Cases of Necessity for The Child & Rabbinical Prohibitions – May Rabbinical prohibitions be fed or provided to a child?[1]
If there is no reason or necessity:[2] If there is no necessity for the child to eat the forbidden food, or be provided with the prohibition, then it is forbidden [according to all opinions] to feed [or provide] him even Rabbinical prohibitions [as stated above in A-B]. This applies even if the child is a mere infant.[3]
If there is a necessity:[4] If there is some necessity for a child to eat Rabbinically forbidden foods for his own benefit[5], then it is disputed amongst Poskim whether one may or may not feed him the food. [This same dispute applies also to providing the child with any other Rabbinical prohibition in a case where the prohibition fulfills some need of the child.] The following are the opinions brought in Admur: Some Poskim[6] rule that it is forbidden for any person to give even a Rabbinically forbidden item to a child with his hands, even if the child is completely below the age of comprehension, and even if the child is in need for it. This applies even if the child is sick, so long as he is not in danger. Thus, regarding feeding a child a prohibition they have the same status as an adult irrelevant of the child’s age. Other Poskim[7], however, rule that it is permitted to feed a child, even above the age of education, any Rabbinical prohibition so long as it is being done for the need of the child, such as for the child to eat and drink if he wants to, and there are not other foods available.[8] Practically, one may[9] rely on the lenient opinion to feed a child a Rabbinical prohibition [even if the child is above the age of education[10]] if the child needs it and no gentile is available to feed the child himself.[11] However, if a gentile is available to feed the child the rabbinic prohibition, it is forbidden for a Jew to do so—even when it is for the child’s need, and even if the child is ill [and rather it is to be fed to him by the gentile]. In all circumstances, it is prohibited to feed a child a biblical prohibition.[12] [Furthermore, even when a child requires food for medical reasons, every possible effort must be made to provide a kosher alternative. This is because consuming non-kosher food can nevertheless have a negative impact on the child’s character.[13] This principle is evident from the ruling that even a pregnant[14] or nursing[15] mother who must eat non-kosher food for medical reasons should avoid doing so whenever possible, and if she does partake of non-kosher food, she should refrain from nursing the child.[16]]
Definition of necessity:[17] A child’s need which can justify feeding him Rabbinical prohibitions in a time of need is defined as a situation in which the food is required for the child’s physical development, [as opposed to for the purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah[18]], and no alternative food is available.[19] A child’s mere desire to eat the food because it tastes good is certainly not a sufficient justification.[20] [Accordingly, one should not rely on this ruling without first consulting a competent rav to determine whether the circumstances genuinely constitute a necessity for the child.[21]]
Summary
It is forbidden to feed a child any prohibition—biblical or rabbinic—when there is no genuine need, regardless of the child’s age. When there is a true necessity for the child’s own physical development, poskim dispute whether rabbinic prohibitions may be fed to him, and in practice one may rely on the lenient view only when no gentile is available to do so. Under all circumstances, a biblical prohibition may never be given to a child.
[1] See Admur 343:5-8; See also Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Tiferes Yisarel Pesicha Miseches Eiruvin; Ketzos Hashulchan 147:11 in great length; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Beir Moshe 6:18; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 197; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:13 footnote 145; Toras Hakatan Chapters 21-24
[2] Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law….. Similarly, it is forbidden to accustom a child to desecration of Shabbat or Festivals, even through acts prohibited only due to shevut (Rabbinic prohibitions).”; Admur 343:6 “But if he does not need it, it is forbidden to feed him even if he is not yet capable of understanding (and his father must protest if he is capable of understanding), even with regard to a rabbinic prohibition. For it is forbidden to nurse him with his mother’s milk after twenty‑four months, even though the prohibition of a woman’s milk is only rabbinic, since he no longer needs it after twenty‑four months.”; Admur 343:7 “And all this applies when one feeds a prohibited item to an infant for our own needs; likewise, if one tells him to do for us some act that is prohibited even if only by rabbinic law.”; Admur 615:1; 616:4; 640:4; 10; Michaber 343:1; Y.D. 81:7; Rambam Machalos Assuros 17:27; Tosafus Rosh Hashanah 32a; Mordechai Shabbos 369; M”A 343:3; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Hagahos Ashri Rosh Hashanah 4:7; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma 2a; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Rebbe Eliezer in Braisa Kesubos 60a; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 544
The source: This law is learned from the ruling in Michaber Yoreh Deah 81:7 in which it states that it is forbidden for a toddler past 24 months to restart nursing, even though nursing is a mere rabbinical prohibition, being that the child no longer needs the milk. [Admur 343:6]
[3] Admur ibid; 266:10; M”A 343:2
[4] See Admur 343:5-6 and 8; Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 16 p. 198 footnotes 5244-549
[5] Meaning that he is hungry or thirsty and there is nothing else available to eat, or he needs to eat for medical reasons.
