Question:
Dear Rabbi, a discussion arose in our shul regarding whether it is permitted to strike someone who is defined as a rasha, a wicked person. We were learning about the severity of striking a fellow Jew—how serious the prohibition is, to the point that the sages disqualified a person who did so from joining a minyan. Someone raised the question: what about a person who strikes a transgressor, a rasha—does the same prohibition apply?
Answer:
The prohibition against hitting a fellow Jew applies even to someone considered a rasha. Therefore, the disqualification of Minyan participation imposed by the sages would still apply in such a scenario. However, there are specific circumstances where hitting a Rasha is not considered a transgression. If a person has the legitimate authority to educate and reprimand—such as a parent with a child (up to a certain age) or a teacher with a student—then in those educational contexts, the individual would not be disqualified. Likewise, it is permissible for an individual to use reasonable force in self-defense to prevent being struck or to protect another person from harm, provided that such action is necessary and that no less forceful alternative is available to effectively stop the aggressor. However, the common denominator across all these cases is that this does not constitute a blanket authorization to use force against anyone merely classified as a rasha (wrongdoer). Rather, it applies only to the specific circumstances described above, under strict conditions. If an individual acts outside of these defined parameters or fails to adhere precisely to the permitted criteria in either scenario, such use of force becomes unjustified, and the individual himself assumes the status of the very rasha against whom he sought to act.
Explanation:
It is Biblically forbidden for one to hit another Jew and if one hits him he transgresses a negative command. The source behind this prohibition is the verse [Devarim 25/2-3] which states “Im Ben Hakos Harasha…Arbaim Yakenu Lo Yosif Pen Yoseif” which prohibits one from hitting a person who is liable for Malkus more than 39 lashes. Now, the person receiving lashes is certainly a Rasha. Accordingly, the entire source behind the prohibition against hitting a fellow Jew not only includes a Rasha, but furthermore is learned from a Rasha, as only a Rasha is liable for receiving lashes, and even so we are commanded not to add, and if a person adds one more and gives him forty lashes he transgresses. Hence, how can we exclude a Rasha from the prohibition?
Furthermore, in the laws of tochacha—rebuke—nowhere do we find stated that it is permitted for one to raise his hand against a fellow Jew in order to give him reproof. This allowance is only given to a father—and even then, only until his child is a certain age—and given to a teacher. The idea is that it’s only given to people who have the authority and legal guardianship over the individual. Only then is reprimanding with a hit permitted and allowed—without going into whether it is the proper approach, especially in today’s day and age. But nonetheless, it doesn’t transgress when done for educational purposes by the legal guardian or rabbi of the individual. However, for anyone else, it is prohibited.
This principle is explicitly implied from the wording of the Alter Rebbe (Admur HaZaken) in Hilchos Nizkei Guf VeNefesh, who writes, and I quote, that if the Torah was particular even with regard to striking a rasha, prohibiting one from hitting him beyond the extent of his wrongdoing, then certainly it is prohibited to strike one who is a Tzadik. From this formulation, it is evident that the Alter Rebbe explicitly includes striking a rasha within the broader prohibition, as implied from the cited verse. Similarly, in his halachic rulings, he states that it is only permissible to strike an individual who is actively assaulting another when such action is strictly necessary for self-defense and there is no alternative means of preventing the harm, thereby implying that the mere designation of a person as a rasha—such as one who strikes another—does not in itself justify striking him; rather, any permissible force is limited solely to immediate defensive necessity. Additionally, he continues and rules that one who observes another transgressing a different prohibition may only administer physical reprimand when that individual is under his authority, such as a servant, child, or student; otherwise, one is not permitted to strike him. Even in such cases, the allowance is limited strictly to preventing the ongoing transgression, but once the act has already been committed, it is forbidden to strike, and instead the matter must be referred to a Beis Din, the court of Jewish law, for appropriate adjudication and sanction. From all of the above, it is clear that in the opinion of the Alter Rebbe, the prohibition applies even to striking a rasha, including one who is actively engaged in sin, and certainly it applies even more so once the transgression has already been committed.
This approach—that it is forbidden to strike even a rasha, a transgressor—is further underscored in the words of the Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo, who explains that if permission were granted for individuals to strike those deemed sinful, it would lead to a breakdown of societal order, as people would take it upon themselves to punish others for even minor perceived transgressions, given that “there is no righteous person on earth who does only good and does not sin.” The Torah, therefore, did not grant license for individuals to act as enforcers, striking others at will, except in very limited circumstances—such as a dayan (judge) acting within the authority of a beis din, or an exceptionally distinguished individual whose moral authority is universally recognized and whose actions are clearly and demonstrably for the sake of Heaven, particularly in the context of guiding and educating the community.
Now all this follows the ruling of the Alter Rebbe in Shulchan Aruch, as well as that of other poskim. However, there are authorities who understand that there is no prohibition against striking a rasha in order to prevent him from sinning, and some explain that this is likewise the underlying rationale behind the allowance to strike one who is assaulting another Jew—that it is not merely a matter of self-defense, but also because the aggressor is engaged in sin and may be struck in order to halt his wrongdoing. Nevertheless, upon closer examination of the sources that permit striking a sinner, it is explicit in the words of the Rama and the Terumas HaDeshen that this allowance is limited specifically to one who is under the authority of the individual, such as in cases of recognized jurisdiction, and does not grant a general license for any person to strike another merely on account of his transgression.
