos?^[635] It is best to not have others be Yotzei with his Havdalah.^[636]

When the Adult Recites Havdalah Along with the Child:[637] All of the above applies only when the adult seeks to fulfill his obligation by listening to the child’s Havdalah without reciting it himself. However, if the adult, whether a man or a woman, recites the entire Havdalah word for word together with the child, then he fulfills his own obligation through his personal recital, [even if the child is the one holding the cup of Havdalah. In such a case, the child is not serving as the one exempting the adult; rather, both are reciting the Havdalah together, and the adult fulfills the mitzvah through his own words. Nonetheless, some Poskim[638] rule that, Lechatchilah, the adult should also have a cup of wine in front of them while repeating the Kiddush after the child, even if the cup remains resting on the table. In this way, the adults recital of Havdalah is connected to a cup of wine, as is required for the proper fulfillment of the mitzvah.]

 

G. Women – May male children be Yotzei Havdalah from a woman? [639]

It is questionable whether a woman who is reciting Havdalah for herself may also fulfill the obligation of a child. Since there are Poskim[640] who maintain that women are not obligated in Havdalah, it follows that even though a woman may recite Havdalah for herself, it is uncertain whether she may discharge the obligation of a child. Some authorities nevertheless rule leniently and permit her to do so, reasoning that with regard to a child, the obligation is only one of chinuch, and therefore the matter constitutes a rabbinic doubt, regarding which one may be lenient. Other authorities, however, question this leniency and remain hesitant to rely upon it in practice. Practically, in a time of need one may be lenient to allow children fulfill their obligation with hearing Havdalah from a woman.[641] This applies even if the woman has already fulfilled her obligation of Havdalah.

 

H. Eating Before Havdalah: May children eat prior to Havdalah? [642]

Just as it is permitted to feed a child before Kiddush, so too it is permitted to feed him before Havdalah. It is forbidden to prevent them from eating if they need to eat.

 

 

 

1. Giving the Havdalah wine to a child to drink – Is One Yotzei?^[643]

It is not necessary for the person who makes Havdalah to drink the cup himself and it suffices for another person to drink from it.^[644] Some Poskim[645], however, rule that this only applies to a person who is of the age of Mitzvos. However, if a child below the age of Mitzvos drinks the Havdalah wine in place of an adult then no one fulfills their obligation. Other Poskim[646], however, rule that one may give the Havdalah wine even to a child to drink [whether male or female^[647]], if the child has reached the age of Chinuch for blessings, and all the adults fulfill their obligation of Havdalah as a result of this child’s drinking of the wine.^[648] Even this opinion however agrees that the wine may not initially be given to a child who has not reached the age of Chinuch for blessings.^[649] However, Bedieved, if one did so he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation of Havdalah according to this approach.^[650] [Practically, whenever possible the wine should initially be given either to an adult who is fulfilling his obligation through the Havdalah or, at most, to a boy who has reached the age of chinuch for Havdalah. Nevertheless, in a case of need, and certainly after the fact, the accepted practical ruling is that one fulfills his obligation even if the Havdalah wine was drunk by a child below the age of Chinuch.[651]]

How much does the child have to drink?^[652] When giving wine of Havdalah to a child, the child must drink Malei Lugmav, which is enough wine to fill one of his cheeks.

 

J. Havdalah during the nine days: [653]

When saying Havdalah during the nine days [Motzei Shabbos Chazon], one is to give the wine to a child to drink [whether male or female^[654], although some rule only male^[655]] who has reached the age of Chinuch [of blessings^[656] although some say also Chinuch of Havdalah^[657]] but has not yet reached the age of Chinuch for mourning.^[658] If such a child is not available he may drink the [entire^[659]] Havdalah wine himself as usual.^[660] [There is no need to make Havdala over beer, or tea and coffee in such a case, and one may even initially make Havadala over wine and drink it himself.^[661]]

 

24. Chinuch on Motzei Shabbos

A. Chinuch in Melaveh Malkah [662]

It is questionable whether there is an obligation to educate children in the mitzvah of eating the Melaveh Malkah meal. Since this mitzvah is of a different nature than the obligatory Shabbos meals, it is not clear that it falls within the standard obligation of chinuch. Nonetheless, one who is careful to accustom his children to participate in Melaveh Malkah and to appreciate its significance is praiseworthy.

 

B. Chinuch in Kiddush Levana: [663]

A child who has reached the age of Chinuch is to be educated to recite Kiddush Levana. The age of Chinuch is from the age that the child understands the meaning of Kiddush Levana.^[664]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] See Toras Hakatan Chapter 32-33; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapters 37-54

[2] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 41-42, 44

[3] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:5 footnotes 32, 61 and 67-70 especially 70; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 41:1-15; 42:1-26

[4] See Mechilta on Parshas Yisro Parshas 7; Mechilta Derashbi; Ramban and Rashba on Shabbos 153b; Rashi and Ramban on Shemos 20:10; Yireim 101; Chinuch Mitzvah 32; Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118; Arugas Habosem 69; Shut Harim 3; Machaneh Chaim 3:26; Shaar Hatziyon 334:54 “In my humble opinion, when it is his father’s fire, the father is Biblically obligated to protest and stop him, since the child is acting on his behalf, so that he not transgress that which is written: ‘You shall not do any melachah—you, your son, and your daughter.’ However, when the child is extinguishing or kindling on behalf of others, then at the very least the other person is rabbinically obligated to protest and stop him…”; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Ketzos Hashulchan 141 footnote 28; Beir Moshe 6:19; Vayan Yosef 189:6; Shevet Halevi 6:38; 7:104; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 3:82; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5 footnotes 32, 61 and 67-70

The Source of the Obligation: The source for this discussion is the Mechilta on Parshas Yisro, which comments on the verse, “You shall not do any melachah—you, your son, your daughter, your servant, and your maidservant.” The Mechilta asks whether the terms “your son and your daughter” refer to adult children or minor children. It answers that they cannot refer to adults, as adult children are already independently commanded in the observance of Shabbos. Rather, the verse must be referring to minors. Notwithstanding the above, neither the Talmud nor the Rambam explicitly records a special obligation upon a father to ensure the Shabbos observance of his minor children. Nevertheless, a number of Rishonim cite the ruling of the Mechilta as authoritative halachah and understand it as creating a particular responsibility upon parents regarding their children’s observance of Shabbos.

[5] Shemos 20:10

[6] The Parameters of the Obligation: There is considerable discussion among the poskim regarding the exact scope of the obligation upon a father to prevent his child from performing melachah on Shabbos. Some authorities understand that the Biblical obligation applies specifically when the father performs the Melacha together with him, or instructs the child to perform the melachah, or when the child performs it on the father’s behalf with his knowledge and approval. Others extend the obligation even to a case in which the father gave no instruction, but the child is nevertheless performing the melachah solely for the father’s benefit and the father is aware of what is taking place. An even broader question discussed by the authorities is whether the obligation applies even when the child is acting entirely for his own benefit and not for the sake of his father at all. Thus, both the nature of the child’s intent and the degree of the father’s involvement play a central role in defining the parameters of this obligation. [See Minchas Chinuch Mitzvah 32:20; Chasam Sofer 1:83; Avnei Nezer O.C. 41:3; Achiezer 3:81; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:134; Eretz Tzevi 45; Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118; Sefas Emes Shabbos 121a; Shevet Halevi 6:38; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 41:2-8]

[7] See Admur 266:10; and so is Setimas Admur throughout chapter 334 and 343 who considers the guarding of Shabbos by a child as part of the Rabbinical Mitzvah of Chinuch

[8] Rama 266:6; Setimas Michaber in the SHU”A 343:1; Setimas Talmud and Rambam Shabbos 20:1-3, as mentioned in Shut Harim O.C. 3; Maggid Mishneh Shabbos 20:7; Levush 266; Beis Ephraim, Y.D. 62; Shivas Tziyon; Minchas Chinuch Mitzvah 32:19; Biur Halacha 266:6; Tehila Ledavid 343:8; Poskim in Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 70; Omitted from Ruf, Rosh, Tur

[9] A Limitation of the Mechilta’s Ruling: The Beis Ephraim, Y.D. 62 argues that the Talmud evidently understood the statement of the Mechilta not as an independent Biblical obligation, but merely as an asmachta (a Scriptural support for a rabbinic concept). He compares this to another statement of the Mechilta which derives from the verse “No melachah shall be done” that one may not have work performed by a non-Jew. The Ramban explains there that the verse is not meant literally, as the verse itself is addressing those who are already obligated in the prohibition. Accordingly, the Beis Ephraim suggests that even though adult children are independently obligated in Shabbos observance, the verse nevertheless serves to teach an additional responsibility upon the parent when the child acts with the parent’s approval or under his direction. He notes that similar interpretations are found in other Midrashic sources, where verses are expounded to place responsibility upon one who causes or facilitates the prohibited act, just as Chazal derive in various places that one who feeds prohibited food to another may be held accountable similarly to the one who actually eats it. Based on this approach, the verse does not establish a unique Biblical obligation of shevisas bano (the child’s Shabbos observance), but rather reinforces the parent’s responsibility to prevent and not facilitate his child’s transgression.

[10] Admur 343:1-3; See Chapter 1 in length; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 44:2-7

[11] Admur 343:1-3; See Chapter 1 in length

[12] Admur 343:3 “But a child who has no understanding at all: his father is not obligated to forcibly prevent him from eating forbidden foods or from desecrating Shabbat, even when the prohibition is from the Torah, since the child does not understand the concept of what he is being prevented from or separated from. Likewise, if he is a kohen, there is no obligation to remove him from a house that contains ritual impurity, unless he is a child who has understanding, in which case his father is obligated to remove him.”; M”A 343:2; Issur Viheter Shaar 48:8; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; M”B 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; See Tosafus Erechin 3a; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3; Beir Moshe 6:20; Mishneh Halachos 3:49; 7:36; Sheilas Shaul 32; Shevet Halevi 7:104; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2 footnote 32 and 61

Other Opinions – Shabbos Melachah Performed by a Child Below the Age of Chinuch: The above Poskim all rule that a child who is below the age of chinuch does not require protest if he performs a melachah on Shabbos, as is the general principle by all prohibitions performed by a child who lacks mental maturity. However, some Poskim rule that Shabbat melachah is an exception to this general principle. According to this view, parents are biblically obligated to prevent their children from performing melachah on Shabbat even if the child has not yet reached the age of understanding or education. The reason given is that the Torah explicitly commands that one’s children rest on Shabbat, as stated in the verse: “You shall not do any work—you, your son, or your daughter.” Under this approach, young children are likened to one’s animals, which are likewise commanded to rest on Shabbat, and therefore parents bear a direct obligation to ensure that their children refrain from labor on Shabbat regardless of age. [Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118] This opinion is a Daas Yachid. [Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid]

[13] See Mateh Efraim 589:5 Alef Lamagen 6; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2 footnote 30

[14] See Admur 343:1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:5; Chapter 1 Halacha 7F

[15] Admur 265:10; Rishonim ibid; Poskim ibid; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 61; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 44:1; 14

Background from Admur: In Admur 343:5 the Halacha is referring to telling a child to eat non-Kosher. The Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3 adds that this includes telling a child to desecrate Shabbos. This is explicitly stated by Admur in 265:10; VeTzaruch Iyun based on this from 328:13 that implies that asking a child to transgress Shabbos in a case of danger is better than having an adult do it, hence implying there is no Biblical prohibition involved in asking him! A. Perhaps one can say that the Issur in asking a child is not in having him do the transgression but in asking him to do something which he is not allowed to do. However, in a case of danger since even a Jew may do so, asking the child is not forbidden at all, and hence there is no prohibition at all taking place, as the child is not commanded in Mitzvos and the adult was allowed to ask him. If, however, an adult transgresses, then although it is allowed and a Mitzvah, it is merely Dechuyah and is like the mashal of an amputation. Hence the advantage of asking a child is that it goes from dechuyah or Hutrah

Instructing a child before Shabbat to perform a transgression on Shabbos: One may not direct a child, even prior to Shabbat, to carry out an act on Shabbat that constitutes a transgression. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3]

[16] Rashba Shabbos 153; Ran Shabbos 153; Shiltei Giborim Tehila Ledavid 343:7; P”M ibid; M”B 343:4 “And this matter is prohibited by the Torah…And behold, from these three commandments we learn for the entire Torah that with respect to all Torah prohibitions, it is forbidden to feed them [to minors] or to command them to transgress.”; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2; See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that this prohibition is only Rabbinical. [Mishneh Lemelech in name of Rashba, brought and negated in Tehila Ledavid ibid]

Opinion of Admur: It is not clear from Admur whether the prohibition he mentions against instructing a child to perform a prohibited act is biblical or rabbinic. On the one hand, Admur discusses this prohibition toward the end of the halakhah in the context of Amirah Lenachri [and in 343:6], which suggests that instructing a child may itself be only rabbinically prohibited. This would imply that the biblical prohibition applies specifically to actively feeding a child a forbidden substance. This reading is further supported by siman 265:10, where Admur does not indicate that a biblical prohibition is involved in simply telling a child to carry a wallet or money from place to place and refers consistently to a case in which the wallet was placed onto the child. This approach appears to follow those authorities who maintain that instructing a child is prohibited only on a rabbinic level, whereas the biblical prohibition is limited to directly causing the child to consume or perform the prohibited matter. Vetzarcuh Iyun! See Kovetz Iyunim Tiferes Shimshon 3 p. 150

[17] See Chelkas Yoev 1:1; Avnei Nezer O.C. 259; Imrei Bina 7; Achiezer 3:81; Pnei Mevin 198; Eretz Tzevi Teumim 16; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 2:53; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:40

Meleches Machsheves and a Child: Some argue that since many prohibitions of Shabbos require meleches machsheves—a deliberate and purposeful act—and a child is halachically deemed incapable of possessing legally significant intent (machshavah), perhaps his actions should not constitute a Shabbos violation at all. Nevertheless, the Acharonim clarify that all of the ordinary prohibitions of Shabbos apply with respect to a child’s actions. Thus, one may not instruct a child to perform a melachah on Shabbos, and we do not say that since a child lacks halachically recognized intent, his act is insignificant. Various explanations are offered by the authorities as to why the requirement of meleches machsheves does not exempt a child’s performance of melachah from the laws of Shabbos.

[18] This is going on Rabbinical matters of which there are opinions which rule one may have a child transgress them on an occasional basis. [Admur 343:6] However a biblical prohibition is always forbidden to ask a child to perform. [Admur 265:10] The Mishneh Berura 343:6 explains an example of this to mean to ask a child to carry a key in a public domain on Shabbos; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3

[19] Melachah She’einah Tzerichah Legufah: According to the Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 [i.e. Rashba and Ran] that the prohibition of sefiyah does not apply to rabbinic prohibitions on occasion in a time of need it can be understood that according to their opinion there would likewise be no prohibition in instructing a child to perform a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah on occasion and in a time of need. This is because according to Rabbi Shimon, such a melachah is not Biblically prohibited and is classified only as a rabbinic prohibition. Now, practically, Admur rules that one may rely on their opinion in a time of need.  However, other authorities question this leniency and maintain that one may not instruct a child to perform a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah. They argue that although it is only rabbinically prohibited, it is more severe than ordinary rabbinic prohibitions because the underlying act is inherently a Biblical melachah. Furthermore, according to those who explain that the prohibition of sefiyah is intended to prevent a child from becoming accustomed to transgressions, there is even greater reason for stringency. Since the child is becoming accustomed to the actual melachah, he may eventually perform the same action even in circumstances in which it constitutes a full Biblical prohibition, as the distinction between a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah and a regular melachah lies primarily in one’s intent and purpose. Thus, practically, there is no leniency applicable to such Melacha. [See Admur 334:25-26; Beis HaLevi 1:13; Shaareiy Deiah 2:66; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:180; Beis Yitzchak 44:8; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 37; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:41-44]

[20] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:55

[21] Admur 343:10 “(However all the above is regarding prohibited foods, even if it is forbidden due to time) However it is permitted to give to a baby on Shabbos items which he is able to do prohibited actions with for himself, and even if one knows that he will do these actions with them , such as to give a baby a cake which has letters written on it which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos as explained in chapter 340, even though the young child will for certain eat it, [nevertheless] since he intends for his own benefit one need not separate him [from doing the prohibition] as was explained above [in Halacha 1]. Nevertheless one [a Gadol] may not place [the cake] into the mouth of the baby.”; M”A 343:2; See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; 3:82 and Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144 who permit to have a child below age 6 to open the fridge; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 who allows placing a child below age 3 in front of the fridge and in front of the light switch; Other contradictory rulings of Admur and their resolution: See Admur 266:10 [forbidden to give wallet to carry], 301:21 [prohibits dressing child with clothing that contain  bells that make noise]; Tehila Ledavid 343:2; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11; Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54; Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 44:11-14

The contradiction in Admur: There is an apparent contradiction within the rulings of Admur regarding the permissibility of giving a child below the age of chinuch an item with which a prohibition will be performed. Here in 343:10, Admur explicitly permits giving a child cake that contains letters, notwithstanding that the inevitable result of eating the cake will be the erasure of the letters, a rabbinic prohibition of mechikas ksav. This ruling implies that even where the adult is aware that a prohibition will certainly occur (pesik reisha), and even where the adult benefits from the child’s action, it is nevertheless permitted to give the item to a child below the age of chinuch. However, this ruling appears to contradict numerous other rulings of Admur, including 343:9 (prohibiting giving a child non‑kosher food), 266:10 (forbidding handing a child an object to carry in a public domain), and 301:21 (based on M”A 301:35 prohibiting dressing a child in garments with bells that will inevitably cause prohibited noise), all of which indicate that one may not actively place a child in a situation where a prohibition will certainly be transgressed.

