Giving a child an item with which he may commit a prohibition:[1]
Non-Kosher food: It is forbidden to give a child [of any age] non‑kosher food if there is a chance that he may come to eat.[2] [This applies even to food forbidden merely due to Rabbinic decree.[3]] Moreover, even food that is prohibited only during a specific time period[4] may not be given to a child [when it is forbidden for him to consume it at that time] if there is a chance that he may come to eat it.[5]
Foods prohibited due to repulsiveness:[6] Even foods that are forbidden solely because of their repulsive nature, and thus fall under the prohibition of bal teshaktzu, may not be given to a child if there is concern that the child may come to eat them.
A live creature:[7] It is forbidden to give an infant a live non‑kosher locust to play with, as it may die and the child may come to eat it, in which case it is considered as though one actively fed the child non‑kosher food. However, one may give a child a live treif[8] bird to play with, since even if it dies, it is not fit for consumption in its present state. [Furthermore, in modern times being that it is no longer customary to eat locusts, a live non-Kosher locust may be given to children to play with, as there is no concern that they will eat it.[9]]
Giving the child an item with which he will desecrate Shabbos with:[10] All of the above restrictions apply specifically to prohibited foods, even where the prohibition is time‑dependent.[11] However, with respect to Shabbos, it is permitted to give a child [of any age below Bar and Bas Mitzvah[12]] objects with which he may perform a prohibited act for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so [and even if the act is Biblically forbidden].[13] [Some Poskim[14] rule that this leniency applies even in a case where the child would be unable to reach the item without the assistance of an adult. This leniency however only applies to individuals other than the child’s father.[15] The father, however, may give such an item to a child only if the child is below the age of chinuch.[16] Once the child reaches the age of chinuch, the father is obligated to educate him in mitzvot and to protest improper behavior, and therefore may not provide him with an item through which he will perform a prohibition.[17]] For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos.[18] Although the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is solely for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him.[19] Nevertheless, an adult may not place the food directly into the child’s mouth[20], [nor instruct the child to eat it, as explained in Halacha B]. [Likewise, it is forbidden for one to tell the baby to eat it.[21]] [Some Poskim[22] maintain that if an item will cause the child to engage in a constant prohibition, it may not be given to him. Others[23] rule that any item whose primary function involves the performance of a prohibited act, in which case it will most certainly be performed by the child, may not be given to a child at all. Likewise, if providing the item to the child implicitly conveys to him that he is expected to perform a prohibited act with it, this would seemingly fall under the standard category of sefiya, and is no different from explicitly instructing the child to perform the prohibition. Accordingly, only in a case where the child has not yet reached a level of maturity or understanding to recognize that the adult, by providing the item, is asking him to perform a prohibited act, may there be room to permit it.[24]]
Giving a child an item with the intent that he desecrate Shabbos: Some Poskim[25] rule that the above leniency applies only when the item is given to the child without intent that he perform a prohibited act with it. However, if the giver’s intent is specifically that the child commits a transgression using the item, it is forbidden to give it to him.[26]
[1] Admur 343:9 “It is forbidden to give a child a live non‑kosher locust to play with, lest it die and the child eat it, in which case one would be actively feeding him a prohibited item, since he himself gave him the prohibition. All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is. Even something that is prohibited only because of bal teshaktzu (repulsiveness) may not be given to him if there is concern that he might eat it. However, it is permitted to give him a non‑kosher bird to play with, since even if it dies it is not fit for consumption.” Admur 343:10 “(All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food, even when the prohibition is time‑dependent.) However, on Shabbat it is permitted to give a child objects with which he can perform a prohibited labor for his own benefit, even if it is known that he will do so. For example, one may give a child a cake with letters written on it, which is forbidden to eat on Shabbat, as explained in siman ש״מ. Even though the child will certainly eat it, since his intent is for his own enjoyment, there is no obligation to prevent him, as explained above—provided that an adult does not place the food directly into the child’s mouth.” Admur 616:4 “All of this applies to a minor who has not yet reached the age of education for the mitzvah of affliction. However, if he has reached the age of education, it is permitted to feed him, give him drink, anoint him, and wash him directly, in the manner explained above. If the minor performs any of these acts on his own, there is no need to protest, except for his father, who is required to protest and to educate his son in the mitzvot. His mother, however, is not obligated in this. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for her to place food before him, since doing so is considered as if she were feeding him directly.”; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4
[2] Admur 343:9 “All the more so is it forbidden to give him any prohibited item that is fit to be eaten as is… if there is concern that he might eat it.” and 10 in parentheses “All of the above applies to prohibitions related to food”; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Toras Hakatan 19:1-29
The reason: As this is considered as if he is actively feeding him a prohibited item. [Admur ibid; M”A ibid; rashi ibid]
[3] As rules Admur next regarding Bal Tishaktzu
[4] Such as Matzah on Erev Pesach for a child who has reached the age of understanding, or a child on Yom Kippur which has reached the age of Chinuch for fasts.