Nonetheless, it is evident that some poskim do not interpret the matter in accordance with the Terumas HaDeshen. Firstly, we have the Yam Shel Shlomo, cited earlier, who in principle permits striking an individual who is sinning in order to prevent the transgression, and limits this heter only due to the concern that granting such permission broadly would result in societal breakdown, with individuals taking it upon themselves to strike others for any perceived wrongdoing. Accordingly, he restricts this allowance to an exceptionally righteous individual whose moral authority is widely recognized and whose words are heeded. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Rambam, in articulating the prohibition against striking a fellow Jew, formulates it by stating that one who strikes a “kosher” member of Israel transgresses, from which it may be inferred that the prohibition does not necessarily extend in the same manner to a rasha—although it is possible that this exclusion is intended specifically for an apikoros or mumar, and not to all transgressors. A Talmudic support for this position may be drawn from the Gemara in Sanhedrin (84b) and Bava Metzia 48b, which states that just as it is permitted to curse certain individuals, so too it is permitted to strike one who is not acting in accordance with “maaseh amecha” (proper conduct among your people). However, it remains unclear how the other opinions cited above would interpret these passages. Seemingly, the straightforward understanding is that the Gemara is referring specifically to cases involving a beis din or an authorized judge, for whom such actions are permitted within a formal judicial context, rather than granting license to an ordinary individual to act on his own initiative.
In any event, to summarize, it is clear that there are authorities who either permit or at least limit the prohibition of striking in the context of preventing a rasha from sinning. However, this does not represent the final halachic ruling, particularly in practice, and even according to the more lenient views—such as that of the Rashal—this allowance is highly restricted and generally not applicable. Certainly, according to the definitive ruling of the Alter Rebbe, and the straightforward implication of the Rama, one may not be lenient in this manner.
An additional point to consider is that, according to some explanations, the entire allowance even within the more lenient opinions applies only to a righteous individual striking a rasha for the sake of preventing sin; however, one rasha may never strike another rasha. This concept may underlie the account of Moshe preventing Dasan from striking Aviram, even though both were both Reshaim, emphasizing that one who is himself not beyond reproach cannot assume the role of enforcer against another. Consequently, it raises the fundamental question: who can confidently assert that he is a tzaddik while the other is a rasha, thereby justifying such action?
Sources:
Admur Hilchos Nizkeiy Haguf Vihanefesh 1 “It is forbidden for a person to strike his fellow. If he does, he transgresses a negative commandment, as it is stated: “And it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten… forty lashes he may give him, he shall not add, lest he add…” If the Torah is particular—even regarding the striking of a wicked person—not to strike him beyond what he deserves, then all the more so regarding the striking of a righteous person. Anyone who raises his hand against his fellow to strike him—even if he does not actually strike him—is called a rasha (wicked person), as it is stated: “And he said to the wicked one: Why would you strike your fellow?” It does not say “Why did you strike,” but rather “Why would you strike,” referring even to merely raising the hand. Anyone who strikes his fellow is placed under a ban (cherem), standing in the ban of the early authorities, and may not be counted toward a quorum of ten (minyan) or for any matter of sanctity until a court releases him from the ban when he accepts upon himself to heed their ruling. Admur Hilchos Nizkeiy Haguf Vihanefesh 2 “One who strikes his fellow even with a light blow that does not involve the value of a perutah (i.e., no monetary liability), since no monetary payment is required, is liable to receive lashes from the Torah. This applies even if his fellow initiated the quarrel and insulted him verbally, and even if he struck him—provided that the aggressor then stopped. However, if the aggressor did not stop, one may strike him in order to save oneself, if it is impossible to save oneself in another way. If it is possible to defend oneself with a minimal amount of force, one may not strike excessively. Similarly, one who sees a fellow Jew striking another and cannot rescue the victim except by striking the aggressor—there is a mitzvah to strike the aggressor in order to separate him from wrongdoing. However, if it is possible to rescue the victim without striking—even by pushing gently—then it is forbidden to strike. Likewise, one who sees another committing a different sin, and that person is under his authority or control, may strike him in order to separate him from the sin, and he is not required to bring him to court. But if the sin has already been committed, he may not strike him; rather, he should bring him to a court so that they may punish him.”
Prohibition applies even to Rasha: Implication of Admur ibid and ibid; Implication of Michaber C.M. 420:1; Rama 421:13; Terumas Hadeshen 218; Implication of Rambam Chovel Umazik 5:1 from his concluding words; Implication of Bava Kama 28a; Radbaz 4:258 (1329); Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Bava Kama 9 in his conclusion; Imrei Yaakov on Admur ibid 17-18 and in Biurim “Vehu Tachas Yado”; Pischeiy Choshen [Bloy] 2:6; Chikikei Lev O.C. 19 leaves in question
No prohibition against Rasha: Possible understanding of Sanhedrin 85a and Ran ibid and Bava Metzia 48b and Sefer Yireim Mitzvah 217 who discuss the exemption from one who curses or hits a Rasha; Implication of Rambam Chovel Umazik 5:1 from his initial words of Adam Kosher; Rashal in Yam Shel Shlomo Bava Kama 9 in his initial stance; Tumim 4:1; Shut Mabit 26; Shut Maharit 2 E.H. 43 [A Rasha may not hit a Rasha]; Nesivos Hamishpat 3:1 and in Mishovev Nesivos; Chasam Sofer 177:3; Chavatzeles Hasharon Parshas Shemos; Poskim in Imrei Yaakov on Admur in Biurim “Vehu Tachas Yado”; Chikikei Lev O.C. 19 leaves in question