The resolutions to the contradictions: This internal inconsistency has led to multiple approaches among the Poskim in explaining Admur’s position. Some make note of the contradiction and leave it unresolved (tzaruch iyun). [Tehila Ledavid 343:2] Others resolve the contradiction by sharply limiting the scope of 343:10, ruling that a child below chinuch may only be given an item with which a prohibition might occur if the adult has no intent for the child to perform the prohibition; if the adult’s intent is that the prohibition be done, even indirectly, it is forbidden. According to this approach, the cake-with-letters case is permitted only because the adult’s intent is feeding the child, not erasing letters. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147, fn. 11; Article of Rav Avraham Elyashvili in Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79] A different resolution that is suggested distinguishes between a one‑time prohibition and a constant or ongoing prohibition. They explain that Admur permits giving a child an item that will result in a single, incidental transgression (such as erasing letters while eating cake), but forbids giving items that will cause continuous violations (such as bells that ring repeatedly or objects that will be carried for an extended period). [Chikrei Halachos vol. 4 p. 54] Other contemporary Poskim adopt a more expansive reading of Admur. According to this approach, the decisive factor is whether the item inherently compels a prohibition or merely enables it. If the child retains a genuine choice whether or not to perform the prohibited act, then giving the item—or even placing the child in proximity to it—is not equivalent to instructing the child to sin, even if the adult hopes to benefit from the result. This reading understands 343:10 as the governing principle, with the stricter rulings in other simanim applying only where the item’s sole or unavoidable use is the prohibition itself. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 55 and 62]

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is possibly forbidden to arrange for a child to perform a prohibition due to Gerama. [See Bear Sarim 5:74; Meorei Haeish 4:13 footnote 182; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 61]

[22] Admur ibid in parentheses

[23] Setimas Admur ibid

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that anyone who sees a child who has reached the age of education transgressing a prohibition, then he must reprimand and stop the child even if he is not the child’s father, and hence certainly it would be forbidden to provide an Issur to such a child. [Bikurei Yaakov 640:5; Kaf Hachaim 343:28; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 footnote 19 in opinion of Rama ibid, based on Yevamos 114a that Beis Din is Lav Davka and the same applies to any person; So rule regarding a Beis Din: 1^st opinion in Rama 343:1; M”A 640:3; Elya Raba 640:4; P”M 640 A”A 4; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yereim; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Rashi Eruvin 96b; Chayeh Adam 66:3] Some Poskim conclude based on this opinion that by a Biblical transgression one is to be stringent and reprimand a child which has reached the age of education even if the child is not his son. However, by Rabbinical prohibitions there is no need to be stringent. [Chayeh Adam ibid; Mishneh Berura 343:7] Based on this, by one may not provide a child who has reached the age of c=Chinuch with an item with which he may do a Biblical prohibition, but may provide him with an item with which he can perform a Rabbinical prohibition if he is not the child’s father. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4]

[24] This is learned from the Gemara Shabbos 90b which does not differentiate [and neither does any Posek] and seemingly allows to give a child a kosher locust to play with even though the child may kill, trap, detach a wing or the like to the locust. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11]. As for the reason that there is a difference between giving the child a food or an item meant for desecrating Shabbos, Tzaruch Iyun.

[25] See Tehila Ledavid 343:6; Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 57

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that in a case where the child would have been unable to reach the item or perform the act independently, and required the assistance of an adult, the matter constitutes a Biblical prohibition of Sefiyas Issur, and is therefore forbidden. [Achiezer 3:81-7]

[26] Hearah 85 in new Shulchan Aruch; See previous footnotes for other opinions

[27] Admur 343:3; M”A 343:2; Issur Viheter Shaar 48:8; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; M”B 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; See Tosafus Erechin 3a; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3; Beir Moshe 6:20; Mishneh Halachos 3:49; 7:36; Sheilas Shaul 32; Shevet Halevi 7:104; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2 footnote 32 and 61

Other Opinions – Shabbos Melachah Performed by a Child Below the Age of Chinuch: The above Poskim all rule that a child who is below the age of chinuch does not require protest if he performs a melachah on Shabbos, as is the general principle by all prohibitions performed by a child who lacks mental maturity. However, some Poskim rule that Shabbat melachah is an exception to this general principle. According to this view, parents are biblically obligated to prevent their children from performing melachah on Shabbat even if the child has not yet reached the age of understanding or education. The reason given is that the Torah explicitly commands that one’s children rest on Shabbat, as stated in the verse: “You shall not do any work—you, your son, or your daughter.” Under this approach, young children are likened to one’s animals, which are likewise commanded to rest on Shabbat, and therefore parents bear a direct obligation to ensure that their children refrain from labor on Shabbat regardless of age. [Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118] This opinion is a Daas Yachid. [Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid]

[28] See Admur 343:1-2; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61

[29] Admur ibid and 340:4; M”A 343:5; Mordechai Remez 369 in name of Maharam, brought in Beis Yosef 340

[30] Admur ibid; 640:4; Mordechai ibid

[31] Admur ibid; Mordechai ibid

[32] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

[33] Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54 based on Admur’s ruling in 301:21 that it is forbidden to give a child clothing with bells, addresses the apparent contradiction between that ruling and the leniency discussed here. He explains that permission is granted only where the child will perform a single, isolated prohibition—such as eating a cake with letters on it—whereas an item that leads to a constant prohibition is forbidden to give to a child. Others (see He’aros U’Biurim, Ohalei Torah no. 831, p. 79) explain that the prohibition in 301:21 is due to the father’s intent: the clothing is given specifically so that the child will ring the bells in order to amuse or calm himself. In such a case, it is prohibited, as explained by the Ketzos HaShulchan (266:10; see the next halacha). However, this explanation is not entirely compelling. While it may be assumed that the child intends to play with the bells, it is not evident that the adult necessarily has such intent; perhaps the garment was given simply for the child to wear. Rather, it may be explained that since the garment’s primary purpose is to produce sound, giving it to the child—regardless of the adult’s subjective intent—is tantamount to instructing the child to perform a prohibited act. As such, it is treated as though the adult is actively “feeding” the child the prohibition. This differs from the case of the cake: although eating it necessarily entails erasing the letters, that is not the cake’s primary function. Its essential purpose is consumption, and therefore giving it to the child is not considered equivalent to directly causing him to perform a prohibited act.

[34] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 55; See previous footnotes

[35] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 62

[36] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11 based on Admur 266:10

Background and Other approaches: This ruling is based on Admur 266:10, and is likewise codified by the Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11). However, in light of the explanation above, it may be suggested that the prohibition in siman 266 is not dependent on the giver’s subjective intent. Rather, since it is evident to all that the wallet is being given for the purpose of carrying it—and thereby performing a prohibited act—this is considered akin to actively “feeding” the child a prohibition. In such a case, giving the item is halachically equivalent to instructing the child to perform the transgression, which is forbidden. In other words, whenever an item is given to a child and its sole understood purpose is for the performance of a prohibited act, it is treated as though the child has been explicitly told to commit that prohibition.

[37] With respect to the case of lettering on a cake discussed above, since the giver’s intent is not that the letters be erased but rather that the child eat the cake, it is therefore permitted to give it to the child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11]

[38] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 44:8-

[39] Az Nidbaru 6:57; Bris Olam Dinei Amirah Lenachri 22:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 and 7

[40] Yaavetz in Migdal Oz 3:5; Bach 334:12 “This child is prior to the age of Chinuch, such as a four or five year old”; Nitei Gavriel Yom Tov 1:5

[41] Admur ibid; M”A 343:3; Tosafus Erechin 2b; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; M”B 343:3 that so write all the Poskim; Kaf Hachaim 343:18; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnotes 93-94; See Admur Basra 2:6 and Kama 2:7 regarding a Kippa; 37:3 regarding tefillin; 70:2 regarding shema; 106:3 regarding Tefila; 124:10 regarding Amen; 128:49 regarding Nesias Kapayim; 186:3 and 187:4 regarding Birchas Hamazon; 199:9 regarding Zimun; 472:25 regarding four cups and story of exodus; 616:5 regarding Yom Kippur fast; 640:3 regarding Sukkah; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1 regarding Torah study

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that unless stated explicitly otherwise, the age at which one begins education (chinuch) for a mitzvah follows the same age as that of the Mitzvah of affliction on Yom Kippur, which is around nine or ten years old, depending on his sharpness. [Rashi Brachos 15a; Megillah 19b; Erechin 2b; Rashba Brachos 48a; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnotes 84-88] However, for matters whose understanding is easy and common, they said that one educates him even earlier, once he has attained awareness of that matter. [Meiri Chagiga 2b; Encyclopedia Talmudit ibid footnote 89] Other Poskim write that the general age is eleven [Rabbeinu Chananel Megillah 19b; Rosh Hashanah 33b for Tekias Shofar “10 or 11”] or twelve [Or Zarua 2:43]. However, all the above Poskim disagree and maintain that these age measures were stated only with regard to training for fasting, but for other mitzvot each child is assessed individually according to his development and according to the nature of the mitzvah.

[42] Admur ibid; M”A ibid; See Admur 271:1; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Elya Raba 343:3; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:17

What about other Shabbos commands? It would seem that the Admur specifically emphasizes Kiddush and Havdalah because he is referring to a child who has already grasped the basic concept of a sacred day called Shabbos. Once a child has reached that level of awareness, he is immediately capable—on an educational level—of understanding Kiddush and Havdalah, which express the sanctification of Shabbat and its distinction from the other days of the week. However, with regard to other Shabbos commandments, it is not necessarily the case that the child has yet reached the requisite level of understanding or readiness for education in those specific matters, as each mitzvah requires its own degree of comprehension and developmental maturity.

[43] See M”A 325:22; Biur Halacha 325:10 “Eino Yehudi Shemila”; P”M 325 A”A 22; Maor Hashabbos 18 footnote 14; Migdanos Eliyahu 2:145; Nishmas Shabbos 5:145; Piskeiy Teshuvos 318:11; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:5 footnote 73; 343:13; 318:10; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 43:1-12

 

[44] Admur 259:7 “There are those which are stringent to not break the plaster through a Jew if it is possible to have it done through a gentile. Similarly [when there is no gentile available] if it’s possible to do it through a child it should not be done through an adult. If this is not possible then the adult should do it in a slightly irregular way.”; Rama 259:7; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:21-22; Admur 305:27 “It is likewise permitted to tell a gentile to force-feed geese once a day, because of the concern for tza’ar ba’alei chaim (preventing animal suffering), as the animals are unable to eat otherwise. If no non-Jew is available, a Jew himself may do so, even though force-feeding animals in this manner is generally prohibited on Shabbos, as explained in Siman 324. Because of tza’ar ba’alei chaim, the Sages permitted it. Nevertheless, it is preferable to have a child do so.”

[45] See Rama 259:7; Admur 259:7; Beis Yosef 269; M”A 269:1; Makor Chaim of Chavos Yair 259; Ateres Tzevi 259:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; 8; 259:2; See Toras Hakatan [Rubinovitch] Chapter 2:29; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:21-22

[46] See Az Nidbaru 8:23

[47] See Admur 266:10 regarding having ones child carry ones wallet on Shabbos; Michaber 266:6; Piskeiy Rid Shabbos 153b; Piskeiy Riad 24:1; Shiltei Giborim 66a; Piskeiy Teshuvos 266:1; 343:3; See also Admur 244:13; 301:40; 311:1; 332:3; 334:2 and 25; Kuntrus Achron 266:2

[48] So is implied from the ruling of the Admur, who mentions an opinion of leniency to ask a child to perform a rabbinic melachah on behalf of an adult only in a case involving a mitzvah. He does not mention, even once, that such an allowance exists in a case of great loss or pressing need alone. This is likewise implied from the ruling of the Admur (266:10), who permits instructing a child to carry one’s wallet [and today we don’t have a Reshus Harabim Min Hatorah] specifically due to a state of panic, and not merely because of a significant financial loss. Now, although with regard to Amirah Lenachri we are lenient even in cases of great loss or great need to permit the performance of a rabbinic prohibition, it nevertheless appears that we are more stringent when it comes to a Jewish child. In that context, the leniency is limited exclusively to the sake of a mitzvah. The reason for this distinction is that only in the context of a mitzvah is a child’s involvement viewed as an isolated and exceptional act, such that there is no concern he will come to perform similar prohibitions upon reaching maturity. However, if a child is instructed to transgress even a rabbinic prohibition merely due to need or financial loss—even if the need is great—there is concern that this will train him to act similarly later in life. Therefore, greater stringency is required, limiting the leniency solely to cases involving a mitzvah. [See Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11–6] A further point to consider is that even in a case that it is done for the sake of a Mitzvah the matter is subject to dispute, as cited by Admur. The Alter Rebbe conclusion for leniency applies only in the context of a mitzvah, and no broader allowance is stated for cases of loss. Accordingly, there is no basis to assume that the more lenient opinion would extend this leniency to other circumstances, nor is there any justification to conclude that the final ruling of the Admur permits leniency in cases beyond those involving a mitzvah.

Other opinions: Some Poskim understand that according to those authorities who are lenient to permit, on occasion, instructing a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzvah, they are likewise lenient in cases of great need or substantial financial loss. According to this view, any situation in which it is permitted to ask a non‑Jew to perform a rabbinic prohibition would equally permit, on occasion, asking a Jewish child to do so. This would apply even to the child’s parents, and even if the child is above the age of Chinuch. Hence, they conclude that one may rely on this lenient approach whenever a gentile is not available. [Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 40 in name of Poskim, including Admur!] As stated above, however, this significant leniency is notably omitted from the ruling of the Admur. Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[49] However, some Poskim rule that regarding Shabbos it is better that the Melacha be done by a Katan who is not one’s son, if possible. [Biur Halacha 266:6; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 and 5]

[50] See Admur 334:25-26; Beis HaLevi 1:13; Shaareiy Deiah 2:66; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:180; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 37

[51] Nishmas Shabbos 7:498; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:51-55

[52] Nishmas Shabbos 7:473; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:38

[53] Admur 261:1; 352:1

[54] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 48; 343:8 footnote 107

[55] See Pnei Meivin 198; Beis Yitzchak 44; Chelkas Yoav 1; Maor Hashabbos 4:13; Nishmas Shabbos 6:272; 7:500; Chut Shani 4:95; Teshuvos Vehanahgos 1:230; 3:82; Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144; Avnei Yashpei O.C. 63; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnotes 64-66; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:45-46

[56] Pnei Meivin 198; Beis Yitzchak 44; Poskim ibid

[57] Chelkas Yoav 1; Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144; Maor Hashabbos 4:13; Chut Shani 4:95

[58] See Chelkas Yoev 1:1; Avnei Nezer O.C. 259; Imrei Bina 7; Achiezer 3:81; Pnei Mevin 198; Eretz Tzevi Teumim 16; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 2:53; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:40

[59] See Beis Yitzchak 44:8; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:41-44

[60] The reason: Although according to Rabbi Shimon such a melachah is not Biblically prohibited, it nevertheless remains rabbinically forbidden, and one may not have a child perform even a rabbinic prohibition. Likewise, the obligation of chinuch requires that a child who has reached the appropriate age be educated to refrain from performing a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah, just as he is trained to avoid other rabbinic prohibitions. Furthermore, since the child is becoming accustomed to the actual act of melachah, there is additional reason to be stringent, lest he later come to perform the same action in a manner that constitutes a full Biblical prohibition.

[61] See Admur 334:25-26; Beis HaLevi 1:13; Shaareiy Deiah 2:66; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:180; Beis Yitzchak 44:8; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 37; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:41-44; 46:19

Background: According to the Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 [i.e. Rashba and Ran] that the prohibition of sefiyah does not apply to rabbinic prohibitions on occasion in a time of need it can be understood that according to their opinion there would likewise be no prohibition in instructing a child to perform a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah on occasion and in a time of need. This is because according to Rabbi Shimon, such a melachah is not Biblically prohibited and is classified only as a rabbinic prohibition. Now, practically, Admur rules that one may rely on their opinion in a time of need.  However, other authorities question this leniency and maintain that one may not instruct a child to perform a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah. They argue that although it is only rabbinically prohibited, it is more severe than ordinary rabbinic prohibitions because the underlying act is inherently a Biblical melachah. Furthermore, according to those who explain that the prohibition of sefiyah is intended to prevent a child from becoming accustomed to transgressions, there is even greater reason for stringency. Since the child is becoming accustomed to the actual melachah, he may eventually perform the same action even in circumstances in which it constitutes a full Biblical prohibition, as the distinction between a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah and a regular melachah lies primarily in one’s intent and purpose. Thus, practically, there is no leniency applicable to such Melacha. [See Admur 334:25-26; Beis HaLevi 1:13; Shaareiy Deiah 2:66; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:180; Beis Yitzchak 44:8; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 37; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:41-44]

[62] See Chapter 1 Halacha 8C

[63] Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill—it is permitted to tell a gentile to feed him, for the needs of a minor are treated as those of a sick person who is not in danger. In such a case, the Sages permitted instructing a gentile even regarding biblical prohibitions, as explained in siman 328. Similarly, if the child requires wine to drink and no Jewish wine is available, but only ordinary wine of gentiles, and the wine is not strong enough to be rendered permissible through dilution of six parts water to one part wine (as explained in Yoreh De’ah siman 134), it is permitted to tell a gentile to give him to drink.”; Admur 328:22 “It is permitted to ask a gentile to cook a food for a child which does not have anything else to eat, as the typical needs of a child has the Halachic status of the needs of a sick person that is not in danger. It is permitted to feed a child Muktzah even with ones hands if it is impossible to do so in a different way.”; M”A 343:3; M”B 343:5; See also Admur 328:19; 22; 450:24-25 regarding Chametz; Tehila Ledavid 343:4; Kaf Hachaim 343:15-16; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:12

[64] The reason: Since the needs of a child are halachically equated with those of a non‑dangerously ill person, by which the Sages permitted instructing a non‑Jew to transgress on his behalf even by a biblical prohibition. [Admur ibid; 328:19; 22; 450:24-25; Tehila Ledavid 343:4] As for why Admur 343:5 limits this leniency here to a case where the child is slightly ill—despite the general principle that even the needs of a healthy child carry the status of one who is ill—this is because there is no necessity for a healthy child to consume specifically non‑kosher food, absent medical need. Accordingly, such a case would not arise with respect to a healthy child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 5]

[65] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:36

[66] See Nishmas Shabbos 7:501; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:54

[67] The poskim dispute the nature of this prohibition. Some understand it as a form of sefiyah—actively causing a child to perform a prohibited act. Others maintain that it is a rabbinic prohibition of amira lenachri, based on the principle that anything forbidden for a Jew to do himself may likewise not be done through instructing a non-Jew. In either case, the practical ruling is that one may not use a non-Jew as an intermediary to have a child perform a prohibited act on Shabbos.

[68] See Har Tzevi 75; Beir Moshe 6:22; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 2:205; Nishmas Shabbos 7:504; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:50

[69] Admur 306:29 in parentheses; see Admur 392:2; Michaber 330:7; M”A 329:2; Even Haezer 4:34 from which it is understood as a simple fact that one is Michaleil Shabbos for a Jewish child; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:19-28

[70] The reason: One may desecrate Shabbos to save a child in order so he fulfill many Shabbasos when he is older. [Admur ibid] However Tzaruch Iyun, as in 328:2 Admur rules that we desecrate Shabbos because of the verse of Vechaiy Bahem. See Biur Halacha 329:4 “Ela” that it is because of Vechaiy Bahem that one may save a child. [Although some sources explain this on the basis that the child will ultimately grow up to observe many future Shabbosos, the primary reason is the general principle of “Vechai Bahem”—that the Torah’s mitzvos were given so that one live by them, and therefore pikuach nefesh overrides Shabbos regardless of the age of the child.]