[6] Stam opinion in Admur 343:5 “This prohibition applies even to matters prohibited only by Rabbinic law. It is forbidden to feed a child such items even if the child needs them, and even if the child is ill, so long as there is no danger to life, just as it is forbidden to do so for an adult.”; Setimas Admur in 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; Shach Y.D. 81:21; Beis Yosef 343 in opinion of Rambam; Rivash; Ritva Yevamos 114 in name of Maharam; Mordechai Shabbos 369, brought in M”A 343:5 and Machatzis Hashekel ibid; Shaar Hamelech Shevisas Assur 1:3; Stam opinion in Michaber; Rama; Rambam ibid; M”B 362:44; Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that so is Setimas Hamichaber ibid like this stringent opinion; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 549
[7] Yeish Omrim in Admur 343:6 “And there are those who say that anything which is for the need of an infant—such as eating and drinking—the Sages did not decree against it at all, and it is permitted to feed him by hand any matter whose prohibition is only rabbinic, if he needs it, even if he has reached the age of education (Chinuch).” Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 “But anything that is for the infant’s own need and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he might become accustomed to it and do the same when he grows up. This is because it is known to him that they permit his needs only because he is small, and he will not be misled by this to do so when he grows up. Therefore, it is permitted to feed him before Kiddush if he wishes to eat, and likewise to give him to drink, and it is forbidden to afflict him. And so too with all similar cases regarding all other rabbinic prohibitions.” [See Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 7 that this Halacha in Admur is a continuation of the lenient opinion in 343:6]; Beis Yosef end of 343 in name of Rashba; Rashba 1:92 [however writes Lehalacha, Velo Lemaaseh]; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a and Shabbos 153b; Ran Shabbos 153b; Yuma beginning of chapter 8; M”A 556:1; Opinion in Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim”; Kaf Hachaim 343:16; Shut Ranach O.C. 112; Encyclopedia Talmudit footnote 548
[8] The reason we don’t suspect the child will do so also when older: When an action serves the child’s own needs and benefit, the Sages were not concerned that he would become habituated to it and continue the practice as an adult. Since it is understood that such permission is granted only because he is a minor, there is no risk that he will be misled to act similarly when he matures. [Admur 343:7; M”A 556:1; Rashba 1:92; Chidushei Rashba Yevamos 114a; Ran 57a]
[9] May one be stringent like the first opinion if he so chooses? If one chooses to however he may be stringent like the first opinion, and on this it was not stated that one may not oppress a child. [Tzemach Tzedek Miluim 13]
[10] As the lenient opinion does not differentiate in this matter between a child who is above or beneath the age of Chinuch
[11] Admur 343:6 “One may rely on their words to be lenient with rabbinic prohibitions when the child needs it and there is no non‑Jew available to feed him.”; Stam ruling in Admur 343:7 follows the lenient opinion, although without depending it on a gentile not being available – see below for the explanation on this contradiction; [Vetzaruch Iyun from all the following areas where Admur makes no mention of this lenient opinion: Admur 269:3; 362:17; 471:10; See Tzemach Tzedek O.C. Safek Lemi 4; Hearos Ubiurim 829 p. 64]; Taz 346:6 [regarding child brining key through a Karmalis]; P”M 346 M”Z 6; Rav Akiva Eiger Kama 15; Kesav Sofer 47 [not to protest against one who is lenient]; Maharam Shick O.C. 173 is Milameid Zecgus on the Makilim; Shoel Umeishiv Mahdurah Gimel 117; Kaf Hachaim 343:16 and 27 records the lenient opinion Lehalacha; Implication of Biur Halacha 343:1 “Midivrei Sofrim” that he is lenient (unlike M”B 362:44); Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid footnote 145 concludes that there is no final arbitration on this matter although writes that Ashkenazim are accustomed to be lenient in this while Sephardim are stringent
Other opinions – Sephardim: Some Poskim rule that one must be stringent like the former opinion which prohibits a Jew from directly feeding a child even a Rabbinically forbidden food even in a time of need. [M”B 362:44 (unlike Biur Halacha ibid); Kesav Sofer 47 that initially we do not rule Lekula; Mahariy Asad 84; Levushei Mordechai 1:51; Arugas Habosem 1:69; Maharshag 2:24; Maharam Shick O.C. 173; Livyas Chen 128 and Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid that so rule Sephardim as is Setimas Maran]
Ruling of Ketzos Hashulchan: Vetzaruch Iyun Gadol on the Ketzos Hashulchan 147 who omits this final conclusion of Admur. However, indeed, in Badei HaShulchan 11:11 he addresses this omission, explaining that he intentionally refrained from publicizing this lenient ruling of Admur, since there are Rishonim who maintain that one should not rely on the lenient view. Nevertheless, this itself requires further iyun: if the Alter Rebbe himself ruled leniently, then who are we—who follow his rulings—to diverge from his pesak?