[5] Admur 343:10 in parentheses; 616:4
[6] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Implication of Shabbos ibid; Tosefes Shabbos 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:13; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 10; See Admur Basra 3:11
[7] Admur 343:9; M”A 343:3; Hagahos Ashri Shabbos end of chapter 9; Shabbos 90b; Kaf Hachaim 343:13
[8] Vetzaruch Iyun why Admur mentions a Treif bird, as even by a kosher bird it is forbidden to be eaten without slaughtering and thus the same suspicion applies.
[9] Chidushei Rashal on Hagahos Ashri of Shabbos; Pischei Olam 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:13
[10] Admur 343:10 “(However all the above is regarding prohibited foods, even if it is forbidden due to time) However it is permitted to give to a baby on Shabbos items which he is able to do prohibited actions with for himself, and even if one knows that he will do these actions with them , such as to give a baby a cake which has letters written on it which is forbidden to eat on Shabbos as explained in chapter 340, even though the young child will for certain eat it, [nevertheless] since he intends for his own benefit one need not separate him [from doing the prohibition] as was explained above [in Halacha 1]. Nevertheless one [a Gadol] may not place [the cake] into the mouth of the baby.”; M”A 343:2; See Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:230; 3:82 and Orchos Rabbeinu 1:144 who permit to have a child below age 6 to open the fridge; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 who allows placing a child below age 3 in front of the fridge and in front of the light switch; Other contradictory rulings of Admur and their resolution: See Admur 266:10 [forbidden to give wallet to carry], 301:21 [prohibits dressing child with clothing that contain bells that make noise]; Tehila Ledavid 343:2; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11; Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54; Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79;
The contradiction in Admur: There is an apparent contradiction within the rulings of Admur regarding the permissibility of giving a child below the age of chinuch an item with which a prohibition will be performed. Here in 343:10, Admur explicitly permits giving a child cake that contains letters, notwithstanding that the inevitable result of eating the cake will be the erasure of the letters, a rabbinic prohibition of mechikas ksav. This ruling implies that even where the adult is aware that a prohibition will certainly occur (pesik reisha), and even where the adult benefits from the child’s action, it is nevertheless permitted to give the item to a child below the age of chinuch. However, this ruling appears to contradict numerous other rulings of Admur, including 343:9 (prohibiting giving a child non‑kosher food), 266:10 (forbidding handing a child an object to carry in a public domain), and 301:21 (based on M”A 301:35 prohibiting dressing a child in garments with bells that will inevitably cause prohibited noise), all of which indicate that one may not actively place a child in a situation where a prohibition will certainly be transgressed.