[71] Admur 306:29; Michaber 306:14; Tosafus Shabbos 4a; Eiruvin 32:b; Gittin 41b; Elya Raba 306:33; M”B 306:57; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:29-34

[72] See Admur 328:13; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:1-2

[73] Although a child is generally not obligated in the mitzvah of saving lives, there is nevertheless no prohibition of sefiyah in this case, since the act is permitted and required for the purpose of saving life. Accordingly, whenever a Shabbos violation is necessary to preserve life, a child may be instructed to perform it just as an adult may perform it himself.

^[74] First and Final opinion in Admur 328:13 |”Even [in a scenario that] we have in front of us gentiles and children under the age of Mitzvos we do not say that [since] one is able to [give the treatment] through these people and avoid desecrating Shabbos through a Jew who is above the age of  Mitzvos, because since the only option in saving him is through doing an action which is forbidden on Shabbos, therefore Shabbos is overruled on his behalf for [all] Jews which are obligated to save him and there is no transgression of Shabbos here at all. Furthermore, even if a Jew wishes to be strict upon himself [to not transgress Shabbos and thus wishes] to do the required labor through a gentile or child, or [he wishes to have them do it] because he does not desire to trouble himself [to do so], there is a Rabbinical prohibition in [him refraining from doing it himself] as perhaps the bystanders will now say that with utter difficulty was [transgressing Shabbos] permitted [to be done] for a life-threatening situation and [they will think that] initially it is not permitted to transgress Shabbos through a Jew that is above the age of Mitzvos, and this may then lead to that where a gentile or child cannot be found then they will not wish to desecrate Shabbos through an esteemed religious leader. Furthermore, the greatest form of fulfilling this Mitzvah is to try to have all the [necessary Shabbos desecrations] done through Jews which are great [Torah] scholars and not through the simple folk and women in order so that Shabbos not be considered frivolous in their eyes and thus have them come to be lenient even in situations that are not life threatening. As well [another reason that great scholars should do so is] in order to publicly rule through a practical case [that Shabbos is allowed to be desecrated in these situations]….. The main Halachic opinion is like the first opinion , although the custom in these countries is like the latter opinion. Nevertheless, it is best not to follow this custom  because there is worry that perhaps since people will now see that the treatments are only done through a gentile, they will come to think that it is always forbidden to do so through a Jew, and occasionally there will not be a gentile available and the ill person will be endangered as a result of their delay in waiting for the arrival of a gentile. At the very least one who wants [to follow the custom and] do so through a gentile is to make publicly known at that time that it is permitted for a Jew himself to do so [and it is only not being done through a Jew] because a gentile is readily available”; Michaber 328:12 in the name of the Rambam; Rambam Shabbos 2:3; Yuma 84b; Rif 4b; Rosh 8:14; Tosafus Yuma 4b; Taz 328:5; Mishneh Berurah 328:37; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:3-418

Other Opinions: Some authorities maintain that even in cases of pikuach nefesh, Shabbos is not completely set aside; rather, only those violations that are absolutely necessary are permitted. Accordingly, whenever the treatment can be provided without a Jew transgressing a Biblical prohibition—such as by having a non-Jew perform the act under proper supervision and without any delay—it should be done in that manner. According to this view, if a non-Jew is readily available and the treatment will not be delayed in any way, he should perform the necessary melachah rather than a Jew. [2^nd opinion in Admur ibid “[However] there are opinions which say that since [in life threatening cases the] Shabbos [prohibitions] are [merely] being overruled and the [holiness of Shabbos has not been] revoked at all, [therefore] whatever [treatment] is possible to be done without Biblically transgressing [Shabbos] is required to be done through not transgressing a Biblically forbidden action and therefore if one is able ………, as well as if one is able to do [the transgression] through a gentile without any delay at all, then one is Biblically required to do so through a gentile [as according to this opinion] it was only [Rabbinically] forbidden to do so [i.e. the treatment] through a gentile in a scenario that there is worry that he may do so lazily and thus come to delay and suspend [the treatment], however [they did not prohibit asking a gentile] if a Jew is actively supervising him and hastening him in a way that there is no worry at all [of possible delay].”; Rama 328:12, in the name of the Ramban and Oar Zarua; Riaz Yuma 3:9; Piskeiy Rid; Chayeh Adam 68:2] Now, although the principal halachic ruling is that a Jew should personally perform all life-saving treatment on Shabbos, some communities customarily rely on the opinion that prefers having a non-Jew perform the necessary melachah when this can be done without any delay. Nevertheless, the preferred practice is to follow the primary ruling and have a Jew perform the treatment. Even where the custom is to utilize a non-Jew, it should be publicly clarified that a Jew is fully permitted to perform the act and that the non-Jew is being used only because he is readily available and no delay will result. This is to prevent people from mistakenly thinking that a Jew may not desecrate Shabbos for pikuach nefesh, which could lead to dangerous delays in future emergencies. [Admur ibid]

[75] The reason: The Sages discouraged having a child perform the task lest people mistakenly conclude that Shabbos may only be desecrated through children or non-Jews, which could lead to dangerous delays in future emergencies. Accordingly, even though a child is not obligated in mitzvos, one should not appoint him to perform life-saving acts in place of an available adult Jew. Only when there would be any delay in treatment should whoever is able to help immediately do so, without hesitation. [Admur ibid]

[76] As it is a Biblical prohibition to ask a child to transgress Shabbos or do any sin. [265:10; 343:5] Hence asking a child to do a Biblical prohibition which is forbidden for an adult does not make it any more lenient, and hence is not allowed.

Background of above ruling:

In 343:5 Admur rules it is Biblically forbidden to feed a child any Issur, although it is unclear from there if other Issurim are as well Biblical. However, in 265:10 Admur states explicitly that asking a child is Biblically forbidden.

VeTzaruch Iyun based on this from 328:134 that implies that asking a child to transgress Shabbos in a case of danger is better than having an adult do it, hence implying there is no Biblical prohibition involved in asking him!!

1. Perhaps one can say that the Issur in asking a child is not in having him do the transgression but in asking him to do something which he is not allowed to do. However, in a case of danger since even a Jew may do so, asking the child is not forbidden at all, and hence there is no prohibition at all taking place, as the child is not commanded in Mitzvos and the adult was allowed to ask him. If however an adult transgresses, then although it is allowed and a Mitzvah, it is merely Dechuyah and is similar to an amputation which is done to save one’s life.

Hence the advantage of asking a child is that it goes from dechuyah or Hutrah

[77] Admur 343:5

[78] As otherwise it is better for one to do so with an irregularity which is permitted according to all by a Rabbinical prohibition in case of a bedridden person, and not enter oneself in a dispute regarding having a child do a Rabbinical prohibition for his own sake.

[79] Admur 343:6

[80] As the allowance in 343:6 is only for the sake of a Mitzvah. Vetzaruch Iyun if a bedridden person can be equated to the sake of a Mitzvah to be lenient.

[81] Admur 334:26 “A child, however, who comes to extinguish a fire must be stopped, even if he has not yet reached the age of chinuch and even if his father is not present. This is because a child does not possess the independent judgment necessary to act for his own benefit. Rather, since he knows that the fire is causing a loss to his father (or to another Jew), we assume that he is extinguishing it on the Jew’s behalf in order to please him. However, if a child desecrates Shabbos for his own personal benefit, there is no obligation to protest, except for his father, who must do so if the child has reached the age of chinuch, as explained in Siman 343.”; Michaber 334:25; Rambam Shabbos 12:7; Mishneh Shabbos 121a; Yevamos 114a; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 45:20-40

[82] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:1-19

^[83] Admur 328:22 “It is permitted to ask a gentile to cook a food for a child which does not have anything else to eat, as the typical needs of a child has the Halachic status of the needs of a sick person that is not in danger. It is permitted to feed a child Muktzah even with ones hands if it is impossible to do so in a different way.”; Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill—it is permitted to tell a gentile to feed him, for the needs of a minor are treated as those of a sick person who is not in danger. In such a case, the Sages permitted instructing a gentile even regarding biblical prohibitions, as explained in siman 328.” [See also Admur 328:19; 450:24-25 regarding Chametz]; Michaber 328:17; 276:4; Rama 276:1; Mordechai Shabbos 250; Maharil 115; Mahariy Viyal 46; Issur Viheter 59:29; M”A 343:3; M”B 343:5; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:1-5

^[84] Ketzos Hashulchan 134 footnote 18

[85] Leniencies Applicable to a Child Due to His Status as a Choleh She’ein Bo Sakanah: Since a young child is halachically considered a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, one may apply to his needs many of the leniencies granted to an ill person. Accordingly, one may ask a non-Jew to perform even Biblical melachos when necessary for the child’s wellbeing, permit the child to take medicine, provide him with muktzah items when needed, and perform even Biblical or rabbinic prohibitions through a Jew when done with a shinui (irregular manner), subject to the same conditions that apply to a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. Likewise, when medicine or treatment must be prepared, it should be done with a shinui whenever required. [Admur 328:19]

[86] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:2-3

[87] Tehila Ledavid 308:47; 309:1-2; 328:24 and 71

[88] Minchas Yitzchak 1:79; 4:124; 10:25; Tzitz Eliezer 8:15-12; Or Letziyon 2:36-4; Nishmas Shabbos 5:469; SSH”K 15:62

[89] So seems to be the opinion of Rama/Admur; This opinion seems to be supported by the Halacha above which states that “the general needs of a child are viewed as the needs of a sick person”; So is also proven from the ruling in 276 that one may ask a non-Jew to light a fire on behalf of young children, based on their status as a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. Likewise, the Pri Megadim M”Z end of 302 permits certain rabbinic prohibitions for the needs of a child, even when no issue of eating is involved. Similarly, the Vilna Gaon in 328:42 cites proof from the Gemara’s discussion of a child who longs for and needs his father’s presence. Since that case does not involve food at all, it demonstrates that the special status granted to a child applies to his needs generally and not merely to matters of eating. Although the Tehillah LeDavid questions this proof, the prevailing understanding of the Acharonim is that no distinction is made, and a young child is treated as a choleh she’ein bo sakanah with respect to all of his ordinary needs.

[90] See Tarshish Shoam 7; Nishmas Shabbos 5:361; M”B 255:1; Teshuras Shaiy Tinyana 73; Yeshuos Yaakov 328:2; Minchas Yitzchak 1:78; 4:124; Ateres Paz 1:3; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:4

^[91] See Shabbos Kehalacha Vol. 1 p. 214; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:6-7

[92] Ketzos Hashulchan 134 footnote 18; Aruch Hashulchan 328:20

^[93] Minchas Yitzchak 1:78; 10:25; SSH”K

[94] Or Letziyon 2:36-4

^[95] Koveitz Mibeis Levi 3:138; in name of Rav Wozner; Chazon Ish; Rav SZ”A in Nishmas Avraham 328:54; Shabbos 121a; Shagas Aryeh 10

[96] Tzitz Eliezer 8:15-12-9

[97] Admur 328:22 “It is permitted to ask a gentile to cook a food for a child which does not have anything else to eat, as the typical needs of a child has the Halachic status of the needs of a sick person that is not in danger. It is permitted to feed a child Muktzah even with ones hands if it is impossible to do so in a different way.”; Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill—it is permitted to tell a gentile to feed him, for the needs of a minor are treated as those of a sick person who is not in danger. In such a case, the Sages permitted instructing a gentile even regarding biblical prohibitions, as explained in siman 328.” [See also Admur 328:19; 450:24-25 regarding Chametz]; Michaber 328:17; 276:4; Rama 276:1; Mordechai Shabbos 250; Maharil 115; Mahariy Viyal 46; Issur Viheter 59:29; M”A 343:3; M”B 343:5; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:1; 8-12

[98] The reason: Since the needs of a child are halachically equated with those of a non‑dangerously ill person, by which the Sages permitted instructing a non‑Jew to transgress on his behalf even by a biblical prohibition. [Admur ibid; 328:19; 22; 450:24-25; Tehila Ledavid 343:4] As for why Admur 343:5 limits this leniency here to a case where the child is slightly ill—despite the general principle that even the needs of a healthy child carry the status of one who is ill—this is because there is no necessity for a healthy child to consume specifically non‑kosher food, absent medical need. Accordingly, such a case would not arise with respect to a healthy child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 5]

[99] Minchas Yitzchak 1:79; 4:124; 10:25; Tzitz Eliezer 8:15-12; Or Letziyon 2:36-4; Nishmas Shabbos 5:469; SSH”K 15:62

[100] Admur 328:22; Rama 328:17

[101] Admur 276:15 “All of the restrictions regarding warming oneself near a fire or heating source apply only in countries with milder climates. However, in very cold regions, it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to make a fire or heat the home for Jews on a particularly cold day, since everyone is considered like a sick person in the face of severe cold. Nevertheless, on a day when the cold is not especially intense, if there are no young children who are suffering significantly from the cold, it is forbidden to ask a non-Jew to make a fire or heat the house. If the non-Jew kindles a fire on his own using wood belonging to a Jew, one must protest. If he did not protest, it is forbidden to warm oneself by that fire.”; Michaber 276:5

[102] See Rama 276:1; Mateh Yosef 276:4; M”B 276:6 in name of Mateh Yehuda and Gra; Kaf Hachaim 276:14; Ketzos Hashulchan 134 footnote 18; SSH”K 38:26

[103] SSH”K 38:25

[104] SSH”K 38:26

[105] SSH”K 38:28

[106] Biur Halacha 302:10

[107] Nishmas Shabbos 5:477

[108] See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:16-20

^[109] Ketzos Hashulchan 134 Halacha 4 regarding Biblical Melacha

[110] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:20; See Rashba Shabbos 129a; Ran Shabbos 61a

[111] Admur 328:19; Ramban Toras Hadam Shaar Hamichush; Igleiy Tal Tochen 18; Tehila Ledavid 22; Ketzos Hashulchan 134 footnote 6; Or Letziyon 2:36-4

[112] M”B 328:57; 106

[113] Chazon Ish 59:4 brought in Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:16

[114] See Admur 334:25-26; Michaber 334:27; Beis HaLevi 1:13; Shaareiy Deiah 2:66; Hisorerus Teshuvah 1:180; Beis Yitzchak 44:8; Tehila Ledavid 278:1; 302:15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 37; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 44:41-44; 46:19

Other opinions who are lenient: See P”M 302 M”Z 6; Biur Halacha 302:10 “Delo”

[115] See Tehila Ledavid 302:15; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:21

[116] Vayivarech David 1:44; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:13

[117] The reason: Since a young child has the halachic status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, and uvdin dechol was permitted for the needs of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah [see Michaber 306:7], it follows that such activities may likewise be performed when genuinely necessary for the wellbeing and care of the child.

[118] Admur 328:22; M”A 328:15; Issur Viheter 59; Chayeh Adam 69:16; M”B 328:58 [requires Shinuiy]; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 47:2-4

^[119] Such as fruits that fell off the tree on Shabbos and the like

^[120] Ketzos Hashulchan 134 footnote 18

[121] SSH”K 15:18 writes that all Muktzah items may be moved for a child’s need if no other is available.

^[122] See Admur 328:41; Michaber 328:34-35; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10-12; Shabbos Kehalacha Vol. 3 Chapter 20

Muktzah of Nolad: See Admur 305:31 regarding milk of an animal that it is forbidden on Shabbos due to Nolad/Muktzah Vetzaruch Iyun why no mention of this is recorded here!

[123] Shabbos Kehalacha 19:1; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10

Why is there no prohibition of Mifarek involved in breast feeding a child on Shabbos and may one breast feed even if the child can eat other foods? The allowance is based on the fact that it is considered Derech Achila, and hence one may breastfeed even if other foods are available, and even if the child is full. [See Shulchan Shlomo 328:56 in name of Rav SZ”A; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10]

[124] Admur ibid; Michaber 328:34; Shibulei Haleket 123; Tosefta 10:14

[125] Admur ibid; Beis Yosef 330 in name of Morechai Remez 371; Olas Shabbos 328:38; Avnei Nezer 47; Divrei Malkiel 5:238; Tehila Ledavid 328:59 based on Tosafus Shabbos 135a; Shaar Hatziyon 328:81; Kaf Hachaim 328:203; Shevet Halevi 6:30; 7:99; 8:81; Yabia Omer 2:32; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 330 footnote 82

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that doing so is only Rabbinically forbidden, being that it is not the normal way of nursing to squeeze out the milk using one’s hands, and hence it is considered a Shinuiy. [Tosefes Shabbos 328:59] However, see Shevet Halevi ibid that in today’s times it is very common to pump breast milk, even the Tosefes Shabbos would agree that it’s biblically forbidden.

[126] The reason: The reason for this is because one who milks into a vessel is completely detaching [the milk from its source] and is liable for the threshing prohibition. It was only permitted to do a Biblical prohibition in a case of life-threatening danger [and not simply to feed a child]. [Admur ibid; Beis Yosef 330; Mordechai Remez 371]

[127] Admur ibid; Michaber 328:35; Shibulei Haleket 123

[128] Implication of Admur ibid who in his reasoning writes that the milk is going to waste; P”M 328 A”A 41; Ketzos Hashulchan 138 footnote 30

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that it is better to squeeze the milk into the baby’s mouth then to squeeze it onto the floor, as squeezing it onto the floor is not allowed according to some opinions. [Kaf Hachaim 328:206]; See coming footnotes!

[129] The reason: The reason for this is because this milk [that is squeezed] is going to waste and therefore it does not contain a Biblical “detaching” prohibition, but rather a Rabbinical prohibition as explained above, and for the need of a child [the Sages] did not apply their decree. [Admur ibid; Olas Shabbos 328:35; Kaf Hachaim 328:205; See Admur 320:21; 330:9; Or Zarua 2:58]

[130] Ketzos Hashulchan 138 footnote 30; P”M 328 A”A 41, as understood by Shaar Hatziyon 328:81; Tehila Ledavid 328:59;  See Tosefes Shabbos 328:59 who questions the allowance of Shibulei Haleket; See Shaar Hatziyon 328:81 who also questions the allowance of Shibulei Haleket and leaves this matter with a Tzaruch Iyun; See Kaf Hachaim 328:206 that so is implied from Admur ibid and Olas Shabbos ibid, however, he understands their ruling to simply permitting even squeezing onto the ground and not excluding squirting into the mouth; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that she may even squirt the milk directly into the baby’s mouth. [Chayeh Adam 69:10; Shibulei Haleket 123; Mishneh Berurah 328:112 (However, see Shaar HaTziyon ibid in which he questions as to why this is allowed.); See Kaf Hachaim 328:206 that in his understanding this applies according to all opinions, even Admur ibid, and the dispute is on the contrary if it may be squirted onto the ground; Thus, he concludes that it is better to squirt it into the mouth and not onto the floor unless it is a time of need; See Or Sameiach on Rambam Shabbos 8:10; Migdanos Eliyahu 3:53; Chayeh Halevi 5:35; Megilas Sefer 7:5 in name of Rav SZ”A; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10 footnote 80]

[131] Admur 330:9; Michaber 330:8; Shabbos 135a; Rosh Shabbos 19:5; Tosafus Shabbos ibid

[132] The reason: The reason for this allowance is as since this milk is going to waste it does not contain the [Biblical] detaching prohibition but rather [only] the Rabbinical prohibition, and due to her pain, they did not decree [against removing it]. [Admur ibid; Rosh ibid; Tosafus ibid; Olas Shabbos 330:8; 1^st reason in M”B 330:32; Kaf Hachaim 330:49] Alternatively, the reason is because it is considered a Melacha Sheiyno Tzericha Legufa. [2^nd reason in M”B 330:32; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 331 footnote 91]

[133] Admur ibid; Rosh ibid; Tosafus ibid; Beis Yosef 330 in name of Mordechai; Olas Shabbos 328:38; Kaf Hachaim 328:203

[134] Piskeiy Teshvuvos 330 footnote 80

[135] The reason: As the milk is going directly into his mouth, and is the form of eating, and receives the same allowance for all nursing.