Contradiction from Admur 343:7: Regarding that which the Alter Rebbe rules explicitly in 343:7, which appears to imply that one must never withhold a rabbinic prohibition from a child: There the Alter Rebbe writes that a child may be fed any rabbinic prohibition for his need, and that it is forbidden to oppress him, and he concludes that the same applies to all rabbinic prohibitions. The Tzemach Tzedek (Miluim 13) raises several difficulties with this ruling:
- In the previous halachah, the Alter Rebbe merely rules that one may be lenient in accordance with the second opinion—and only under specific conditions, such as when no gentile is available—whereas here he appears to rule that one must be lenient.
- In truth, the specific case discussed in Halacha 7 (tasting before Kiddush) is permitted even according to the first opinion, as the Alter Rebbe explicitly rules in 269:3, since this is not an intrinsic prohibition. Why, then, is this distinction not mentioned here?
- Moreover, with regard to these matters, one may be lenient even with a biblical prohibition, as is evident from the allowance to feed a minor on Yom Kippur.
The Ketzos HaShulchan (147, footnote 7) resolves these questions by explaining that Halacha 7 is not an independent ruling, but rather a continuation and clarification of the second opinion. The Alter Rebbe’s intent is to explain that, according to this opinion, any rabbinic prohibition may be given to a child for his own need—this in contrast to actions performed for the needs of adults, which were prohibited in the previous halachah even according to the second opinion. See there for his resolution of the remaining difficulty raised by the Tzemach Tzedek.
In conclusion: The ruling of 343:7 does not represent the Alter Rebbe’s final and absolute position regarding all rabbinic prohibitions. Rather, it is stated within the framework of the second opinion, and the practical ruling therefore remains as stated above: this leniency applies only under specific circumstances, such as when no gentile is available.
[12] Pashut from all Poskim ibid! Piskeiy Teshuvos ibid
[13] Rama Yoreh Deah 81:7 regarding an infant eating milk from a gentile, as explained in Shach 81:26; M”A 343:2; Tosefes Shabbos 343:2; Kaf Hachaim 343:11; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 4; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:9; See Pri Chadash (Yoreh De’ah, siman 81, se’if katan 26) who already protested and cried out sharply about this matter, stating as follows: Since in our times people are not careful with these matters of forbidden foods, most children go astray, and most of the insolent individuals of our generation lack any fear of Heaven that penetrates their hearts. Even when they are rebuked directly, they are not receptive to moral instruction. And who is greater for us than Elisha ben Avuyah? For he did not come to that path because of any later deed of his own, but rather because his mother, who was pregnant with him, passed by a place where food was being cooked for idolatry. She smelled it and felt a need to eat from it, and that substance permeated him like the venom of a snake.”
Time‑Dependent Prohibitions: The Achronim have discussed whether this negative effect applies also to permitted foods that become prohibited due to time-related restrictions, such as chametz on Passover, eating on Yom Kippur, and eating matzah on the day before Passover. [See Darkei Teshuvah 81:90; Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 4] From the words of the Gemara in Yoma (82b), which discusses a pregnant woman who smelled food on Yom Kippur, it is evident that this category is also included. [Arugas Habosem O.C. 138] Nevertheless, it is certainly forbidden to be stringent in a situation involving even a possible danger to life, and the ruling must be determined according to the judgment of the halachic authority in each case. However, allowing a minor to eat before kiddush or havdalah is clearly more lenient according to all opinions, since this prohibition is merely a rabbinic safeguard enacted out of respect for the sanctity of the day. [Piskeiy Teshvuos 343:9]
[14] Darkei Moshe O.C. 617:1 “One must be careful that a pregnant woman guard herself as much as possible that she does not eat pork and non-kosher meats as this will cause that her child will be God fearing”; Or Zarua 279; Yerushalmi Chagiga 9b regarding the mother of Acher that she had once eaten a non-Kosher food during her pregnancy due to having smelled it and lusted after it, and this is what caused her son to become a heretic; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 142:1; Shevach Habris 1:24; Nitei Gavriel 3 56:5
[15] Rama Y.D. 81:7; Taz Y.D. 81:12; Shach Y.D. 81:24; Arugas Habosem O.C. 138; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 142:1; 147:2;
[16] Shach Y.D. 81:24; P”M 81 M”Z 12; Sefer Shemiras Haguf Vihanefesh [Lerner] 147:3; Piskeiy Teshuvos 343:9
[17] See Admur 343:5 “If, however, the child requires it—such as when he is somewhat ill”; 343:7 “Whatever is for the need of the child and for his Takanaso – development and benefit”
[18] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11
[19] So is evident from the source of the ruling regarding nursing a toddler pass 24 months which is forbidden. Thus one must conclude that even when the child needs to eat, if other Kosher foods are available it is forbidden for him to eat it.
[20] See Admur 343:9-10 [This is demonstrated by Admur 343:9-10, who rules that even rabbinically prohibited foods may not be given to a child and the only allowance to feed him cake with lettering is because the Melacha is not the main purpose of the item. This makes clear that a child’s mere desire to eat a food because it tastes good is not considered a legitimate justification. Furthermore, he explicitly rules there that even by cake with lettering it may not be placed into the child’s mouth directly.
[21] Ketzos Hashulchan 147 footnote 11:11