The resolutions to the contradictions: This internal inconsistency has led to multiple approaches among the Poskim in explaining Admur’s position. Some make note of the contradiction and leave it unresolved (tzaruch iyun). [Tehila Ledavid 343:2] Others resolve the contradiction by sharply limiting the scope of 343:10, ruling that a child below chinuch may only be given an item with which a prohibition might occur if the adult has no intent for the child to perform the prohibition; if the adult’s intent is that the prohibition be done, even indirectly, it is forbidden. According to this approach, the cake-with-letters case is permitted only because the adult’s intent is feeding the child, not erasing letters. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147, fn. 11; Article of Rav Avraham Elyashvili in Hearos Ubiurim Ohalei Torah 831 p. 79] A different resolution that is suggested distinguishes between a one‑time prohibition and a constant or ongoing prohibition. They explain that Admur permits giving a child an item that will result in a single, incidental transgression (such as erasing letters while eating cake), but forbids giving items that will cause continuous violations (such as bells that ring repeatedly or objects that will be carried for an extended period). [Chikrei Halachos vol. 4 p. 54] Other contemporary Poskim adopt a more expansive reading of Admur. According to this approach, the decisive factor is whether the item inherently compels a prohibition or merely enables it. If the child retains a genuine choice whether or not to perform the prohibited act, then giving the item—or even placing the child in proximity to it—is not equivalent to instructing the child to sin, even if the adult hopes to benefit from the result. This reading understands 343:10 as the governing principle, with the stricter rulings in other simanim applying only where the item’s sole or unavoidable use is the prohibition itself. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 55 and 62]
Other opinions: Some Poskim rule it is possibly forbidden to arrange for a child to perform a prohibition due to Gerama. [See Bear Sarim 5:74; Meorei Haeish 4:13 footnote 182; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and fn. 61]
[11] Admur ibid in parentheses
[12] Setimas Admur ibid
Other Opinions: Some Poskim rule that anyone who sees a child who has reached the age of education transgressing a prohibition, then he must reprimand and stop the child even if he is not the child’s father, and hence certainly it would be forbidden to provide an Issur to such a child. [Bikurei Yaakov 640:5; Kaf Hachaim 343:28; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:2 footnote 19 in opinion of Rama ibid, based on Yevamos 114a that Beis Din is Lav Davka and the same applies to any person; So rule regarding a Beis Din: 1st opinion in Rama 343:1; M”A 640:3; Elya Raba 640:4; P”M 640 A”A 4; Tosafus Nazir 28b; Tosafus Yesheinim Yuma 82a in name of Yereim; Terumas Hadeshen 94; Rashi Eruvin 96b; Chayeh Adam 66:3] Some Poskim conclude based on this opinion that by a Biblical transgression one is to be stringent and reprimand a child which has reached the age of education even if the child is not his son. However, by Rabbinical prohibitions there is no need to be stringent. [Chayeh Adam ibid; Mishneh Berura 343:7] Based on this, by one may not provide a child who has reached the age of c=Chinuch with an item with which he may do a Biblical prohibition, but may provide him with an item with which he can perform a Rabbinical prohibition if he is not the child’s father. [Piskei Teshuvos 343:4]
[13] This is learned from the Gemara Shabbos 90b which does not differentiate [and neither does any Posek] and seemingly allows to give a child a kosher locust to play with even though the child may kill, trap, detach a wing or the like to the locust. [Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11]. As for the reason that there is a difference between giving the child a food or an item meant for desecrating Shabbos, Tzaruch Iyun.