[136] See Or Sameiach on Rambam Shabbos 8:10; Migdanos Eliyahu 3:53; Chayeh Halevi 5:35; Megilas Sefer 7:5 in name of Rav SZ”A; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10 footnote 80

[137] Chayeh Adam 69:10; Shibulei Haleket 123; Mishneh Berurah 328:112 (However, see Shaar HaTziyon ibid in which he questions as to why this is allowed.); See Kaf Hachaim 328:206 that in his understanding this applies according to all opinions, even Admur ibid

[138] See Kaf Hachaim 328:206 that in his understanding this applies according to all opinions, even Admur ibid, and the dispute is on the contrary if it may be squirted onto the ground; Thus, he concludes that it is better to squirt it into the mouth and not onto the floor unless it is a time of need

[139] Ketzos Hashulchan 138 footnote 30; P”M 328 A”A 41, as understood by Shaar Hatziyon 328:81; Tehila Ledavid 328:59;  See Tosefes Shabbos 328:59 who questions the allowance of Shibulei Haleket; See Shaar Hatziyon 328:81 who also questions the allowance of Shibulei Haleket and leaves this matter with a Tzaruch Iyun; See Kaf Hachaim 328:206 that so is implied from Admur ibid and Olas Shabbos ibid, however, he understands their ruling to simply permitting even squeezing onto the ground and not excluding squirting into the mouth; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10

[140] Implication of Admur ibid who in his reasoning writes that the milk is going to waste; Ketzos Hashulchan 138 footnote 30

[141] Implication of Admur ibid; Shaar Hatziyon 330:81; However, see Tehila Ledavid 330:59 and see Piskeiy Teshuvos 330 footnote 81 and 328:59 that perhaps having the child look at the milk is also considered a use

[142] Tehila Ledavid 330:59; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:10

[143] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:8 [12 in new edition]

The issue of Muktzah: Vetzaruch Iyun as to why none of the Poskim who deal with this question touch upon the idea that squeezing into a vessel transgresses the laws of Muktzah due to it being Mivatel Keli Meiheichano.

[144] So is proven from all the following Poskim that the allowance to pump milk for the sake of relieving breast praying is only when the milk will be going to waste: Admur 330:9; 328:41; Michaber 328:34; 330:8; Shabbos 135a; Rosh Shabbos 19:5; Tosafus Shabbos ibid; Beis Yosef 330 in name of Mordechai; Olas Shabbos 328:38; Kaf Hachaim 328:203; 330:50

[145] Bris Olam

Opinion of Admur: See Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:12 footnote 91 that according to the M”B who records Melacha Sheiyno Tzericha Legufa as a second reason for the allowance it is permitted to squeeze into a bottle and then throw out. This implies that according to Admur ibid who omits this reason only writes the reason of it going to waste, that it would be forbidden.

[146] The reason: As the entire allowance is due to it going to waste, and whenever it does not go directly to waste it can be under the biblical prohibition of Mifareik. []

[147] Avnei Nezer 47; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:12 and footnote 91 that so is the ruling according to the M”B who records a second reason for the allowance being that it is a Melacha Sheiyno Tzericha Legufa; See Kaneh Bosem 1:21

[148] Ketzos Hashulchan 138 footnote 30

[149] A Grogeres is 19.2 milliliters [Shiurei Torah 3:17], thus one is to squeeze less than this amount at a time.

[150] The reason: As one is only liable for the Detaching prohibition if he pumps the minimum measurement of a Grogeres.

[151] Mishneh Yosef 9:34 based on Rashi Shabbos 135a who writes of having too much milk can lead to illness, hence implying that currently there is no illness; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:12 footnote 92

[152] See Zivcheiy Tzedek Y.D. 116:90; Kaf Hachaim 116:148

[153] Tiferes Yisrael Kalkeles Hashabbos Dash 5; Kaf Hachaim 328:210; Ketzos Hashulchan 130 footnote 30; Shevisas Hashabbos Dash 35; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:12 footnote 92

[154] Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:11 footnote 82

[155] The reason: As the allowance to squeeze milk even when it goes to waste is only allowed when done for the sake of the child, such as to stimulate it, or for the sake of relieving physical pain, and not simply for the sake of not getting wet in which case it would be a rabbinical prohibition to squeeze out the milk even if it goes to waste.

[156] Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:12 footnote 93

[157] SSH”K 36:21

[158] Maor Hashabbos 14:105

[159] See Har Tzevi 201; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:11; Shabbos Kehalacha 19:8

[160] Divrei Shalom 1;28; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 82; However, see Shabbos Kehalacha 19:13-14 and Biurim 7 regarding using an electric pump that set up before Shabbos, and that in a time of great need she may do so, if she places it on her breast before it turns on.

[161] Although doing so involves a biblical transgression, one may transgress biblically for the sake of Pikuach Nefesh. [Admur 328:41]

[162] See Or Letziyon 2:36-8; Nishmas Shabbos 328:460; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:11 footnote 83 that in today’s times that the formulas have tremendously advanced in their quality, one should not follow leniency of the Poskim in next footnote, and should always try formula first, after consulting with a doctor.

[163] Maor Hashabbos 14:61 in name of Rav SZ”A and Rav Elyashiv; Yabia Omer 9:32; Shabbos Kehalacha 19:9

[164] Har Tzevi 201, brought in SSH”K 36:22

[165] A Grogeres is 19.2 milliliters [Shiurei Torah 3:17], thus one is to squeeze less than this amount at a time; See regarding the shiur Chatas for pumping breast milk: Birkeiy Yosef 328:13 in name of Radbaz; Erech Hashulchan 328:13; Kaf Hachaim 328:204

[166] The reason: In order to avoid pumping the amount that would make one liable for a Chatas. [Har Tzevi]

[167] Shabbos Kehalacha 19 Biurim 5; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:11 footnote 84

[168] As all the milk in the stomach of the child joins for the Shiur [Avnei Nezer 232; Ketzos Hashulchan 138 footnote 30], and hence pumping in intervals does not make this matter more lenient. [Shabbos Kehalacha ibid]

[169] In order to diminish the amount of times that she pumps. [Shabbos Kehalacha ibid]

[170] Some Poskim rule, that if a gentile is available, then it is better to use an electric pump through asking the gentile to plug it in, then to use a hand pump. [Shraga Hameir 3:7; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 85]

[171] Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid and footnote 86

[172] Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 85; Shabbos Kehalacha 19:13-14 and footnote 23 and Biurim 7

The reason: As by an electric pump it does all the pumping, and hence she is only considered to have done one action of Melacha, while by a manual pump, every time she squeezes it, another Melacha is done.

[173] SSH”K  27:50 based on Chazon Ish 38:4; Shabbos Kehalacha ibid; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 87; However, see Maor Hashabbos 14 footnote 105 that this is not Gerama at all; See also there and Toras Hayoledes 41:7 if placing one’s finger on the hole which causes it to turn on is considered Gerama or not

[174] Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:11

[175] See Admur 320:16; 318:25-27; Shabbos Kehalacha Vol. 1 p. 212

[176] See Admur 318:29; Michaber 318:17; Shabbos Kehalacha Vol. 1 p. 210

[177] See regarding the cooking prohibition, that it does not apply by milk in a Keli Sheiyni: Admur 318:12; Minchas Yitzchak 5:127 [unlike SSH”K 1 footnote 151 based on M”B 318:39]; See Poskim in next footnote regarding that the insulation prohibition does not apply in such a case if not fully submerged

[178] See Admur 318:23; Mahadura Basra for chapter 259 p. 878 in new Shulchan Aruch; M”B 258:2; Chazon Ish 37:17; Sheivet Halevy 5:31; Shabbos Kehalacha Vol. 2 page 65; Piskeiy Teshuvos 258:2

 

[179] See regarding that milk that flowed on Shabbos is Muktzah: Admur 305:31; 308:9; Kuntrus Achron 305:2; Michaber 305:20; M”A 305:12; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 5; Tehila Ledavid 328:56; Chazon Ish 44:4-5; M”B 328:58 regarding moving Muktzah milk for baby with Shinuiy; Tzitz Eliezer 8:15-12; Peir Hador 3:182; Megilas Sefer 66; Maor Hashabbos Shevet Halevi 8:80; Shabbos Kehalacha 19:15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 330:11 and 12 footnote 88; See regarding status of Muktzah of complete Nolad: Admur 310:19; 507:3; M”A 310; M”B 310:32;

Other opinions: Other Poskim differentiate between milk of a mother and cows milk and argue that perhaps mothers milk is not Muktzah as they disregard the reason of Nolad altogether, and claim that since it is meant for breastfeeding, there is no decree of Mashkin Shezavu. However, according to Admur who invalidates cows milk due to Nolad, the same would apply to women’s milk. []

[180] The reason: There is nothing intrinsically wrong with wearing a milk collector cup on Shabbos so long as one does not actively squeeze out any milk into it, and it is no different than wearing a nursing pad. Although it is a Biblical prohibition of Dash/Mifareik to squeeze milk on Shabbos, whether from a milking cow or a nursing mother, nonetheless, this prohibition only applies against actively squeezing the milk, however, to have the milk simply drip out on its own is not under any prohibition, and is not something that one can control.

[181] The reason: According to many Poskim, the milk itself is considered Muktzah due to being a complete Nolad and perhaps also due to the decree of Mashkin Shezavu, and so rules the Alter Rebbe in his Shulchan Aruch.

Other opinions: Other Poskim differentiate between milk of a mother and cows milk and argue that perhaps mothers milk is not Muktzah as they disregard the reason of Nolad altogether, and claim that since it is meant for breastfeeding, there is no decree of Mashkin Shezavu. However, according to Admur who invalidates cows milk due to Nolad, the same would apply to women’s milk. []

[182] Background: Being that the milk is Muktzah, therefore it would seem that it would not be permitted to use a milk collector cup on Shabbos being that the milk is forbidden to be handled due to Muktzah. However, in truth we can permit moving the nursing cup that holds the milk in order to then spill it out into the sink under the basis of Tiltul Min Hatzad, which permits moving a non-Muktzah object that contains a Muktzah object in it for the sake of the non-Muktzah object, and so too here one desires to get rid of the milk from the cup for the sake of emptying it. Likewise, perhaps it can be permitted under the status of Geraf Shel Reiy, being no different than throwing out a soiled nursing or sanitary pad. However, if one desires to keep the milk for feeding after Shabbos, then it is a problem due to Muktzah to move the breast cup for the sake of spilling and saving the milk, as Tiltul Min Hatzad is prohibited when done for the sake of the Muktzah item. Nonetheless, as by all Muktzah, it would be permitted to do all this using an irregularity, such as the back of one’s hands, if one can manage to do so. Now, regarding circumventing the Muktzah prohibition by placing water in the cup, so is explicitly ruled in the Poskim regarding Muktzah wine that flowed on Shabbos, and works under the basis of Kama Kama Batul. However, if in the end there will be more milk than water in the mixture then although it is still not Muktzah, it is questionable whether a child may drink as perhaps the milk is forbidden to be consumed due to the decree of Mashkin Shezavu. Vetzaruch Iyun!

[183] See regarding Tiltul Min Hatzad: Admur 308:61-62; 309:4-6; 310:17; 311:14; Michaber 308:27; 309:3-4; 310:8; 311:8; See regarding Geraf Shel Reiy: Admur 308:72-76; 335:4; Michaber 308:34-37; Gemara Beitza 36b; Shabbos 121b;

[184] See regarding Kama Kama Batul: Admur 335:4; M”A 335:4; Darkei Moshe 335:1; M”B 335:15; Yoreh Deah 134:1 and 3; Shach Y.D. 134:4; Avnei Nezer Y.D. 225; Shabbos Kehalacha 19:15 and 16 Biurim 8 p. 20

[185] See regarding the decree of Mashkin Shezavu: Regarding fruits: Admur 320:3; Michaber 320:1; Shabbos 143b; Regarding milk: Admur 305:33; Kuntrus Achron 301:2

[186] Beir Moshe 6:27; SSH”K 16 footnote 11 in name of RSZ”A.

As there are opinions which allow even an adult to do so.

[187] Reason: Since there are authorities who permit ordinary noisemaking devices even for adults, there is greater room for leniency in a pressing situation involving the needs of an infant. However, musical toys remain forbidden according to the letter of the law.

[188] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:22-23

[189] Admur 328:15; M”A 328:8; Rambam Shabbos 2:17; Yuma 84b; Mur Uketzia 328; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:22

[190] SSH”K 41:28; Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:11; Nishmas Shabbos 5:285; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:22

[191] See Nitei Gavriel 58:16-17; Toras Hayoledes 2:46; 12; Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:30; 330:1 footnote 13; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:22

[192] Admur 328:19 “However if one needs to eat foods which are recognizable that they are administered for healing, then although doing so is a Rabbinical prohibition due to [a decree] that one may come to grind up herbs as will be explained [in Halacha 43], nevertheless since (this is something which is impossible to do through a gentile and he is) sick throughout his entire body, [therefore] [the Sages] permitted for him to do so. [However] there are opinions which prohibit [the ill person from taking medicine]. Regarding the final ruling, in a [dispute over a] Rabbinical prohibition one may follow the lenient opinion.”; Rama 328:37; M”B 328:21

[193] If the child is young enough to be considered even when healthy like a bedridden person, then definitely it is allowed. However perhaps one can argue that even if the child is above this age he may be given medicine under any scenario so long as he is under the age of Mitzvos. A possible basis for this leniency is the ruling of Admur in Hilchos Sefiyah (Siman 343), where he permits relying on the lenient opinion that allows providing a child with a rabbinic prohibition when necessary for the child’s wellbeing. Accordingly, since taking medicine is itself only rabbinically prohibited, there is room to be lenient.

Furthermore, it may be argued that even the stringent opinion would agree in this case. The stringent opinion primarily discusses foods or substances that are themselves rabbinically prohibited. Here, however, the medicine is intrinsically permitted; it is only subject to an external rabbinic restriction due to the decree of shechikas samamanim. Similar to the allowance to feed a child before Kiddush, where the food is inherently permitted and only prohibited due to a side restriction, one can argue that medicine may likewise be given to a sick child even if he does not have the status of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah.

[194] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:30 in name of Az Nidbaru; Nishmas Shabbos 5:472; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46 footnote 34

[195] See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46 footnote 33

[196] Beir Moshe 1:36, brought in Piskeiy Teshuvos 327:1

[197] Minchas Yitzchak 7:20; Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:18 Vetzaruch Iyun from Piskeiy Teshuvos 327:1 which contradicts this ruling here and rules that it is always forbidden.

[198] As in such a case there is no smoothening prohibition, as is proven from the fact that no smoothening prohibition was mentioned regarding soap. [Daas Torah brought in Minchas Yitzchak ibid].

[199] See Ketzos Hashulchan 146:32.

[200] Piskeiy Teshuvos 328:20 in name of Chazon Ish, SSH”K 33:14; Beir Moshe 1:36-4

[201] Admur 328:47; Michaber 328:42; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 46:14-15; See Tehila Ledavid 328:71

^[202] Ketzos Hashulchan 128 footnote 20; Minchas Yitzchak 4:124

[203] Admur 328:51

[204] See Admur 275:7 “Schoolchildren (tinokos shel beis rabban) are permitted to read by candlelight even when their teacher is not present, because the fear and respect of their teacher rests upon them. They do not reach out to do anything, even during the week, without their teacher’s permission. Therefore, there is no concern that they will come to adjust the flame.”; Michaber 275:6; Rambam Shabbos 5:15; Shabbos 13b; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 43:23-27

[205] Aruch Hashulchan 275:10; See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 43:27

[206] Orchos Rabbeinu 1:116

[207] Admur 301:1-2 [printed in the new Edition of the Shulchan Aruch, based on manuscript of Maharil, first published in Yagdil Torah N.Y. 10]; Michaber 301:1-3; Shabbos 113; Ketzos Hashulchan 117:2-3

[208] Yeshaya 58:13

[209] Shabbos 113a; Tur 301; Levush 301

[210] Some Poskim explain the reason behind these regulations is because they all involve physically stressful, or non-relaxant activities, and the Torah instructed us to rest on Shabbos. [Aruch Hashulchan 301:44]

[211] Michaber 301:2; Admur Kuntrus Achron 301:1-2; Tur 301 in name of Sefer Hamitzvos; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 43:28-29

[212] M”A 301:3

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule one may not initially run and skip on Shabbos even as child play, and hence if a chiold asks he is to be told not to do so. [Bach 301, brought in M”A ibid]

[213] Elya Raba 301:5; Aguddah; Kaf Hachaim 301:9

[214] Admur 301:21 “Children may go out on Shabbos wearing gold bells that are woven into or sewn onto their garments for decorative purposes. However, if the bells are not woven or sewn into the clothing but are merely attached by a knot or the like, it is forbidden for them to go out wearing them, even if they are young children. This is because it is not customary for ordinary children to wear such bells; rather, they are typically worn only by princes and the children of wealthy and distinguished families. For other children, wearing them is considered pretentious, and the children of noblemen and wealthy people may mock them for displaying an honor that is not fitting for them. There is therefore concern that the father, upon hearing that his child is being ridiculed, may remove the bells from him. Since they are not sewn or woven into the garment, he may then forget and carry them in the public domain. Even when the bells are woven into the garment, the child may wear them only if they do not contain a clapper. If they contain a clapper designed to produce sound, they may not be worn on Shabbos, even indoors, because it is forbidden to cause a bell that is made for producing sound to ring on Shabbos. Although in this case it is the child who is making the sound, and we are not generally commanded to separate a child from every Shabbos prohibition, nevertheless it is forbidden to dress him in such a garment, since doing so is akin to actively causing him to transgress (ma’achilo issur beyadayim). When the bell has no clapper, it is permitted even for an adult to wear a garment that has such a bell sewn or woven into it. Furthermore, if the wearer is from a noble or wealthy family for whom such ornaments are customary, he may wear it even if it hangs from his neck, and we do not suspect that it may break off and be carried. This is because gold and silver ornaments are generally attached securely. Bells made of ordinary metals, however, may only be worn if they are sewn or woven into the garment, since otherwise there remains concern that they may fall off and be carried.”; M”A 301:32; Elya Raba 301:40; Tosafus Shabbos 67a in name of Yerushalmi; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 43:30-34

Children of Wealthy or Noble Families: Based on the above, it follows that children of noble or wealthy families may wear such decorative bells even when they are not sewn or woven into their garments. Since this form of adornment is common and appropriate for them, there is no concern that others will mock them and cause their father to remove the ornament. Likewise, there is no concern that the child himself will carry the ornament if it falls off, as we are not obligated to prevent a child from carrying in such a circumstance.

Nor is there concern that the father will carry the ornament if it falls off, as it is uncommon for the father to be standing immediately next to the child at the precise moment that the ornament breaks or falls. However, some authorities dispute this entire distinction and maintain that even children of wealthy or noble families may not go out with a bell or ornament that is not sewn or woven into their clothing. According to this opinion, the Sages did not differentiate between one child and another (lo plug), and therefore the prohibition applies universally. [Implication of Admur ibid; P”M 301 A”A 33; Rosh Yosef Shabbos 67a]

[215] The reason: The reason is that such ornaments are ordinarily worn only by princes, nobility, or the children of very wealthy individuals. For ordinary children, wearing them is considered pretentious, and there is concern that others may mock them. If the father hears that people are ridiculing his child, he may remove the ornaments from the child while outdoors, and there is then concern that he may inadvertently carry them in a public domain. [Admur ibid]

[216] Admur 301:21 “If they contain a clapper designed to produce sound, they may not be worn on Shabbos, even indoors, because it is forbidden to cause a bell that is made for producing sound to ring on Shabbos. Although in this case it is the child who is making the sound, and we are not generally commanded to separate a child from every Shabbos prohibition, nevertheless it is forbidden to dress him in such a garment, since doing so is akin to actively causing him to transgress (ma’achilo issur beyadayim).”; M”A 301:32; Biur Halacha 301 “Bedavka”; Minchas Shlomo 2:35-5; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 43:34

[217] The reason: Although the child is the one causing the bells to ring as he walks, it is nevertheless forbidden for an adult to dress him in such a garment. Doing so is considered akin to actively causing the child to perform a prohibited act (sefiyah), as the adult is directly placing upon him an item whose intended function is to create noise on Shabbos. Accordingly, any clothing or ornament containing noise-making bells or similar devices may not be placed on a child on Shabbos. [Admur ibid] Now although it was explained above [Halacha 1F based on Admur 343:10] that one may give a child an item with which he will transgress Shabbos with if one does not intend that the child transgress Shabbos, perhaps one can say that in this case one does intend that the child make noise with his bells so one can tell where he is at all times, and therefore it is forbidden. Vetzaruch Iyun.

[218] So is implied from Admur 301:21 which mentions that doing so is “Feeding the prohibition with one’s hands” which is forbidden to be done even to children below the age of Chinuch. So is also implied from Tehila Ledavid 343:2 and so certainly learns Chickrei Halachos 4 p. 54. With regards to the seeming contradiction between this ruling and the ruling in 343:10, see Chikrei Halachos ibid; Haros Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79.

[219] As then certainly it is like one is feeding the child the Issur.

[220] Admur 338:1

[221] As is understood from 338:1

[222] Admur 339:2

[223] Michaber 301:20; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 43:35

[224] M”A 316:26 in name of Aguda Shabbos 120; M”B 316:57 in name of Chayeh Adam 30:4; Kaf Hachaim 316:123; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 43:37

[225] Admur 324:7; Michaber 324:11; Rambam Shabbos 21:36; Mishneh Shabbos 155b; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 43:38

[226] The reason: As they eat food from the field and are not dependant on the owner for food. [Admur ibid]

[227] The reason: As the Sages only permitted troubling oneself on Shabbos for animals if the animals are dependent on oneself for their food. [Admur ibid]

[228] See Sefer Hasichos 5749 1:222 that he did not see the Rebbe Rayatz follow the custom of feeding on Shabbos Shira due to the above ruling of Admur ibid which prohibits it, and See Heichal Menachem 2:12 that the Rebbe answered an individual not to publicize this custom of the Maharal, being that it has already become forgotten; See Shulchan Menachem 3:341; Hiskashrus 704 p. 19; See, however, Hisvadyus 5747 2:448 and p. 454 in which the Rebbe complained that it is not publicized enough

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that children may do so being that it is not a complete Shvus. [Ashel Avrahahm Butchatch 167:6 “The same applies regarding Shabbos Kodesh. Since one may not feed animals whose sustenance is not one’s responsibility, I am accustomed to throw food to cats through children, as in this manner there is no objection according to all opinions. The same is proper regarding Shabbos Shirah. This is not considered a full-fledged rabbinic prohibition (shevus), and therefore there is no objection according to all opinions. Furthermore, Chazal permitted even a shevus in cases of tza’ar ba’alei chaim (animal suffering), as we find regarding milking. Certainly, the same should apply here, where there is animal suffering, as the animal smells the food and is not given it. This is somewhat analogous to muzzling an animal while threshing, which is prohibited due to tza’ar ba’alei chaim. In addition, feeding animals whose sustenance is not one’s responsibility is itself not considered a full-fledged shevus. There is also a certain aspect in which the sustenance of the cat becomes one’s responsibility once it smells the food, since there is tza’ar ba’alei chaim, and therefore a degree of responsibility rests upon him.”]

[229] Admur 324:8; M”A 324:7; Siddur Yavetz “Minhag Shtus and forbidden”; Beir Heiytiv 324:8; Kitzur SHU”A 87:18; M”B 324:31; Ashel Avrahahm Butchatch 167:6; Ketzos Hashulchan 131:1; See Kaf Hachaim 324:47; Piskeiy Teshuvos 324:5; See Menorah Hatehora 324:19 that this custom of feeding birds on Shabbos Shira has already become nullified

Other opinions: Some justify the custom based on the claim that since their intent is for a Mitzvah, in order to repay the birds which sang Shirah by Kerias Yam Suf, therefore they may do so. [Tosefes Shabbos 324:17, brought in Daas Torah 324, Orchos Chaim, Kerem Shlomo, Kaf Hachaim 324:47, Ketzos Hashulchan ibid; Minchas Shabbos 87:15, brought in Ketzos Hashulchan 131 footnote 5; Menorah Hatehora 324:19 that it is simply thrown on the roofs, and hence is not considered feeding; Makor Chaim of Chavos Yair 324; Aruch Hashulchan 324:3; Nimukei Orach Chaim 324 states it is an accepted custom from the Holy Tzadik Reb M”M of Rimnav, to give the birds crumbs on Shabbos Shira in reward for them having eaten the leftover Man which Dasan and Aviram cunningly spread out on Shabbos night to make it appear as if the Man fell on Shabbos. He then goes on to defend the custom based on Halacha; Likkutei Maharich Minhagei Chodesh Shevat-Shabbos Shira; Sefer Hadras Kodesh p. 40; Tzitz Eliezer 14:28; Piskeiy Teshuvos 324 footnote 31]

[230] See Likkutei Maharich Minhagei Chodesh Shevat-Shabbos Shira; Sefer Hadras Kodesh p. 40; Piskeiy Teshuvos 324 footnote 29

[231] So was the custom of the Maharal of Prague and so he would instruct the teachers to educate the children, as recorded in Sefer Hasichos 5702 p. 73 in the name of the Alter Rebbe, in the name of the Maharal of Prague; This custom is recorded in all the Poskim ibid, beginning with the M”A ibid; It is also recorded in Hisvadyus 5747 2:448 and p. 454 in which the Rebbe complained that it is not publicized enough in and Likkutei Sichos 2:522; See Heichal Menachem 2:12 that the Rebbe answered an individual not to publicize this custom of the Maharal, being that it has already become forgotten; See Shulchan Menachem 3:341; Hiskashrus 704 p. 19

The reason: This is done in order to reward the birds for having sung Shira by the sea. [Tosefes Shabbos ibid] Alternatively, it was done in reward for the birds having eaten the leftover Man which Dasan and Aviram cunningly spread out on Shabbos night to make it appear as if the Man fell on Shabbos. [Nimukei Orach Chaim ibid]

[232] See Sefer Hasichos 5749 1:222 that he did not see the Rebbe Rayatz follow this custom due to the above ruling of Admur ibid which prohibits it, and See Heichal Menachem 2:12 that the Rebbe answered an individual not to publicize this custom of the Maharal, being that it has already become forgotten; See Shulchan Menachem 3:341; Hiskashrus 704 p. 19; See, however, Hisvadyus 5747 2:448 and p. 454 in which the Rebbe complained that it is not publicized enough

Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that children may do so being that it is not a complete Shvus. [Ashel Avrahahm Butchatch 167:6]

[233] Toras Shabbos 324:15; Kinyan Torah 6:14; Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[234] Shaar Halacha Uminhag 1:149

[235] Admur 305:27 “It is likewise permitted to tell a gentile to force-feed geese once a day, because of the concern for tza’ar ba’alei chaim (preventing animal suffering), as the animals are unable to eat otherwise. If no non-Jew is available, a Jew himself may do so, even though force-feeding animals in this manner is generally prohibited on Shabbos, as explained in Siman 324. Because of tza’ar ba’alei chaim, the Sages permitted it. Nevertheless, it is preferable to have a child do so.”; M”A 305:12; M”B 305:71; Kaf Hachaim 301:84

[236] The reason: As this is considered troubling oneself for the week, as there is no Shabbos need in gorging the animal on Shabbos. [Admur ibid]

[237] See Admur 340:4; 343:10; M”A 343:5; Mordechai Remez 369 in name of Maharam, brought in Beis Yosef 340; Chavos Yair 307; Tosefes Shabbos 340:8; M”B 340:14; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 43:39

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that it is always permitted even for an adult to break letters of a cake. [Degul Merevava 340] Other Poskim rule it is forbidden even for a child. [Chikrei Lev O.C. 62] Other Poskim rule it is permitted to place it in front of the child but not into his hands. [Pesach Hadvir 343:10]

[238] Admur 343:10; Chazon Ish 61:1; This comes to teach that even within the process of eating it is forbidden, unlike the ruling of the M”B in next footnote. The Chazon Ish ibid rules like Admur that even within the process of eating this is forbidden.

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that it is always permitted to break letters of a cake. [Degul Merevava 340] The M”B 340:16 thus rules based on this that one may be lenient to break the letters within the process of eating [meaning upon chewing it] as opposed to breaking off a piece with letters and then eating it.

[239] If the child is above the age of Chinuch it is obviously forbidden for the father to give him the cake and have him do a prohibition as rules Admur in 343:2

[240] Admur 343:10; M”A 343:5; Mordechai Remez 369 in name of Maharam, brought in Beis Yosef 340

[241] Admur 343:10

[242] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11

[243] Ketzos Hashulchan 146 footnote 52

[244] Doing so does not form ditches within the earth but rather presses it more in. There is likewise no prohibition of “mundane act” involved in pushing a baby carriage outside, as there is with regards to carrying someone in a chair on Yom Tov [522:3], as it is very difficult to carry a baby otherwise, and there is thus no longer worry that doing so belittles Shabbos. [ibid]

[245]  SSH”K 28:42

[246] Piskeiy Teshuvos 337:1

[247] M”B 301:164; Chayeh Adam 22:7; Ketzos Hashulchan 116 footnote 20; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 43:24-26

[248] The reason is that since these garments are soiled with the child’s waste, it is obvious that they were not freshly laundered, and therefore there is no concern that observers will suspect one of having washed them on Shabbos.

[249] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:1-34

[250] See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 47:25-28

[251] SSH”K 15:18; See Admur 328:22; M”A 328:15; Issur Viheter 59; Chayeh Adam 69:16; M”B 328:58 [requires Shinuiy]; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 47:2-4

^[252] Ketzos Hashulchan 134 footnote 18

[253] Tosefes Shabbos Hakdama 308; P”M 308 A”A 72; Pesicha Hilchos Yom Tov; Elya Raba 308:45; Shibulei Haleket 121; Daas Torah 308:22; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:1

[254] A child is generally considered to have valid actions (ma’aseh) but not halachically significant intent (machshavah). Accordingly, a child’s decision to designate an item for use does not remove its muktzah status, nor can his intent render an item muktzah. However, once a child reaches the age of thirteen and is presumed to have the signs of adulthood, his intent is effective in matters of muktzah, as in rabbinic matters we rely on the presumption that he has reached maturity.

[255] Daas Torah 309:4; SSH”K 20 footnote 173 in name of Minchas Shabbos; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:1 footnote 1

[256] The concept of a child not having Machshava is brought in Minchas Shabbos 88:63; and Tosefes Shabbos in end of introduction to 308.

[257] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:6-10

[258] Admur 309:1 “One may lift his child in a private domain, [even if] there is a stone in [the child’s] hand, [as] this is not considered as if one is carrying the stone in his hand. [However] this only applies if it is impossible to [avoid lifting up the child without the stone ], such as for example if his child has a [strong] longing for [the parent to lift him up] and [thus] if he does not lift him up the child will get sick , [as in such a situation it is permitted to lift him up with the stone] as the [Sages] did not decree against moving [a Muktzah item] without using ones actual hands in a situation where there is danger of [it causing] illness.  As well [the situation here is discussing] that it is not possible to remove the stone out of the hands of the child, as [if he does so then the child] will scream and cry.  However if the child does not currently long [to be picked up] then it is forbidden to lift him [with the stone]. It is not similar to other [cases] of moving a forbidden [Muktzah] object, which moves consequently through one moving in his hands a permitted [non-Muktzah] object that is with [the Muktzah object], in which the [Sages] permitted [to move in cases that] it is impossible to shake off the prohibited item from the permitted one, as was explained. [The reason that it is not similar is] because the [Sages] only permitted this [to be done] when one needs to use the permitted item, however here [in a case that child does not long to be lifted it is forbidden to lift him up with the stone as] it is not considered such a necessity to lift up the child when the child is not longing to be lifted.”; Michaber 309:1; Mishneh Shabbos 141b; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:6-10

[259] The reason: As the [Sages] did not decree against moving [a Muktzah item] without using ones actual hands in a situation where there is danger of [it causing] illness. [Admur ibid; M”A 309:1; M”B 309:2]

[260] Admur ibid; M”A 309:1; M”B 309:2

[261] The reason: As the allowance to move a non-muktzah item together with a muktzah item applies only when one genuinely needs the permitted item itself. Accordingly, although a child holding a stone is not considered identical to directly carrying the stone, the Sages only permitted lifting the child when there is a significant need—such as when the child strongly desires to be held and will become greatly distressed otherwise. If the child has no particular need to be picked up, then lifting him is not considered a sufficient necessity to justify indirectly moving the muktzah item. [Admur ibid; based on Tosafus ibid; However the M”B 309:2 explains this is considered as if he is holding the Mukztah in his hand, Vetzaruch Iyun why!]

[262] Admur 309:2 “Even in a case that the child longs for his parent, it was only permitted [to lift him up when he is] with a stone. However, if he has a coin in his hand it is forbidden even to hold him by the hand while he [the child] is walking in a private domain.

The reason for this is: due to a decree that perhaps the coin will fall from the child’s hand and the father will forget [that it is Shabbos] and pick it up, which ends up that he has moved [a] Muktzah [item in] a completely  [forbidden form of] moving, and [by a case that one may come to] completely move [something Muktzah], [the Sages] suspected [for this] and decreed [against lifting up the child], even in a situation that there is a danger of [it causing] illness, being that his life is not in danger if he is not lifted up .”; Michaber 309:1; Chayeh Adam 67:16; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:13-22

[263] Admur ibid; 1^st opinion in Michaber ibid; Bach 309; Rashi; Rashba; See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:16-18

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is permitted to hold the hands of the child and only lifting up the child is forbidden. [Ran in name of Ramban; 2^nd opinion in Michaber ibid; Elya Raba brought in Biur Halacha 309:1 “Veyeish Omrim”]

[264] The reason: The Sages were concerned that the money might fall and the parent would instinctively pick it up, resulting in a direct violation of the laws of muktzah.

[265] See Admur 308:13; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:12

Background:

The Michaber 308:3 rules that one who lifted a Keli Shemilachto Leissur for need of its space is allowed to place it down wherever he wishes. The M”A 308:7 extends this allowance to even a case that he was not allowed to pick up the Mucktah and accidently did so, being that the Sages did not decree against the continued movement of the Muktzah and only forbade the initial lifting and movement. It is evident from the M”A in 266:19 and 331:5 that this allowance applies even if one accidently lifted an item that is completely Muzkath, such as MMG or MMCK. [P”M 308 A”A 7] Admur in 308:13 brings a first opinion [which is this opinion of the M”A] that states that one may continue moving all Muktzah, even Mukzath Gamur, that was accidently lifted. Admur then brings a second opinion [Smag, Even Haozer] that prohibits the continued movement by Muktzah Gamur and allows it only by MM”I. Admur concludes that in a case of loss one may be lenient by Muktzah Gamur. An example of this allowance is brought in 266:19 in which acse we rule that one who forgot his wallet in his pocket may continue to carry it home, and in 331:10 that the Mohel may continue carrying the Milah knife [both of these cases involve loss].

Ruling of M”B: The M”B in 308:13 brings both opinions and rules like the stringent opinion, as so rules also the Derech Chaim. However in 266:35 he concludes that in a acse of loss one may be lenient, and hence in conclusion his opinion is the same as that of Admur here.

[266] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:23-24

[267] M”B 309:2; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:11; 31-34

[268] Aruch Hashulchan 308:62. One may do so even without entering water into the potty, as whatever was needed for the honor of the people the Sages did not decree against by Muktzah [ibid]

[269] SSH”K 16:10

[270] As the purpose of this moving is neither Legufo or Limikomo, and if anything is Liatzmo, to prevent damage. Now, it is questionable whether one may move a Keli Shemilachto Liisur for the sake of preventing damage of either items. [See Az Nidbaru 11:21 p. 41; Rav SZ”A in SSH”K 20 footnote 30] Therefore, it is best to move it with a Shinuiy which is allowed according to all.