[14] See Tehila Ledavid 343:6; Piskei Teshuvos 343:4 footnote 57
Other opinions: Some Poskim rule that in a case where the child would have been unable to reach the item or perform the act independently, and required the assistance of an adult, the matter constitutes a Biblical prohibition of Sefiyas Issur, and is therefore forbidden. [Achiezer 3:81-7]
[15] Hearah 85 in new Shulchan Aruch; See previous footnotes for other opinions
[16] Admur 343:3; M”A 343:2; Issur Viheter Shaar 48:8; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; M”B 343:3; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; See Tosafus Erechin 3a; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 3; Beir Moshe 6:20; Mishneh Halachos 3:49; 7:36; Sheilas Shaul 32; Shevet Halevi 7:104; Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:2 footnote 32 and 61
Other Opinions – Shabbos Melachah Performed by a Child Below the Age of Chinuch: The above Poskim all rule that a child who is below the age of chinuch does not require protest if he performs a melachah on Shabbos, as is the general principle by all prohibitions performed by a child who lacks mental maturity. However, some Poskim rule that Shabbat melachah is an exception to this general principle. According to this view, parents are biblically obligated to prevent their children from performing melachah on Shabbat even if the child has not yet reached the age of understanding or education. The reason given is that the Torah explicitly commands that one’s children rest on Shabbat, as stated in the verse: “You shall not do any work—you, your son, or your daughter.” Under this approach, young children are likened to one’s animals, which are likewise commanded to rest on Shabbat, and therefore parents bear a direct obligation to ensure that their children refrain from labor on Shabbat regardless of age. [Mishkanos Yaakov O.C. 118] This opinion is a Daas Yachid. [Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid]
[17] See Admur 343:1-2; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:1; Rambam Tzitzis 3:9; Chagiga 4a; See Likkutei Sichos 35 p. 61
[18] Admur ibid and 340:4; M”A 343:5; Mordechai Remez 369 in name of Maharam, brought in Beis Yosef 340
[19] Admur ibid; 640:4; Mordechai ibid
[20] Admur ibid; Mordechai ibid
[21] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11
[22] Chikrei Halachos 4 p. 54 based on Admur’s ruling in 301:21 that it is forbidden to give a child clothing with bells, addresses the apparent contradiction between that ruling and the leniency discussed here. He explains that permission is granted only where the child will perform a single, isolated prohibition—such as eating a cake with letters on it—whereas an item that leads to a constant prohibition is forbidden to give to a child. Others (see He’aros U’Biurim, Ohalei Torah no. 831, p. 79) explain that the prohibition in 301:21 is due to the father’s intent: the clothing is given specifically so that the child will ring the bells in order to amuse or calm himself. In such a case, it is prohibited, as explained by the Ketzos HaShulchan (266:10; see the next halacha). However, this explanation is not entirely compelling. While it may be assumed that the child intends to play with the bells, it is not evident that the adult necessarily has such intent; perhaps the garment was given simply for the child to wear. Rather, it may be explained that since the garment’s primary purpose is to produce sound, giving it to the child—regardless of the adult’s subjective intent—is tantamount to instructing the child to perform a prohibited act. As such, it is treated as though the adult is actively “feeding” the child the prohibition. This differs from the case of the cake: although eating it necessarily entails erasing the letters, that is not the cake’s primary function. Its essential purpose is consumption, and therefore giving it to the child is not considered equivalent to directly causing him to perform a prohibited act.
[23] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 55; See previous footnotes
[24] Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:4 and footnote 62
[25] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11 based on Admur 266:10
Background and Other approaches: This ruling is based on Admur 266:10, and is likewise codified by the Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 11). However, in light of the explanation above, it may be suggested that the prohibition in siman 266 is not dependent on the giver’s subjective intent. Rather, since it is evident to all that the wallet is being given for the purpose of carrying it—and thereby performing a prohibited act—this is considered akin to actively “feeding” the child a prohibition. In such a case, giving the item is halachically equivalent to instructing the child to perform the transgression, which is forbidden. In other words, whenever an item is given to a child and its sole understood purpose is for the performance of a prohibited act, it is treated as though the child has been explicitly told to commit that prohibition.
[26] With respect to the case of lettering on a cake discussed above, since the giver’s intent is not that the letters be erased but rather that the child eat the cake, it is therefore permitted to give it to the child. [Ketzos HaShulchan 147, footnote 11]