[271] Admur 308:12; M”A 308:8; M”B 308:16

[272] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapters 51-54

[273] See Admur 343:5-6 and 8; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 198 footnotes 5244-549; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:2-5

[274] See Darkei Moshe 325:8

[275] See Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Shut Harim O.C. 3; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 2:53; Pnei Mevin O.C. 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Eretz Tzevi 75; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnotes 40-45; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343 footnotes 42-45 Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13

[276] Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 “And there are those who say that anything which is for the need of an infant—such as eating and drinking—the Sages did not decree against it at all, and it is permitted to feed him by hand any matter whose prohibition is only rabbinic, if he needs it, even if he has reached the age of education (Chinuch).” Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 “But anything that is for the infant’s own need and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he might become accustomed to it and do the same when he grows up. This is because it is known to him that they permit his needs only because he is small, and he will not be misled by this to do so when he grows up. Therefore, it is permitted to feed him before Kiddush if he wishes to eat, and likewise to give him to drink, and it is forbidden to afflict him. And so too with all similar cases regarding all other rabbinic prohibitions.” [See Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 7 that this Halacha in Admur is a continuation of the lenient opinion in 343:6]; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; M”A 556:1; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that it is forbidden for any person to give even a Rabbinically forbidden item to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, and even if the child is in need for it. This applies even if the child is sick, so long as he is not in danger. [Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; M”B 362:44; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549]

[277] Kesav Sofer O.C. 47; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:6

[278] See Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Shut Harim O.C. 3; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 2:53; Pnei Mevin O.C. 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Eretz Tzevi 75; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnotes 40-45; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343 footnotes 42-45 Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13; See Admur 343:5-6 and 8; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 198 footnotes 5244-549; See previous Halacha

[279] See Eretz Tzevi Frumer 75

Difference between Children Below and Above the Age of Understanding: A child who has reached the age of understanding is subject to the mitzvah of chinuch. Accordingly, his father must protest if he transgresses on his own, and there is concern that repeated leniencies may accustom him to the prohibition and lead to improper conduct when he becomes older. In contrast, a child below the age of understanding is not yet subject to chinuch, and there is generally no obligation to protest his actions when done on his own. Likewise, there is less concern that he will become accustomed to the conduct, since he lacks sufficient understanding. For these reasons, the halacha is often more lenient regarding a child below the age of understanding.

[280] See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:20; Toras Hakatan 25:7

[281] If one does not instruct the child to do so and simply places it in his hands: Seemingly, based on Admur 343:10, if a child is below the age of understanding (approximately under three years old), one may give him food in a private domain even if he will end up carrying it outside, and even for the use of the adult, so long as one does not instruct him to carry it outside. [See Chapter 1 Halacha 8G]

[282] See Admur 343:5-6; 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Taz 346:6; 619:3; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Chasam Sofer O.C. 99; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15 [Meikal]; Maharam Shick 173; Shut Harim O.C. 3; Levushei Mordechai O.C. 60; Chikrei Lev 69; Peri Yitzchak 1:11 [Machmir]; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; 2:53; Pnei Mevin O.C. 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Yad Yosef 343:4; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Arugas Habosem 71; Eretz Tzevi Frumer 75; Kaf Hachaim 343:27; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnotes 40-45; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:7-30; Toras Hakatan 28:11

Background of This Halacha

This halacha is subject to considerable debate, controversy, and complexity within the Poskim. Its foundation lies in the discussion presented at length in Chapter 1, Halacha 8, regarding the dispute between the Rambam and the Rashba as to whether a child—even one who has reached the age of chinuch—may be allowed or instructed to perform a rabbinic prohibition for his own benefit or for the sake of a mitzvah. There, the Alter Rebbe concludes that in a time of need one may rely on the lenient opinion and permit a child to perform a rabbinic prohibition for his own sake or for the purpose of a mitzvah. The core issue here is whether carrying a siddur, chumash, food, or similar item to shul falls within these parameters. Specifically, is such carrying considered to be for the child’s mitzvah needs, and is the carrying prohibition in the given circumstance only rabbinic in nature? The answers to these questions form the basis of the discussion.

Opinions who are Lenient according to Rashba: Several Acharonim rule that according to the Rashba, who permits rabbinic prohibitions when done for the genuine needs of the child, it would likewise be permitted for the sake of the child’s mitzvah observance. Indeed, if one permits a child to transgress a rabbinic prohibition for his ordinary personal needs, then certainly there is room to permit it for the purpose of a mitzvah. [Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Chikrei Lev 69; Peri Yitzchak 1:11; Kerem Shlomo 128]

Opinions who are completely Stringent: Some authorities however disagree and maintain that even according to the Rashba, who permits certain rabbinic prohibitions for a child’s benefit, this leniency is limited to the child’s physical and developmental needs (rivityei) and does not extend to mitzvah needs. They argue that with regard to a mitzvah, one should apply the principle of shev v’al ta’aseh—it is preferable for the child to forgo this mitzvah than to educate him through a rabbinic transgression. Furthermore, there is a greater concern that the child may come to err in the future, as he may not appreciate that the leniency was granted only because of the special circumstances. [See Chikrei Lev ibid; Tzitz Hakodesh 19:3]

Opinions who are Completely Lenient even according to Rambam: Other authorities take the opposite approach and rule that even according to the Rambam, who generally prohibits causing a child to transgress a rabbinic prohibition, an exception may be made when it is necessary for the child’s mitzvah education. According to this view, the obligation of chinuch can override the concern of sefiyah regarding a rabbinic prohibition when it serves a genuine mitzvah need of the child. [Taz 346:6; 619:3; Chasam Sofer O.C. 99; Shut Harim 3; Beis Halevi 1:13]

[283] See Eretz Tzevi Frumer 75

Difference between Children Below and Above the Age of Understanding: A child who has reached the age of understanding is subject to the mitzvah of chinuch. Accordingly, his father must protest if he transgresses on his own, and there is concern that repeated leniencies may accustom him to the prohibition and lead to improper conduct when he becomes older. In contrast, a child below the age of understanding is not yet subject to chinuch, and there is generally no obligation to protest his actions when done on his own. Likewise, there is less concern that he will become accustomed to the conduct, since he lacks sufficient understanding. For these reasons, the halacha is often more lenient regarding a child below the age of understanding.

[284] Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Biur Halacha 343 “Bidivrei Sofrim” See Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Shut Harim O.C. 3; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 2:53; Pnei Mevin O.C. 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Eretz Tzevi 75; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnotes 40-45; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13

This is based on a) The opinion of Rashba ibid as explained in Chapter 1 Halacha 8D.; b) An opinion who holds that for a child below the age of Chinuch it is permitted even on a constant basis [See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:20; Toras Hakatan 25:7]; c) The idea that one may give a child an item with which he will perform an Issur as explained in Chapter 1 Halacha 8G.

[285] See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:20; Toras Hakatan 25:7

[286] Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Biur Halacha 343 “Bidivrei Sofrim”

[287] See Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Eretz Tzev 75; Tiferes Yisrael, brought in Rav Akiva Eiger ibid; Pnei Mevin 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:16-19

Other Opinions: Some poskim rule that one may never instruct a child to carry on behalf of an adult, even for the sake of a mitzvah. Furthermore, in an area that regularly lacks an eiruv, such carrying cannot be considered an occasional or exceptional occurrence. Rather, since it is a recurring reality, there is greater concern that the child will come to view such carrying as permissible and continue the practice when he becomes older. [Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Chasam Sofer ibid; Maharam Shick 173; Tehila Ledavid 343; Peri Yitzchak 1:11]

If one does not instruct the child to do so and simply places it in his hands: Seemingly, based on Admur 343:10, if a child is below the age of understanding (approximately under three years old), one may give him a siddur, chumash, or Tallis in a private domain even if he will end up carrying it outside, and even for the use of the adult, so long as one does not instruct him to carry it outside. [See Chapter 1 Halacha 8G]

[288] See Admur 343:10; Chapter 1 Halacha 8G

[289] See Admur 343:6 “And even if the infant himself does not need it, but rather the adult needs the infant to perform for him some act that is prohibited only rabbinically, according to this reasoning there is no prohibition to give it to him to do on his behalf….when it is given to him only occasionally, there is no concern for this, provided that it is in a context where there is no prohibition involved in what he is doing on behalf of the adult, as explained in siman 334, such as for the sake of a mitzvah.”; Admur 343:8 “Therefore, any rabbinic prohibition (shevut) that is permitted to be performed by a non-Jew for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden to be performed by means of a minor, due to concern that he may become habituated to it—unless it is only on an occasional, incidental basis, as explained above.”; Rashba 1:92; Shut Rashba 323; Tosafus Eruvin 40b; M”A 269 and 289; Darkei Moshe 325:8; Taz 346:6; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Chikrei Lev 69; Peri Yitzchak 1:11; Biur Halacha 343 “Veafilu”; Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Tiferes Yisrael Hilchos Eruvin; Meishiv Davar 20; Eretz Tzevi 75

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that it is forbidden to allow a child [of any age], even on an occasional basis, to transgress a prohibition on behalf of an adult, even for the sake of a mitzvah. [Implication of Admur 343:6; Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Chasam Sofer 6:13; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549; [See, however the following Poskim who understand that even this opinion agrees to permit it on occasion and hence there is no dispute between the sides: Beis Efraim Y.D. 62; Mechzeh Avraham 36; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3 footnote 49]

[290] Admur and Poskim ibid; Arugas Habosem 71; Chikrei Lev ibid; Tzitz Hakodesh 19:3

The reason: As there is no bodily need involved for the child to take the Siddur, and it is thus possibly forbidden even according to the lenient opinion [Rashba] brought in Admur. [Chikrei Lev ibid; Tzitz Hakodesh 19:3] Furthermore, even according to the Rashba it may only be done on occasion.

[291] Admur and Poskim ibid; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Biur Halacha 343 “Veafilu”; Shut Harim 3; See Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Eretz Tzev 75; Tiferes Yisrael, brought in Rav Akiva Eiger ibid; Pnei Mevin 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:16-19

[292] Tehila Ledavid 343:4, based on the lenient opinion which allows transgressing an occasional Rabbinical prohibition for the sake of a Mitzvah.

[293] See Shoel Umeishiv Gimel 1:117; Eretz Tzev 75; Tiferes Yisrael, brought in Rav Akiva Eiger ibid; Pnei Mevin 240; Meishiv Davar 1:20; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:16-19

Other Opinions: Some poskim rule that one may never instruct a child to carry on behalf of an adult, even for the sake of a mitzvah. Furthermore, in an area that regularly lacks an eiruv, such carrying cannot be considered an occasional or exceptional occurrence. Rather, since it is a recurring reality, there is greater concern that the child will come to view such carrying as permissible and continue the practice when he becomes older. [Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 15; Chasam Sofer ibid; Maharam Shick 173; Tehila Ledavid 343; Peri Yitzchak 1:11]

[294] Admur 325:2-4; 347:3; 307:35; Taz 307:12; M”A 307:20; 325:2 and 6; Maharam Mintz 117; Mordechai Remez 252 in name of Tosafus; Shiltei Hagiborim on Mordechai 70a in name of Tosafus; SSH”K 18:54; Nishmas Shabbos 7:489; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:40

Admur 325:2 “In any event one may not actually place [the food] into his hands in order so he [the Jew] not be the one to extract the [food] from within the private domain, rather the gentile should take it from his hand as then the gentile is the one doing the actual extraction.”; 325:4 “Nevertheless, one must beware not to place [the item] into the actual hand of the gentile being that one is able to avoid doing so [and still accomplish what is needed]. Even with objects that belong to the gentile one must beware against doing this.”; 325:16 “those that do so must beware to not place the vessel into the hand of the gentile as well as to not take it from his hand as was explained there [in chapter 307]”; 347:3 “However, Rabbinically it is forbidden to give it to him, even if he is a Gentile, and even in a Karmalis”; 307:27 “The custom is not to receive a letter from the hand of a gentile and rather one is to ask him to put it down on the ground or table due to worry that the Jew may end up taking the letter before the gentile stops walking to rest doing and it is thus found that the Jew did the Hanacha, which is Rabbinically forbidden even today when some Poskim rule that we no longer have a Biblical public domain.”;

[295] The reason: Just as it is rabbinically forbidden to place an item into the hand of a non-Jew when one knows or anticipates that he will carry it in a prohibited manner on Shabbos, so too one may not place an item into the hand of a child in order that the child carry it. Since placing the item into the child’s hand constitutes the akirah (initial lifting of the item for transport), it is forbidden even when the child himself will perform the remainder of the carrying.

[296] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 47:14-16; 51:30; 52:33-44

[297] The poskim debate whether a parent may hold the hand of a child who is carrying an item in that same hand.

Stringent opinion: Some authorities rule that when the adult holds the child’s hand that is carrying the object, it is considered as if the adult himself is carrying the object, or at the very least that the adult and child are carrying it together. Accordingly, it is forbidden to do so in an area without an eiruv. [Teshuras Shaiy 1:172]

Lenient opinion: Other authorities maintain that this concern applies only when the adult is actually assisting the child in carrying the item, such as when the object is heavy. However, if the child is independently carrying a light object, the fact that the parent is holding his hand merely to prevent him from running away or becoming frightened does not render the parent a participant in carrying the object. [Chayeh Levi 2:29]

Practical implication: One should preferably avoid holding the same hand in which the child is carrying an item when walking in an area without an eiruv.

[298] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:39

[299] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 51:29

[300] Admur 266:10 “He may give it to a child, even if the child has reached the age of chinuch and is his own son, whom he is obligated to educate in the observance of mitzvos. Nevertheless, the obligation of chinuch is only rabbinic, and the Sages waived it in this case so that the adult not come to carry the item himself. However, when giving it to the child—or even to a deaf-mute or mentally incompetent person—he must give it to them while they are already walking, and take it from them before they come to a stop, so that they do not perform both an akirah (lifting) and a hanachah (placing down), as explained above. For although one is not commanded regarding their “rest” (shevisah), it is nevertheless Biblically forbidden to actively cause them to violate a prohibition, as explained in Siman 343. Thus, even though he gives them the purse before Shabbos, since he knows they will carry it on Shabbos and gives it to them for that purpose, it is considered as if he is actively feeding them a prohibition. Therefore, the permission extends only to a case where they do not perform both an akirah and hanachah, in which case no Biblical prohibition is involved (even if this occurs in a true public domain). The Sages permitted this rabbinic violation so that the adult not come to carry the item himself. Nevertheless, if a donkey is available, he should place the item on the donkey rather than give it to a child, deaf-mute, or mentally incompetent person, since they are human beings and there are others of their kind who are obligated in mitzvos, which may lead to confusion.”; Michaber 266:6; M”A 266:8; Chikrei Lev 62; M”B 266:15; Piskeiy Teshuvos 266:1; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 45:1-19

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that if the item was placed on the child before Shabbos, it may remain with him throughout and there is no need to repeatedly remove and replace it when he stops and starts. Nevertheless, if the item was given to the child after Shabbos began, then even they agree that one must remove it whenever the child stops and return it only once he resumes walking. [Rama ibid] Some Poskim rule that in a karmelis, where the prohibition is only rabbinic, one may rely on the lenient opinion of the Rama. [Mishnah Berurah 266:15]

[301] The reason: The reason is that the obligation of chinuch is rabbinic, and Chazal waived it in this exceptional circumstance so that the adult not come to carry the item himself. [Admur ibid]

[302] The reason: This is because even though one is not generally commanded regarding the “rest” of a child, one may not actively cause a child to violate a Biblical prohibition (sefiyah). Thus, the leniency extends only to avoiding a Biblical transgression while permitting what is at most a rabbinic prohibition. This case serves as an example of the general principle that in a situation of substantial financial loss, Chazal were at times willing to waive the ordinary rabbinic obligation of chinuch. However, even in such circumstances, one may not actively cause a child to violate a Biblical prohibition.

[303] Admur 362:17 “One should not create a human partition (mechitzah shel bnei adam) except in a time of need and pressing circumstances. If one forgot an item in a public domain, it is preferable to bring young children there and allow them to pick up the item on their own and bring it into the house than to construct a human partition and have an adult bring it in. This applies only when the child does not know that the object belongs to his father. In that case, the child is acting for his own benefit, thinking that he has found an object in the public domain. However, if the child knows that the object belongs to his father, then he is presumably bringing it for his father’s benefit, and every person is obligated to stop the child from bringing it, as explained in Siman 334. Certainly, one may not bring the child there in order that he retrieve the object. The same law applies if the object belongs to another person and the child recognizes it and intends to bring it to that individual. All of the above applies to other people. However, a father is obligated to educate his child, rebuke him, and prevent him from desecrating Shabbos whenever he sees him doing so, even when the child is acting for his own benefit and even regarding rabbinic prohibitions, as explained in Siman 343. Certainly, a father may not bring the child to the location in order that he retrieve the object, even if the object does not belong to the father.”; Rama 36:7; Yevamos 113b; Shibulei Haleket 104; Chayeh Adam 66:4; M”B 362:44; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:31-36

[304] Admur 343:5; Seer Chapter 1 Halacha 8B

[305] See 343:3 and 10, brought in Chapter 1 Halacha 8G, and so is implied from the end of 362:17 which mentions the obligation of the father to protest his sons actions, which only applies if the son is above the age of understanding.

[306] The reason: One may even bring the owner’s child to the area where the object was left, provided that the father is unaware that this is being done in order for his son to retrieve the object, and the child himself does not know that the object belongs to his father. In such a case, the child is viewed as carrying it for his own benefit, as one who has found a lost object.

[307] The reason: This is because one is not obligated to reprimand another person’s child when the child is committing the act for his own benefit, as explained in Chapter 1, Halacha 7E.

[308] As one can assume that he is carrying it in order to return it to his father, in which case the rule is that all must reprimand him for transgressing a prohibition for someone else’s behalf, as explained in Chapter 1, Halacha 7F.

[309] As one can assume that he is carrying it in order to return to his father.

[310] Nishmas Shabbos 7:492; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:37

[311] Nishmas Shabbos 7:473; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:3; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 49:38

[312] Admur 261:1; 352:1

[313] See Admur 308:81 “A woman may help her son walk even in a public domain, as we do not make a decree [as was decreed by animals] that [if we allow this to be done then] she may come to pick him up and carry him four cubits in the public domain. [The reason for this is] because even if she does do this she will not transgress a Biblical prohibition but rather a Rabbinical prohibition , being that a live human is considered to carry himself [even when being carried by someone else]. [However, this is] only [allowed] so long as that she does not drag him , but rather that she lifts up one of his feet leaving the second on the ground with which he supports himself until she places back down the foot that she had lifted up, as when done in this way it ends up that he [the child] is always supporting himself with one foot. However, when she drags both feet then it is as if she is carrying him, which is forbidden to be done even in a Karmalis. [However] if the child is so young that he needs to be dragged by both feet [in order to move], and [thus if she does so she ended up] carrying him in a public domain, then she is Biblically liable, as by such a young child we do not say [the rule] that ‘A human carries himself’. Similarly, one who carries [a person] bound [with rope, and thus cannot walk] or a sick [person] which [is so sick that he] cannot walk at all, then one is Biblically liable [for carrying him], being that [people in such conditions] are not carrying themselves at all. [Furthermore] even if [the child] is old enough to walk on his feet on his own, [it is nevertheless] forbidden to carry him even in a Karmalis, as the [Sages] only said [the rule] that “a human carries himself” with regards to exempt one from being liable to bring a  Chatas offering [if he were to carry him], however at the very least this remains Rabbinically prohibited [to be done] being that it is considered a “Shvus” , while in a Karmalis this is considered a “Shvus Dishvus ” The populace must be warned about [this prohibition of carrying humans] being that they mistakenly [think that it is allowed, and thus carry humans].”; 307:27; 325:16; 331:8; 586:24; Rambam Shabbos 18:16; Shabbos 94a; 128b; 130a; 141b; Elya Raba 308:84; P”M 308 A”A 71; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 28; M”B 308:154; Biur Halacha 308 “Shelo”; Igros Moshe Y.D. 1:2; 4:91 Shevet Halevi 7:37; 11:86; Az Nidbaru 6:31; SSH”K 38:28; Piskeiy Teshuvos 308:56; 58; 276 footnote 109; 307:20 and 30; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:1-41; Piskeiy Teshuvos 308:57-58

[314] Shabbos 94a

[315] See M”A 308:70

Applies even to infant – No Issur Hotzah: Tosafus Shabbos 130a; Ritva Shabbos 141b; reah; Rabbeinu Yeshayah; Meiri 94a

Does not apply to infant – Issur Hotzah: Ramban, Rashba, Ran on Shabbos 141b; Tosafus Shabbos 94a; Opinion in Meiri ibid

[316] Admur 308:81; P”M ibid; Rav Akiva Eiger ibid; M”B 308:153

[317] Admur 308:81 “[Furthermore] even if [the child] is old enough to walk on his feet on his own, [it is nevertheless] forbidden to carry him even in a Karmalis, as the [Sages] only said [the rule] that “a human carries himself” with regards to exempt one from being liable to bring a  Chatas offering [if he were to carry him], however at the very least this remains Rabbinically prohibited [to be done] being that it is considered a “Shvus” , while in a Karmalis this is considered a “Shvus Dishvus ” The populace must be warned about [this prohibition of carrying humans] being that they mistakenly [think that it is allowed, and thus carry humans].”; M”A 308:71; M”B 308:154; Binyan Tziyon 20; See Tehila Ledavid on Admur ibid; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:6-11

Background: The above discussion concerns whether carrying a child constitutes a Biblical prohibition. However, even according to the opinions that apply the principle of chai nosei es atzmo and therefore exempt one from Biblical liability, the Sages nevertheless prohibited carrying a child on Shabbos. Accordingly, carrying a child in a reshus harabim remains rabbinically forbidden even when the child is capable of moving himself. Likewise, carrying a child in a karmelis is also forbidden, notwithstanding the principle of chai nosei es atzmo. Thus, the practical significance of chai nosei es atzmo is primarily that carrying such a child is not a Biblical transgression; however, a rabbinic prohibition still remains in force.

[318] Admur ibid; M”A ibid

The reason: The Tehillah LeDavid questions the very basis of the Magen Avraham’s stringency, noting that Chazal permitted a shvus d’shvus in situations of suffering (tza’ar). If so, all the more so there should be room for leniency in a case involving the distress of a young child (tza’ara d’yenuka). He suggests, however, that perhaps the leniency of shvus d’shvus in a case of suffering was granted only when the act is performed through a non-Jew, and not in other forms of shvus d’shvus.

Other Opinions – Grounds for Leniency in a Karmelis: Some Poskim seek to justify the common practice of carrying a child who is able to walk in a karmelis. They reason that since carrying such a child is not Biblically prohibited due to the principle of chai nosei es atzmo, and a karmelis itself is only rabbinically prohibited, prohibiting it would amount to a gezeirah ligzeirah (a rabbinic safeguard upon a rabbinic safeguard), which the Sages may not have enacted. There is therefore greater room for leniency, particularly for the sake of a mitzvah or when the child will become very distressed and cry if left behind. [Peri Tevua 7 in negation of M”A ibid; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 28; Divrei Nechemia 25; Igros Moshe 4:91]

[319] Admur ibid “The populace must be warned about [this prohibition of carrying humans] being that they mistakenly [think that it is allowed, and thus carry humans].”

[320] Shut Rav Akiva Eiger ibid and Mishnah Berurah 308:154 write that it is better not to explicitly instruct them, applying the principle of “mutav sheyihyu shogegin v’al yihyu mezidin”—it is preferable that they remain inadvertent transgressors rather than become deliberate ones. So likewise rules the Igros Moshe 4:91

[321] Shevet Halevi 7:37; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:15; SSH”K 38 footnote 83

[322] Admur 308:81; Michaber 308:41; Rambam Shabbos 18:16; Mishneh Shabbos 128b; M”A 308:70-71; Rashi Shabbos 94a; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:16-25; See Tehila Ledavid 308:47

[323] Admur ibid “[However, this is] only [allowed] so long as that she does not drag him , but rather that she lifts up one of his feet leaving the second on the ground with which he supports himself until she places back down the foot that she had lifted up, as when done in this way it ends up that he [the child] is always supporting himself with one foot.”

The reason: This is allowed as we do not make a decree [as was decreed by animals] that [if we allow this to be done then] she may come to pick him up and carry him four cubits in the public domain. [The reason for this is] because even if she does do this she will not transgress a Biblical prohibition but rather a Rabbinical prohibition, being that a live human is considered to carry himself [even when being carried by someone else]. [Admur ibid]

[324] Admur ibid “However, when she drags both feet then it is as if she is carrying him, which is forbidden to be done even in a Karmalis.” M”A 308:71; Rashi Shabbos 94a

Other opinions: According to those authorities who understand the prohibition as a rabbinic decree, there is room to argue that in a karmelis it should be permitted, as this would constitute a gezeirah ligzeirah (a rabbinic safeguard upon another rabbinic safeguard). [Mishnah Berurah 308:154; Biur Halacha 308 “Shelo”]

[325] Admur ibid “[However] if the child is so young that he needs to be dragged by both feet [in order to move], and [thus if she does so she ended up] carrying him in a public domain, then she is Biblically liable, as by such a young child we do not say [the rule] that ‘A human carries himself’.”; M”A 308:70 in opinion of Ramban, Rashba, Ran on Shabbos 141b; Tosafus Shabbos 94a

[326] The reason: The principle of “chai nosei es atzmo” applies only to a child who is capable of supporting and moving himself. Accordingly, a child who cannot walk at all, a person who is bound, or someone so ill that he cannot move independently does not benefit from this principle, and carrying such a person in a reshus harabim may constitute a Biblical prohibition. [Admur ibid]

[327] See Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:6-11

[328] In a reshus harabim, even if the child is already capable of walking on his own and the principle of chai nosei es atzmo applies, it is nevertheless Rabbinically forbidden. Furthermore, it is forbidden to carry a child on one’s shoulders in a karmelis. Although in a karmelis the prohibition is only rabbinic, and chai nosei es atzmo eliminates Biblical liability, the Sages nevertheless prohibited carrying a child in this manner even if it is only a Shvus Deshvus. Certainly all the more so does this apply to a child who cannot walk on his own, as explained above that it may consists of a Biblical prohibition.

[329] Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:9-11

[330] Peri Tevua 7 in negation of M”A ibid; Shut Rav Akiva Eiger 28; Divrei Nechemia 25; Igros Moshe O.C. 4:91; Tzitz Eliezer 13:32-4; Nishmas Shabbos 5:482

[331] The reason: The reason for this leniency is that Chazal permitted a shvus d’shvus in a case of great need. These Poskim rule that this principle is not limited to acts performed through a non-Jew, but may apply even when the shvus d’shvus is performed by a Jew.

[332] Nishmas Shabbos 5:482

[333] See Admur 301:81; 2^nd opinion in Admur 340:2 that even for Mitzvah is forbidden; 328:9 and 20 regarding allowance only for Choleh; 331:8-9; 307 allowance only for gentile; 362 allowance only for Bein hashmashos; P”M 307 A”A 7-8 leaves in question

[334] Why the Child’s Needs Do Not Provide a Clear Basis for Leniency According to Admur: One might argue that carrying a child should be permitted based on the Rashba’s ruling, cited by Admur (343:6), that a child may perform a rabbinic prohibition for his own need. However, this argument is difficult to accept, as in most cases there is no pressing need for the child to arrive home immediately. The parent can simply remain with the child where he is until he calms down, rests, or is persuaded to continue walking. Accordingly, carrying the child home cannot generally be classified as a genuine need of the child. Moreover, even in a case where the child is truly exhausted, hungry, or unable to continue walking, the Rashba’s leniency does not directly apply. The Rashba permits having the child perform a rabbinic prohibition for his own need; he does not permit an adult to perform a rabbinic prohibition on the child’s behalf. One therefore cannot derive a dispensation for the parent to carry the child. However, a further argument could be made that the needs of a young child are treated like those of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah, for whom certain rabbinic prohibitions are permitted, as expaliedn in Halacha 6. Nevertheless, this too does not provide a sufficient basis for leniency in cases that the child cannot walk on his own, as such Rabbinical Melacha generally requires a shinui even for the sick. Accordingly, according to Admur, none of these considerations provides a clear heter for the parent himself to carry the child who cannot walk independently at all, in which case carrying him may involve a Biblical prohibition, and is hence forbidden even if they are in a Karmalis. However, regarding a child who is capable of walking on his own, for whom the principle of chai nosei es atzmo applies, carrying him is only rabbinically prohibited, as explained above. Accordingly, carrying such a child in a karmelis would constitute a shvus d’shvus. Based on this, there is room to argue that even according to Admur, a shvus d’shvus may be performed for the genuine needs of a child, whose needs are treated similarly to those of a choleh she’ein bo sakanah. Therefore, in a case where the child is truly exhausted, hungry, or otherwise unable to continue walking home despite every effort to persuade him, there may be greater room for leniency to carry him through a karmelis. Nevertheless, this argument requires further analysis and cannot be considered a conclusive proof, especially in light of Admur’s general reluctance to permit rabbinic prohibitions outside of the specific frameworks established by Chazal.

[335] See previous footnote

[336] See Az Nidbaru 6:31; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:12-14; Piskeiy Teshuvos 308:58

[337] See Admur 243:1; 263:25; 307:6-8; 331:8; 495:10; Rambam Shabbos 6:1; Shabbos 150a

[338] See Admur 331:8; M”B 331:20 [unlike M”B 308:154]

Other Opinions: Some authorities, including the Peri Megadim and Mishnah Berurah, write that one may ask a non-Jew to carry a child through a karmelis. [See M”B 308:154; P”M 308 A”A 71] However, elsewhere these same authorities limit the permissibility of amirah l’nochri to cases involving a genuine mitzvah need, illness, or other pressing necessity. [M”B 331:20] Accordingly, it must be concluded that their leniency here was not intended as a blanket allowance, but rather applies only in situations of substantial need or for the sake of an actual mitzvah. [Az Nidbaru 6:31] Other authorities, however, understand the ruling of the Peri Megadim and Mishnah Berurah literally. According to this approach, the ordinary needs of a young child are themselves considered a significant need, and one may therefore ask a non-Jew to carry a child whenever necessary, even absent a specific mitzvah requirement or unusual circumstance. [See Shevet Halevi 7:37; 11:86]

[339] Admur 331:8; M”B 331:20

[340] See Admur 308:81 regaridng even a Jew; SSH”K 38:28

[341] Shevet Halevi 7:37; 11:86; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:12-14; See SSH”K 38:28 who depends on custom and directs to ask Rav and in footnote implies that Rav SZ”A agreed to the possible justification; Piskeiy Teshuvos 308:58 who concludes that we cannot protest protest

[342] The justification: The justification offered by the lenient authorities is based on a triple rabbinic leniency (shvus d’shvus d’shvus) for the sake of a mitzvah. Since contemporary public areas are generally classified as a karmelis (a rabbinic public domain), asking a non-Jew to carry constitutes one shvus, carrying in a karmelis constitutes a second shvus, and carrying a child who is able to walk on his own is itself only rabbinically prohibited due to the principle of chai nosei es atzmo, constituting a third shvus. Accordingly, for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah—such as participating in a Shabbos meal—some authorities found room to justify the lenient practice. Furthermore, some authorities extend this justification even to a child who cannot yet walk on his own. According to their approach, since asking a non-Jew to carry the child is itself only a rabbinic prohibition, and the carrying is taking place in a karmelis, there remains sufficient basis for leniency when performed for the sake of a mitzvah or other significant need. Furthermore, some Poskim rule that even carrying a child who cannot yet walk on his own is only rabbinically prohibited. According to this approach, the leniency of shvus d’shvus Deshvus for the sake of a mitzvah or significant need may apply even in such a case. Accordingly, they do not view the child’s inability to walk as eliminating all grounds for leniency, although this approach is not accepted by Admur, who explicitly rules that carrying a child who cannot walk independently involves a Biblical prohibition.

[343] See Admur 308:81 who rules stringently that a) there is a Biblical prohibition to carry a child who cannot walk on his own; and b) there is a Rabbinical prohibition to carry a child that can walk on his own.

[344] See Admur 345:11 “A public domain (Reshus HaRabim) is defined as streets or marketplaces that are sixteen amos wide by sixteen amos, corresponding to the width of the road in the Levite encampment in the wilderness.”; Michaber 345:7; Rambam Shabbos 14:1; Eruvin 6a and 99a; Taz 345:6; M”B 345:23; 364:7

[345] See SSH”K 38:28; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:13

[346] Tzitz Eliezer 13:32; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:14; SSH”K 38:51

[347] See SSH”K 38 footnote 87; Piskeiy Teshuvos 308 footnote 477

[348] SSH”K 38:21; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:27-28

[349] See M”B 345:23; Tzitz Eliezer 14:32; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 52:29-30

[350] The reason: Even for those who are stringent because they are concerned that contemporary streets have the status of a Biblical reshus harabim, the area nonetheless remains only rabbinically prohibited when surrounded by a tzuras hapesach, as ruled by Admur (364:4). Certainly, for those whose stringency is based merely on concerns regarding the validity of the eiruv and not because they consider the area a Biblical reshus harabim, the area has the status of a karmelis. Accordingly, regarding a child to whom the principle of chai nosei es atzmo applies, one may rely on the opinions of those Acharonim who permit carrying such a child in a karmelis, as prohibiting it would amount to a gezeirah ligzeirah (a rabbinic decree upon a rabbinic decree).

[351] See Tehila Ledavid 309:1; Chayeh Levi 2:29; SSH”K 18 footnote 211; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 47:23-24; 52:33-38

[352] See Michaber 414:2; Rambam Eruvin 6:21; Eruvin 82a; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 53:1-51

[353] See Admur 366:2, 4; Michaber 366:3; 371:6; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 54:1-51

[354] Admur 331:11; 511:1; 616:1 and 3 regarding Yom Kippur; Michaber 331:9; M”A 511:5; 616:1; Mishneh Shabbos 134b; Shevet Halevi 5:31-4; Levush 616; Chayeh Adam 95:10; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 48:1-19

Admur 331:11 “Today that it is no longer viewed as a medical necessity to bathe a circumcised child, it remains forbidden to do so to the child the same way as is forbidden for an adult. Hence only one’s face, hands and feet [i.e. minority of his limbs] may be bathed in hot water, and only if the water was heated before Shabbos.” Admur 616:1 “Although the oppressions of Yom Kippur do not apply to children, nevertheless they may only be bathed in cold water. However, one may not bathe his entire body in hot water, even if the water was heated before Shabbos, as bathing in hot water on Yom Kippur is not forbidden only due to oppression, but due to the prohibition applicable on every Shabbos of the year in which it is forbidden to bathe in hot water due to the decree against the bathhouses.”; Admur 511:1 “However, a baby who is customarily bathed every day may have his entire body bathed at one time, even with water heated on Yom Tov for the purpose of drinking. Since this is a genuine need of the child, the Sages did not apply their decree in this case. Nowadays, however, when even during the week it is common not to bathe a baby for two or three days, it is forbidden even on Yom Tov to bathe the child’s entire body with water heated on Yom Tov, even if he is washed limb by limb.”

Background: The Acharonim ibid write that the various leniencies historically granted for bathing children on Shabbos and Yom Tov applied primarily in earlier generations, when it was customary and considered necessary for a child’s health and development to be bathed daily. However, nowadays, when even during the week children are often not bathed every day, these authorities rule that the leniencies no longer apply, and one may not bathe a child in hot water on Shabbos or Yom Tov, even through a non-Jew. Other authorities, however, disagree and maintain that the distinction is not between earlier and later times, but rather between different children. According to this view, any child who is ordinarily bathed every day and experiences discomfort without it may still be treated leniently, whereas a child who is normally not bathed for several days may not. [Chemed Moshe 511:3; M”B 511:12 and 18]

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is permitted to bathe a child in hot water on Shabbos/Yom Kippur. [Bach 616, brought in M”A ibid] The M”A ibid negates his opinion and so rules Admur. See however Shevet Halevi 5:31 and Piskeiy Teshuvos 326 footnote 10 that one may bathe a child in hot water as this decree does not apply against a child. Vetzaruch Iyun from the Poskim above. Perhaps however they refer only to a case that the child needs it, such as he is dirty or sick and the like.

The law on Yom Tov: Admur records two opinions regarding if one may bathe a child entire body in hot water on Yom Tov-see 511:1!

[355] Being that bathing [majority of the body] in hot water is forbidden on Shabbos, it is likewise forbidden to do so to a child just as it is forbidden to feed a child any Rabbinically prohibited food, as explained in 343:1. [Admur 616:1]

[356] Admur and Michaber ibid which are discussing a child after Mila

[357] Admur 326:1; Michaber and Rama ibid; Shabbos 40a

[358] Or Letziyon 2:35-4; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 48:4; See also Shevet Halevi and Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid

[359] As even an adult may bathe in hot water in a case of pain.

[360] See Rama 511:2; M”A 616:1; M”B 511:13; 613:7; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso 48:11-16

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is permitted to have a gentile heat water in order to bathe a child in hot water on Shabbos/Yom Kippur. [Bach 616, brought in M”A ibid; Tehila Ledavid 326:1]

[361] The reason: As this constitutes a shvus deshvus (a double rabbinic prohibition), which is permitted for the needs of a child.

[362] See Admur 511:1; 616:3; M”A 511:5; Levush 616; Chayeh Adam 95:10

[363] Background: Diapers Fastened with Adhesive Tape

The halachic discussion regarding disposable diapers with adhesive tape centers on three potential concerns related to the melachos of Tofer (sewing/attaching) and Korei’a (tearing):

1. Opening the diaper by removing the adhesive tab from its protective backing.
2. Fastening the diaper by attaching the adhesive tab to the diaper.
3. Removing the diaper by separating the adhesive tab from the diaper during a diaper change.

The permissibility of tape-fastened diapers on Shabbos depends on how the poskim evaluate each of these actions.

Removing the protective backing: Many poskim rule that removing the adhesive tab from its protective backing is prohibited due to concerns of tearing, and therefore require that the tabs be opened before Shabbos. Other poskim permit doing so on Shabbos, arguing that the attachment was never intended to remain for any significant period of time.

Fastening the diaper: Some poskim prohibit fastening the adhesive tabs to the diaper because of the melachah of sewing or joining materials together. Many others permit it, maintaining that the attachment is entirely temporary and is intended to be undone shortly thereafter.

Removing the diaper: Some poskim permit separating the adhesive tabs only discreetly and not in front of those unfamiliar with the halachah, due to concerns that others may draw incorrect conclusions. Other poskim permit removing the diaper without restriction. According to all opinions, however, one should not reattach the tabs after removing the diaper for the sole purpose of sealing it before disposal, but should discard it without re-fastening it.

[364] Tzitz Eliezer 16:6; see Minchas Yitzchak 5:39 regarding removing the plastic cover from a band aid in which he rules it is forbidden. Shemiras Shabbos K’hilchoso 15:81, Az Nidberu 13:25, Shevet Ha’Levi 5:78, Yechaveh Da’as 6:24, Machzei Eliyahu 71, Be’er Moshe 6:14, Chut Shuni Shabbos 1:17: page 137

[365] As it is meant to be attached to the plastic part so long as it is not used. It is thus an attachment that is meant to last some time.

[366] Minchas Yitzchak 8:31; 9:41; Mishneh Halachos 8:60; Kinyan Torah 5:26; Lehoros Nasan brought in Piskeiy Teshuvos 340 footnote 101

[367] As a) The attachment is at the very least considered temporary which is also forbidden in the laws of sewing. [Minchas Yitzchak ibid]. b) Because the tape never gets removed from the diaper as it tears part of the diaper off with it upon opening the tape, and thus regarding that part which gets removed with the tape it is considered a permanent attachment. [Lehoros Nasan, and so ruled to me Rav Asher Lemel Kohen]

[368] Sheivet Halevy 5:31; Az Nidbaru 6:31; 7:34; Yechaveh Daas 6:25, Tzitz Eliezer 16:6; Beir Moshe 6:14; SSH”K 15:81

[369] As they hold that if one were to buy the diaper that day then it would be meant to be opened that same day,, and thus the attachment of the tape to the plastic part is not really meant to last.

[370] Minchas Yitzchak ibid.

[371] As rules Rama and Admur in 317 regarding tearing the sewn stitches of the collar done by the laundry mat to keep it temporarily in place.

[372] Sheivet Halevy 5:31; Az Nidbaru 6:31; Yechaveh Daas 6:25, Tzitz Eliezer 16:6; Beir Moshe 6:14; SSH”K 15:81.

[373] Shulchan Shlomo (Siman 343, note 1)

[374] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 277; Minchas Yitzchak 2:16; 3:24-14

[375] Nevertheless this itself is not simple that it is forbidden being that possibly a Psik Reisha which is done indirectly and one has no benefit of may be done on Shabbos. See Minchas Yitzchak ibid which discusses the different sides to the matter

[376] Minchas Yitzchak ibid

[377] Beir Moshe 6 Elektri 4; Brought in Piskeiy Teshuvos 320 footnote 20; Nishmas Shabbos 7:488; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 2:180; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:49

[378] Az Nidbaru 2:36

[379] See Pnei Meivin 198; Beis Yitzchak 44; Chelkas Yoav 1; Maor Hashabbos 4:13; Nishmas Shabbos 6:272; 7:500; Chut Shani 4:95; Teshuvos Vehanahgos 1:230; 3:82; Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144; Avnei Yashpei O.C. 63; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:3; Beir Moshe Elektri 6:9-10; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnotes 59 and 64-66; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:45-49

Possible Basis for Leniency: One could perhaps argue that when the food in the refrigerator is needed for the child himself, no non-Jew is available, and there is a significant Shabbos need (tzorech Shabbos), there may be room to combine the opinions that permit providing a child with a rabbinic prohibition for his own benefit (Admur 343:6–7). Accordingly, if one were to classify the resulting prohibition as only rabbinic, there may be a basis to allow even an older child to perform the act for his own need.

However, this reasoning is subject to several significant objections:

1. Admur (334:26) implies that when a child performs a prohibited act primarily for the benefit of an adult, it is not treated as a case of the child acting for his own immediate need, even if the child will later derive some benefit. Thus, just as extinguishing a fire to save a house is viewed as being done on behalf of the adult owner, so too removing the refrigerator light may not qualify as an act done for the child’s present personal benefit.
2. There appears to be no clear precedent in the poskim permitting a child who has reached the age of chinuch to perform a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah for such a purpose.
3. The classification of the act as a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is itself questionable, as many authorities do not apply this leniency in a case of pesik reishei. If so, the act would retain the status of a Biblical prohibition, and the entire basis for leniency would fall away.
4. The authorities who discuss this question generally emphasize the case of a child below the age of chinuch, suggesting that the leniency was not intended to apply to older children.

Accordingly, while one could attempt to construct a basis for leniency, substantial grounds exist to reject the comparison and limit any leniency to a child below the age of chinuch.

[380] Additional Basis for Leniency Today By LED lights: One could argue that the above concerns are somewhat mitigated in many contemporary refrigerators. In many modern models, the interior light is LED or fluorescent, and many of the electrical reactions caused by opening the door may only be rabbinic in nature according to numerous authorities. If so, one might argue that the entire case involves only rabbinic prohibitions, which would strengthen the possibility of relying upon the lenient ruling of Admur (343:6–7) regarding a child’s own need.

[381] Chelkas Yoav 1; Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144; Rav SZ”A in letter in Maor Hashabbos 4:13; Chut Shani 4:95; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:47

[382] Har Tzevi 1:151; Rav AZ”a in SSH”K 10:14; Beir Moshe ibid; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso Chapter 44:49 footnote 109

[383] Adnei Paz 4:28; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchaso ibid

[384] Admur 340:10; Vetzaruch Iyun from 266:10, and so rules Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11, that a child even below Chinuch may only be given an object if the adult has no intent for the child to the prohibition with that object, while here the entire intent of lifting the child is for him to turn off the light. Hence on what bases is it permitted? Perhaps however one can say that since here one is not placing the item into the hands of the child and is simply placing him near the item, therefore it is more lenient.

[385] Shevet Hakehasi 4:126; Nishmas Shabbos 7:479; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 8 and 61; Chinuch Habanim Kehilchasa 44:12

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is forbidden to place a child near a light for him to turn it on or off. Some Poskim rule it is possibly forbidden to arrange for a child to perform a prohibition due to Gerama. [See Bear Sarim 5:74; Meorei Haeish 4:13 footnote 182; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 61]

[386] Requires Further Analysis: This ruling requires further clarification. As explained earlier (Chapter 1, Halacha 8F), even a child who is below the age of chinuch may only be given an object when the adult does not intend for the child to perform a prohibition with it. In the present case, however, the entire purpose of lifting the child is so that he turn the light on or off. This would appear to be a much more direct form of causing the child to perform the prohibited act. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand the basis for permitting it. Seemingly, this case is not comparable to merely handing a child an object that he may later misuse on his own initiative, as here the adult’s intent from the outset is for the child to perform the melachah. Therefore, the rationale behind this leniency requires further analysis (vetzaruch iyun).

[387] See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; Beir Moshe Elektri 18 Chinuch Habanim Kehilchasa 44 footnote 107

[388] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 53

[389] Admur 338:6; Rama 338:5; Darkei Moshe 338:5; Shiltei Hagiborim Eiruvin 35b; Aruch Hashulchan 338:12

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that it is forbidden to play any game on Shabbos being that they do not bring one to a needed wisdom. [M”A 338:8 in name of R”A Sasson 180; Shut Harav Meir Gagin 66; Radbaz end of Vol. 5; Elya Raba 338:6; Birkeiy Yosef 338:1; Tosefes Shabbos 338:11; M”B 338:21; Kaf Hachaim 338:39] Admur ibid omits this opinion from his Shulchan Aruch.

[390] See Admur 338:6; The M”A 338:8 brings R”A Sasson which forbids playing any games on Shabbos being that they do not bring one to a needed wisdom. Admur omits this opinion from his Shulchan Aruch; Beir Moshe 2:27

[391] Ketzos Hashulchan 110 footnote 16

[392] Admur 518:12

[393] 110 footnote 16

[394] Admur 338:6 “One may not play with nuts, apples, or similar items by rolling them on the ground, due to a rabbinic decree lest one come to intentionally level depressions in the ground in order to prepare a smooth path for rolling the nut or apple. However, it is permitted to play on a table or on a mat. It is nevertheless forbidden to do so on the ground, even if the floor is paved, as explained in Siman 337 regarding smearing and leveling the ground. Nevertheless, one should not protest women and children who play with nuts on the ground, since they certainly will not listen, and it is preferable that they transgress unknowingly rather than intentionally (mutav sheyihyu shogegin v’al yihyu mezidin).”; Michaber and Rama 338:5; Rambam Shabbos 21:3; Rav Yehuda Eruvin 104a

[395] Admur ibid; Rama ibid; Ketzos Hashulchan 146 footnote 60; Shevisas Hashabbos

The Reason This Applies Even Today: As these games are also played outside on dirt floors, and hence there is worry if we allow it on tiled floors, one may come to do so on dirt floors. However, regarding sweeping, on Shabbos, it is not common to sweep the courtyard as it was already swept bfore Shabbos. [Ketzos Hashulchan ibid]

Other opinions: Some Podskim rule that on tiled floors it is allowed, and no decree was made due to dirt floors as was done by sweeping, as it is not common to play these games. [Aruch Hashulchan 338:12]

[396] SSH”K 16:5; Piskeiy Teshuvos 338:9 rules that according to Rav SZ”A it is even permitted to play on a tiled courtyard.

[397] Admur 338:6 “All of the above applies when playing merely for amusement. However, one who plays in order to win money or other gain is forbidden to do so, even when playing games of chance (such as grad or om grad), because this resembles commercial activity and business dealings.”; Rama 338:5; Rambam Shabbos 23:17; Iggur 521

[398] Michaber 322:6; Admur 338:6; M”A 322:9; M”B 322:24; Ketzos Hashulchan 146:32 footnote 70 [lenient regarding using Sefer or by heart]; Piskeiy Teshuvos 322:10;

[399] If the items are not similar to each other then this is forbidden due to the gambling prohibition even during the week. If however the items are similar to each other, then during the week it is permitted as there is no gambling involved. However, on Shabbos it is forbidden due to a decree that due to jealousy one may come to measure the individual portions to see which portion is in truth larger. [Michaber ibid] Gambling is likewise forbidden on Shabbos due to it being similar to business. [338:6]

[400] 1^st opinion in Michaber 322:6; Tur 322; Beis Yosef 322 that so rules Rif Shabbos 63b and Rosh 23:3; Bach 322 that so is the final ruling and so is implied to be the ruling of the Michaber ibid; M”B 322:22; Kaf Hachaim 322:31 that so is the final ruling

The reason: Although the father of the home owns all the items and it is not real gambling and worry of stealing, nonetheless it is forbidden as this can lead to gambling with others and in a way that people lose and win. [M”B 322:22]

The reason: Due to the gambling prohibition [ibid]

[401] 2^nd opinion in Michaber 322:6; Rambam Shabbos 23:7; Taz 322:4

The reason: The reason for this is because gambling itself is only Rabbinically forbidden and hence there is no need to make an additional decree against this leading to one coming to gamble. [Maggid Mishneh on Rambam ibid; Olas Shabbos 322:10; Elya Raba 322:10; See Taz ibid for his alternative explanation]

[402] Bach 322 that so is the final ruling and so is implied to be the ruling of the Michaber ibid; Kaf Hachaim 322:31 that so is the final ruling

[403] M”A 322:9

[404] Nezer Hakodesh, as he understands Shevus Yaakov, brought in M”B 322:24; Ketzos Hashulchan 146:32 and footnote 70

[405] Ketzos Hashulchan 146:32 based on Tzemach Tzedek 26

[406] Beir Moshe 6:27; SSH”K 16:3. As the entire reason behind the noisemaking prohibition-in the opinion of M”B- is because of Uvdin Dechol, which is not so applicable by such toys. However according to Admur which rules the reason behind the prohibition is due to a decree one may come to fix the vessel, then it would seemingly be forbidden. Seemingly according to all it would be forbidden to give the child music making toys as it is forbidden due to a Rabbinical decree according to all. [So also concludes Piskeiy Teshuvos 338 footnote 2]

[407] In contrast to music, see next footnote.

[408] See Piskeiy Teshuvos 343

[409] So seems to be the opinion of Admur, as the reason behind the prohibition of intentionally making noise is because one may come to fix the item. Hence this is a typical Rabbinical prohibition which applies to all children above the age of Chinuch. However, Tzaruch Iyun as noise making items are disputed if they are forbidden to be used even by adults and hence perhaps by children there is room to be more lenient.

[410] 301:21 regarding giving a child clothing with bells to wear. This ruling is based on the understanding of Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54, and other alternative explanations of this ruling. However according to the explanation of Hearos Ubiurim 831 p. 79 so long as the adult has no intent for the child to make noise with the object, such as the objects can be used in a different way to entertain the child, then giving him the object is allowed.

[411] Tzaruch Iyun regarding noise making objects as bells can be defined as an item which makes music, as well as that noise making items is a dispute if forbidden even by an adult.

[412] Admur 338:6 “It is permitted to play with bones used for games (known as Tshayich), even though they produce noise, since the participants do not intend to create the sound.”; Admur 338:6; Rama 338:5; Darkei Moshe 338:5; Shiltei Hagiborim Eiruvin 35b; Aruch Hashulchan 338:12; Some authorities explain that this ruling refers to chess [Minchas Yitzchak 1:33], while others understand it to refer to five stones and similar children’s games. [Chelkas Yaakov 1:71]

[413] Admur 308:83

[414] 1^st opinion in Admur ibid; Michaber 308:45; Iggur 521; Shibulei Haleket 121

[415] 2^nd opinion in Admur ibid; Rama 308:45; Tosafus Beitza 12a; M”A 308:73

[416] Admur ibid; Rama ibid; M”A ibid

[417] The city of Tur Shimon was destroyed, according to one opinion, for the sin of playing ball on Shabbos, which according to the lenient opinion means due to the sin of using their Shabbos for ball playing instead of learning Torah. [Ketzos Hashulchan 110 footnote 16]

[418] Ketzos Hashulchan 110 footnote 16; Taz 518:2 writes in name of Rashal that it is a wonderment that playing ball is allowed on Yom Tov when in truth it is a game of children and not meant for adults. Thus he rules that it is an evil custom for adults to spend their time playing ball, and “if I had the power I would nullify it”.

The Ketzos Hashulchan explains how even during the week ball playing is to be avoided, as it is a mere women’s game, being that they are not obligated in learning Torah, as well as that some of the games are taken from the gentiles.

[419] Ketzos Hashulchan 110 footnote 16

[420] Yesod Yeshurun 4 page 270; Betzeil Hachachmah 4:92; Beir Moshe 2:20

[421] Admur 338:6; Ketzos Hashulchan Ibid in name of Mishneh Berurah 308:158.

[422] Due to decree of “Mashveh Gumos”. 338:6;  SSH”K 16:7. It is forbidden even to play on a concrete court as rules Ketzos Hashulchan 146:60 However SSH”K 16:5; Piskeiy Teshuvos 338:9 rule that according to Rav SZ”A it is permitted to play on a tiled courtyard.

[423] Mishneh Berurah 308:158

[424] SSH”K 16:13; Piskeiy Teshuvos 314:6; Beir Moshe 6:34

[425] SSH”K 16:4

[426] Piskeiy Teshuvos 313:4

[427] Beir Moshe 6:25; Tzitz Eliezer 13:30

[428] As well for a child it is considered a Shabbos need and thus fulfills all the conditions required by a not even temporary vessel.

[429] Shalmei Yehuda 85:1

[430] SSH”K 16:20

[431] Michzei Eliyahu 69

[432] SSH”K 16:20

[433] Beir Moshe 6:24

[434] Piskeiy Teshuvos 340:16-footnote 51

[435] Admur 340:4

[436] Admur 340:10; M”A 340:6; Rambam Shabbos 11:17; Degul Merivava 340; Tehila Ledavid 340:3

[437] Admur 340:6

[438] Some Poskim rule it is forbidden to open or close them on Shabbos due to the writing and erasing prohibition. [1^st opinion in Admur 340:4; M”A 340:6; Levush 340:4; Menorah Hatehora 340:4] However other Poskim  rule it is permitted to close and open [the books].  [2^nd opinion in Admur 340:4; Taz 340:2; Shut Rama 119; Maharash Halevi 27] The reason for this lenient opinion is as follows: As since the letters are already written and it is just that they are lacking proximity, this does not contain a writing prohibition. As since it is possible to bring them close together easily without doing any new action they are considered like they are close and standing and one is doing nothing with this proximity. Similarly, it is permitted to open them for this reason and one is not considered like he is erasing them as their writing [remains] intact and it is possible to near them to each other easily and they are [thus] considered already now to be] as if [they were] close. [Admur ibid; Taz ibid; Nishmas Adam 37:2; See Shut Rama ibid for other reasons mentioned; See Piskeiy Teshuvos 340 footnote 97]

[439] Ketzos Hashulchan 144:3; Shaar Hatziyon 340:25 in name of Achronim; Sefer Hachaim; Poskim brought in Piskeiy Teshuvos 340 footnote 98]

[440] Admur ibid; Kneses Hagedola, brought in M”A 340:6; Tzemach Tzedek in Mishnayos Shabbos 12:4; Tosefes Shabbos 340:9; Birkeiy Yosef 340:5; Mor Uketzia 340; Chayeh Adam 38:5; Levushei Mordechai 1:59; Aruch Hashulchan 340:27; Mishneh Berurah 340:17; Poskim in Kaf Hachaim 340:30 and so concludes Kaf Hachaim ibid; Igros Moshe 2:40; Minchas Yitzchak 7:15; Poskim in Piskeiy Teshuvos 340:10 footnote 98

Other opinions: Some Poskim rule like the stringent opinion, that it is forbidden for the book to be opened or closed. This would likewise apply if there are designs on the edges of the papers. [Avnei Neizer 210]

[441] Piskeiy Teshuvos 340:16-footnote 51 [old] 340:19 [new]

[442] Shalmeiy Yehuda 5:3 in name of Rav Elyashiv; Bris Olam Mocheik 8, Az Nidbaru 5:18; Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:75 regarding the prohibition in placing torn pages together

[443] The reason: This is Rabbinically forbidden due to the writing prohibition. It is not similar to the allowance of closing a book with letters written on its pages, being that by a book, the pages are bound together and is already considered to be very close. [Az Nidbaru ibid based on 1^st reason in Teshuvas Harama ibid] Likewise, here one has intent to

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